Citation Numbers: 40 N.J. Eq. 205
Judges: Affirmance, Brown, Clement, Depue, Dixon, Magie, Parker, Paterson, Reed, Reversal, Scudder, Syokel, Whitaker
Filed Date: 6/15/1885
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/16/2022
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Joseph Lloyd, in 1872, was seized of a tract of land situate in the county of Monmouth. On the 10th of April, 1872, Asher
Lloyd, by a deed executed May 23d, 1872, and recorded May 28th, 1872, conveyed the premises to Eichard M. Blatehford to secure the repayment of money loaned by him to Lloyd.
John E. ’V'anderveer, Obadiah Holmes, John S. Applegate, Marsh & Co., and others, were, by rules of court, admitted as applying creditors under the attachment. An auditor was appointed, judgment by default in the attachment suit on the auditor’s report was entered, and an order for a sale by the auditor of the lands attached was made in the attachment suit.
On the 2.6th of March, 1873, on the application of Lloyd, the judgment by default was opened and his appearance entered at the suit of the plaintiff in attachment and each of the applying creditors, pursuant to the thirty-eighth section of the attachment act, without any bond being given. Thereupon the attachment proceedings were, by rule of court, set aside, saving all liens created by the statute.
Declarations were filed in said suits, to which the defendant filed pleas, and at January term, 1874, the suits were brought to trial, and judgments were obtained by ’V’anderveer, Applegate, Obadiah Holmes and Marsh & Co. The plaintiff in the attachment did not obtain any judgment. Vanderveer’s judgment was entered January 29th, 1874, and, on the 30th of January, 1874, the judgments of Applegit, Obadiah Holmes and Marsh & Co. were entered. Upon these several judgments executions duly recorded were issued, directed to the sheriff of the county of Monmouth, and executed by him by a levy upon the same premises. The sheriff subsequently made sale of the premises under and by virtue of the said executions, and Conover became the purchaser thereof, and took a sheriff’s deed therefor bearing date December 9th, 1874.
Conover, befing in possession, filed this bill against the executors and devisees of Blatehford, to have his title under the sheriff’s deed declared superior to Blatchford’s title under the
The attachment act gives the writ of attachment a lien on the lands of the defendant from the time it was issued, and makes yoid all convejumces by him thereafter, and declares that a deed of conveyance therefor by the auditor shall convey to the purchaser the estate the defendant had at the time the writ became a lien. Rev. 45 § 18; Id. 51 § 53. The lien so created is for the benefit of the plaintiff in the attachment suit, and all creditors who may become applying creditors. Oummins v. Blair, 3 Harr. 151. On the other hand, the act concerning judgments provides that no judgment shall affect or bind lands but from the time of the actual entry thereof on the minutes or records of the court. Rev. 530 § 3.
Blatchford’s deed is subsequent to the issuing of the writ of attachment, and prior to the entry of the judgments upon which the executions were issued under which the sheriff made sale. The question presented is whether Conover’s title taken under the sheriff’s sale will have relation to the time when the writ of attachment was issued, and have the same priority it would have had if taken under a sale by the auditor in the attachment proceedings.
The proceeding for the collection of debts by attachment is altogether statutory, and derives its efficacy wholly from the terms and provisions of the statute. “ It has,” as was said by Chief-Justice Beasley, “no other or greater effect than such as has been, either in express terms or by reasonable intendment, given to it by the legislative will.” Miller v. Dungan, 7 Vr. 21. “Nothing,” says Mr. Drake, “seems more distinctly to characterize the whole system of remedy by attachment than that it is a special remedy at law, belonging exclusively to a court of law, and to be resorted to and pursued in conformity with the terms of the law conferring it.” Brahe on Attachment § 4 a.
The attachment act in force in this state possesses peculiar features which distinguish proceedings under it from proceedings under attachment acts of sister states. In most of the other states the writ is sued out by a creditor for his benefit alone, and
In the court below, Conover’s title under the sheriff’s deed seems' to have been given relation as of the time the writ of attachment was issued, ex necessitate, on the theory that a sale could not be made by the auditor where the defendant had appeared to the suits of the plaintiff and the applying creditors. This opinion was based on a literal rendering of the fifty-first section of the act. That section enacts:
The chancellor’s view of this section is that under it the auditor was not empowered to sell the lands attached except where the judgment had been entered by default. This construction we think needlessly strict in view of the course of legislation on this subject, the obvious purposes of the act, and the liberal construction of its provisions which the legislature has prescribed as the means of carrying into effect the legislative purpose.
