ROBYN D. FISHER VS. BOARD OF TRUSTEES (PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2135-19
ROBYN D. FISHER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'
RETIREMENT SYSTEM
Respondent-Respondent.
____________________________
Submitted April 12, 2021 – Decided June 25, 2021
Before Judges Sabatino and Gooden Brown.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Public
Employees' Retirement System, Department of
Treasury, PERS No. x-xxx379.
Stayton Law, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Herbert J.
Stayton, Jr., on the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Connor Martin, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Robyn Fisher appeals from the December 18, 2019 final agency
decision of the Board of Trustees (Board) of the Public Employees' Retirement
System (PERS) denying her request to reinstate her administrative appeal.
Fisher voluntarily withdrew her appeal of the denial of her application for
accidental disability retirement (ADR) benefits after the matter was transferred
to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for a hearing and the Administrative
Law (ALJ) heard testimony from three witnesses but had not yet issued an initial
decision. Because our review of the record in light of the relevant legal
precedents supports the Board's decision, we affirm.
We glean these facts from the record. Fisher was enrolled in PERS in
1992 when she was employed as a Security Guard for the Camden City Parking
Authority. Over the years, Fisher worked as a Clerk for the Camden City
Housing Authority and as a Confidential Assistant with the Camden County
Board of Elections, transferring her PERS benefits with each position. Fisher
ultimately left government employment in 2017.
On May 9, 2015, while still employed by Camden County Board of
Elections, Fisher "fell down steps" at City Hall in Camden, spraining her ankle
and straining her knee and back. Fisher fell while attending a teaching
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assignment for work. After the fall, Fisher drove herself to the urgent care and
was released within twenty-four hours. Fisher reported the injury to her
employer on May 11, 2015.
On November 3, 2015, Fisher "tripped on [a] curb, falling face forward"
at the Parks Department in Cherry Hill while she was retrieving "provisional
ballot bags" in the course of her employment with the Camden County Board of
Elections. She "scraped [the] palms of [her] hands [and] knees [and] hurt [her]
right shoulder." Fisher also "experienced [pain] in [her] lower back." Fisher
drove herself to the emergency room and was released within twenty-four hours.
She reported the injury to her employer the following day. A co-worker
witnessed Fisher "being helped up off the ground," but "did not see her fall."
On March 11, 2016, Fisher submitted an application for ordinary disability
retirement benefits (ODR). In her application, Fisher listed her disability as:
Cognitive changes since chemotherapy for breast
cancer in 2009-2010. Trouble processing information,
unable to focus or concentrate, unable to complete tasks
on time. Trouble finding [her] words, constantly
smelling cigarette smoke, daily migraines[,] and
vertigo. Falling and dropping things, bumping into
walls, dizziness. Panic attacks and constant anxiety,
major depressive disorder, social anxiety disorder.
Chronic pain in shoulder, knees[,] and ankles.
Weakness and fatigue.
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On February 16, 2017, the Board denied Fisher's application for ODR
benefits based on its determination that she was "not totally and permanently
disabled from the performance of [her] regular and assigned duties pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 43:15A-42 and relevant case law." The notification letter explained
that based on her "years of service," Fisher "qualif[ied] for a Deferred
Retirement," which meant she would be eligible to collect retirement benefits
following her sixtieth birthday. 1 The notification also informed Fisher that she
could appeal the Board's denial of ODR benefits within forty-five days, after
which the determination would be final.
On March 18, 2017, Fisher's counsel notified the Board that Fisher was
appealing the February 16, 2017 denial of ODR benefits and requested an
administrative hearing. However, two days earlier, on March 16, 2017, Fisher
had submitted an application for ADR benefits. In that application, Fisher listed
her disability as "orthopedic and neurologic residuals" stemming from the
November 3, 2015 trip and fall incident. 2 In light of the ADR application, on
1
Fisher was born in 1965.
2
"The main difference between [ADR and ODR] is that [ODR] need not have
a work connection. In addition, an [ADR] entitles a member to receive a higher
level of benefits than those provided under an [ODR]." Patterson v. Bd. of Trs.,
State Police Ret. Sys., 194 N.J. 29, 42-43 (2008).
