In Re the Adoption of a Child by W.P.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

GARIBALDI, J.

The issue in this appeal is whether pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1 (the “Grandparent Visitation Statute”), grandparental visitation by a child’s biological grandparents can be enforced over the objections of nonrelative adoptive parents. To resolve that issue, we must determine whether an award of visitation under the Grandparent Visitation Statute conflicts with the public policy of the New Jersey Adoption Act, N.J.S.A. 9:3-37 to -56 (the “Adoption Act”), when a child is adopted by a nonrelative intact family.

I.

V was born on August 11, 1994, to unmarried parents JH and TS. When V was six months old, JH placed her with nonrelatives WP and MP (the “adoptive parents,” or “petitioners”). TS, the child’s biological father, was incarcerated at that time. JH executed a consent for Vs adoption and her parental rights ■ were terminated.

The prospective adoptive parents filed a eomplaint for adoption. TS filed a formal answer objecting to the adoption on May 2,1995. His parents, KS and MS (the “grandparents” or “respondents”), filed an application to intervene to obtain custody of V, to permit grandparental visitation, and to permit them to file a complaint for the adoption of V. The court granted the grandparents the right to intervene on the issues of grandparent visitation and custody if the adoption was not granted. However, their application to adopt was denied. In July 1995, TS was released from prison. He resided with his parents and worked for his father. On September 15, 1995, TS was granted visitation rights, and an order was entered allowing his parents to accompany him during his visitations. The order later was amended to make the grandparents’ presence at TS’s visitations mandatory. In January 1996, TS was arrested again, this time for possession and theft of handguns from his father’s home. As a result of that action, TS’s parents obtained a Final Restraining Order against him under the Domestic Violence Law.

Ultimately, TS’s parental rights were terminated by court order over his objection. TS’s appeal from that order was denied by the Appellate Division. In re Adoption of a Child by W.P. and M.P., 308 N.J.Super. 376, 387, 706 A.2d 198 (App.Div.1998). The panel found that the record supported the court’s conclusion that TS was unfit to act in a parental role and that continuation of TS’s parental relationship would place V in substantial jeopardy. It noted TS’s “chronic addiction to drugs,” that he “has lived a life of crime,” and that his “life has been punctuated by lengthy periods of incarceration.” Id. at 386, 706 A.2d 198. It further observed, “TS’s volatile relationship with his parents would place him in conflict concerning issues of child care, and thus their ability to assist in raising [V] would inevitably be subverted.” Id. at 387, 706 A. 2d 198 (emphasis added).

An adoption hearing was held in March 1998. By order dated April 1, 1998, the court directed that visitation by the grandparents on the third Sunday of every month was to continue. The order also directed the adoptive parents and the grandparents to submit briefs on whether visitation should continue following the final order of adoption.

On April, 1, 1998, the trial court entered a Final Judgment of Adoption that provided in part:

3. The entry of this Judgment of Adoption shall terminate all relationships between the child and the birth mother, [JH], and putative father, [TS], as well as all rights, duties, and obligations of any person founded on those relationships, including the rights of inheritance under the laws of intestacy of the State of New Jersey except for any rights which may have vested prior to the entry of this judgment; and

4. The entry of this Judgment shall establish the same relationships, rights, duties, and obligations between the child and the adopting parents as if the child was born to the adopting parents in lawful marriage, including all rights of inheritance under the laws of intestacy.

Subsequently, in an unpublished opinion, the trial court found that the Grandparent Visitation Statute was constitutional even as applied to “intact” families. The court also held that the Grandparent Visitation Statute and the Adoption Act were not inherently in conflict. Instead, the court found that when parental rights have been terminated, the statutory scheme required an assessment of continued grandparental visitation on a case-by-case basis, with the best interests of the child being the determining factor.

Given the existing relationship between the grandparents and V, the trial court held that there should be a hearing to afford the grandparents an opportunity to demonstrate that continued visitation will be in Ws best interest pursuant to the factors enumerated in the Grandparent Visitation Statute. On October 29, 1998, the court entered an order continuing the ongoing visitation and scheduling a hearing for December 3, 1998, on the issue of what grandparental visitation, if any, should be ordered.

