State v. J v. (082507) (Passaic County and Statewide)

SYLLABUS
This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the
Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.
State v. J.V. (A-95-18) (082507)
Argued March 3, 2020 -- Decided June 11, 2020 -- Revised June 12, 2020
Timpone, J., writing for the Court.
In this appeal, the Court considers whether the new juvenile waiver statute,
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1 (Section 26.1), applies retroactively to a juvenile who was waived
to adult court, pled guilty, and was sentenced before the statute became effective.
Seventeen-year-old J.V. attempted to take a man’s cellphone and, during the
ensuing struggle, stabbed the victim nine times. The police charged J.V. with acts of
delinquency which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted attempted murder,
armed robbery, and weapons offenses.
The State filed a motion to transfer jurisdiction from the Superior Court’s Family
Part to the Criminal Part to try J.V. as an adult under the then-existing, but now repealed,
juvenile waiver statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(a), under which the Legislature tasked the
Attorney General (AG) with developing guidelines for prosecutors to follow when
seeking to waive a juvenile to adult court. Following the AG Guidelines, the prosecutor
filed a statement of reasons listing certain factors supporting waiving J.V. to adult court.
After conducting the waiver hearing, the Family Part judge granted the State’s
motion to transfer jurisdiction. J.V.’s counsel made an application for bail, arguing that
J.V. had an IQ of 58, had been in special education classes for the majority of his life, and
had attempted suicide six times while detained in the juvenile detention center. The
Family Part judge denied the requested bail and entered an order waiving jurisdiction on
October 23, 2013. Once in adult court, on June 17, 2015, J.V. entered guilty pleas to
attempted murder and armed robbery and the State agreed to recommend concurrent
eighteen-year prison terms, subject to the No Early Release Act.
On the heels of J.V.’s guilty pleas, the Legislature repealed the juvenile waiver
statute, replacing it with Section 26.1. L. 2015, c. 89, §§ 1-7. It codified the AG
Guidelines, mandating supplementary factors for prosecutors to consider when seeking to
waive a juvenile to adult court, including: the juvenile’s age and maturity, the juvenile’s
need for special education classes, the juvenile’s mental health status, and the juvenile’s
history of substance abuse and/or emotional instability. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(3)(d),
1
(e), and (j). Section 26.1 was not made effective immediately, but instead, became
effective on March 1, 2016. On September 18, 2015, the trial court sentenced J.V. in
accordance with his plea deal.
J.V. appealed, arguing that Section 26.1 should apply to him retroactively because
of the ameliorative nature of the new waiver statute and that he therefore was entitled to a
new waiver hearing. The Appellate Division agreed and remanded for a new waiver
hearing. The Court granted the State’s petition for certification. 239 N.J. 10 (2019).
HELD: The language of Section 26.1 is plain and unambiguous. It became effective
years after J.V. was waived to adult court. The Court concludes the Legislature intended
the statute to apply prospectively to those juvenile waiver hearings conducted after the
statute became effective. The statute does not apply to J.V.
1. Generally, new criminal statutes are presumed to have solely prospective application.
The Court has recognized three exceptions to the presumption of prospective application
of a new law to warrant affording that law retroactive application: (1) the Legislature
provided for retroactivity expressly, either in the language of the statute itself or its
legislative history, or implicitly, by requiring retroactive effect to “make the statute
workable or to give it the most sensible interpretation”; (2) “the statute is ameliorative or
curative”; or (3) the parties’ expectations warrant retroactive application. Gibbons v.
