MILTON BENJAMIN VS. WEGMANS FOOD MARKETS, INC. (L-0501-18, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0880-19
MILTON BENJAMIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WEGMANS FOOD
MARKETS, INC.,
Defendant-Respondent.
Submitted January 27, 2021 – Decided May 11, 2021
Before Judges Alvarez and Sumners.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-0501-18.
Hark & Hark, attorneys for appellant (Michael J. Collis,
on the briefs).
Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin,
attorneys for respondent (Walter J. Klekotka and
Walter F. Kawalec, III, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Milton Benjamin appeals the dismissal, and the denial of
reconsideration of that dismissal, of his personal injury litigation against
defendant Wegmans Food Market, Inc. We affirm.
On the forty-fifth day from the reconsideration denial, on October 28,
2019, plaintiff filed his notice of appeal and case information statement. See R.
2:4-1. Because the date of the order on the notice of appeal was incorrect, an
amended notice of appeal was filed. Attached to the case information statement
appended to both were the two orders plaintiff seeks to challenge—the trial
court's August 2, 2019 dismissal on summary judgment of plaintiff's complaint,
and the September 13, 2019 denial of reconsideration.
Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was filed August 26, 2019,
seemingly more than twenty days after entry of summary judgment. See R. 4:49-
2 ("a motion for rehearing or reconsideration . . . shall be served not later than
[twenty] days after service of the judgment or order upon all parties by the party
obtaining it"). By citing to the order in its responding brief, defendant
questioned plaintiff's ability, for procedural reasons, to challenge either the
original grant of summary judgment and extension of discovery denial, or the
reconsideration decision. In his revised appellate reply brief, plaintiff asserted
he was not electronically served the dismissal order until August 6, 2019, which
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would bring the motion for reconsideration into the twentieth day. However,
neither party argued this to the trial judge.
The procedural and factual circumstances leading to the two orders are
straightforward. Plaintiff fell in a Wegmans store on July 16, 2017, and alleged
the fall exacerbated his pre-existing epilepsy. Plaintiff filed suit on February 6,
2018; defendant answered March 12, 2018.
The court extended discovery a final time to April 30, 2019, requiring
plaintiff to serve all expert reports by April 1, 2019. After delays he later
claimed were occasioned by treatment for cancer, plaintiff submitted to a
medical exam by defendant's expert on April 3, 2019. Defendant was required
to serve all of its expert reports by April 15, 2019. Arbitration was conducted,
in the apparent absence of any reports, on May 29, 2019.
Problems on both sides contributed to the delay in producing expert
reports. The reasons for plaintiff's initial failure to do so on a timely basis are
unexplained. Defendant's expert could not timely complete a report until
plaintiff provided medical records.
Because defendant's expert required additional time to produce a report,
once plaintiff produced the required additional information, defendant filed
another motion to extend discovery due to "exceptional circumstances." That
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motion was denied. On June 20, 2019, defendant filed the summary judgment
motion.
On or about July 23, 2019, plaintiff filed a motion requesting that the
discovery period be extended, attributing plaintiff's delay to his treatment for
cancer. The judge, who heard the motion simultaneously with defendant's
motion for summary judgment, found it procedurally defective because it was
not filed prior to the April 30 discovery expiration date.
Furthermore, when the judge asked plaintiff's counsel if he had any
medical reports connecting plaintiff's fall to his recurring seizures, he said his
requests were still pending. The judge reasoned that since the time for discovery
had ended, the matter had been arbitrated, and "two years and seven months"
had elapsed since plaintiff's injury, plaintiff's motion to extend discovery had to
be denied on the grounds of fundamental fairness.
In granting the motion for summary judgment, the judge observed:
. . . counsel, I was even willing to open it up to say,
perhaps - - if he shows up today with a hint, a doctor -
- a doctor even saying I'm on my way to writing that
opinion, but I need X, I need Y, I need Z, and, Judge,
you know, this takes time or what have you, I would
have given some consideration to it.
But I don't have any of that. I have, Judge, give
me some more time and we'll wait and see what
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happens. I can't do that. That's not fair to the defense
at this point.