The adoptive parents filed a motion for leave to appeal that order, which the Appellate Division granted. In an unpublished opinion, the panel concluded that the interlocutory appeal had been improvidently granted. The panel determined that a ruling on the interplay between the Grandparent Visitation Statute and the Adoption Act would benefit from the best interests hearing called for by the trial court. Nonetheless, the Appellate Division offered numerous observations and tentative conclusions. Among them was the court’s conclusion that the Adoption Act implicitly contemplates rights of post-adoption visitation by the biological family members.

We granted the adoptive parents’ motion for leave to file within time and their motion for leave to appeal. 161 N.J. 328, 736 A.2d 522 (1999).

II.

We view this appeal as a question of statutory interpretation of the Grandparent Visitation Statute and the Adoption Act, as applied to the rights of biological grandparents who seek visitation over the objections of nonrelative adoptive parents following the termination of the parental rights of the child’s biological parents, either by consent or by court order. We conclude that such cases present an inherent conflict between the two statutes and find that the overriding public policy and statutory law regarding adoptions preclude the application of the Grandparent Visitation Statute when the child is adopted by intact, nonrelative adoptive parents. Because we decide this case on statutory grounds, we do not address the constitutional argument raised by the parties.

A. The Grandparent Visitation Statute

In 1972, the New Jersey Legislature enacted its first version of the Grandparent Visitation Statute. N.J.SA 9:2-7.1 (L. 1971, c. 420, § 1, effective Feb. 1, 1972). The Visitation Statute, amended in 1973, afforded standing to grandparents to seek visitation only when “either or both of the parents of a minor child ... is or are deceased, or divorced or living separate and apart in different habitats----” N.J.SA 9:2-71 (as amended by L. 1973, c. 100, § 1). The Statute was subsequently amended again in 1987 to allow siblings to apply for visitation with the child. N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1 (as amended by L. 1987, c. 363, § 2). Thus, prior to 1993, “intact” families (those not disrupted by death or divorce) were not subject to statutory visitation rights of grandparents.

In 1993, N.J.S.A. 9:2-71, was amended to provide:

a. A grandparent or any sibling of a child residing in this State may make application before the Superior Court, in accordance with the Rules of Court, for an order for visitation. It shall be the burden of the applicant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the granting of visitation is in the best interests of the child.

b. In making a determination on an application filed pursuant to this section, the court shall consider the following factors:

(1) The relationship between the child and the applicant;

(2) The relationship between each of the child’s parents or the person with whom the child is residing and the applicant;

(3) The time which has elapsed since the child last had contact with the applicant;

(4) The effect that such visitation will have on the relationship between the child and the child’s parents or the person with whom the child is residing;

(5) If the parents are divorced or separated, the time sharing arrangement which exists between the parents with regard to the child;

(6) The good faith of the applicant in filing the application;

(7) Any history of physical, emotional or sexual abuse or neglect by the applicant; and

(8) Any other factor relevant to the best interests of the child.

c. With regard to any application made pursuant to this section, it shall be prima facie evidence that visitation is in the child’s best interest if the applicant had, in the past, been a full-time caretaker for the child.

[N.J.S.A 9:2-7.1 (as amended by L. 1993, c. 161, § 1 (effective June 29, 1993)).]

The new statute expanded the scope of grandparents’ visitation rights and removed the requirement that the birth parents be deceased or divorced. The amended Grandparent Visitation Statute became effective June 29,1993.

B. N.J.S.A. 9:3-50 of the Adoption Act

Toward the end of 1993, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 9:3-50 of the Adoption Act, entitled “Effect of adoption; relationships of parent and child; rights of inheritance,” to provide:

14.a. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.1993, c. 345).

b. The entry of a judgment of adoption shall establish the same relationships, rights, and responsibilities between the child and the adopting parent as if the child were born to the adopting parent in lawful wedlock. For good cause, the court may direct the entry of judgment nunc pro tunc as of the date the action was instituted. In applying the intestate laws of this State, an adopted child shall have the same rights of inheritance as if born to the adopting parent in lawful wedlock.

c. The entry of a judgment of adoption shall:

(1) terminate all parental rights and responsibilities of the parent towards the adoptive child except for a parent who is the spouse of the petitioner and except those rights that have vested prior to entry of the judgment of adoption;

(2) terminate all rights of inheritance under intestacy from or through the parent unless that parent is the spouse of the petitioner or that parent or other relative had died prior to the judgment of adoption; and

(3) terminate all rights of inheritance under intestacy from or through the child which existed prior to the adoption.

d. The court may order counseling for the adopting parents.

