STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOSE FRANCISCO REINOSO (10-07-1691, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5364-15T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOSE FRANCISCO REINOSO,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Submitted July 9, 2018 – Decided July 24, 2018
Before Judges Carroll and Rose.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Atlantic County, Indictment No.
10-07-1691.
Condon & Theurer, attorneys for appellant
(Kathleen Mary Theurer, on the brief).
Damon G. Tyner, Atlantic County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (John J. Lafferty, IV,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Jose Francisco Reinoso appeals from a June 30, 2016
order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) after
an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
I.
We discern the salient facts and procedural history from the
record on appeal. Defendant was born in the Dominican Republic
in 1959, and thereafter entered the United States in 1987. At the
time of his arrest on drug charges in June 2009, defendant held
the status of permanent legal resident, but he was not a United
States citizen.
In July 2010, defendant was charged in Atlantic County
Indictment No. 10-07-1691 with third-degree possession of cocaine,
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count one); third-degree distribution of
cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3) (count two); and third-degree
distribution of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone, N.J.S.A.
2C:35-7 (count three).
On November 15, 2010, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement,
defendant pled guilty to count two, as amended to third-degree
possession with intent to distribute cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
5(b)(3). The State agreed to waive any prison term and associated
parole ineligibility period that might otherwise be applicable
pursuant to the Attorney General's Brimage1 Guidelines, and
recommend that defendant be sentenced to a non-custodial term of
1
State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998).
2 A-5364-15T4
probation. The State also agreed to dismiss the remaining counts
of the indictment.
During the plea proceeding, defendant testified he was
pleading guilty of his own free will, he was satisfied with his
attorneys' services, and he had no questions for the court or
counsel. Defendant provided a factual basis for his guilty plea,
acknowledging he possessed cocaine with the intention of sharing
it with others.
On January 14, 2011, defendant was sentenced to a five-year
probationary term and ordered to pay applicable fees and penalties.
Among the various conditions of probation imposed, defendant was
directed to comply with any Immigration and Customs Enforcement
requirements. Defendant did not file a direct appeal.
Sometime after sentencing, the United States Department of
Homeland Security commenced removal2 proceedings against
defendant. Consequently, on June 16, 2015, an order of removal
was entered, and defendant was deported to the Dominican Republic
where he currently resides.
Defendant filed a timely PCR petition claiming ineffective
assistance of plea counsel. Specifically, he asserted counsel
2
"Removal" is the current statutory term for what was previously
referred to as "deportation." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 345
n.1 (2012).
3 A-5364-15T4
misadvised him of the immigration consequences of his plea, failed
to provide him with discovery, and failed to discuss the
possibility of entering into the Pretrial Intervention (PTI)
program.
On May 18, 2016, Judge Patricia M. Wild, who had not presided
over the plea or sentencing proceedings, conducted an evidentiary
hearing on defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
Defendant's plea counsel, Mark Roddy, Esq., and his associate,
Meredith Hamson, Esq., were called as witnesses by the State.
Roddy testified to his experience, having handled between two
and three thousand criminal matters prior to representing
defendant. He stated he met with defendant and was aware defendant
was not a United States citizen. Roddy was further aware that a
conviction on any of the drug charges would affect defendant's
immigration status. Based on his prior experience and the nature
of the charges, Roddy opined it was unlikely defendant would be
accepted into PTI, if he had applied.
After obtaining and reviewing discovery, Roddy characterized
the State's proofs as "fairly strong. It was a sale in a school
zone that the [S]tate had recorded with a consensual intercept
recording." Contrary to defendant's assertion, Roddy was "sure"
he reviewed the discovery with defendant.
4 A-5364-15T4
After that testimony was elicited, defendant's PCR counsel
advised the judge she "just became aware" Hamson was present in
court, and requested that the judge sequester Hamson. The judge
denied the application
on the basis that [Roddy and Hamson] are both
professionals. They are officers of the
court, and I see no prejudice to the defendant
by having them both here. As a matter of
fact, I believe it might be helpful to the
[c]ourt in moving the case along so that . .
. [the prosecutor] may be able to dispense
with some of the preliminar[y questions] with
respect to [Hamson].
Roddy then continued his testimony, responding to the
prosecutor's questions on direct examination as follows:
Q. Did you ever inform the defendant that if
he accepted the plea he, and I quote, wasn't
going anywhere?
A. No. I wouldn't say that.
Q. Was it your understanding at the time of
the plea that a plea to intent to distribute
was an aggravated felony requiring mandatory
deportation?
A. It's an aggravated felony. There's no
question about it. What the feds do is up to
them.
Q. And is it your practice to inform clients
of potential immigration consequences such as
deportation?
A. I have been doing that since 1993.
5 A-5364-15T4
Q. Do you have any recollection if you
informed the defendant that he would be
deported if he accepted the plea?