Plaintiff's counsel asserted that it would have been "impossible to get [a
report] without the information that we're waiting for." When pressed, plaintiff's
counsel added that there was no "final conclusion as to what these episodes - -
as the last medical records show." The judge observed that everything necessary
for a report was now available, yet no report had been obtained. Therefore, he
granted the motion for summary judgment on the basis that "there is not evidence
in the case of causation by way of competent medical testimony by which the
plaintiff could present a viable case."
On August 26, 2019, plaintiff filed the motion for reconsideration. The
judge acknowledged at the September 13, 2019 oral argument receipt of a letter
authored by plaintiff's expert—a "preliminary summary"—which indicated a
"full report" would issue in due course. The letter suggested plaintiff's epilepsy
might have been exacerbated by the fall, in reliance on plaintiff's wife's
statements.
The judge opined the letter could have been produced earlier, as the
information from plaintiff's wife was available in April 2019, months before the
case was dismissed. Thus, the judge denied reconsideration, stating "there must
be finality and in this case, that finality came on August 2[, 2019]."
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On appeal, plaintiff raises the following point:
I. TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION
BY DENYING [PLAINTIFF'S] MOTION TO
REOPEN DISCOVERY AND GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS STILL
TREATING.
Plaintiff contends the trial judge abused his discretion in the issuance of
both orders. Before addressing the issues, both procedurally and substantively,
it is necessary to reiterate some relevant precedent.
We do not consider evidence outside the trial record. See Scott v. Salerno,
297 N.J. Super. 437, 447 (App. Div. 1997) ("[A]ppellate courts will not consider
evidence submitted on appeal that was not in the record before the trial court.").
Making new arguments in a reply brief is also improper. See Bouie v.
N.J. Dep't of Cmty. Affs., 407 N.J. Super. 518, 525 n.1 (App. Div. 2009) ("[A]
party may not advance a new argument in a reply brief.").
"A timely filed motion for reconsideration tolls the time for filing an
appeal. However, an untimely motion to reconsider does not." Eastampton
Center, LLC v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of Eastampton, 354 N.J. Super. 171, 187
(App. Div. 2002) (citation omitted). Rule 1:3-4 forbids enlargement of time for,
inter alia, motions for reconsideration subject to Rule 4:49-2. When a motion
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for reconsideration is untimely, we may lack subject matter jurisdiction over the
appeal:
In Hayes, [this court] addressed the interplay between
Rule 4:49-2 and Rule 1:3-4(c), which expressly
prohibits the relaxation of the twenty-day time
restriction for filing a motion for reconsideration. . . .
Rule 1:3-4(c) "expressly" prohibits "the parties" and
"the court" from enlarging the time specified by Rule
4:49-2 . . . We thus hold the Law Division did not have
subject matter jurisdiction at the time it granted
plaintiff's untimely motion under Rule 4:49-2 for
reconsideration of its June 9, 2017 final judgment
granting defendants' motion to compel arbitration.
[Murray v. Comcast Corp., 457 N.J. Super. 464,
469-471 (App. Div. 2019).]
Pursuant to a November 15, 2017 New Jersey Supreme Court order, "the
provisions of Rule 1:5-6 ('Filing') . . . shall be supplemented and relaxed . . . to
provide that documents filed through an approved electronic filing system are
deemed filed upon receipt into the system . . . ."
In plaintiff's appellate merits brief, he did not discuss the denial of the
motion for reconsideration—he only challenged the judge's grant of summary
judgment and denial of his application for an extension of discovery. In his
appellate reply brief, plaintiff argues that he did not waive his right to appeal
the reconsideration order, as defendant contends, because his argument is that
the initial denial was improper. In his initial brief, plaintiff focused on whether
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he satisfied the exceptional circumstances test for an extension of discovery. R.
4:24-1(c).
"An issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived." Sklodowsky v.
Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011). Plaintiff mentioned the
reconsideration order in the preliminary statement to his merits brief, in which
he makes the perhaps unsupported claim that he "timely moved for
[r]econsideration . . . which was ultimately denied for substantially similar
reasons" as the denial of plaintiff's motion to reopen discovery. (Pb2).