[N.J.S.A. 9:3-50 (as amended by L. 1993, c. 345, § 13, (effective April 27,1994)).]

In revising N.J.S.A. 9:3-50, the Legislature deleted language appearing to terminate, in the adoption setting, the rights, duties and obligations of any person “founded upon” a relationship between the child and the biological parents. That amended statute became effective on April 27,1994.

The grandparents assert that the Legislature, in revising the Adoption Act in 1993, intended to harmonize the Adoption Act with the Visitation Statute, enacted earlier in the same year. However, an examination of the legislative history of the two statutes reveals that the Legislature did not revise the Adoption Act to conform it, or harmonize it, with the Grandparent Visitation Statute, but amended the Adoption Act to facilitate adoptions.

C. Legislative History of the Grandparent Visitation Statute

On May 20, 1993, the General Assembly gave final approval to the Grandparent Visitation Statute. The bill was signed into law by Governor Florio on June 29, 1993, and became effective that same day. As previously stated, the new law eliminated the requirement that a child’s parents be deceased, divorced or separated in order for a grandparent to apply for visitation rights. Instead, the statute provides that “a grandparent or any sibling of a child residing in this State” may apply for visitation, and it instructs the Superior Court to consider eight enumerated factors when determining whether the grant of such visitation is in the best interests of the child.

In its original form, the bill did not enumerate factors, requiring only that visitation be in the best interests of the child, with no guidance to the courts. In an apparent response to concerns that it constituted “a gross invasion of the .sanctity and privacy of the family unit,” the bill was amended, setting forth the eight factors as a way of limiting the intrusive elements of the act. See Letter from Cary B. Cheifetz, Esq., Skoloff & Wolfe, to Gov. Jim Florio (Dec. 22, 1992) (enclosing proposed bill setting forth specific criteria that protect child’s best interests).

A precursor to the current statute Assembly Bill No. 1475 was prefiled for introduction in the 1990 session. That bill expressly would have required that the court consider the objections of a parent to an application for visitation by that parent’s parent (i.e., the child’s grandparent). See Assembly Bill No. 1475, Prefiled for Introduction in the 1990 Session. According to the bill statement accompanying Bill No. 1475, the purpose of that provision was to “ensure that the court does not grant visitation to a parent’s own blood relatives without considering whether the parent may object to such visitation.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added). Although that provision was not enacted in the final bill, it suggests that the Legislature believed that parental autonomy should be afforded deference. Moreover, we observe that the statement was written in terms of “a parent’s own blood relatives.” That suggests that, at least in its earlier form, the Grandparent Visitation Statute was not intended to apply to a nonrelative adoption.

D. Legislative History of the Adoption Act

On December 16, 1993, almost 7 months after it enacted the Grandparent Visitation Statute, the Assembly gave final approval to Assembly Bill No. 1418/Senate Bill No. 685. That enactment revised and updated New Jersey’s Adoption Act. The revisions, many in number, represented the first set of comprehensive changes to the adoption laws in nearly 14 years. The amendatory act contained twenty-three separate sections including revised N.J.S.A. 9:3-50.

The legislative history reveals that section 18 of the Adoption Act was the most controversial of all the revisions. That section, now found at N.J.S.A. 9:3-39.1, permits the use of intermediaries in non-agency settings to facilitate private adoptions. The passed-bill memorandum from Chief Counsel Scott Weiner to Governor Jim Florio summarized the amendatory sections of the bill without reference to the Grandparent Visitation Statute. See Memorandum from Scott A. Weiner, Chief Counsel, to Gov. Jim Florio (Dec. 21, 1993) (summarizing amendatory sections of Adoption Act).

