STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MICHAEL L. SANTIAGO (20-02-0179, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1831-20
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL L. SANTIAGO,
Defendant-Respondent.
_________________________
Submitted June 7, 2021 – Decided June 21, 2021
Before Judges Rothstadt and Mayer.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cumberland
County, Indictment No. 20-02-0179.
Jennifer Webb-McRae, Cumberland County
Prosecutor, attorney for appellant (Shari-Ann Sasu,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief, and
Andre R. Araujo, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and
on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
respondent (Morgan A. Birck, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
By way of leave granted, the State appeals from a January 28, 2020 order
allowing defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.
We summarize the relevant facts. On December 8, 2019, officers from
the Vineland Police Department responded to a reported stabbing. Upon arrival,
an officer spoke to the victim L.S. (Smith). 1 Smith, who suffered several stab
wounds to his torso, told the police he was asleep and heard a knock at the door.
When Smith opened the door, a man pushed his way inside and "started swinging
at [Smith] with a knife in his hand." Smith punched the assailant, knocking him
to the ground and causing him to drop the knife. Smith retrieved the knife, and
the assailant fled.
Smith described the assailant as "a Hispanic male wearing a denim jacket
and jeans who he kn[ew] as 'Kahuna.'" An officer at the scene identified
defendant as Kahuna and showed Smith a photograph of defendant. Smith
confirmed the man in the picture was his attacker.
The police issued a warrant for defendant's arrest on the following
charges: attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(1) and 2C:11-3(a)(1);
aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); unlawful possession of a weapon,
1
We use a pseudonym to protect the identity of the victim. R. 1:38-3(c)(6).
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N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d); possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-4(d); burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1); and aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2). The day after the stabbing incident,
defendant voluntarily presented himself to the police and was arrested.
On February 19, 2020, a grand jury indicted defendant for third-degree
aggravated assault, (count one); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon,
(count two); third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (count
three); and third-degree burglary, (count four).
On March 9, 2020, defendant pleaded guilty to count one in exchange for
dismissal of the remaining counts. 2 The State also agreed to recommend
defendant be sentenced to five years' probation.
Based on the closure of New Jersey courts due to COVID-19, defendant's
sentencing hearing was postponed several times. On December 1, 2020, prior
to sentencing, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant,
maintaining his innocence, claimed he pleaded guilty because he "did not want
to continually sit in jail for an undetermined amount of time." He further
asserted the victim made statements to various people, admitting "[the victim]
2
Defendant remained in custody from December 9, 2019, the date his arrest,
until March 9, 2020, the date of his guilty plea.
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knew that it was not [defendant] who stabbed him." 3 The State opposed the
motion.
On December 8, 2020, the judge heard counsels' arguments on the motion.
The judge decided "to adjourn both the sentencing and the motion for a period
of [forty-five] days in order to allow the State or the defense to have contact
with [the victim] to determine whether or not he continue[d] to be a viable
complaining witness."
The motion hearing reconvened on January 28, 2021. During the
adjournment period, neither party located the victim. The judge, understanding
"[a] rational person could [plead guilty] while still claiming innocence" to avoid
imprisonment, recognizing defendant's assumption of risk "by walking away
from a probationary sentence," and hesitating "to take a guilty plea from an
innocent person," granted defendant's plea withdrawal in the interests of justice
pursuant to Rule 3:9-3(e). While the judge found the matter was a "close case"
and both parties "made perfectly logical and correct legal arguments," he
acknowledged "in a close case[,] the scales usually tip in favor of the defendant."
He also noted withdrawal of the guilty plea was "a big roll of the [dice] for this
3
The record is unclear whether defendant learned of the victim's recanting
before or after his guilty plea.
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defendant. Because [the judge] suspect[ed] if [he] withdr[e]w [the] guilty plea
that the State [wa]s never going to give [defendant] a probationary offer again."
The judge's decision was "tempered by the fact that prior to sentencing[,] courts
should exercise their discretion liberally to allow pleas to be withdrawn,
notwithstanding the fact that . . . defendant[s are told y]ou can't change your
mind."
In analyzing the factors under State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 157-58 (2009),
the judge concluded "defendant has . . . at least provided some plausible basis
for the request. And the plausible basis is that his attorney can't find the
complaining witness and that he has been told . . . the complaining witness has
since recanted . . . ." Regarding the nature and strength of defendant's reasons
for withdrawing the plea, while the judge did not know why defendant sought
to withdraw his plea, the judge noted there "was a plea bargain. It was
advantageous to the defendant." On the fairness or prejudice to either party, the
judge, citing the interests of justice standard governing pre-sentence withdrawal
applications, explained he never "want[ed] to take a guilty plea from an innocent
person."
