LINDA B. JONAS VS. EDWIN R. JONAS, III (FM-04-0259-89, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3696-16T2
LINDA B. JONAS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
EDWIN R. JONAS, III,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
Submitted May 16, 2018 – Decided August 17, 2018
Before Judges Nugent and Geiger.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County,
Docket No. FM-04-0259-89.
Edwin R. Jonas, III, appellant pro se.
Linda B. Jonas, respondent pro se.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Edwin R. Jonas, III, was once a prominent
Haddonfield attorney. His undoing has been his inexplicable,
obstinate, unlawful, and decades-old refusal to pay child support
and alimony obligations that have accumulated since his 1990
divorce. The extreme measures he has taken over the years to
avoid his obligations include removing the parties' children from
the country, attempting to dissipate assets, making false
statements to the court, and fleeing the jurisdiction.
There have been ten post-judgment appeals involving this
action.1 This is the eleventh. Here, defendant appeals from an
April 7, 2017 order denying the following relief: modification of
a May 4, 2006 order; vacation of October 22, 1996, May 19, 1999,
and May 23, 2006 orders; and costs and counsel fees. Defendant
also appeals the grant of plaintiff Linda B. Jonas' cross-motion
to enforce litigant's rights by compelling compliance with May 4,
2006, January 30, 2008, and December 29, 2011 orders. Lastly,
defendant appeals from an April 11, 2017 order denying his motion
to transfer venue.
On appeal, defendant argues the following points: (1) the
trial court erred in applying the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine; (2) all judges of the Camden County Superior Court should
recuse themselves due to the appearance of impropriety; (3) the
judge who decided these motions ethically erred by ruling on the
underlying motions before determining defendant's motion for a
1
The previous appeals, which detail this action's lengthy
procedural history, are: Nos. A-3104-90, A-4322-90, A-1309-91, A-
1431-93, A-1342-95; consolidated appeal Nos. A-3734-95 and A-1950-
96 (App. Div. Dec. 19, 1997); No. A-5857-98; No. A-5241-05 (App.
Div. Jan. 30, 2008); and No. A-1118-10 (App. Div. Dec. 29, 2011).
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change in venue; (4) defendant was denied due process because of
the lack of notice of the motion hearing and lack of an impartial
tribunal; and (5) the motion judge erred by barring defendant from
filing any further applications and by refusing to hear the merits
of defendant's motions.
Defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant
extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We
add only the following brief comments.
In one of the relatively early post-judgment proceedings,
defendant misrepresented to the court that he did not intend to
either leave the State with the parties' three children or
liquidate assets. He then left the country with the children,
bought a home in the Cayman Islands, and attempted to sell a
convenience store he owned. Jonas v. Jonas, Nos. A-3734-95 and
A-1950-96 (App. Div. Dec. 19, 1997) (slip op. at 4-6).
In consequence, on January 12, 1996, a Family Part judge
entered an order directing title to defendant's property in
Medford, his condominium in Florida, and his convenience store be
transferred to plaintiff. The order authorized plaintiff to "hold,
sell, liquidate or otherwise dispose of same for creation of a
constructive trust to ensure payment of spousal and child support."
Id. at 10-11. The order further provided the net proceeds of the
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sales should be held in trust by plaintiff's counsel and used to
pay outstanding support orders. Id. at 11.
We affirmed these orders. Id. at 26-27. In doing so, we
noted if defendant returned to the jurisdiction and complied with
the orders, the order of January 12, 1996, which required plaintiff
to maintain records of the trust, gave defendant "the means to
hold the plaintiff accountable" for any diversion. Id. at 27.
In a subsequent appeal, we recounted that in 2006 a Family
Part judge, considering a motion by plaintiff to enforce litigant's
rights and a cross-motion by defendant to compel an accounting of
the constructive trust, invoked the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine and dismissed defendant's cross-motion without prejudice.
Jonas v. Jonas, No. A-1118-10 (Dec. 29, 2011) (slip op. at 3). We
noted we had previously affirmed the Family Part judge's invocation
of the doctrine, as well as the judge's dismissal of defendant's
cross-motion. The judge dismissed defendant's cross-motion
without prejudice to future consideration provided defendant
personally appeared and posted a surety bond to cover all
outstanding judgments. Ibid. We continued:
Despite the clarity of this court's 1997
decision, which conditions defendant's right
to seek an accounting and appointment of an
independent trustee on compliance with court
orders, and the 2008 decision approving
application of the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine, defendant has not posted bond in the
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judgment amount, personally appeared in court
or even filed a certification signed by him.
Instead, he filed identical, consecutive
motions to vacate orders entered prior to 2008
and compel an accounting and appointment of
an independent trustee. Defendant's only
argument respecting his entitlement to be
heard on the motions was his attorney's
representation that he could not locate an
arrest warrant.
[Ibid.]
In the case before us, without posting a bond, defendant
moved for an accounting. He is now apparently willing to appear
in court. He makes numerous allegations of impropriety against
his former wife and her attorney, and he repeatedly refers to the
value of the property that the court ordered sold to enforce his
support obligations. Conspicuously absent from his pleadings is
any mention of the current sum of money he owes for twenty-eight
years of accumulated alimony and child support, including medical
and educational expenses for his children. Also missing is any
mention of any attempt he ever made to voluntarily pay so much as
one month of alimony or child support.
In view of defendant's continuing refusal to comply with
court orders and post a bond for either past judgments or current
support arrearages, we find no error in the trial court's dismissal
of his motion.
Affirmed.
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