The legislative history reveals that the amendments to N.J.S.A. 9:3-50 were a small part of a larger package of revisions to the adoption laws, the first set of such revisions in early 14 years. Typically, the newspaper articles reported that:

New Jersey’s adoption laws would be revised with the aim of providing more options for prospective adoptive parents, including allowing the use of unpaid intermediaries to arrange adoptions, ...

[Tom Johnson, Bill Voted to Update Adoption Laws as an Aid to Prospective Parents, Newark Star Ledger, Feb. 2,1993.]

Another article reported:

State lawmakers on Thursday approved a measure that revamps New Jersey’s adoption laws to legalize private adoptions and allow unpaid intermediaries to arrange adoptions.

[Dunston McNichol, Adoption Law Revision Advances, Bergen Record, Dec. 1Y, 1993.]

See also Letter from Nicholas R. Scalera, Director, Division of Youth and Family Services of New Jersey Department of Human Services, to Emery J. Ungrady, Jr., New Jersey Senate (June 8, 1993) (questioning the advisability of intermediary involvement, and continuing recommendation that adoption be authorized only by approved agencies); letter from Thomas R. Curtin, New Jersey State Bar Association President, to Gov. Jim Florio (Dec. 23,1993) (supporting bill because it makes adoption easier in New Jersey and clarifies current adoption laws).

Nowhere in the available documents pertaining to the Adoption Act is there a specific reference to the issue of grandparent visitation. The legislative history does contain some references addressing the standards by which a parent may object to termination of parental rights, but not to grandparent visitation. Indeed, N.J.S.A. 9:3-50, including its very heading, “rights of inheritance,” suggests that the Legislature was concerned with rights of inheritance and other issues, not grandparental visitation rights.

The absence of a discussion of grandparent visitation indicates that the Legislature did not revise the Adoption Act to harmonize it with the Grandparent Visitation Statute. That is further evidenced by the passage of time — nearly 7 months — between the two enactments. If the Legislature had wanted to harmonize the Grandparent Visitation Statute with the Adoption Act, it could have done so expressly at the time it revised the latter act.

Based on an examination of the legislative history of the Grandparent Visitation Statute and the Adoption Act, we find that the Legislature did not intend to harmonize or conform the two statutes. The two statutes are separate. Moreover, we believe that the statute that permits visitation rights of parents of the biological parents of a child adopted by intact nonrelative adoptive parents is in conflict with the provisions of the Adoption Act. An examination of the statutory scheme of the Adoption Act further supports that conclusion.

E. Statutory Scheme of the Adoption Act

It is a well-established principle that “[i]n discerning [the Legislature’s] intent we consider not only the particular statute in question, but also the entire legislative scheme of which it is a part,” Alan J. Comblatt, P.A v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 234, 708 A.2d 401 (1998)(quoting Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 108 N.J. 123, 129, 527 A.2d 1368 (1987)). The statutory scheme of the Adoption Act emphasizes the complete termination of the biological parents’ rights, thus having the logical effect of terminating a biological grandparent’s right to visitation. We also observe that the confidentiality of the entire adoption procedure also supports the conclusion that the Adoption Act bars the continued visitation of the biological grandparent of a child adopted by nonrelative adoptive parents.

N.J.S.A. 9:3 — 38(f)—defines parent to include “a parent or parents by adoption.” N.J.S.A. 9:3-41(a) provides in part that:

Prior to the execution of the surrender, the approved agency shall, directly or through its agent, inform the person executing the surrender that the instrument is a surrender of parental rights by the signatory and means the permanent end of the relationship and all contact between the parent and child.

[N.J.S.A. 9:3-41(a) (emphasis added).]

N.J.S.A 9:3-41.1(a) provides in pertinent part that an approved agent

shall provide a prospective parent with all available information, other than information which would identify or permit the identification of the birth parent of the child ■ ■ ■

[N.J.S.A. 9:3 — 41.1(a) (emphasis added).]