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March 31, 2017, Fisher's counsel notified the Board that she was withdrawing
her ODR application and attendant appeal, electing instead to proceed with the
March 16, 2017 ADR application.
On September 20, 2017, the Board denied Fisher's application for ADR
benefits. The Board explained:
In making its determination, the Board noted that
Ms. Fisher filed her application on the basis of an
incident described as occurring on November 3, 2015.
Also, the Board considered an incident that occurred on
May 9, 2015 which was noted on the employer
certification.
The Board . . . determined that both incidents
were identifiable as to time and place, are considered
undesigned and unexpected and occurred during the
performance of Ms. Fisher's regular and assigned
duties. However, the Board determined there is no
evidence in the record of a total and permanent
disability as a result of either of these incidents.
In making its determination, the Board evidently relied on an August 12,
2017 Retirement System's Medical Review Board (MRB) report. The MRB
found "[n]o objective evidence for an orthopedic disability" based on a review
of Fisher's independent medical examination, medical records, and current job
description. As a result, the MRB did not "consider [Fisher] to be totally and
permanently disabled" and unable "to perform the duties of [her] job."
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Thereafter, Fisher filed a timely administrative appeal. On November 9,
2017, the Board approved her request for a hearing and transferred the matter to
the OAL as a contested case. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -31. On July 24 and
October 9, 2018, an ALJ presided over Fisher's hearing during which both Fisher
and the Board presented their respective cases. At the July 24 proceeding, the
ALJ heard testimony from Fisher and her orthopedic expert, and on October 9,
the Board's expert testified. The following day, October 10, 2018, prior to the
conclusion of the hearing and the issuance of an initial decision by the ALJ,
through counsel, Fisher submitted a signed "Withdrawal of Appeal" to the ALJ,
with a copy to the Board, "withdrawing [her] appeal of the denial of [her]
application for [ADR] benefits." The withdrawal neither explained the reason
for the withdrawal nor limited the withdrawal in any way.
Approximately three months later, on January 30, 2019, Fisher submitted
another application for ODR benefits, listing "orthopedic and neurologic injuries
to [her] right shoulder[,] bilateral knees[,] bilateral hands[,] right ankle[,] right
wrist[,] and low back" as the disability. On January 31, 2019, the Division of
Pensions and Benefits (Division) advised Fisher in a letter that she could not file
another application for disability retirement for her "shoulders, knees, hands,
ankle, wrist and back" because she was "not found disabled" in both her first
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ODR application and her prior ADR application, which she appealed and "then
withdrew." The Division determined that the September 20, 2017 denial by the
Board of her ADR application "stands as the final decision" and "[n]o further
[a]pplications for [d]isability [r]etirement for the same ailments will be
accepted."
On March 4, 2019, Fisher's counsel responded to the Division's letter,
explaining the circumstances of Fisher's withdrawal of her ADR benefits appeal.
According to counsel, when he arrived for the scheduled October 9, 2018 OAL
hearing during which the Board's expert was scheduled to testify, Fisher
"advised [him] that she had shoulder surgery scheduled." Counsel continued:
I spoke with the [Deputy Attorney General (DAG)
representing the Board] and advised him of this
situation and suggested . . . that our options were to: (1)
adjourn the testimony of [the Board's expert] until after
[Fisher's] surgery and re-evaluation; or, (2) to proceed
with [the expert's] testimony, knowing that he would
have to be recalled after re-evaluation. The DAG
indicated that he would have to call Pensions to discuss
the situation. After his phone conference with a
representative of Pensions, he indicated that his
directive was to proceed with [the expert's] testimony.
There then ensued some discussion with the [c]ourt
wherein I indicated that the most expeditious option
was to withdraw[ Fisher's] pending application, re-file
and resume the application process after [Fisher] was
re-evaluated. [The Board's expert's] testimony was
taken. At no time did the DAG indicate to me, or the
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ALJ, that Pensions would take the position set forth in
[the Division's] letter.
Consequently, I would request that this matter be
referred back to the [OAL] for resumption of the
hearing on [Fisher's] application for disability
retirement benefits.