Gibbons, 86 N.J. 515, 522-23 (1981). But courts look to those exceptions only in
instances “where there is no clear expression of intent by the Legislature that the statute
is to be prospectively applied only.” Id. at 522. (pp. 12-15)
2. Based on the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, the Court finds that the
Legislature intended to afford Section 26.1(c)(3) only prospective application to those
juvenile waiver proceedings conducted after the statute’s effective date. When enacting
Section 26.1, the Legislature -- in deliberate terms -- made the statute effective seven
months after its enactment. The Legislature’s postponement of Section 26.1’s effective
date is akin to a legislative flare, signaling to the Judiciary that prospective application is
intended. Because it finds the Legislature clearly intended to afford Section 26.1
prospective application only, the Court does not consider the exceptions to the
presumption of prospective application of a new statute. (pp. 15-17)
3. The Court is unpersuaded by arguments that the statute’s delayed implementation date
is likely attributable to the need to collect and report data or to afford time to address the
housing of juvenile inmates. There is nothing in Section 26.1 to support that the
Legislature deliberately delayed the implementation of the statute for those reasons. The
Court will not wade into the murky waters of speculation and conjecture to ascertain the
Legislature’s intent when the language of the statute is unequivocal. (pp. 17-18)
2
4. The Court is also not convinced by the argument that Section 26.1(c)(3) should apply
retroactively given the Appellate Division’s decision in State in Interest of J.F., 446 N.J.
Super. 39 (App. Div. 2016). In J.F., the Family Part judge denied the State’s motion to
waive J.F., a fourteen-year-old juvenile accused of murder, to adult court. Id. at 41-42,
50-51. At the time of the court’s decision, the Legislature had enacted Section 26.1,
which raised the minimum age eligibility requirement for juvenile waivers from fourteen
years old to fifteen years old, but the court applied the previous waiver statute in denying
the State’s motion. See id. at 41-42, 50-52. The Appellate Division upheld the Family
Part judge’s decision to deny the State’s waiver motion but did so after finding that
Section 26.1’s age provision was entitled to retroactive application because it was
ameliorative. Id. at 52-57. (pp. 18-20)
5. Unlike the juvenile in J.F., J.V. was waived to adult court, pled guilty, and was
sentenced all before Section 26.1 became effective. In other words, when Section 26.1
became effective, J.V.’s proceedings before the juvenile and adult courts were over. The
juvenile in J.F., however, was never waived to adult court and had pending proceedings
in the juvenile court both before and after Section 26.1 became effective. Said another
way, Section 26.1 cannot apply to J.V. because he was waived to adult court years before
the statute became effective. (pp. 20-21)
6. Because J.V. cannot overcome the presumption of prospective application of Section
26.1, the Court does not address the parties’ Savings Statute arguments. (p. 21)
REVERSED and REMANDED to the Appellate Division.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON,
FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion.
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SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-95 September Term 2018
082507
State of New Jersey,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
J.V.,
Defendant-Respondent.
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
Argued Decided Revised
March 3, 2020 June 11, 2020 June 12, 2020
Carol M. Henderson, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for appellant (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
General, attorney; Carol M. Henderson, of counsel and
on the briefs).
Michele E. Friedman, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; Michele E. Friedman, of
counsel and on the briefs).
John McNamara, Jr., Chief Assistant Morris County
Prosecutor, argued the cause for amicus curiae County
Prosecutors Association of New Jersey (Francis Koch,
President, attorney; John McNamara, Jr., of counsel and
on the brief).
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Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae
American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American
Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation,
attorneys; Alexander Shalom and Jeanne LoCicero, on
the brief).
Barry Evenchick argued the cause for amicus curiae
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey
(Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; CJ Griffin, of
counsel and on the brief).
JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this matter, we consider whether the new juvenile waiver statute,
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1 (Section 26.1), applies retroactively to a juvenile who
was waived to adult court, pled guilty, and was sentenced before the statute
became effective. The Appellate Division found retroactivity and concluded
defendant J.V. was entitled to a new juvenile waiver hearing in light of Section
26.1.
We cannot agree. The language of Section 26.1 is plain and
unambiguous. It became effective years after J.V. was waived to adult court.
We conclude the Legislature intended the statute to apply prospectively to
those juvenile waiver hearings conducted after the statute became effective.