The State filed a motion for leave to appeal which we granted. On appeal,
the State argues the judge "misapplied the law, considered irrelevant and
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inappropriate information, and abused [his] discretion" in granting defendant's
plea withdrawal motion. According to the State, defendant failed to satisfy
Slater because: (1) he offered a "bald assertion of innocence"; (2) defendant's
desire to be released from custody was an insufficient reason to plead guilty; (3)
the existence of a plea agreement was an insignificant factor; (4) the State was
prejudiced by the withdrawal because the key witness was no longer available;
and (5) "[t]he State has an interest in the finality of its guilty pleas." We reject
the State's arguments.
We review a decision on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of
discretion. State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 404 (2015). An abuse of discretion
"arises when a decision is 'made without rational explanation, inexplicably
departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" State
v. Williams, 458 N.J. Super. 274, 280 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Flagg v. Essex
Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).
Before sentencing, a judge reviewing a plea withdrawal applies "the
interests of justice" standard. R. 3:9-3(e); State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 113, 123-
24 (1988). "[C]ourts are to exercise their discretion liberally to allow plea
withdrawals." Slater, 198 N.J. at 156. When a trial court decides a motion to
vacate a guilty plea, the court must consider "(1) whether the defendant has
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asserted a colorable claim of innocence; (2) the nature and strength of
defendant's reasons for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4)
whether withdrawal would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair
advantage to the accused." Id. at 157-58. While "[t]rial courts should consider
and balance all of the factors[, n]o factor is mandatory; if one is missing, that
does not automatically disqualify or dictate relief." Id. at 162.
Here, the judge properly applied the Slater factors in granting defendant's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Under factor one, defendant raised a colorable claim of innocence. A
colorable claim of innocence "rests on 'particular, plausible facts' that, if proven
in court, would lead a reasonable factfinder to determine the claim is
meritorious." State v. Munroe, 210 N.J. 429, 443 (2012) (citing Slater, 198 N.J.
at 158-59). The judge concluded the inability to locate the victim added
plausibility to defendant's claim the victim recanted his statement identifying
defendant as the assailant. The judge did not need to find defendant had a
winning argument, only that defendant's argument was plausible. Slater, 198
N.J. at 159 ("Courts are not to conduct a mini-trial. . . . They should simply
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consider whether a defendant's assertion of innocence is more than blanket, bald
statement and rests instead on particular, plausible facts."). 4
Under factor two, defendant had reasons for withdrawal of the plea. As
the judge aptly noted, whatever the reasons for defendant's withdrawal of the
plea, the judge could not rely on skepticism as a basis for rejecting the motion.
Slater, 198 N.J. at 160. ("In assessing the nature and strength of the reasons for
withdrawal, courts should not approach them with skepticism.").
Under factor three, a plea deal had been reached. However, a plea deal
has minimal weight in a trial court's Slater analysis. Id. at 161. ("We recognize
that the vast majority of criminal cases are resolved through plea bargains and
do not suggest that this factor be given great weight in the balancing process.").
The judge did not give significant weight to the existence of defendant's plea
agreement other than noting the plea was advantageous to defendant.
4
In the presentence report, defendant stated, "the account of events the victim
reported was not accurate," and the victim "changed his story several times about
what happened at the time of the offense." In ruling on the motion, the judge
expressly noted "the facts d[id not] make a lot of sense on a number of levels."
The inconsistent facts further bolstered defendant's colorable claim of innocence
and plausibility of his argument.
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Under factor four, the State was not unfairly prejudiced by the plea
withdrawal. Although the judge made no express finding regarding factor four,
the State never presented the arguments raised on appeal to the motion judge.
For the first time on appeal, the State claims, "an interest in the finality of
its guilty pleas, particularly where trials are suspended for the foreseeable future
due to the COVID-19 pandemic." However, the State fails to explain why an
interest in the finality of guilty pleas overrides a defendant's ability to withdraw
a plea where the defendant proffers evidence in support of the Slater factors.
Additionally, the State asserts prejudice based on the inability to locate
the victim. While the inability to locate a witness may result in prejudice, the
State was unable to locate the victim prior to the March 2020 plea hearing. The
State's claimed prejudice remained unchanged since the date of defendant's
guilty plea and therefore the State failed to demonstrate prejudice under the
fourth prong.
In considering motions to withdraw a plea, trial judges have broad
discretion. Under Slater, judges are encouraged to exercise that discretion and
balance the factors as appropriate. Despite the matter presenting a "close case,"
"the interests of justice" standard, Rule 3:9-3(e), warranted allowing defendant
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to withdraw his guilty plea. Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied the
judge did not abuse his discretion in granting defendant's motion.
Affirmed.
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