STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. PAUL RODGERS(07-08-1322, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3614-15T4
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD
PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
L.C.,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP
OF T.L.M., a minor.
__________________________________
Submitted March 30, 2017 - Decided April 7, 2017
Before Judges Lihotz and Hoffman.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County,
Docket No. FG-04-116-16.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Diana S. Yu, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Melissa Dutton-
Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Laura A. Dwyer, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
Guardian, attorney for minor (David Valentin,
Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
We examine challenges to an April 14, 2016 Family Part
judgment terminating the parental rights of defendant L.C. and
awarding plaintiff, the Division of Child Protection and
Permanency (the Division), guardianship to effectuate the adoption
of three-year-old T.L.M. The judgment also terminated the parental
rights of the child's father J.M., noting he executed an identified
surrender to allow the child's adoption by relatives in California,
on March 1, 2016, from which he has not filed an appeal. Defendant
seeks reversal, arguing the Division failed to present clear and
convincing evidence to sustain the judgment terminating her
parental rights. More specifically, defendant admits her drug
abuse caused T.L.M.'s removal, but maintains she made significant
strides to overcome that harm, which the judge ignored; the
Division declined to extend in-patient drug treatment program
services in the Mommy and Me program, which defendant requested;
and termination of parental rights would cause the child to suffer
more harm than good.
The scope of this court's review of a trial court's decision
to terminate parental rights is limited. In re Guardianship of
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J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002). We are obliged to accord
deference to the trial judge's factual findings and credibility
determinations respecting the judge's feel of the case based upon
the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses. Cesare v. Cesare,
154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs.
v. F.M., 375 N.J. Super. 235, 259 (App. Div. 2005). Reversal is
required only in those circumstances when the stated findings are
"so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made." N.J.
Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)
(quoting Snyder Realty, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 233 N.J.
Super. 65, 69 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 117 N.J. 165 (1989)).
We have considered each of L.C.'s arguments in the context
of the record and the applicable law. We affirm substantially for
the reasons expressed in the thorough and extensive oral opinion
issued by Judge Francine I. Axelrad at the close of evidence on
April 14, 2016. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A). We repeat our prior
determination:
"[C]oncern has arisen for the best
interests of children whose parents have
forsaken their parental duties." N.J. Div.
of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J.
494, 505 (2004) (citations omitted). The
emphasis of the federal Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), Pub. L. No. 105-
89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amendments in
sections of 42 U.S.C.A.) "has shifted from
protracted efforts for reunification with a
birth parent to an expeditious, permanent
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placement to promote the child's well-being."
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. C.S.,
367 N.J. Super. 76, 111 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 180 N.J. 456 (2004); see N.J.S.A.
30:4C-15.
In our view, parents dabbling with
addictive substances must accept the mandate
to eliminate all substance abuse. Such
unabated behavior initiates the foster care
placement of their children and causes
continuing harm by depriving their children
of necessary stability and permanency. See
P.P., supra, 180 N.J. at 510; [In re
Guardianship of] K.H.O., 161 N.J. [337,] 354
[(1999)].
[N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. T.S.,
417 N.J. Super. 228, 245 (App. Div. 2010).]
Here, ample credible evidence demonstrated reunification
could not be achieved because defendant failed to remain substance
free, and the extensive delay caused significant harm to the child,
who did not have a safe, permanent home, satisfying N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
15.1(a)(1), (2). Judge Axelrad detailed the drug abuse treatment
services extended to defendant by the Division, which began in
2009, long before this child's birth, satisfying N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
15.1(a)(3). Despite a myriad of treatment programs, her chronic,
illicit drug use persisted. In February 2016, defendant was
actively abusing drugs, when she requested to be placed in the
adult residential "Mommy and Me" treatment program accompanied by
T.L.M. The program, which was extended to parents moving toward
reunification with their children, had a waiting list. Defendant
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repeatedly refused to engage in a higher treatment level of care
provided by an adult inpatient facility other than Mommy and Me.
Accordingly, the Division determined T.L.M., who had been in
placement for nineteen months, needed permanency. Therefore, the
Division redirected its efforts toward securing the child's
adoption, after concluding defendant's conduct demonstrated she
was not committed to rehabilitation to effect reunification.
Finally, the judge credited unrefuted expert testimony that T.L.M.
had an insecure attachment with defendant, such that severing the
relationship will not cause severe and enduring harm. N.J.S.A.
30:4C-15.1(a)(4).
"A child is not chattel in which a parent has an untempered
property right" and should not "be held prisoner of the rights of
others, even those of his or her parents." C.S., supra, 367 N.J.
Super. at 110-11. The record substantially supports the findings
by Judge Axelrad that the evidence clearly and convincingly
established termination of parental rights was in T.L.M.'s best
interests. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).
Affirmed.
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