Clearly, the statute does not apply to J.V. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of the Appellate Division.
2
I.
The facts are straightforward and undisputed. We glean them from the
juvenile waiver proceeding and J.V.’s plea colloquy.
A.
On Mother’s Day in 2013, seventeen-year-old J.V. left his house armed
with a kitchen knife with plans to rob someone of money or a cellphone. He
walked to a train station near his home and spotted the victim -- an
unsuspecting twenty-eight-year-old man who had just been dropped off. J.V.
approached the victim and asked to use his cellphone. The victim was initially
startled but allowed J.V. to use his cellphone because J.V. was a “kid.” J.V.
took the cellphone and pretended to make a phone call by pressing the phone’s
buttons and placing it to his ear.
After making the fake call, J.V. walked back to the victim and told him
he was keeping the phone. The victim demanded his phone back and, when
J.V. refused, they began to fight for it. During the ensuing struggle, J.V.
whipped out the kitchen knife and stabbed the victim nine times, piercing and
cutting the victim’s neck, ear, shoulders, and the top of his head. J.V.’s knife
pierced the victim’s vocal cords, causing permanent damage. After the ninth
blow, the victim fell to the ground.
3
J.V. ran from the train station with the victim’s cellphone in hand. He
discarded his knife in a garbage can. Witnesses at the train station observed
the stabbing and called the police. An off-duty police officer was driving near
the train station and overheard sirens. Turning on his radio, he heard a
dispatch report of a robbery at the train station. The officer observed J.V. run
past his vehicle, noting that J.V. matched the assailant’s description provided
by the dispatch. The officer pursued J.V. and radioed his location to other
officers. Moments later, the police apprehended J.V. He was “drenched” in
blood. During the arrest, J.V. blurted out he had just taken “a guy’s”
cellphone and discarded a knife. J.V. gave the cellphone to the officers and
led them to the knife in the garbage can.
The police began interviewing J.V. at police headquarters. Upon
learning J.V. was a juvenile, they notified his parents. J.V.’s father came to
the police station and briefly sat in on the interview. J.V. admitted he planned
to steal someone’s cellphone and brought the knife with him for coercion. J.V.
then detailed the assault and the stabbing.
Following the interview, the police charged J.V. with acts of
delinquency which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted
attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and 2C:5-1(a)(1); armed robbery,
4
N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1); unlawful possession of a knife, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d);
and possession of a knife for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d).
B.
A month after the stabbing, on June 4, 2013, the State filed a motion to
transfer jurisdiction from the Superior Court’s Family Part to the Criminal Part
to try J.V. as an adult under the then-existing, but now repealed, juvenile
waiver statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(a).
Under that waiver statute, the Legislature tasked the Attorney General
(AG) with developing guidelines for prosecutors to follow when seeking to
waive a juvenile to adult court. In response, the AG instructed prosecutors
seeking to file a juvenile waiver motion to consider: (1) the nature of the
offense; (2) the need for deterrence; (3) the effect of the waiver on the
prosecution of any co-defendants; (4) the maximum sentence and length of
time served; (5) the juvenile’s prior record; (6) trial considerations , such as the
likelihood of conviction and the potential need for a grand jury investigation ;
and (7) the victim’s input. Office of the Attorney Gen., Juvenile Waiver
Guidelines, 5-6 (Mar. 14, 2000) (AG Guidelines). In addition, the AG
Guidelines directed prosecutors filing a waiver motion to include a statement
of reasons addressing the prosecution’s consideration and the applicability of
the factors. Id. at 7.
5
Following the AG Guidelines, the prosecutor in this case filed a
statement of reasons listing certain factors supporting waiving J.V. to adult
court. After conducting the waiver hearing, the Family Part judge granted the
State’s motion to transfer jurisdiction. J.V.’s counsel made an application for
bail, arguing that J.V. had an IQ of 58, had been in special education classes
for the majority of his life, and had attempted suicide six times while detained
in the juvenile detention center. The Family Part judge denied the requested
bail and entered an order waiving jurisdiction on October 23, 2013.