A. I don't recall a specific conversation. I
know that I would have told him because I tell
everybody the same thing. . . .
Q. What would you have told him?
A. I'd tell him he's deportable. I'd say
you're more deportable if you go to jail
because the feds come to the county jail once
a week and see who's in there and what they're
in there for and whether they're citizens. So
I said that's . . . number one. I would have
told him that I've had people that have been
charged with more serious stuff that have
ducked deportation and people that are charged
with less serious stuff that have been
deported. So, there's no[] guarantee. The
feds do whatever they're [going to] do. But
I know that it increases your chances of
success if you're not locked up because that's
normally who they focus on. I would have told
him that.
On cross-examination, Roddy indicated he recommended that
defendant consult with an immigration lawyer prior to entering his
guilty plea.
Hamson worked as Roddy's associate and she appeared with
defendant at the November 15, 2010 plea proceedings. Hamson was
aware defendant was not a United States citizen, and she had prior
experience representing non-citizens in removal proceedings. Like
Roddy, Hamson was also aware that a conviction on any of the
charges would affect defendant's immigration status.
6 A-5364-15T4
Hamson testified she circled the answers to the questions on
the plea form based on the responses she received from defendant.
These included the answers to question 17, which reflected that
defendant was not a United States citizen, and that he understood
he might be deported by virtue of his guilty plea, he would be
subject to deportation/removal if his plea of guilty was to a
crime considered an "aggravated felony" under federal law, and he
had the right to seek legal advice on his immigration status prior
to entering a plea of guilty.
As noted, defendant had already been removed to the Dominican
Republic and consequently he testified telephonically at the
hearing. According to defendant, although he had met with Roddy
twice at Roddy's office, and thereafter at the courthouse, at no
time did Roddy review the discovery or discuss the PTI program
with him.
With respect to the immigration issue, defendant testified
as follows:
Q. Did Mr. Roddy explain to you the charge
that they wanted you to plead guilty to?
A. Yes. . . .
Q. And did he advise you of any immigration
consequences resulting from your plea of
guilt[y]?
7 A-5364-15T4
A. At no time. He told me that there wouldn't
be any problems that I was going any place.
That's what he told me.
Q. So you asked him if there would be any
deportation consequences?
A. Yes. I asked him if I would have problems
with my documents. And he said you wouldn't
have any problems. That's [the] same words
he used.
Q. Did . . . Mr. Roddy indicate why, if at
all, the plea offer was a good plea offer?
A. No. He did not explain it. No.
Q. Did he advise you of . . . the likely
consequences if you did not take the plea?
A. He told me that there was a video. I never
saw it because I never sell [drugs]. But he
said that there was a call made from my
telephone about selling drugs and that I could
get six months in jail and that's why I . . .
pled guilty.
Q. And so . . . . If you knew you could be
deported, would you have pled guilty?
A. No. I would have gone to trial even if I
would have gotten five years in prison. If I
would have known I was going to be deported.
He never said anything to me ever.
Defendant also denied speaking with Hamson about deportation
at the time he initialed and signed the plea form. On cross-
examination, however, defendant testified he could not recall
whether Hamson reviewed the questions on the plea form with him
or circled the answers on the plea form.
8 A-5364-15T4
On June 30, 2016, Judge Wild entered an order denying
defendant's PCR petition. In her comprehensive written opinion
that accompanied the order, the judge found the testimony of Roddy
and Hamson credible. By contrast, Judge Wild found defendant was
not a credible witness due to "several inconsistencies in his
testimony" and because portions of his testimony were contradicted
by his testimony during the plea hearing. Ultimately, the judge
found "[defendant's] testimony that he was not informed of the PTI
program; not informed of immigration consequences; and that he
entered his plea 'under pressure' is simply not credible." This
appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant argues:
POINT I
THE COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENSE COUNSEL'S
REQUEST FOR SEQUESTRATION OF STATE'S WITNESS
WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
POINT II
THE COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF.
II.
A.
We first address defendant's contention that the trial
court's failure to sequester Hamson constitutes reversible error.
9 A-5364-15T4
We conclude this argument does not warrant extended discussion.
We add the following brief comments.
Trial courts have discretion to order the sequestration of
witnesses. State v. Miller, 299 N.J. Super. 387, 399 (App. Div.
1997). Pursuant to N.J.R.E. 615, "At the request of a party or
on the court's own motion, the court may, in accordance with law,
enter an order sequestering witnesses." The purpose of
sequestration is to prevent prospective witnesses from hearing
other witnesses testify so that a witness' testimony is not shaped
or tailored by another witness' testimony. State v. Williams, 404
N.J. Super. 147, 160 (App. Div. 2008). A witness who violates a
sequestration order may be barred from giving testimony at trial.