Section 51 of the present act is section 21 of the act of 1798 (R. L. 360), with the exception of the words “ and upon which the attachment remains a lien,” which were inserted in the Revision of 1874. The sixteenth section of the act of 1798 provided for appearances to the suits of the plaintiff and applying creditors by filing special bail in each suit, and upon such appearances the writ of attachment and all proceedings under it were entirely set aside. No lien on property attached was saved when, uj on such appearance, the attachment was set aside, and in such cases there could be no sale by auditors; therefore, in directing a sale by auditors when the judgment was entered by default, the legislature used language which was descriptive of and applicable to the condition of affairs in which there was property which might be subject to a sale in proceedings under that act. In 1820 a supplement to the act of 1798 was passed, which, by the third section, provided for continuing the lien of the writ on lands, notwithstanding the defendant appeared and filed special bail. That section prohibited the conveyance by the defendant of the lands or any estate therein whereof he was seized or possessed or entitled unto at the time of the issuing of the writ of attachment, and enacted that the writ should, immediately on the issuing thereof, become and remain a lien on said lands as against the defendant and all persons claiming under him by virtue of any such conveyance, until the plaintiff and the applying credit
The supplement of 1820 contemplated that appearances might be entered by the defendant by filing special bail, pursuant to the sixteenth section of the act of 1798, whereby, by force of that section, the writ of attachment and all proceedings under it would be set aside; and it provided for the continuance of the lien of the writ upon lands, notwithstanding such setting aside; and yet it contained no express provision for the enforcement of the lien by a sale of the lands. The plain intent of this act was that the attachment suit should remain in esse as a proceeding in rein for the purpose of enforcing the lien of the writ upon the lands attached, although the defendant had appeared; and it is a reasonable construction of that act that the lien so retained should be made available by a sale in virtue of an order of the court, and by the officer who, by the original act, was designated to make sale and disposition of property brought under the control of the court by the writ of attachment. By no other process recognized by the act could the lien of the writ be carried into execution. Section 3 of the act of 1820, and section 21 of the act of 1798 were retained in the Revised Statutes of 1845, and also in the Revision of 1874, as originally passed, except that in the Revision of 1874 the words, “ and upon which the attachment remains a lien,” were added. R. S. 48 §§ 8-35; Rev. 45 §§ 18-51. The construction these two sections would bear relatively to each other as they stood in the act of 1798, and the supplement of 1820, was not altered by the two acts being comprehended in one act in these revisions.
But if there should be any doubt as to the power of the auditor to sell the lands attached under such circumstances, arising from the words of the fifty-first section, there can be no doubt on that subject where the defendant appeared, under the thirty-eighth section.
It will be observed that by these sections there is ho provision for setting aside the attachment proceeding, as there is upon an appearance effected by giving a bond under the thirty-second or thirty-seventh section. In lieu of such a provision section thirty-eight simply declares that no other or further claim by creditors shall be put in under the attachment after the entry of such appearance. It also provides that the suits of the plaintiff and the applying creditors shall thereafter proceed, in all respects, as if commenced by summons. The lien of the attachment is preserved, notwithstanding such appearance, with authority in the court to appoint an auditor with like power in all respects as if such appearance had not been entered. The legal effect of these sections is to leave the attachment suit and all proceedings under it precisely as if no appearance had been entered, except that the claims of the plaintiff and the applying creditors, instead of being litigated before the auditor, shall be determined before the court and a jury, the same as if the parties had commenced suits therefor by summons. The power of the auditor to make sale and conveyance of lands attached in virtue of a special order of the court, is also retained. The restriction of the powers of the auditor to sales of personal property is repugnant to the language of the act; for the section declares that the auditor so appointed shall be invested “ with like powers in all respects ” as if the proceed
Indeed, if there be need to resort to any implication of a power to sell in order to carry the lien of the writ of attachment into execution, an implication in favor of such power in the auditor would be the only implication allowable. There is no power for the sale of lands granted anywhere in the act otherwise than upon the judgment in the attachment suit; no power of sale by any officer of the court except the auditor; no authority to sell except by a special order of the court for that purpose. A sale by the sheriff, or by virtue of an execution, or upon any judgment other than the judgment in the attachment suit, is nowhere alluded to in the act. No provision is contained in it for giving judgments recovered by creditors, after appearances entered, a lien as of the time the writ of attachment issued. The lien which is retained is, in express words, the lien of the writ of attachment. The conveyances by the defendant, wdiieh are made void, are those made pending the attachment, and the conveyances which, by the statute, are given priority over conveyances made by the defendant after the writ issued, are such as are made by the auditor and in the attachment proceedings.