Thereafter, a grand jury indicted J.V. for attempted murder, armed
robbery, and weapons offenses. J.V.’s counsel requested an evaluation to
determine whether J.V. was competent to stand trial. After a three-day
hearing, the trial court found J.V. competent to stand trial but noted there was
evidence that he was mentally impaired.
Once in adult court, on June 17, 2015, J.V. entered guilty pleas to
attempted murder and armed robbery. In exchange, the State agreed to
recommend concurrent eighteen-year prison terms, subject to the No Early
Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
On the heels of J.V.’s guilty pleas, the Legislature repealed the juvenile
waiver statute, replacing it with Section 26.1. L. 2015, c. 89, §§ 1-7. It
codified the AG Guidelines, mandating supplementary factors for prosecutors
6
to consider when seeking to waive a juvenile to adult court. Those factors
include: the juvenile’s age and maturity, the juvenile’s need for special
education classes, the juvenile’s mental health status, and the juvenile’s history
of substance abuse and/or emotional instability. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(3)(d),
(e), and (j). Section 26.1 was not made effective immediately, but instead,
became effective on March 1, 2016. L. 2015, c. 89, § 7.
On September 18, 2015, the trial court sentenced J.V. in accordance with
his plea deal. That sentencing occurred well before the effective date of the
new statute.
C.
J.V. appealed, challenging both the Family Part judge’s ruling to waive
jurisdiction and his sentence. He contended he was entitled to a new waiver
hearing in light of Section 26.1. Relying on the Appellate Division’s decision
in State in Interest of J.F., 446 N.J. Super. 39 (App. Div. 2016), J.V. argued
that Section 26.1 should apply to him retroactively because of the ameliorative
nature of the new waiver statute. J.V. speculated that had the prosecutor
considered the new waiver factors under Section 26.1(c)(3), the prosecutor
may not have sought to waive him to adult court. To the extent Section
26.1(c)(3) does not apply retroactively, J.V. claimed he was still entitled to a
new waiver hearing because the prosecution abused its discretion in analyzing
7
the factors under the AG Guidelines. He also argued that his sentence was
excessive.
The Appellate Division agreed with J.V.’s Section 26.1 arguments.
Given its decision in J.F., the Appellate Division concluded “[t]he waiver
statute is ameliorative and thus subject to retroactive application.” The court
reasoned that the new waiver factors under Section 26.1(c)(3) “may affect the
severity of the outcome for the juvenile.” The court further found that J.V.
was entitled to a new waiver hearing under the new waiver statute applying
Section 26.1’s provisions because he was sentenced after the “enactment of the
more lenient waiver statute.” The Appellate Division took note that under the
new statute, prosecutors must now consider a juvenile’s mental disability but
that such an evaluation was not mandated under the repealed statute or under
the AG Guidelines. The Appellate Division remanded for a new waiver
hearing in light of Section 26.1.
Because it ruled in his favor, the Appellate Division considered neither
J.V.’s additional argument that the prosecution abused its discretion in
analyzing the waiver factors under the AG Guidelines nor J.V.’s excessive
sentencing claim.
This Court granted certification, 239 N.J. 10 (2019), and permitted the
County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey, the American Civil Liberties
8
Union of New Jersey (ACLU), and the Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL) to participate as friends of the Court.
II.
A.
At the time the State moved to waive J.V. to adult court, N.J.S.A.
2A:4A-26 governed juvenile waiver proceedings. Under that statute, the
Legislature directed the AG to develop and disseminate to the county
prosecutors “those guidelines or directives deemed necessary or appropriate to
ensure uniform application” of the juvenile waiver law. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(f)
(repealed). Following the directive, the AG promulgated the Guidelines,
identifying several factors (previously discussed) that prosecutors must
consider when moving to waive a juvenile to adult court. AG Guidelines at 5-
6. The AG Guidelines also directed prosecutors to file a statement of reasons
setting forth the prosecution’s consideration of the waiver factors. Id. at 7.
