MALIK ALI VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3807-15T2
MALIK ALI,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
______________________________
Submitted July 31, 2018 – Decided August 6, 2018
Before Judges Sabatino and Mawla.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
Corrections.
Malik Ali, appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney
for respondent (Melissa Dutton Schaffer,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;
Suzanne M. Davies, Deputy Attorney General,
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Malik Ali is an inmate serving a life sentence in
New Jersey State Prison. He appeals from a July 5, 2016 final
agency decision of the Department of Corrections, finding him
guilty under N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1 of a prohibited act, *.803/*.751
(attempting to bribe prison staff), and *.803/*.306 (attempted
conduct which disrupts or interferes with the security or orderly
running of the correctional facility). As a result of the finding,
appellant forfeited the $600 in his prison account.
According to the Department's findings, the facts leading to
appellant's adjudication were that he solicited his daughter to
receive money from a civilian. The money was used to pay corrupt
staff to smuggle contraband into the prison and launder money back
to appellant by way of money orders, which were in the exact
amounts of $200 and $400 each. The Department relied upon an
investigation by its Special Investigations Division ("SID") and
letters sent by a fellow inmate, R.W., to the civilian with the
money laundering instructions.
On his initial appeal, appellant argued he should have had
the opportunity at the original disciplinary hearing in November
2014 to adduce the live testimony of R.W. in order to attack R.W.'s
credibility, and potentially dispel the claim that appellant was
at the center of the alleged money laundering scheme. In June
2016, we remanded to the Department to consider appellant's request
for such live testimony.
On remand, the Department denied appellant's request for live
testimony, citing concerns that doing so would be hazardous to
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prison security and could create a sense of intimidation and fear
on R.W.'s part if he gave testimony that conflicted with
appellant's account. The Department relied instead on R.W.'s
letter, which named appellant as the recipient of the laundered
funds. The Department noted appellant had not requested additional
witness statements, and the written witness statement he had
procured was vague and self-serving. The Department additionally
found the funds from appellant's daughter matched the sum the
civilian had been instructed to give her in the letter.
On appeal from the remand determination, appellant argues the
Department did not follow the remand instructions, which he
believes mandated the live testimony of R.W. He argues he was
deprived of due process because the Department's determination was
based on evidence he could not review. He further argues he was
not adjudicated guilty of an offense that mandated forfeiture of
his prison account funds.
Our scope of review in this prison disciplinary matter is
limited. We generally will not disturb the Department's
administrative decision to impose disciplinary sanctions upon an
inmate, unless the inmate demonstrates that the decision is
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or that the record lacks
substantial, credible evidence to support that decision. See
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Jacobs v. Stephens, 139 N.J. 212, 222 (1995); Figueroa v. N.J.
Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 190 (App. Div. 2010).
Applying this principle of deference, we affirm the
Department's final agency decision. The Department has wide
discretion as to whether to allow live testimony in disciplinary
hearings. See N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.13(a)(1). We are unpersuaded that
the Department abused that discretion here, or that it violated
appellant's due process rights. Appellant had a fair opportunity
to review the SID evidence the Department relied upon. He does
not explain specifically how live testimony would have likely
changed the outcome.
Moreover, the evidence in the record relied upon by the
Department supports its determination, which was not arbitrary or
capricious. Finally, given that the adjudication was for money
laundering, the remedy imposed upon the finding of guilt
appropriately included the seizure of the laundered funds.
All other arguments raised by appellant lack sufficient merit
to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D) and (E).
Affirmed.
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