STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. TAHEED HILL (13-01-0046, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0063-17T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TAHEED HILL a/k/a JAHEED
HILL, MARK J. HOLMES, and
JAHEED S. HILL,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Argued July 10, 2018 — Decided August 13, 2018
Before Judges O'Connor and Moynihan.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No.
13-01-0046.
John S. Furlong argued the cause for appellant
(Furlong and Krasny, attorneys; John S.
Furlong, of counsel and on the brief).
Monica do Outeiro, Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for respondent (Christopher
J. Gramiccioni, Monmouth County Prosecutor,
attorney; Monica do Outeiro, of counsel; Emily
M. M. Pirro, Legal Assistant, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Taheed Hill appeals from the denial of his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea to third-degree possession with intent
to distribute a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in a school
zone, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, arguing:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA WHERE THE TERMS OF
THE PLEA AGREEMENT REGARDING CONCURRENT
SENTENCES WERE NOT HONORED.
We perceive no error, much less clear error, in the judge's
decision to deny defendant's motion to withdraw his plea and
affirm.
Defendant reprises his contention made to the trial court
that "a scrivener's error in classification at the county jail
resulted in a hardship of constitutional dimension," arguing his
classification as a state inmate after sentencing on January 24,
2014 pursuant to his plea agreement — which called for a term
concurrent with defendant's sentence on a federal parole
violation,1 imposed on December 20, 2013 – deprived him of credits
toward his federal sentence which did not begin until he completed
1
Defendant agreed to an extended-term state prison sentence of
seven years with forty-two months parole ineligibility. At the
time of his arrest on the CDS charges, defendant was on supervised
release stemming from a federal conviction for possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon.
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his state prison term. He maintains that his prison term was
converted from concurrent to consecutive – "a manifest injustice"
constituting grounds for his plea withdrawal. R. 3:21-1.
We recognize a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is committed
to the judge's sound discretion, State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145,
156 (2009), and will only overturn a judge's decision if there was
an abuse of discretion causing the decision to be clearly
erroneous, State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 372 (App. Div.
2014).
"A denial of a motion to vacate a plea is
'clearly erroneous' if the evidence presented
on the motion, considered in light of the
controlling legal standards, warrants a grant
of that relief." State v. Mustaro, 411 N.J.
Super. 91, 99 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting
Slater, 198 N.J. at 164). . . .
. . . [W]here the court does not hold an
evidentiary hearing, we may exercise de novo
review over the factual inferences the trial
court has drawn from the documentary record.
State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420-21 (2004).
Thus, it is within our authority "to conduct
a de novo review of both the factual findings
and legal conclusions of the . . . court."
Id. at 421.
[O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. at 372-73.]
We therefore balance the four factors required by the Slater
Court to be evaluated in determining a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea: "(1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim
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of innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant's reasons
for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4)
whether withdrawal would result in unfair prejudice to the State
or unfair advantage to the accused," 198 N.J. at 157-58, and affirm
for substantially the same reasons expressed by Judge Joseph W.
Oxley in his written decision, adding only the following comments.
Defendant never asserted his innocence. He admitted his
guilt during his plea colloquy, acknowledged he sold drugs to the
presentence report writer, and – according to his attorney during
the motion hearing – accepted responsibility. We agree with Judge
Oxley's determination that the plea agreement should not be
afforded great weight; it does however weigh against defendant,
who has "a heavier burden in seeking to withdraw [this plea]
entered as part of a plea bargain." Slater, 198 N.J. at 160. We
likewise concur with the judge's finding that, although the fourth
Slater factor need not be considered because defendant did not
establish the other factors, see id. at 162-64, the State would
be prejudiced if defendant were permitted to withdraw his plea
because the passage of time from the commission of the crime on
August 3, 2012 hinders the State's ability to regroup law
enforcement personnel, laboratory experts and defendant's three
co-defendants. And we note that proficient defense counsel at the
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present trial would be able to challenge the State's witnesses'
ability to recall events from 2013.
In considering the nature and strength of defendant's reasons
for withdrawal, we heed the Court's direction and focus "on the
basic fairness of enforcing a guilty plea by asking whether
defendant has presented fair and just reasons for withdrawal, and
whether those reasons have any force." Id. at 159. "It is
fundamental that when a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement, the terms of the agreement must be fulfilled." State
v. Kovack, 91 N.J. 476, 482 (1982). "The terms of the plea
agreements must be meticulously adhered to, and a defendant's
reasonable expectations generated by plea negotiations should be
accorded deference." State v. Brockington, 140 N.J. Super. 422,
427 (App. Div. 1976). A review of the sentencing transcript and
the judgment of conviction confirms that both the prosecutor's
office and the court heeded the plea agreement and imposed a
sentence concurrent to defendant's federal twenty-month parole
violation. The court even released defendant on his own
recognizance (ROR), subject to a federal detainer, so he could
receive federal custodial credits.2
2
Defendant's merits brief and Judge Oxley's decision indicate the
bail was reduced on December 19, 2013; during argument on the
motion to withdraw, defense counsel stated the date was December
4, 2012, conceding however he might be "off on the date."
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Thus we agree with Judge Oxley and the State, as admitted by
defense counsel during the motion hearing, that the prosecutor's
office and court adhered to the plea agreement. We see no support
for defendant's insistence that "[t]o be sure, the State, not the
federal government, failed to carry out defendant's plea bargain."
During motion argument, defense counsel offered only his self-
described "educated guess" that a classification officer in the
Monmouth County jail – which, according to defendant houses both
State and federal prisoners – failed to notify federal authorities
that defendant should have been in federal custody. He later
admitted, "I don't know what happened," as to whether a
classification officer, "someone in Trenton," or someone at the
Central Reception and Assignment Facility – to which defendant was
sent after his State sentencing – "called someone at the marshal's
office, and [said], nah, we'll take [defendant]." There is no
evidence the State did anything to deprive defendant of the
bargained-for sentence. Contrary to defendant's contention, the
State relinquished control over defendant when he was released
ROR.
Defendant's request for credits should have been made in the
federal arena. This motion – the purpose of which, according to
defense counsel, was to vacate the State sentence, "await a
reclassification of [defendant's] federal jail credits" and, "if
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. . . acceptable to the State," thereafter withdraw the motion
under review and "consent to re-sentencing in absentia" – is a
back-door attempt to present a federal issue in State court.
Whether defendant is entitled to federal credits after his ROR
release is not for a New Jersey court to decide. A State court's
grant of defendant's motion to withdraw his plea will not correct
the "manifest injustice" defendant alleges. See R. 3:21-1. A
vacated plea will not provide defendant any federal credits; and
there is no guarantee he would be able to subsequently enter a
plea to the State charges. The case would be placed on the trial
list, having the impact we discussed when analyzing the Slater
factors.
After balancing all four of the Slater factors, we determine
defendant has not met his burden of substantiating his request
with "strong, compelling reasons." 198 N.J. at 160. Defendant
has not shown that the denial of his post-sentencing motion was
manifestly unjust, overcoming the "formidable barrier" created by
the acceptance of his guilty plea. Slater, 198 N.J. at 156-57
(quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)).
We deem the balance of defendant's arguments, including his
briefly mentioned contention – not raised below — that he was not
advised of the possibility his sentence would be served
consecutively, to be without sufficient merit to warrant
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discussion in this decision. R. 2:11-3(e)(2); State v. Robinson,
200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009).
Affirmed.
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