In State v. J.M., we ruled that prosecutors must file the statement of
reasons as part of the State’s waiver motion so judges could review the
prosecution’s reasoning in determining whether its decision to seek waiver was
arbitrary. 182 N.J. 402, 419 (2005). Then, in State in Interest of V.A., we
directed courts to review for abuse of discretion a prosecutor’s decision to
waive a juvenile to adult court. 212 N.J. 1, 8 (2012).
9
In August 2015, the Legislature repealed the juvenile waiver statute and
enacted Section 26.1. L. 2015, c. 89, §§ 1-7. Section 26.1 codified the AG
Guidelines and advanced additional factors prosecutors must consider when
seeking to waive a juvenile to adult court. See N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(3); see
also State in Interest of N.H., 226 N.J. 242, 252 (2016) (noting the addition of
factors under the new statute). In addition to the factors under the AG
Guidelines, Section 26.1(c)(3) now requires prosecutors to consider the “[a]ge
and maturity of the juvenile,” “[a]ny classification that the juvenile is eligible
for special education,” the juvenile’s involvement with “child welfare
agencies,” and “[e]vidence of mental health concerns, substance abuse, or
emotional instability of the juvenile.” N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(3)(d), (e), (i),
and (j). Section 26.1 also codified this Court’s holding in J.M. requiring
prosecutors to file a statement of reasons addressing the waiver factors so
courts may determine whether “the prosecutor abused his [or her] discretion in
considering [those] factors in deciding whether to seek a waiver.” See
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(a), (b), and (c)(3); see also N.H., 226 N.J. at 251 (noting
Section 26.1’s “requirements are consistent with J.M.”).
When enacting Section 26.1, the Legislature declared that it “shall take
effect on the first day of the seventh month following enactment.” L. 2015, c.
89, § 7. Accordingly, Section 26.1 became effective on March 1, 2016. Ibid.
10
In N.H., we considered the State’s discovery obligations to juveniles
when the State seeks to waive a juvenile to adult court. 226 N.J. at 245. In
that case, the State had charged the juvenile with murder and weapons offenses
and sought to waive him to adult court for trial. Id. at 246. Before the waiver
hearing in N.H., the juvenile sought full discovery from the prosecutor, which
the Family Part judge granted. Id. at 247. The State appealed that ruling and,
by the time the appeal reached this Court, Section 26.1 had become effective.
Id. at 247, 249. We ultimately concluded that Section 26.1 did not address
discovery in juvenile cases. Id. at 253. Given “the critical nature of juvenile
waiver proceedings, and to ensure fairness” to juveniles, we invoked our
supervisory authority and imposed an obligation on the State to provide full
discovery to juveniles when it seeks to waive a juvenile to adult court. Id. at
256.
In rendering our decision, we extensively reviewed the juvenile waiver
statutory scheme. See id. at 248-52. Based on a comparison of the old and
new waiver statutes, we concluded the “[s]tatutory revisions about the process
for the waiver decision do not alter existing law in a material way.” Id. at 249.
Turning to the new juvenile waiver factors under Section 26.1(c)(3), we noted
with approval the new waiver law “adopted parts of the [AG] Guidelines and
case law.” Id. at 250. We also observed that Section 26.1(c)(3)’s factors
11
“encompass[ed] and expand[ed] upon the factors listed in the [AG]
Guidelines.” Id. at 252. Given the similarities between Section 26.1 and the
old waiver statute, we opted not to “conduct a full-blown retroactivity
analysis.” Id. at 249.
B.