N.J.S.A 9:3-51 was amended to provide that all records of judgment of adoption:

shall be sealed and thereafter shall be made accessible only by court order.

[N.J.S.A 9:3-51 (emphasis added).]

N.J.S.A. 9:3-52(a) provides that:

[a]U records of proceedings relating to adoption, including the complaint, judgment and all petitions, affidavits, testimony reports, briefs, orders and other relevant documents, shall be filed under seal by the clerk of the court and shall at no time be open to inspection or copying unless the court, upon good cause shown, shall otherwise order.

[N.J.S.A 9:3-52(a)(emphasis added).]

As the above-cited provisions of the Adoption Act reveal, the traditional adoption process is characterized by closed and confidential proceedings. Once the adoption is final, the records are sealed, and can be opened for inspection only by court order. All legal ties of the child to its natural parents are completely and permanently severed. The child becomes the child of the adoptive parents and part of their extended family. The intent of the Legislature is to promote the creation of a new family unit without fear of interference from the natural parents. In re Adoption of a Child by D.M.H., 135 N.J. 473, 491, 641 A.2d 235 (1994), cert. denied, sub nom. Hollingshead v. Hoxworth, 513 U.S. 967, 115 S.Ct. 433, 130 L.Ed.2d 345 (1994). That intent did not change upon the enactment of the 1993 amendments to the Adoption Act.

No New Jersey court has directly addressed the issue of whether the statutory visitation rights of a child’s biological grandparent can continue following the termination of parental rights and adoption of the child by nonrelatives. However, in Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 332 A.2d 199 (1975), this Court considered the application of the Grandparent Visitation Statute in the context of a stepparent adoption. After the child’s birth mother died, the child’s father remarried and the child was adopted by her stepmother. Ibid. The child’s maternal grandmother subsequently instituted an action to visit the child over the objections of the natural father and the child’s stepmother. Ibid. This Court upheld the grandmother’s right to visitation, holding that the statutory right to grandparental visitation, in the context of stepparent adoption, was not in conflict with the policies of the Adoption Act. Id. at 436, 332 A.2d 199. Mimkon was decided prior to the 1993 amendments to the Grandparent Visitation Statute and the 1993 amendments to the Adoption Act. Therefore, Mimkon does not conclusively resolve this ease. However, this Court’s observations regarding the policies underlying the Adoption Act in Mimkon merit discussion.

In Mimkon, we stressed that the Adoption Act was primarily designed to protect children placed for adoption because their parents were “unwilling or unable to care for them.” Mimkon, supra, 66 N.J. at 434, 332 A.2d 199. “That is why the judgment of adoption terminates all relationships between the child and his natural parents.” Ibid. The Court emphasized that different considerations apply in cases involving stepparent, rather than nonrelative adoption. With stepparent adoption, “the policy of insulating the adoptive child from his natural parents is not so clearly compelling as it would be in other situations.” Id. at 435, 332 A.2d 199. Specifically, we observed that “nothing in this opinion is intended to suggest that the grandparent could invoke the visitation statute after the child of the grandparent has in fact been adjudicated to have ‘forsaken his parental obligations and adoption ordered.’ In that case the policy of N.J.S.A. 9:3-17(e).30, subd. A plainly controls.” Ibid., n. 3. That statute provided that to give effect to the public policy of the state regarding the welfare of children requiring placement for adoption it was necessary to “protect the adopting parents ... from later disturbance of their relationships to the child by the natural parents.” Id. at 432, 332 A.2d 199. We reaffirm our observation in Mimkon that visitation in the context of nonrelative adoption conflicts with the policies underlying the Adoption Act. The holding of Mimkon should not be extended to nonrelative adoption.

