SUSAN MANLEY VS. BOARD OF REVIEW (DEPARTMENT OF LABOR)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0118-17T4
SUSAN MANLEY,
Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
and METROPOLITAN PLANT
EXCHANGE, INC.,
Respondents.
__________________________
Submitted May 22, 2019 – Decided June 6, 2019
Before Judges Vernoia and Moynihan.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of
Labor, Docket No. 114,629.
Susan Manley, appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent Board of Review (Melissa Dutton Schaffer,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Rimma
Razhba, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Respondent Metropolitan Plant Exchange, Inc. has not
filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
Claimant Susan Manley appeals from a Board of Review (Board) final
agency decision adopting an Appeal Tribunal determination that she is
disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits because she
did not leave her job at a florist shop for good cause attributable to the work, see
N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), and ordering that she refund $881 in benefits she received
during her disqualification, see N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d). We affirm.
Manley was employed by Metropolitan Plant Exchange, Inc.
(Metropolitan), from May 31, 2016, until she resigned on January 27, 2017.
Following her resignation, she received $881 in unemployment compensation
benefits for the weeks ending February 18, 2017, through March 4, 2017.
The Deputy Director later notified Manley that she was disqualified for
benefits as of January 22, 2017, because she left work with Metropolitan without
good cause attributable to the work. The Deputy Director also determined
Manley was liable to refund the $881 in benefits she received. Manley appealed
the disqualification and refund order.
The Appeal Tribunal conducted a telephonic hearing on Manley's appeal .
Manley testified that in October 2016, she advised her supervisor at
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Metropolitan that she obtained a part-time job with another employer. Manley
said the supervisor reacted negatively to the announcement and thereafter
mistreated her. Manley testified that in one instance another employee, a
cashier, was selected over her to perform floral work while they were both at
work in Metropolitan's facility. 1
Manley also claimed that after working thirty-seven and a half hours per
week through October, November and December, the supervisor reduced her
weekly work hours to twenty-seven and a half beginning in January 2017
because Metropolitan's business slowed following the year-end holidays. The
hours of other employees were also reduced, and Manley acknowledged
Metropolitan's business slowed during the early portion of the calendar year.
Manley testified the supervisor said her hours would increase when business
improved. Manley searched for work with another employer due to her
dissatisfaction with the supervisor's purported treatment. She resigned from
Metropolitan on January 27, 2017.
The Appeal Tribunal found Manley voluntarily left her job because of the
working environment, but she failed to present evidence establishing the
1
Manley also testified the supervisor threw out her coffee cup, but admitted she
had no personal knowledge or other evidence supporting that claim.
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supervisor's behavior "was unduly harsh [such] that the working conditions were
so severe as to cause [her] to leave available work for no work at all." The
Appeal Tribunal concluded Manley was therefore "disqualified for benefits as
of [January 22, 2017,] in accordance with N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)," and ordered that
she refund the $881 in benefits she received during the period of her
disqualification. See N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d). Manley appealed.
The Board initially ordered a remand for a new hearing because a
complete and audible record of the Appeal Tribunal hearing was not available
for review. The Board vacated the remand order after receiving a digital
recording of the hearing. In its final decision, the Board affirmed the Appeal
Tribunal's findings and conclusion, upheld Manley's disqualification and
ordered the $881 refund. This appeal followed.
In her pro se brief on appeal, Manley offers the following arguments for
our consideration:
POINT 1
THE DECISION WAS INCORRECT, BECAUSE MY
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS WERE AWARDED,
AND IF THERE WAS A QUESTION REGARDING
MY ELIGIBILITY THEN THE BENEFITS SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED AT THAT TIME,
AND A NOTICE SHOULD HAVE
AUTOPOPULATED DURING THE APPLICATION
PROCESS TO ADVISE THERE WAS AN ISSUE.
A-0118-17T4
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AND IN ADDITION, WHY WOULD I CONTINUE
TO BE SENT A NOTICE FROM BOTH
UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE BOARD OF REVIEW
PROCESS SAYING I MUST CONTINUE TO CLAIM
BENEFITS OR I COULD LOSE ELIGIBILITY IF
THERE WAS A QUESTION ABOUT MY
ELIGIBILITY, AND THIS IS VERY CONFLICTING
INFORMATION.