The preceding extensive history of the evolution of juvenile waiver to
adult court paves the way for the decision in the matter. The sole question
before this Court is whether Section 26.1(c)(3) applies retroactively to J.V. -- a
juvenile who was waived to adult court, pled guilty, and was sentenced under
the older statute well before the new waiver statute became effective. The
Appellate Division found the new statute to be retroactive and ordered a new
waiver hearing.
We review that determination anew -- without affording any deference to
the Appellate Division’s decision -- because whether a statute applies
retroactively “is a purely legal question of statutory interpretation.” Johnson
v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370, 386 (2016); see also Garden State
Check Cashing Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Banking & Ins., 237 N.J. 482, 489
(2019) (“We . . . apply de novo review to issues of statutory interpretation.”).
Without question, “[t]he overriding goal of all statutory interpretation ‘is
to determine as best we can the intent of the Legislature, and to give effect to
12
that intent.’” State v. S.B., 230 N.J. 62, 67 (2017) (quoting State v. Robinson,
217 N.J. 594, 604 (2014)). To determine the Legislature’s intent, we look to
the statute’s language and give those terms their plain and ordinary meaning ,
DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005), because “the best indicator of
that intent is the plain language chosen by the Legislature,” Johnson, 226 N.J.
at 386 (quoting Cashin v. Bello, 223 N.J. 328, 335 (2015)).
If, based on a plain and ordinary reading of the statute, the statutory
terms are clear and unambiguous, then the interpretative process ends, and we
“apply the law as written.” Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581,
592 (2012). “A court may neither rewrite a plainly[ ]written enactment of the
Legislature nor presume that the Legislature intended something other than
that expressed by way of the plain language.” O’Connell v. State, 171 N.J.
484, 488 (2002). If, however, the statutory text is ambiguous, we may resort
to “extrinsic interpretative aids, including legislative history,” to determine the
statute’s meaning. S.B., 230 N.J. at 68.
“When the Legislature does not clearly express its intent to give a statute
prospective application, a court must determine whether to apply the statute
retroactively.” Twiss v. Dep’t of Treasury, 124 N.J. 461, 467 (1991).
Generally, new criminal statutes are presumed to have solely prospective
application. See, e.g., State v. Parolin, 171 N.J. 223, 233 (2002) (“[T]he
13
presumption [is] that criminal legislation is to have prospective effect . . . .”);
accord James v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 216 N.J. 552, 556 (2014) (“The law favors
prospective application of a new statute.”). We apply a presumption of
prospective application for newly enacted statutes because “retroactive
application of new laws involves a high risk of being unfair.” Oberhand v.
Dir., Div. of Taxation, 193 N.J. 558, 570 (2008) (quoting Gibbons v. Gibbons,
86 N.J. 515, 522 (1981)).
To overcome the presumption of prospective application, we must find
the “Legislature clearly intended a retrospective application” of the statute
through its use of words “so clear, strong, and imperative that no . . . meaning
can be ascribed to them” other than to apply the statute retroactively.
Weinstein v. Inv’rs Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 154 N.J. Super. 164, 167 (App. Div.
1977). Courts apply a newly enacted statute retroactively only if “the
Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive application” and
“retroactive application of that statute will [not] result in either an
unconstitutional interference with vested rights or a manifest injustice.”
James, 216 N.J. at 563 (quoting In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 50 (1996)).
We have recognized three exceptions to the presumption of prospective
application of a new law to warrant affording that law retroactive application:
(1) the Legislature provided for retroactivity expressly, either in the language
14
of the statute itself or its legislative history, or implicitly, by requiring
retroactive effect to “make the statute workable or to give it the most sensible
interpretation”; (2) “the statute is ameliorative or curative”; or (3) the parties’
expectations warrant retroactive application. Gibbons, 86 N.J. at 522-23. But
we look to those exceptions only in instances “where there is no clear
expression of intent by the Legislature that the statute is to be prospectively
applied only.” Id. at 522.
III.
A.