Courts in other jurisdictions have addressed the tension between their grandparent visitation and adoption statutes. However, those decisions are guided mainly by the specific statutory provisions, which differ from New Jersey’s, and are of limited precedential value. Jurisdictions with adoption and visitation statutes similar to ours have declined to impose grandparental visitation rights in nonrelative adoption settings. See, e.g., Sowers v. Tsamolias, 262 Kan. 717, 941 P.2d 949, 951 (1997) (holding that after adoption, parents of birth parents no longer “grandparents” of the child within the meaning of the visitation statute); Hicks v. Enlow, 764 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Ky.1989) (interpreting, interplay between visitation statute and adoption statute to allow visitation in ease of stepparent adoption, but to disallow visitation in the case of nonrelative adoptions); L.F.M. v. Department of Soc. Serv., 67 Md.App. 379, 507 A.2d 1151, 1159 (1986) (holding that grandparents had no right to visit children over objection of confidential prospective adoptive parents).

III.

Our finding that the Legislature did not intend the Grandparent Visitation Statute to apply to situations where the child is adopted by nonrelative adoptive parents is further supported by the Legislature’s specific rejection of the proposed open adoption provision to the Adoption Act. Open adoption “reflects an agreement between the adoptive parents and one or more members of the child’s biological family permitting visitation after the child has been formally adopted.” In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 361, 736 A.2d 1246 (1999). That is exactly the arrangement the grandparents are asserting in this case, albeit without the consent of the adoptive parents.

The 1993 amendments to the Adoption Act rejected a proposed open adoption provision which would have provided:

With the consent of the adopting parent the court may provide in the adoption order for visitation or other type of communication with the child after the adoption by any person who had a relationship with or was biologically related to the adopted child. This provision may be modified by the court, subsequent to the adoption on petition of the adoptive parent for good cause shown.

[A 1418, § 13(d), 205 th Leg., 1 st Sess. (N.J. May 14, 1992) (above language was never enacted).]

The language of that rejected provision contemplated that post-adoption contact could continue between a child and biological family only with the voluntary consent of the adopting parent. It was thus never anticipated, even if the concept of open adoption had been enacted, to compel visitation against the wishes of the adoptive parents. In this case, the adoptive parents do not (and have never) consented to such a visitation agreement.

To permit post-adoption visitation in this ease represents a direct conflict With the Legislature’s rejection of open adoption. New Jersey courts have repeatedly reinforced the principle that open adoption will not be enforced absent express legislative command. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 361, 736 A.2d 1246; In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 386, 736 A.2d 1261 (1999); In re Adoption of a Child by D.M.H., supra, 135 N.J. at 493, 641 A.2d 235. This Court has declined to resolve the question of the validity or enforceability of an open adoption noting that the Legislature has deferred its consideration and that “the issue of open adoption represents a significant policy issue which should be addressed in separate legislation.” In re Adoption of a Child by D.M.H., supra, 135 N.J. at 494, 641 A.2d 235 (quoting Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to Senate No. 686 (1993)).

The above cited cases have highlighted the importance of preserving adoptive parents’ autonomy in raising their child after the parental rights of biological parents are terminated. This Court has noted that the primary purpose of the termination of rights provision in the adoption statute is to “protect adoptive parents from post-adoption disruptions in their relationship with adoptive children, by natural parents who have surrendered children for adoption or where parental rights been severed.” In re Adoption of a Child by D.M.H., supra, 135 N.J. at 491, 641 A.2d 235 (quoting In re Adoption of Children by F., 170 N.J.Super. 419, 422-423, 406 A.2d 986 (Ch.Div.1979)). This Court acknowledged that the revised adoption statute “maintains the policy that adoption ends the parental role of the biological parents and transfers that role to the adoptive parents.” In re Adoption of a Child by D.M.H., supra, 135 N.J. at 491, 641 A.2d 235. Even arrangements, that are entered into with mutual consent permitting continued contact between biological relatives and the adopted child, “cannot be judicially enforced given the potential for disruption of the child’s family life under such arrangements and the fact that under the adoption laws the adoptive parents’ rights are paramount.” In re Guardianship of K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 362, 736 A.2d 1246 (emphasis added).

IV.

An examination of the legislative history demonstrates that the overarching purpose of the Legislature in revising the Adoption Act was to facilitate and encourage adoptions. It is a well-established principle that administrative agencies are entitled to substantial deference in the area of their expertise. Mayflower Secs. Co. v. Bureau of Secs., 64 N.J. 85, 92-93, 312 A.2d 497 (1973). We agree with the position of the Division of Youth and Family Services (“DYFS”), which intervened as amicus curiae in this interlocutory appeal, that the Grandparent Visitation Statute was not intended to be applied in the case of adoption by nonrelatives, and must not be applied because court-enforced visitation by biological grandparents would discourage — if not prevent — adoption.