On August 2, 2019, after reviewing counsel's "correspondence,
[c]ertification . . . , and all documentation in the record," the Board denied
Fisher's request to reinstate the appeal. In the notification letter, the Board
explained that
there was no requirement that Ms. Fisher withdraw her
matter from the OAL so that she may proceed with an
application for [ODR] benefits. Ms. Fisher had filed
and withdrew several disability applications, all
generally on the same impairments. . . . The matter was
ripe for a hearing before the ALJ and Ms. Fisher opted
to withdraw. Moreover, the regulations authorize the
Board to award an [ODR] benefit to an [ADR] applicant
if the member is found to be disabled from performing
their regular and assigned duties without the need for a
separate hearing or application. N.J.A.C. 17:2-6.7.
Thus, the ALJ had jurisdiction to consider whether Ms.
Fisher was eligible for [ODR] benefits.
The letter also advised Fisher of her appeal rights, specifying that if an
appeal was filed within the forty-five-day timeframe for appeal, the Board would
"determine whether to grant an administrative hearing based upon the standards
for a contested case hearing set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act,
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N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1[,] and the Uniform Administrative Procedure Rule, N.J.A.C.
1:1-1 et seq." Further, "[i]f the granted appeal involve[d] solely a question of
law, the Board may retain the matter and issue a final determination which shall
include detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the
documents, submissions and legal arguments of the parties."
On August 13, 2019, Fisher's counsel sent a letter to the Board appealing
the Board's determination that Fisher "would not be able to re-file an application
on conditions included in the withdrawn application," and that Fisher's
"withdrawal was a final disposition of the matter." Counsel specifically
appealed the denial of "Fisher's request to reinstate her appeal." The letter
notified the Board that Fisher would "rely on the procedural history of th[e]
matter, the transcript of the hearing and discussions on the record with [the
ALJ],"3 counsel's "[c]ertification dated July 2[], 2019,[4] the medical records and
3
In the December 18, 2019 final agency decision, the Board noted that Fisher's
counsel "neither cited to nor provided the hearing transcripts" in support of the
appeal. Although the July 24, 2018 transcript of the OAL hearing was provided
as part of the record on this appeal, the October 9, 2018 transcript that
presumably contained discussions on the record pertaining to Fisher's
withdrawal of her appeal was not provided.
4
Counsel's July 2, 2019 certification was not provided as part of the appellate
record. However, we presume that it was the same certification reviewed by the
Board in its August 2, 2019 denial of Fisher's request to reinstate her appeal and
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reports previously submitted as well as additional medical documentation and
information to be submitted on the issue of total and permanent disability from
the performance of her regular and assigned duties as well as causal
relationship." Counsel "requested that th[e] matter be referred by the Board for
an administrative hearing based upon the standards for a contested case
hearing."
On December 18, 2019, the Board issued a final agency decision
reiterating its denial of Fisher's request to reinstate her appeal. As a threshold
matter, the Board denied Fisher's request for an administrative hearing, finding
"no material facts in dispute." The Board then made "[f]indings of [f]act,"
reciting the procedural history of the matter. See Sloan ex rel. Sloan v.
Klagholtz, 342 N.J. Super. 385, 392 (App. Div. 2001) ("If a matter before an
agency does not present contested material issues of fact that can be decided
only 'after [an] opportunity for an agency hearing,' it is not a contested case
subject to transfer to the OAL." (alteration in original) (quoting N.J.S.A.
52:14B-2)).
that it recounted the circumstances of the withdrawal of the appeal contained in
counsel's March 4, 2019 response to the Division's letter.
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Next, the Board determined it was able to render "conclusions of law . . .
on the basis of the retirement system's enabling statutes and regulations without
the need for an administrative hearing." In that regard, in addition to relying on
the reasons stated in its August 2, 2019 denial letter, in denying Fisher's request
to reinstate her appeal, the Board added:
Under the Uniform Administrative Procedure
Rules, a party may withdraw their request for a hearing
on the contested issues before the OAL upon written
notice to the ALJ and all parties. N.J.A.C. 1:1-19.2.
Once a party withdraws their request for a hearing, the
ALJ returns the matter to the clerk and the matter is
returned to the agency head for disposition. [Ibid.] In
this case, you filed papers to withdraw Ms. Fisher's
appeal from the OAL. The Board notes that there is no
language in either document which limits the
withdrawal to a specific issue in the case, and the
withdrawal was not filed with any language respecting
whether it was with or without prejudice. In light of the
procedural posture of this case, the Board also found
that you failed to provide a reasonable basis or good
cause to reinstate a matter that was withdrawn from the
OAL, returned to the agency, and placed on the Board's
meeting agenda to note the withdrawal.
