STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JASON BAKER STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. LUIS BELTRAN (94-06-0667, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2961-18
A-5023-18
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JASON BAKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LUIS BELTRAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Argued (A-2961-18) and Submitted (A-5023-18)
December 2, 2021 – Decided February 4, 2022
Before Judges Alvarez, Mawla, and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Cumberland County, Indictment No. 94-06-
0667.
James K. Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant Jason Baker (Joseph E.
Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; James K. Smith,
Jr., of counsel and on the briefs).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant Luis Beltran (Andrew R. Burroughs,
Designated Counsel, on the briefs).
Kaila L. Diodati, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
for respondent in A-2961-18 (Jennifer Webb-McRae,
Cumberland County Prosecutor, attorney; Danielle R.
Pennino, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
brief).
Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General, attorney for
respondent in A-5023-18 (Lauren Bonfiglio, Deputy
Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).
Appellant Luis Beltran filed a pro se supplemental
brief.
PER CURIAM
Co-defendants Jason Baker and Luis Beltran appeal from the January 29,
2019 imposition of concurrent life terms entered after a resentence hearing. We
affirm, but remand for a third hearing in light of the Supreme Court's decision
in State v. Comer.1
1
State v. Comer, ___ N.J. __ _ (2022).
A-2961-18
2
Defendants2 murdered an elderly couple during a home invasion burglary
on March 2, 1994. Before breaking into the isolated home through a basement
window, then sixteen-year-old Beltran cut wires he believed activated a burglar
alarm system, and almost immediately shot the wife four times, execution-style.
The group dragged the victim's body down the stairs and left her in a corner of
the basement.
The victim's husband returned home some forty-five minutes later. Baker
shot twice, striking the husband's cheek with the second bullet. The husband
fled the house and ran down the driveway, attempting to escape. The burglars
gave chase. When they caught him, one of them smashed the husband's head
with the butt of the gun, knocking him down to the ground, before the group
kicked and beat him. The trio dragged the husband back into the house where
they stabbed and pummeled him to death. The medical examiner found the
husband suffered twenty-seven separate injuries, including thirteen cut wounds,
four tear wounds, four fractured ribs, a bullet wound, and numerous defensive
wounds.
Beltran and Baker were prosecuted as adults. A jury convicted Beltran of
the following charges: (1) burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 (count one); (2) murder
2
A third participant is not involved in this appeal.
A-2961-18
3
of Margaret McLoughlin (Margaret), N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2) (count
two); (3) felony murder of Margaret, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count three);
(4) murder of George McLoughlin (George), N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2)
(count four); (5) felony murder of George, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count five);
(6) robbery of Margaret, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (count six); (7) robbery of George,
N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (count seven); (8) possession of a handgun for an unlawful
purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count eight); (9) possession of a knife for an
unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count nine); (10) unlawful possession
of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count ten); (11) unlawful possession of a
knife, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (count eleven); (12) criminal mischief, N.J.S.A.
2C:17-3(a)(1) (count twelve); and (13) false incrimination, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-4(a)
(count thirteen).
On January 13, 1995,3 the trial judge sentenced Beltran to two consecutive
life terms for the two murder convictions, each carrying the minimum mandatory
thirty-year parole ineligibility period. The judge merged the felony murders and
possession of a weapon for unlawful purposes, imposing concurrent terms for
the remaining offenses. We affirmed the convictions and sentences. State v.
Beltran, No. A-4362-94 (App. Div. May 23, 1997). Beltran appealed no further.
3
The judgment of conviction (JOC) was dated January 27, 1995.
A-2961-18
4
Beltran's third post-conviction relief petition (PCR) asserted his sentence
violated Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which declared mandatory life
terms imposed for juveniles convicted of homicide unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment. In light of State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 152 (2017), the Court summarily remanded for resentence.
Zuber extended the Miller doctrine to apply to aggregate sentences functionally
equivalent to life sentences. See State v. Beltran, 229 N.J. 151 (2017).
After Beltran's trial and sentence in 1995, Baker pled guilty to felony
murder as to one victim and murder as to the other. He negotiated for two life
terms, each subject to a thirty-year parole bar, with the understanding that the
State would argue for consecutive sentences. The trial court conducted the
sentencing hearing on May 18, 1995, and entered the JOC on May 23, 1995.
The trial judge granted the State's application and imposed consecutive terms.
Baker appealed, we affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied certification. State
v. Baker, 153 N.J. 48 (1998); State v. Baker, No. A-6326-94 (App. Div. Oct. 27,
1997). On April 10, 2017, on reconsideration of his third appeal of unsuccessful
PCR petitions, we remanded for resentencing in light of Zuber.