Against that landscape, we conclude the Appellate Division erred by
applying Section 26.1(c)(3) retroactively to J.V. Based on the plain and
unambiguous language of the statute, we find the Legislature intended to
afford Section 26.1(c)(3) only prospective application to those juvenile waiver
proceedings conducted after the statute’s effective date.
When enacting Section 26.1, the Legislature -- in deliberate terms --
made the statute effective seven months after its enactment. L. 2015, c. 89, § 7
(“This act shall take effect on the first day of the seventh month following
enactment.”). The Legislature’s postponement of Section 26.1’s effective date
is clear evidence that the Legislature intended the statute to apply
prospectively only. See, e.g., Twiss, 124 N.J. at 468 (explaining a statute’s
15
“postponed effective date” is evidence of the Legislature’s intent that the
statute applies prospectively only).
Moreover, “the Legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial
construction of its enactments.” DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 494 (quoting N.J.
Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 175 N.J. 178, 195 n.6 (2002)). We assume
the Legislature knew that courts would construe Section 26.1’s postponed
effective date only to allow prospective application of the statute. “[H]ad the
Legislature intended an earlier date for the law to take effect, that intention
could have been made plain in the very section directing when the law would
become effective.” James, 216 N.J. at 568. Instead, the Legislature explicitly
made the statute effective after its enactment date, which is “akin to a
legislative flare, signaling to the judiciary that prospective application is
intended.” Olkusz v. Brown, 401 N.J. Super. 496, 502 (App. Div. 2008);
accord Twiss, 124 N.J. at 468.
Because we find the Legislature clearly intended to afford Section 26.1
prospective application only, we need not consider the exceptions to the
presumption of prospective application of a new statute. See Gibbons, 86 N.J.
at 522-23; see also Twiss, 124 N.J. at 467 (explaining that a court will only
conduct a retroactivity analysis “[w]hen the Legislature does not clearly
express its intent to give a statute prospective application”). Since J.V. was
16
waived to adult court, pled guilty, and was sentenced before Section 26.1
became effective, the statute does not apply to him.
J.V. and supportive amici, the ACLU and the ACDL, argue that Section
26.1’s postponed effective date does not evidence the Legislature’s intent to
afford the statute prospective application only. They contend the statute’s
delayed implementation date is likely attributable to Section 26.1’s
requirement that the AG and Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC) collect and
report data on juvenile waivers. See N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(g); see also J.F.,
446 N.J. Super. at 59 n.14 (presuming that Section 26.1’s postponed effective
date “was likely necessitated by the [AG’s] need to prepare guidelines and the
requirement that the JJC establish a program to gather and report data”). At
oral argument, the ACLU suggested the Legislature delayed the
implementation of Section 26.1 to afford the Department of Corrections and
the JJC time to address the housing of juvenile inmates given the statute’s
provisions allowing convicted, waived-up juveniles to serve out their sentences
in juvenile detention centers. See N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(f).
We are unpersuaded by those speculative arguments. There is nothing in
Section 26.1 to support that the Legislature deliberately delayed the
implementation of the statute for the reasons advanced by J.V. and amici. We
will not wade into the murky waters of speculation and conjecture to ascertain
17
the Legislature’s intent when the language of the statute is unequivocal. See
O’Connell, 171 N.J. at 488 (stating a court will not “presume that the
Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain
language”). The plain and unambiguous language of Section 26.1 keeps us
ashore because the statute’s text is “the best indicator” of the Legislature’s
intent, Johnson, 226 N.J. at 386 (quoting Cashin, 223 N.J. at 335), and the
statute’s postponed effective date provides clear evidence that the Legislature
intended to apply the statute prospectively only, see Twiss, 124 N.J. at 468.
“[W]e need delve no deeper than the act’s literal terms to divine the
Legislature’s intent.” O’Connell, 171 N.J. at 488 (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Butler, 89 N.J. 220, 226 (1982)).