The Board also notes that there was no reason to
withdraw Ms. Fisher's appeal from the OAL in order to
pursue an [o]rdinary, rather than an [a]ccidental
disability pension. PERS members may apply for either
[o]rdinary or [a]ccidental [d]isability retirement
benefits. N.J.S.A. 43:15A-42, 43. Under both statutory
schemes, a member must establish a total and
permanent disability in order to qualify for either
disability benefit. [Ibid.] Moreover, the regulations
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authorize the Board to award an [ODR] benefit to an
[a]ccidental [d]isability applicant if the member is
found to be disabled from performing their regular and
assigned duties without the need for a separate hearing
or application. N.J.A.C. 17:2-6.7.
In this ensuing appeal, Fisher argues that "[t]here is no prejudice to either
party in re-opening the OAL proceedings to supplement the record with expert
medical testimony and/or medical records relative to the impact of Fisher's
shoulder surgery." She asserts that because "the interests of justice and a liberal
reading of the applicable pension laws support permitting [her] to reinstate her
appeal," the "Board's denial of her request . . . is unreasonable, arbitrary and
capricious."
Our review of decisions by administrative agencies is limited, with the
party challenging the validity of the administrative action carrying a substantial
burden of persuasion. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). Under our
standard of review, an agency's determination must be sustained "'unless there
is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks
fair support in the record.'" Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys.,
206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (quoting In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007)).
Thus, on appeal, our role is limited to the evaluation of three factors:
(1) whether the agency's action violates express or
implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency
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follow the law; (2) whether the record contains
substantial evidence to support the findings on which
the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying
the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly
erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably
have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 28 (quoting Mazza v. Bd. of
Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 143 N.J. 22, 25
(1995)).]
When the agency's decision satisfies those criteria, we are obliged to
afford substantial deference to the agency's expertise and superior knowledge of
a particular field, even if we would have reached a different result from that
reached by the agency. Ibid.; In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 657 (1999). While we
are not bound by an agency's interpretation of legal issues, which we review de
novo, Russo, 206 N.J. at 27, "[w]e must give great deference to an agency's
interpretation and implementation of its rules enforcing the statutes for which it
is responsible." Piatt v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 443 N.J.
Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting St. Peter's Univ. Hosp. v. Lacy, 185
N.J. 1, 13 (2005)). "Such deference has been specifically extended to state
agencies that administer pension statutes." Ibid.We acknowledge "the well-settled proposition that since pension laws are
remedial social legislation, they must be liberally construed in favor of the
persons intended to be benefitted thereby." Bumbaco v. Bd. of Trs. of Pub.
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Emp.s' Ret. Sys., 325 N.J. Super. 90, 94 (App. Div. 1999) (citing Steinmann v.
Dep't of Treasury, 116 N.J. 564, 572 (1989)). 5 Relying on this recognized
liberality in the interpretation of pension laws to benefit the members, Fisher
challenges the Board's denial of her request to reinstate her administrative
appeal as unreasonable.
Our Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he power to reopen
proceedings 'may be invoked by administrative agencies to serve the ends of
essential justice and the policy of the law.'" Minsavage for Minsavage v. Bd. of
Trs., Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund, 240 N.J. 103, 107-08 (2019) (quoting
In re Van Orden, 383 N.J. Super. 410, 419 (App. Div. 2006)). However, the
Board's exercise of that inherent power should be invoked only when a member
demonstrates "good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence." Id.
at 109.
5
While "an employee is entitled to [such] liberality . . . when eligible for
benefits, . . . eligibility is not to be liberally permitted." Smith v. State, Dep't of
Treasury, Div. of Pensions & Benefits, 390 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div.
2007). "Instead, in determining a person's eligibility to a pension, the applicable
guidelines must be carefully interpreted so as not to 'obscure or override
considerations of . . . a potential adverse impact on the financial integrity of the
[f]und.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Chaleff v. Teachers' Pension &
Annuity Fund Trustees, 188 N.J. Super. 194, 197 (App.Div. 1983)).
