Judges: Affirmance, Black, Buskirk, Campbell, Chard, Chiee, Clark, Gardner, Heppenheimer, Kalisch, Katzenbach, Min, None, Reversal, Turn
Filed Date: 3/3/1924
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/11/2024
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The primary question to be decided in this case is the meaning and application of the words “the main body of no building shall be erected nearer the front property line of any avenue than twelve feet” in a covenant in a deed.
It is alleged in the bill of complaint that Bradford Wright owned a tract of land in Atlantic City. In 1899 he plotted and mapped the same. In making conveyances it was his intention and purpose to create a general plan and scheme' touching the construction of buildings thereon. To that end deeds made by him to his respective grantees for lots in said blocks had covenants inserted containing the above restrictive clause. An examination of the map put in evidence as Exhibit d-1 discloses the plotting and mapping of the land
The complainant is the owner of lot number four (4) on the map, running through the block. Its dimensions axe thirty-nine by seventy-two feet. The defendants own the lot on the comer of Atlantic and Millidgeville (now Kingston)avenue, being lot number one (1), and the rear of lot number three (3), thirty-six (36) feet on Atlantic avenue by a depth of about one hundred and nineteen (119) feet, on which they admit that they are building an addition to the present
Hence, the importance of the words in the covenant in the deeds: “nearer the front property line of any avenue than twelve feet.” Is the line of Millidgeville (now Kingston) avenue a front property line? We think it is not, because, from these facts, it is argued with reason, as the westerly line of Millidgeville (now Kingston) avenue, a narrow street fifty feet wide, was the extreme boundary of Bradford Wright’s ownership; that all his lands lay westward of that point; that the general layout of the property, which shows that the block here drawn under investigation is only seventy-two feet wide, it seems unreasonable and certainly doubtful, whether Bradford Wright ever intended that the lots running through the block from Aberdeen place to Millidgeville (now Kingston) avenue should face Kingston instead of Aberdeen place, dr that he ever intended that Kingston avenue should be “the front property line” within the meaning of the restrictions. The lots on the westerly side of Aberdeen place face that street. It is reasonable to suppose that he intended that the lots on the easterly side should also face the same street looldng out upon the flower-beds on Aberdeen place. In addition to this the testimony in the record shows that all the buildings, except on Atlantic avenue, actually front on Aberdeen place and are built on a uniform line, while there are seven or eight garages built on Kingston avenue. That fact is some evidence of a clear intention, that the owners of the various properties, lots numbers three (3) to thirteen (13) understood that Aberdeen place was a street on which their buildings should face and shows that there has been a contemporary construction by the parties concerned; that Aberdeen place is a “front property line” and that Kingston avenue is a rear property line, with the exception of lot number one (1), on the corner of Kingston and Atlantic avenues, and as to that lot Kingston- avenue is a
“The rule where a deed is of doubtful meaning, or the language used is ambiguous, the construction given by the parties concerned, as elucidated by their conduct, will be deemed the true one, unless the contrary is shown, particularly so where all the parties concerned have acted upon a particular construction. 18 Corp. Jur. 262 § 218 (S); Meaney v. Stork, 81 N. J. Eq. 210.
“Such conduct of the parties indicates a popular or practical interpretation. Bringham v. H. S. Mulock Co., 74 N. J. Eq. 287, 290, cited in Pearson v. Stafford, 88 N. J. Eq. 391.”
For these reasons we think there has been no violation of the restrictive covenant by the defendants. The decree of the court of chancery should be affirmed. This view of the case renders it unnecessary to consider the other point urged, that there had been an abandonment of the restrictive covenants.
The decree of the court of chancery is affirmed.