A-2961-18
5
On September 4, 2018, a different judge 4 conducted an extensive sentence
hearing. Defendants submitted their psychological evaluations, testimony from
Baker's psychologist, statements from the victims' family, and statements from
defendants' families. Defendants demonstrated that they had not committed
infractions in prison for many years, obtained several certifications and
diplomas, and enjoyed their respective families' support. The victims' grandson,
among the victims' family members who made statements, lamented that, due to
constant updates about defendants' various legal proceedings, "for almost two-
thirds of my life, I have not been able to go more than a month or two without
direct interaction with this crime."
Beltran's lengthy statement included a discussion of caselaw he
considered relevant, and a complaint that he only received the sentencing
memoranda from his lawyer and the State a few days prior. Before the judge
formally imposed the new sentence on January 29, 2019, the court heard
Beltran's supplemental written statement, which he had prepared the prior
weekend. During this additional statement, Beltran disagreed with his lawyer's
presentation regarding Zuber:
My confession does contain some facts about this case
but in the . . . sense, that we went there for guns and
4
The trial judge had since retired.
A-2961-18
6
[the victims] were lamentively [sic] killed are horrible
facts.
What happened and who did [what] isn't as clear.
For example, I have no idea why I confessed to kicking
[the husband]. Yeah, I don't remember doing so nor
confessing to it but I've seen that it's down in my
confession. I don't know why I said that.
Beginning with the submissions regarding Beltran, the judge thoughtfully
reviewed the information presented at the hearing, the trial, and the first
sentencing. He found aggravating factor one because of the horrific nature of
the crimes. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1). He also found aggravating factor three,
based not only on the more than forty total juvenile complaints pending or
adjudicated against Beltran at the time of the murders, but also because he
continued to pose "a substantial risk of [committing] new offenses if released."
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3). The judge gave substantial weight to aggravating factor
nine. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9). He also afforded great weight to aggravating
factor twelve, citing the ages and vulnerability of the victims. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(a)(12).
In discussing Miller and Zuber, the judge noted that this crime did not
result from impulse, or the casual possession of a gun. Defendants concocted a
plan, selected targets, and schemed ahead of time to shoot any occupants in the
home. The judge described this home invasion burglary as atypical because of
A-2961-18
7
the purposeful nature of the homicides, including the multiple assaults up on the
husband.
The judge found that despite the passage of time and Beltran's positive
growth, he still lacked appropriate maturity, still thought "in concrete ways,"
and failed to grasp the broader impact of his crimes. Beltran's limited insights
and remorse caused the judge to opine he had not been rehabilitated. The judge
therefore sentenced Beltran to the original life term subject to thirty years of
parole ineligibility, with the major change that Zuber "demand[ed]" the terms
be concurrent.
The judge added that, considering the weight of the aggravating factors
and total lack of any mitigating factors, the Yarbough5 factors would ordinarily
require a consecutive sentence but for Miller and Zuber. But Miller and Zuber,
in his opinion, mandated concurrent sentences. Yarbough would have ordinarily
resulted in consecutive sentences for two pre-planned murders committed forty-
five minutes apart during a home invasion.
The judge applied the same legal analysis to Baker. He noted Baker had
only three juvenile adjudications when originally sentenced. As with Beltran,
and for the same reasons, he found aggravating factor one. He also found
5
State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985).
A-2961-18
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aggravating factors three and nine. The judge did not believe Beltran had been
the "ringleader," but characterized the crime as a "collaborative effort." He even
called Baker the "precipitator of the action against [the husband]." Baker shot
the newly widowed husband in the face, in his own home, from two feet away.
Baker then chased the husband down the driveway, beat him with the gun,
knocked him to the ground, "and . . . kicked him in the head and stomped on him
. . . ." Baker and his cohorts carried the husband back inside his home, stomped
him some more, then ended his life by stabbing him multiple times with his own
kitchen knives.
The judge reiterated that this was not the typical situation where, for
instance, a convenience store clerk is shot incidental to juveniles committing a
theft. Under Yarbough, consecutive sentences would have been warranted had
Baker been an adult when he committed murders. While Baker appeared more
mature than Beltran, approaching rehabilitation, the judge had concern about his
psychological profile, including his history of animal abuse. Unlike Beltran,
who grew up in an unfavorable environment, the judge expressed fears that
"there's something else going on with . . . Baker."
A-2961-18
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In sum, the judge concluded, after thoughtful consideration of the
evidence, that the only thing that had meaningfully changed since the original
sentencing was the law—not the fundamental character of defendants.
On appeal, Baker raises the following points:
POINT I
IN RESENTENCING THIS DEFENDANT
PURSUANT TO THE DECISION IN STATE v.
