STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. WILLIAM BOSTONÂ (04-10-0985, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1483-15T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
WILLIAM BOSTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
———————————————————————————————
Submitted November 8, 2017 – Decided December 4, 2017
Before Judges Hoffman, Gilson and Mayer.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Cumberland County, Indictment
No. 04-10-0985.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (William Welaj, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Patrick D. Isbill,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant William Boston appeals from the May 27, 2015 Law
Division order denying his petition for post-conviction relief
(PCR). We affirm.
The case arose from the fatal stabbing and strangulation of
R.W. on the evening of July 30, 2002.1 We outlined the relevant
facts, and the issues defendant raised on appeal, in our prior
opinion affirming defendant's convictions for first-degree murder,
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1)-(2); first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A.
2C:11-3a(3); second-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2; third-
degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-4d; second-degree conspiracy to commit murder, N.J.S.A.
2C:5-2 and 2C:11-3a(1)-(2); and third-degree conspiracy to commit
burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:18-2. See State v. Boston, No.
A-4129-07 (App. Div. Aug. 21, 2012), certif. denied, 213 N.J. 568
(2013). After merger, the trial court sentenced defendant to
fifty-five years of imprisonment for the murder conviction, and
concurrent sentences on his remaining convictions. Id. at 2.
1
The State's medical examiner determined the victim's jugular
vein was severed, and she was also strangled. He opined that "the
strangulation and severance of the jugular vein were two
'competing' and 'virtually simultaneous' causes of . . . death."
Boston, supra, No. A-4129-07, slip op. at 6-7.
2 A-1483-15T1
On defendant's direct appeal, we rejected his arguments
regarding: 1) the inadmissibility of statements to the police
based upon his claimed lack of competence to knowingly and
intelligently waive his Miranda2 rights; 2) the trial court's
refusal to re-open his Miranda hearing, failure to allow him to
present a complete defense, denial of his right to confrontation,
admission of improper hearsay, and imposition of an excessive
sentence; and 3) prosecutorial impropriety. Id. at 2-5.
On March 4, 2013, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition, and
PCR counsel filed a brief in support of the petition. On May 19,
2015, the PCR judge heard oral argument, and on May 27, 2015, the
court denied defendant's application in a written opinion, without
an evidentiary hearing. On December 9, 2015, defendant filed a
notice of appeal.
Defendant raises the following issues on this appeal:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR [PCR], IN PART, UPON
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS PURSUANT TO RULE 3:22-
12(A)(1).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR [PCR] WITHOUT
AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO FULLY
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d
694 (1966).
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ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT HE FAILED TO
RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL REPRESENTATION FROM
TRIAL COUNSEL AS A RESULT OF COUNSELS' FAILURE
TO UTILIZE RELEVANT PSYCHIATRIC[,]
PSYCHOLOGICAL[,] AND MEDICAL TESTIMONY DURING
THE MIRANDA HEARING.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR [PCR], IN PART, ON
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS PURSUANT TO RULE 3:22-5.
Based on our review of the record and the applicable law, we
conclude these arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant extended
discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the
reasons set forth by Judge Robert G. Malestein in his cogent
written opinion. We add the following comments.
To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of
counsel, defendant must satisfy the two-prong test articulated in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984), which our Supreme Court adopted
in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). "First, the defendant
must show . . . counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth
Amendment." Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland,
supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693).
Defendant must then show counsel's deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. Ibid. To show prejudice, defendant must
4 A-1483-15T1
establish by "a reasonable probability" that the deficient
performance "materially contributed to defendant's
conviction . . . . " Id. at 58.
Rule 3:22-5 provides "a prior adjudication upon the merits
of any ground for relief is conclusive whether made in the
proceedings resulting in the conviction or in any post-conviction
proceeding . . . ." Thus, this standard's application requires
the "[p]reclusion of consideration of an argument presented in
[PCR] proceedings . . . if the issue raised is identical or
substantially equivalent to that adjudicated previously on direct
appeal." State v. Marshall, 173 N.J. 343, 351 (2002) (citation
omitted).
Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel assertion
attempts to re-litigate arguments he raised on direct appeal; to
wit, he argued the trial court erred in rejecting his motion to
suppress his statements because they were not knowing and
voluntary, and the corresponding motion to re-open consideration
of the Miranda issue. On defendant's direct appeal, we rejected
his arguments challenging his Miranda waiver. Boston, supra, slip
op. at 22-30. These claims are substantially equivalent to the
claims he asserts in this appeal, and thus are barred by Rule
3:22-5. PCR is not another avenue for defendant to submit the
5 A-1483-15T1
same arguments he asserted on direct appeal. See State v. McQuaid,
147 N.J. 464, 484 (1997).
In his PCR petition, defendant claims his attorney provided
ineffective assistance by failing to present psychological,
psychiatric, and medical evaluations at his Miranda hearing. The
record does not support the claim that defendant's trial counsel
was deficient. Regardless, even if counsel was deficient in
failing to present the expert testimony at the Miranda hearing,
defendant could not show prejudice, i.e. "a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, supra, 466
U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698; see also
State v. L.A., 433 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div. 2013).
Moreover, defendant's petition is time-barred. See R. 3:22-
12(a)(1). Defendant was sentenced on August 3, 2007, and his PCR
petition was filed on March 4, 2013. Thus, the petition was filed
out of time. We agree with Judge Malestein that defendant
demonstrates neither excusable neglect nor a fundamental injustice
resulting from upholding the time-bar. Notably, counsel
represented defendant on his direct appeal.
Defendant further contends the PCR court erred by ruling on
his petition without an evidentiary hearing. However, this matter
did not require a hearing because defendant failed to present a
6 A-1483-15T1
prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State
v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013) (citing State v. Preciose, 129
N.J. 451, 462-63 (1992)); R. 3:22-10(b).
Affirmed.
7 A-1483-15T1