Plaintiff's original and amended notice of appeal referenced both the
August 2, 2019 order granting summary judgment and the September 13, 2019
order denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, however. (CS). "While the
rule does not in terms so provide, it is clear that it is only the judgments or orders
or parts thereof designated in the notice of appeal which are subject to the appeal
process and review." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5.1
on R. 2:5-1 (2021); see also Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 298-99
(2020).
Given this procedural morass, we reluctantly elect to briefly discuss the
two orders. Appellate courts have in the past been
mindful of the fact that in some cases a motion for
reconsideration may implicate the substantive issues in
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the case and the basis for the motion judge's ruling on
the summary judgment and reconsideration motions
may be the same. In such cases, an appeal solely from
the grant of summary judgment or from the denial of
reconsideration may be sufficient for an appellate
review of the merits of the case, particularly where
those issues are raised in the [case information
statement].
[Fusco v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Newark, 349 N.J.
Super. 455, 461 (App. Div. 2002).]
"An appellate court applies 'an abuse of discretion standard to decisions
made by [the] trial courts relating to matters of discovery.'" C.A. ex rel.
Applegrad v. Bentolila, 219 N.J. 449, 459 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting
Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371 (2011)). We
"generally defer to a trial court's disposition of discovery matters unless the
court has abused its discretion or its determination is based on a mistaken
understanding of the applicable law." Rivers v. LSC P'ship, 378 N.J. Super. 68,
80 (App. Div. 2005). An abuse of discretion "arises when a decision 'is made
without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies,
or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J.
561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. I.N.S., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th
Cir.1985)). We assess the judge's interpretation of applicable law de novo.
Barlyn v. Dow, 436 N.J. Super. 161, 170 (App. Div. 2014).
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In order to meet the exceptional circumstances standard permitting
extension of a discovery end date after the time has elapsed, a party must show:
1) why discovery has not been completed within time
and counsel's diligence in pursuing discovery during
that time; (2) the additional discovery or disclosure
sought is essential; (3) an explanation for counsel's
failure to request an extension of the time
for discovery within the original time period; and (4)
the circumstances presented were clearly beyond the
control of the attorney and litigant seeking the
extension of time.
[Rivers, 378 N.J. Super. at 79; see also R. 4:24-1(c).]
Plaintiff treated for cancer in February 2019, approximately a year after
he filed his complaint. The treatment therefore does not explain the reason he
could not gather the necessary medical information to present to defendant's
medical expert, or did not submit to a medical exam until April 2019, or could
not cooperate with the production of his own expert's report. Thus, the judge's
decision not to extend the discovery period was not an abuse of discretion.
The connection between plaintiff's slip and fall and the exacerbation of
his seizures is beyond the ken of the average juror, clearly requiring expert
testimony. See Froom v. Perel, 377 N.J. Super. 298, 318 (App. Div. 2005)
("Expert testimony is required when the issue is beyond the 'common knowledge
of lay persons.'" (quoting Kelly v. Berlin, 300 N.J. Super. 256, 265-66 (App.
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Div. 1997)). Plaintiff was obliged to file a timely motion to extend discovery
based on his need to produce an expert report as to causation.
Plaintiff argues that the preliminary letter produced during the
reconsideration argument sufficed. The argument lacks merit because the
information on which it was based was available long before. Plaintiff's wife's
statements, the basis for the preliminary letter, were made during a deposition
taken November 30, 2018. Plaintiff underwent an ambulatory EEG in April
2019. Reconsideration was denied September 13, 2019.
"[A] litigant must initially demonstrate that the [c]ourt acted in an
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner, before the [c]ourt should engage
in the actual reconsideration process." Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274,
289 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch.
Div. 1990)). "Reconsideration cannot be used to expand the record and reargue
a motion." Capital Finance Co. of Delaware Valley, Inc. v. Asterbadi, 398 N.J.
Super. 299, 310 (App. Div. 2008). The belated production of the letter was an
attempt to expand the record and reargue the original motion. See ibid.Defendant's motion for summary judgment was also properly granted.
Employing the same standard as the trial court, as a matter of law, plaintiff could
not prevail. Conley v. Guerrero, 228 N.J. 339, 346 (2017) ("We apply the same
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standard as the trial court."). In the absence of a medical report and expert
testimony causally connecting the fall to the seizures, plaintiff could not
proceed.
Affirmed.
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