WILLIAM COBURN VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD (NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4921-16T3
WILLIAM COBURN,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE
PAROLE BOARD,
Respondent.
______________________
Submitted June 19, 2018 – Decided August 10, 2018
Before Judges Simonelli and Koblitz.
On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole
Board.
William Coburn, appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney
for respondent (Melissa Dutton Schaffer,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;
Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant William Coburn, an inmate of Northern State Prison,
appeals from the May 31, 2017 final agency decision of the New
Jersey State Parole Board (Board), which affirmed the decision of
the two-member Board Panel (Board Panel) to deny parole and impose
a thirty-six-month future eligibility term (FET). We affirm.
Following a jury trial, Coburn was convicted of first-degree
murder, second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful
purpose, third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, possession
of a controlled-dangerous substance with an intent to distribute
and possession of marijuana. On July 12, 1985, he was sentenced
to thirty years to life imprisonment.
Coburn became eligible for parole a second time on February
18, 2017. On January 6, 2017, the Board Panel determined there
was a substantial likelihood that defendant would commit a new
crime if released on parole at that time and denied parole based
on: the serious nature of the offense; prior criminal record;1
prior opportunities on probation and parole failed to deter
criminal behavior; prior incarceration did not deter criminal
behavior; commission of numerous, persistent, and serious
institutional disciplinary infractions since the last panel
hearing, with the last infraction occurring in December 2015;2 and
1
Coburn has no prior adult convictions, but had an adjudication
for truancy as a juvenile.
2
While incarcerated, Coburn was found guilty of committing five
institutional disciplinary infractions, including prohibited acts
2 A-4921-16T3
insufficient problem resolution, specifically, lack of insight
into criminal behavior, and minimization of conduct. The Board
Panel also found that:
[Coburn] blames the victim for basically
shooting herself. His version of the story
is not believable and does not stand up to the
evidence in the file. He has no understanding
of his violent criminal behavior and does not
show any remorse for the victim and only cares
about how this crime affected him. More work
needs to be done to address concerns for
parole.
The Board Panel also considered the mitigating factors:
minimal prior record; participation in institutional programs,
including programs specific to behavior; institutional reports
reflect a favorable institutional adjustment; and attempt to
enroll in programs but was not admitted.
Coburn administratively appealed to the Board. He contended
the Board Panel failed to consider material facts; its decision
was contrary to written Board policy or procedure; a Board Panel
member participating in the deliberations or disposition of the
case demonstrated personal interest, prejudice, or bias, which
affected the decision; and a Board Panel member participating in
the deliberations or disposition of the case failed to comply with
*.004, fighting with another person, and *.306, conduct which
disrupts or interferes with the security or orderly running of the
correctional facility.
3 A-4921-16T3
the Board's Professional Code of Conduct and the Parole Act of
1979.
Coburn contended that the Board Panel failed to comply with
the Board's Professional Code of Conduct by focusing on how the
victim lost her life, and tainted the record by falsely stating
he said the victim shot herself. He argued that he told the Board
Panel he was guilty of causing a person to lose their life, which
he lived with and regretted each day, and concluded that by
focusing only on the murder, the Board Panel was prejudiced and
judgmental. He also argued that the Board Panel said he lacked
remorse, but never asked him about his feelings, and the Board
Panel lacked the skills and professional training as a psychiatrist
to give an opinion on his feelings.
Coburn further contended that the Board Panel failed to
consider factors 7, 8, 13, 15, 18 and 20 of N.J.A.C. 10A-
71:3.11(b).3 He argued the Board failed to consider that he had
3
N.J.A.C. 10A-71:3.11(b)(7) ("[p]attern of less serious
disciplinary infractions[]"); N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b)(8)
("[p]articipation in institutional programs which could have led
to the improvement of problems diagnosed at admission or during
incarceration[]"); N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b)(13) ("[m]ental and
emotional health[]"); N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b)(15) ("[s]tatus of
family or marital relationships at the time of eligibility[]");
N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b)(18) ("[h]istory of employment, education
and military service[]"); and N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b)(20)
("[s]tatement by the court reflecting the reasons for the sentence
imposed[]").
4 A-4921-16T3
only five less serious disciplinary infractions throughout his
incarceration, had completed positive institutional programs, had
no record of any mental health problems, maintained employment
while incarcerated, had a good relationship with his family, and
the sentencing judge said he was reluctant to impose the ultimate
sentence imposed because Coburn had no prior criminal record.