POINT 2
WHEN I SPOKE WITH NANCY THE HR
REPRESENTATIVE AT METROPOLITAN PLANT
SHE ADVISED ME THE COMPANY WOULD NOT
DENY UNEMPLOYMENT TO ANYONE OF THEIR
EMPLOYEES SO WHY IS THERE AN ISSUE WITH
MY ELIGIBILITY.
POINT 3
AND IN ADDITION, WHY WOULD I CONTINUE
TO BE SENT A NOTICE FROM BOTH
UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE BOARD OF REVIEW
PROCESS SAYING I MUST CONTINUE TO CLAIM
BENEFITS OR I COULD LOSE ELIGIBILITY IF
THERE WAS A QUESTION ABOUT MY
ELIGIBILITY, AND THIS IS VERY CONFLICTING
INFORMATION.
Our review of decisions by administrative agencies is limited. In re
Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). The "final determination of an
administrative agency . . . is entitled to substantial deference." In re Eastwick
Coll. LPN-to-RN Bridge Program, 225 N.J. 533, 541 (2016). We reverse if the
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decision of the administrative agency is "'arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,'
the determination 'violate[s] express or implied legislative policies,' the agency's
action offends the United States Constitution or the State Constitution, or 'the
findings on which [the decision] was based were not supported by substantial,
credible evidence in the record.'" Ibid. (alterations in original) (quoting Univ.
Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 191 N.J. 38,
48 (2007)). "The burden of demonstrating that the agency's action was arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable rests upon the person challenging the administrative
action." In re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443-44 (App. Div. 2006); see also
Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 218 (1997) ("Claimants bear the burden
of proof to establish their right to unemployment benefits.").
Under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), a person is ineligible for unemployment benefits
if he or she leaves work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work.
N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b) defines "good cause attributable to such work" as "a reason
related directly to the individual's employment, which was so compelling as to give
the individual no choice but to leave the employment." "The decision to leave
employment must be compelled by real, substantial and reasonable circumstances
not imaginary, trifling and whimsical ones." Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J.
Super. 284, 288 (App. Div. 1983). Further, "[m]ere dissatisfaction with working
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conditions which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect health, does not
constitute good cause for leaving work voluntarily." Ibid. (quoting Medwick v. Bd.
of Review, 69 N.J. Super. 338, 345 (App. Div. 1961)). "In the wake of a voluntary
departure from work, the claimant bears the burden 'to establish good cause
attributable to such work for leaving.'" Ardan v. Bd. of Review, 231 N.J. 589, 603
(2018) (quoting N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(c)).
We discern no basis to reverse the Board's determination that Manley failed
to sustain her burden of establishing she resigned for good cause attributable to the
work. She did not present any evidence demonstrating she was subject to conditions
leaving her no choice but to resign. N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b). Manley argues she
resigned because she was subject to bullying by her supervisor. The record,
however, is devoid of any evidence supporting that characterization of her
supervisor's actions. She failed to present any evidence establishing a "cause
sufficient to justify [her] voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining
the ranks of the unemployed." Domenico, 192 N.J. Super. at 287 (quoting Condo v.
Bd. of Review, 158 N.J. Super. 172, 174 (App. Div. 1978)). The Board correctly
concluded she is disqualified from benefits following her voluntary resignation.
We also find no merit in Manley's argument that the Board erred by requiring
that she refund the benefits paid during her disqualification. N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d)(1)
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requires that a claimant refund benefits received while she "was disqualified from
receiving benefits." Manley contends she should be exempt from the requirement
that she refund the benefits because she received the benefits in good faith and
without fault. It is well-settled, however, that "N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d) requires the full
repayment of unemployment benefits received by an individual who, for any reason,
regardless of good faith, was not actually entitled to those benefits." Bannan v. Bd.
of Review, 299 N.J. Super. 671, 674 (App. Div. 1997). Requiring the refund of
benefits paid when a claimant is disqualified "furthers the purpose of the
unemployment compensation laws," prevents the depletion of the "Unemployment
Trust Fund" by "recoup[ing] benefits erroneously paid to an unentitled recipient,
however blameless he or she may have been," ibid., and is required by federal law,
see 42 U.S.C. § 503, for states receiving federal funds used to assist in the
administration of unemployment compensation laws, Bannan, 299 N.J. Super. at
675.
Manley's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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