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In Steinmann, 116 N.J. at 565, and Duvin v. State, Dep't of Treasury, Pub.
Employees' Ret. Sys., 76 N.J. 203, 208 (1978), the Court determined that the
Board's inherent powers allowed members to reopen their retirement selections
based on considerations of good cause and reasonable diligence.
The pensioners in Steinmann and Duvin selected sub-
optimal retirement options. This Court held that the
Steinmann pensioner had shown good cause for
amending her pension designation and should have
been permitted to do so, and that the Duvin pensioner
should have the opportunity at further proceedings to
show good cause "for reopening his original pension
application and allowing him to claim accidental
disability retirement in lieu of early retirement
allowance. . . ."
[Minsavage, 240 N.J. at 109 (quoting Steinmann, 116
N.J. at 565, 577-78; Duvin, 76 N.J. at 205-06, 208).]
In Minsavage, the Court considered "whether a widow [could] modify the
retirement application of her recently deceased husband, who was a member of
the Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund . . . , even though his application was
never approved because he selected a retirement option for which he was
ultimately ineligible." Id. at 105. The Court held "that neither membership nor
prior approval of a retirement application [was] required for modification of a
retirement selection where good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable
diligence [were] shown," and remanded for the Board "to allow [the widow] the
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opportunity to argue in favor of modification under that standard." Ibid. The
Court pointed out that "[s]uch proof must include evidence that [the decedent]
qualified for ordinary disability retirement and that, but for his incapacity, he
would have changed his retirement selection to ordinary disability." Id. at 110.
Here, the interests of justice do not weigh in favor of allowing Fisher to
reinstate her appeal, which she voluntarily withdrew on the advice of counsel.
Unlike Steinmann, Duvin, and Minsavage, Fisher did not select a sub-optimal
retirement option. On the contrary, she selected an ADR, which "entitles a
member to receive a higher level of benefits than those provided under an
[ODR]." Patterson, 194 N.J. at 43. Fisher asserts she "exercised her right to
withdraw[] her pending application on appeal before the OAL with the intention
of rightfully re-filing an application for ODR benefits." However, as the Board
pointed out, if Fisher was found to be disabled from performing her regular and
assigned duties but ineligible for ADR, N.J.A.C. 17:2-6.7 authorized the Board
to award an ODR benefit instead, without the need for a separate hearing or
application.
Further, although Fisher's attorney subsequently explained the
circumstances of her withdrawal to the Board, at the time she withdrew her
appeal, the withdrawal was unconditional. Thus, her claim that she was unaware
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that "the withdrawal was with prejudice" rings hollow. See Maeker v. Ross, 219
N.J. 565, 578 (2014) ("[E]veryone is presumed to know the law. . . ."). Even
considering the circumstances of Fisher's withdrawal, a re-evaluation following
impending shoulder surgery was unnecessary because in order to support her
disability retirement application, Fisher had to prove that she was totally and
permanently disabled at the time she left employment in 2017. See N.J.A.C.
17:1-6.4(a) ("Each disability retirement applicant must prove that his or her
retirement is due to a total and permanent disability that renders the applicant
physically or mentally incapacitated from performing normal or assigned job
duties at the time the member left employment. . . ."). Thus, her condition
following shoulder surgery over a year later was immaterial.
Additionally, to support her request to the Board for reinstatement of her
appeal, Fisher's counsel indicated in his August 13, 2019 letter that, among other
things, Fisher would rely on the transcript of the October 9, 2018 hearing and
"discussions on the record with the [ALJ]" that purportedly related to the
withdrawal of her appeal. However, as noted by the Board in its final decision,
Fisher's counsel "neither cited to nor provided the hearing transcripts" in support
of the appeal. Likewise, Fisher failed to provide the Board with additional
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medical documentation on the issue of total and permanent disability when
afforded an opportunity to do so.
On this record, we are satisfied that Fisher failed to show good cause,
reasonable grounds, or reasonable diligence to invoke the Board's exercise of its
inherent power to reopen the proceedings and reinstate her appeal. Thus, there
is no showing that the Board's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable, or that it lacked fair support in the record to justify our
intervention.
Affirmed.
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