We place great reliance on the position of DYFS that to permit application of the Grandparent Visitation Statute to adoption by nonrelatives or where there has been an involuntary termination of parental rights, as in this ease, would have a chilling effect on prospective adoptive parents. According to DYFS, as of January 1995 there were 1,049 children who were legally freed for adoption, and awaiting finalization of that status. Only 33 of those children were awaiting a relative adoption. The vast majority of the adoptive homes have no connection to the child’s biological family. The effect of the Grandparent Visitation Statute is very important to the children DYFS serves.

The ultimate purpose of the Adoption Act is to support the newly-created family and to encourage other families to adopt a child with the knowledge that biological relatives will not interfere with the new family unit. As DYFS stated in its brief:

It is under this legislative scheme that the State’s compelling interest in protecting children in a stable and permanent home is firmly established as paramount. This strong public policy must not be undermined by the forced imposition of biological family visitation after adoption. The Grandparent Visitation Statute must not be interpreted to qualify or condition an adoption. To interpret these two statutes in any other way would lead to an unintended result and effectively undermine the intended purpose of the Adoption Act, in derogation of the rules governing statutory construction.

See Adams v. Cooper Hosp., 295 N.J.Super. 5, 12-13, 684 A.2d 506, certif. denied, 148 N.J. 463, 690 A.2d 610 (1997).

Some of the reasons adoptive parents fear grandparent visitations are evident in this ease. The adoptive parents do not want any further connection with TS, whose rights were terminated because he presented a continuing threat to Vs safety and well-being. In re Adoption of Child by W.P. and M.P., supra, 308 N.J.Super. at 386, 706 A.2d 198. They fear that on his release from prison, TS will pursue them and their daughter, either on his own or through his parents. As the trial court observed, although TS’s parents have obtained a Final Restraining Order against him under the Domestic Violence Act, such an order can be vacated at any time. It is very difficult for parents to turn aside their own child. In the past, when TS was released from prison he always returned to his parents’ home. Certainly, it is possible that the grandparents’ visitation may provide unsupervised opportunity for TS to have association with V, even though his parental rights have been severed based on parental unfitness.

Moreover, the nonrelative adoptive parents have faced protracted and expensive litigation over visitation rights. To subject the adoptive parents now to a best interests hearing, as proposed by the dissent, would further prolong the already lengthy and cumbersome court proceedings. (Post at 200, 748 A.2d at 539). As noted previously, the intent of the adoption statute is to encourage and facilitate adoptions, not to hinder them.

V.

We understand that grandparents wish to maintain close contact with their grandchildren. Nonetheless, the situation changes when a child is adopted by nonrelatives. Vs adoptive parents also have an adopted son, slightly older than V. If the grandparents of his biological parents sought the same visitation rights as the respondents do in this case, one can imagine the confusion that would be created. The stability of the new family unit would be seriously jeopardized. The adoptive parents would have to comply with two visitation schedules with two different families. Under such circumstances, it would be very difficult for the adoptive family to create and maintain a new stable and intact family unit.

An adoptive family must be given the right to grow and develop as an autonomous family, and must not be tied to the very relationship that put the child in the position of being adopted. Any other ruling would relegate the adoptive parents to “ ‘second-class’ status.’ ” Mimkon, supra, 66 N.J. at 441, 332 A.2d 199 (Clifford, J., dissenting). As Justice Clifford correctly observed, an adoptive parent (a mother in that ease), is “for every purpose and from every perspective and in any terms save blood as much the maternal parent to the child as is any other mother to her daughter.” Ibid. The true grandparents of V (who would have visitation rights under the Grandparent Visitation Statute) are now the parents of her adoptive parents. They are now Ys family.

We vacate the judgment of the Appellate Division and reverse the order of the trial court filed October 29,1998.