J.V. and his supportive amici also contend Section 26.1(c)(3) should
apply retroactively given the Appellate Division’s decision in J.F. Again, we
are not convinced.
In J.F., the Appellate Division ruled that Section 26.1’s new age-
eligibility provision was entitled to retroactive application. 446 N.J. Super. at
55-57. There, the State had filed an interlocutory appeal to challenge the
Family Part judge’s refusal to waive a fourteen-year-old juvenile accused of
murder to adult court. Id. at 41-42. At the time of the State’s waiver motion,
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 governed waiver proceedings and the statute permitted the
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State to seek the involuntary waiver of a fourteen-year-old juvenile. Id. at 43,
52-53.
Following a hearing, the Family Part judge denied the State’s
application, finding that the juvenile had met his burden under the previous
waiver statute to prove the probability of his rehabilitation, and that
probability of rehabilitation outweighed the State’s reasons for waiver. Id. at
42, 50-51. At the time of the court’s decision, the Legislature had enacted
Section 26.1, which raised the minimum age eligibility requirement for
juvenile waivers from fourteen years old to fifteen years old. See id. at 52; see
also N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(1). Under Section 26.1, not in effect at the time,
the juvenile at issue in J.F. would not have been eligible for waiver because he
was fourteen years old at the time of his offenses. Id. at 53. The Family Part
judge acknowledged the enactment of Section 26.1, but did not apply the
statute and denied the State’s juvenile waiver motion. Id. at 52.
Following the State’s appeal, the Appellate Division -- on its own
initiative -- asked the parties to provide briefing on whether Section 26.1 was
entitled to retroactive application. Id. at 42. After that briefing, the Appellate
Division upheld the Family Part judge’s decision to deny the State’s waiver
motion but did so after conducting a retroactivity analysis of Section 26.1’s
new age provision and finding that it was entitled to retroactive application.
19
Id. at 52-57. According to the Appellate Division, Section 26.1(c)(1) is an
ameliorative statute because it “was intended to ameliorate the punitive
sentencing previously meted out to adolescent offenders after waiver . . . [and]
to address the treatment needs of children.” Id. at 55. The Appellate Division
found that in Section 26.1 “[t]he Legislature, in raising the age requirement for
waiver by one year, determined that children who commit offenses when under
the age of fifteen should never be waived up to face adult penalties.” Id. at 56.
Unlike the juvenile in J.F., J.V. was waived to adult court, pled guilty,
and was sentenced all before Section 26.1 became effective. In other words,
when Section 26.1 became effective, J.V.’s proceedings before the juvenile
and adult courts were over. The juvenile in J.F., however, was never waived
to adult court and had pending proceedings in the juvenile court both before
and after Section 26.1 became effective. Said another way, Section 26.1
cannot apply to J.V. because he was waived to adult court years before the
statute became effective. Cf. State v. Bass, 457 N.J. Super. 1, 11-12 (App.
Div. 2018) (refusing to apply Section 26.1 retroactively because “the waiver
law was not only the same at the time defendant committed the offense, but
also at the time of his waiver, conviction, and sentencing” and the court found
“no evidence the Legislature intended [Section 26.1] to reach concluded cases
20
which have already passed through the proverbial ‘pipeline’”), certif. denied,
238 N.J. 364 (2019).
Our decision today rests solely on the facts before us. We hold that a
juvenile who was waived to adult court, pled guilty, and was sentenced long
before Section 26.1 became effective cannot claim the benefit of the new
juvenile waiver statute. The Appellate Division’s contrary ruling in this case
contravenes the plain and unambiguous language of Section 26.1, and so that
decision cannot stand.
B.
Because we conclude J.V. cannot overcome the presumption of
prospective application of Section 26.1, we need not address the parties’
Savings Statute arguments.
IV.
For the above reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate
Division and remand this matter to that court for consideration of J.V.’s
remaining arguments.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN,
PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE
TIMPONE’s opinion.
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