Coburn posited that because he had no adult criminal record and
only an adjudication for truancy as a juvenile, there was no
support for the Board Panel's determination that there was a
substantial likelihood he would commit a new crime.
In a comprehensive May 31, 2017 written final agency decision,
the Board affirmed the Board Panel's decision. The Board reviewed
the evidence presented at and the electronic recording of the
hearing before the Board Panel, and found no evidence to support
Coburn's allegation of improper conduct by any Board Panel member.
The Board determined the Board Panel asked Coburn appropriate
questions in a professional manner, afforded him ample time and
opportunity to ask and answer questions and to speak on several
points, and listened to his answers, as evidenced by the Board
Panel's follow-up questions. The Board noted the Board Panel
discussed the shooting with Coburn, questioned him about the
circumstances of the shooting, never stated that Coburn said the
victim shot herself, and afforded Coburn the opportunity to ask
5 A-4921-16T3
questions at the conclusion of the hearing. The Board concluded
the Board Panel's questioning was appropriate and found no merit
to Coburn's argument that the Board Panel was unprofessional in
conducting his hearing.
The Board found the Board Panel reviewed Coburn's entire
record in rendering its decision, appropriately considered his
institutional disciplinary charges, and did not solely base its
decision on the negative aspects in the record, but rather, on the
entire record, governed by the factors set forth in N.J.A.C.
10A:71-3.11. The Board also found the Board Panel appropriately
determined that Coburn exhibited insufficient problem resolution,
specifically that he lacked insight into his criminal behavior.
The Board found that Coburn had been involved in treatment,
but gained little insight from the programs he attended. The
Board noted that Coburn's program participation and rehabilitative
efforts did not negate the fact that he still lacked insight into
his criminal behavior and minimized his conduct. The Board also
noted that although it appeared Coburn had made some progress, his
criminal behavior was deeply rooted, as evidenced by his
institutional infractions. The Board emphasized that although
Coburn acknowledged the serious consequences of his criminal
conduct, this represented only an initial effort at
rehabilitation. The Board found Coburn's admission of guilt did
6 A-4921-16T3
not equate to a change in his behavior, and concurred with the
Board Panel that based on the aggregate of all relevant factors,
there was a substantial likelihood Coburn would commit another
crime if released on parole at the time.
The Board found Coburn had not identified any material facts
the Board Panel failed to consider or any written Board policy or
procedure which the Board Panel's decision was contrary, or any
failure of the Board Panel to comply with the Board's Professional
Code of Conduct. The Board determined Coburn provided no evidence
to support his claim that a Board Panel member participating in
the deliberations or disposition of his case had a demonstrable
personal interest or demonstrated prejudice or bias in the case,
which affected the decision.
Lastly, the Board found the Board Panel considered the
aggregate of the evidence pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11, and
fully documented and supported its decision pursuant to N.J.A.C.
10A:71-3.18(f). The Board concurred with the Board Panel's
determination that a preponderance of the evidence indicated there
was a substantial likelihood that Coburn would commit a crime if
released on parole at that time. The Board affirmed the Board
Panel's decision to deny parole and establish a thirty-six-month
FET. On appeal, Coburn reiterates the arguments made to the Board.
7 A-4921-16T3
Our review of the Board's decisions is limited. In re
Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (citing Henry v. Rahway State
Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579 (1980)). The Board's "decisions are
highly 'individualized discretionary appraisals.'" Trantino v.
N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 173 (2001) (citation omitted).
"Accordingly, the Board 'has broad but not unlimited discretionary
powers,' and its determinations 'are always judicially reviewable
for arbitrariness.'" Ibid. The Board's decisions "depend[] on
an amalgam of elements, some of which are factual but many of
which are purely subjective appraisals by the Board members based
upon their experience with the difficult and sensitive task of
evaluating the advisability of parole release." Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 10 (1979). As
the Court observed, parole boards should focus on "what a man is
and what he may become rather than simply what he has done." Ibid.
Examining the record in light of the arguments raised, we are
satisfied that the Board adhered to these principles and its own
guidelines in rendering the final decision. The Board's findings
were based "on sufficient credible evidence in the whole record[,]"
Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 154 N.J. 19, 24 (1998) (quoting
N.J. State Parole Bd. v. Cestari, 224 N.J. Super. 534, 547 (App.
Div. 1988)), and are entitled to our deference. In the Board's
application of those principles to the facts, we find nothing
8 A-4921-16T3
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in its determination to
deny parole and establish a thirty-six-month FET. Coburn's
arguments to the contrary are without sufficient merit to warrant
further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
9 A-4921-16T3