An execution upon a judgment as the means of giving effect to the lien of the writ of attachment, is not only inconsistent with the procedure established by the attachment act> but is also at variance with statutory provisions restricting the lien of judgments upon lands to the time of actual entry, and giving priority to executions as of the time of the delivery of the recorded execution to the sheriff. The right to make such use of a writ of execution cannot be implied from the words of the statute that “ said writ shall * * * remain a lien on said lands * * * until the plaintiff and such of the creditors of the defendant as shall apply under the attachment shall be satisfied their just debts.” These words do not create a general lien in favor of these creditors, to be enforced by suit in equity or actions at law, as liens are usually enforced. The lien given is the lien of the writ of attachment, and it is clear that it was the legislative intent that that lien should be carried into effect by means of pro
Appearance by the defendant at the suit of any applying creditor will produce the result that the court, having by such appearance obtained jurisdiction of the defendant’s person, the judgment recovered by the creditor, besides the ascertainment of the amount due upon his claim presented under the attachment, will obtain also the quality of a judgment in personam at common law, on which the creditor may issue execution and seize and levy upon the defendant’s property as if the suit had been commenced by a summons duly served. But the judgment, considered as a common law judgment, will be subject to the statutory provision that it shall not bind lands except from the time of actual entry; and a purchaser taking title under it will take only such title as the defendant had when judgment was entered, subject to all prior liens and encumbrances. If the creditor at whose suit the aj>pearance is entered desires to avail himself of the lien of the writ of attachment and to reach the title the defendant had when the writ issued, he must have his debt, as ascertained by the judgment in his favor, embraced in the judgment in the attachment suit, whereon the auditor may make a sale and conveyance of the lands attached, which, by the statute, shall convey the estate therein which the defendant had at the time the writ of attachment issued.
Nor will the fact that in this case one of the executions under which the sheriff’s sale was made — that of Applegit — commanded the sheriff to cause the damages recovered to be made of the lands and real estate “ whereof the defendant was seized on the 10th day of April, 1872 ” — which is the date of the issuing of the attachment — avail the purchaser. A sheriff selling lands
Conover having taken his title under a sheriff’s sale by virtue of executions upon judgments of applying creditors, his title has relation only to the time the judgments were entered, and is therefore subsequent to Blatchford’s title under his deed.
Nor can we consider, on this issue, the relief prayed by the defendant’s cross-bill, that Blatchford’s title be declared superior to the lien of the writ of attachment. Conover’s title under his sheriff’s deed — which is all that is put in issue in this suit— having relation only to the date of the entry of the judgments upon which the sheriff made the sale, he is not, as the controversy now stands, the proper party to litigate the question as to the validity of the lien of the writ of attachment.
The complainant’s bill having been filed under the act to compel the determination of claims to real estate in certain cases, and to quiet the title to the same, the decree in this suit must fix and settle the rights of the parties in the premises. Rev. 1190 § 6. So much of the decree appealed from as determines that Con-over’s title is superior to that of Blatchford should be reversed, and a decree be entered declaring Blatchford’s title under his deed superior to that of Conover under his sheriff’s deed, with costs to be taxed against the complainant. That part of the decree which dismisses the defendant’s cross-bill should be affirmed.
Neither party succeeding wholly in this court, neither should have costs here.