ZUBER, THE JUDGE FAILED TO ADDRESS THE
BOTTOM-LINE ISSUE OF WHETHER
DEFENDANT HAD BEEN REHABILITATED
DURING HIS MANY YEARS IN PRISON AND WAS
"FIT TO REJOIN SOCIETY." ACCORDINGLY, THE
MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED ONCE AGAIN
FOR A PROPER RESENTENCING.
A. Zuber Requires That At A Resentencing The
Judge Must Determine Whether, In Fact, A
Juvenile Offender Has Been Rehabilitated, And
If So, That Offender Must Be Resentenced To A
Term That Will Allow For His Or Her "Release"
From Prison.
B. The Judge Below Failed [To] Conduct A Full
Resentencing In Compliance With Zuber.
1. Zuber's Directives For Resentencing
2. Jason Baker's Resentencing.
C. In New Jersey, Consideration For Release On
Parole Does Not Constitute A "Meaningful
Opportunity For Release Based Upon
Demonstrated Maturity And Rehabilitation."
A-2961-18
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On appeal, Beltran raises the following points:
POINT I
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED IS EXCESSIVE AND
MANIFESTLY UNFAIR AS THE SENTENCING
COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY CONSIDER AND
WEIGH CERTAIN MITIGATING FACTORS.
POINT II
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED IS EXCESSIVE AND
UNFAIR AS THE SENTENCING COURT FAILED
TO PROPERLY ANALYZE AND APPLY THE
RELEVANT MILLER/ZUBER FACTORS.
POINT III
APPLICATION OF THE MANDATORY MINIMUM
IN THIS CASE WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS
THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENT PRECLUDED
THE SENTENCING COURT FROM CONSIDERING
AND IMPOSING A SENTENCE CONSISTENT
WITH MILLER/ZUBER.
POINT IV
A LIFE SENTENCE WITH A THIRTY-YEAR
PERIOD OF PAROLE INELIGIBLITY IS ILLUSORY
AS PAROLE BOARD STATISTICS SHOW THAT
DEFENDANT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY TO HAVE A
REALISTIC OPPORTUNITY FOR PAROLE
REGARDLESS WHETHER [OR NOT] HE
PRESENTS EVIDENCE OF HIS REHABILITATION.
A-2961-18
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I.
Except for defendants' contentions that the murder statute's parole
ineligibility term is unconstitutional and that parole review does not provide a
meaningful opportunity for release, this would have been excessive sentence
appeals, albeit through the avenue of post-conviction relief because of Miller
and Zuber. However, the Court's recent decision in State v. Comer renders them
moot. See State v. Comer, ___ N.J. ___ (slip op. at 6-7).
The judge addressed defendants' sentences understanding that the
minimum sentence alternative for murder was thirty years of parole ineligibility.
That is no longer the case.
As in Comer, defendants were juveniles at the time of the offense,
although the double-murder home-invasion burglary does not appear to be an
example of children "lack[ing] maturity and responsibility . . . ." Id. (slip op. at
45). Defendants intended to commit murder. The victims were not slain
incidental to the burglary.
Be that as it may, a new sentencing alternative is now available—namely,
parole ineligibility of less than thirty years. See id. (slip op. at 58). At the
resentence hearing, the judge must again consider the Miller factors to determine
A-2961-18
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whether defendants have been rehabilitated and are more cognizant of the risks
and consequences of their actions. See ibid.Although the judge found neither defendant rehabilitated, he found neither
to be incorrigibly corrupt. For that reason, we remand the matter again for fresh
consideration of the sentence in light of Comer. Given the lapse in time since
the last resentencing hearing, defendants are of course entitled to present up-to-
date proofs regarding their conduct in the state prison system, or any other
information they consider pertinent to their personal development or to prove
rehabilitation.
Vacated and remanded for a sentencing rehearing to be conducted in light
of State v. Comer. We do not reach defendants' additional issues as they are
either made moot or irrelevant by this remand.
We express no opinion regarding the outcome of a Comer review of
defendants' sentences. As the Court said, such review allows "minors a later
opportunity to show they have matured, to present evidence of their
rehabilitation, and to try to prove they are fit to reenter society . . . ." Id. (slip
op. at 51). The Court also noted that "'[a]n unacceptable likelihood exists that
the' brutal nature of an offense can 'overpower mitigating arguments based on
youth.'" Id. (slip op. at 54) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573
A-2961-18
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(2005)). Thus, the court must "consider the totality of the evidence[,]" and
"explain and make a thorough record of their findings to ensure fairness and
facilitate review." Ibid.Vacated and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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