State v. Dayton, 292 N.J. Super. 76, 89 (App. Div. 1996).
Nevertheless, "Absent a clear showing of prejudice[,] an
inadvertent violation of a sequestration order does not trigger
automatic exclusion of the witness' testimony." Williams, 404
N.J. Super. at 160.
Here, we agree with defendant that the status of Roddy and
Hamson as attorneys should not serve as a per se basis to deny
sequestration. Nonetheless, defendant has failed to identify any
prejudice that resulted because Hamson was not sequestered.
Initially, we note the sequestration request was not made until
Roddy had given substantial testimony at the hearing. Moreover,
10 A-5364-15T4
Roddy primarily testified to the plea negotiations and his pre-
plea conversations with defendant, while Hamson's testimony
focused on the plea hearing itself, at which Roddy was not present.
Because their testimony essentially did not converge, the risk of
Hamson tailoring her testimony after hearing Roddy testify was
minimal. Accordingly, under the facts presented, we find no abuse
of discretion in the court's decision to deny defendant's belated
sequestration application that would warrant granting a new
hearing or suppressing Hamson's testimony.
B.
We next address defendant's contention that the trial court
erroneously denied his PCR petition. In doing so, we review the
legal conclusions of a PCR court and mixed questions of fact and
law under the de novo standard of review. State v. Harris, 181
N.J. 391, 420 (2004). Where an evidentiary hearing has been held,
we accord deference "[i]n reviewing a PCR court's factual findings
based on live testimony" and should not disturb "the PCR court's
findings that are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the
record." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 576 (2015) (quoting State
v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013)).
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee
that a defendant in a criminal proceeding has the right to the
11 A-5364-15T4
assistance of counsel in his defense. The right to counsel
includes "the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Nash,
212 N.J. at 541 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
686 (1984)).
In Strickland, the Court established a two-part test, later
adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58
(1987), to determine whether a defendant has been deprived of the
effective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Under the first prong of the Strickland standard, a petitioner
must show that counsel's performance was deficient. It must be
demonstrated that counsel's handling of the matter "fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness" and that "counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687-88.
Under the second prong of the Strickland standard, a defendant
"must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense."
Id. at 687. There must be a "reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." Id. at 694. In the context of a PCR
petition challenging a guilty plea based on the ineffective
assistance of counsel, the second prong is established when the
defendant demonstrates a "reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and
12 A-5364-15T4
would have insisted on going to trial." State v. Nuñez-Valdéz,
200 N.J. 129, 142 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting State
v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)).
A petitioner must establish both prongs of the Strickland
standard in order to obtain a reversal of the challenged
conviction. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52;
Nash, 212 N.J. at 542. "With respect to both prongs of the
Strickland test, a defendant asserting ineffective assistance of
counsel on PCR bears the burden of proving his or her right to
relief by a preponderance of the evidence." Gaitan, 209 N.J. at
350; see also State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 357 (2009); State v.
Goodwin, 173 N.J. 583, 593 (2002). A failure to satisfy either
prong of the Strickland standard requires the denial of a petition
for PCR. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.
In the context of plea agreements of non-citizen defendants,
the performance of plea counsel is deficient under the first prong
of the Strickland standard where counsel "provides false or
misleading information concerning the deportation consequences of
a plea of guilty." Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. at 138. In addition,
in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), the United States
Supreme Court held that plea counsel "is required to address, in
some manner, the risk of immigration consequences of a non-citizen
13 A-5364-15T4
defendant's guilty plea."3 State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285,
295 (App. Div. 2016) (citing Padilla, 559 U.S. at 367). The
Padilla Court created a "two-tiered analytical structure for
assessing the duty of effective assistance," which "depend[s] on
the certainty of immigration consequences flowing from the plea."
Gaitan, 209 N.J. at 356, 380.
"[I]mmigration law is often complex, and the consequences of
a conviction are often far from clear." Blake, 444 N.J. Super.
at 295 (citing Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369). In circumstances where
"the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, clear,
and explicit in defining the removal consequence[s,]" then an
attorney is obliged to be "equally clear." Padilla, 559 U.S. at
368-69. Counsel's failure "to point out to a noncitizen client
that he or she is pleading to a mandatorily removable offense
[constitutes] deficient performance of counsel." Blake, 444 N.J.
Super. at 300 (quoting Gaitan, 209 N.J. at 380).
We are convinced defendant failed to sustain his burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his plea counsel's
performance was deficient under the first prong of the Strickland
standard. The credible evidence in the record supports the court's
finding that Roddy did not provide misleading advice to defendant
3
The holding in Padilla applied prospectively, and is applicable
to defendant's plea here. Gaitan, 209 N.J. at 380.
14 A-5364-15T4
regarding the immigration consequences of his plea. Nuñez-Valdéz,
200 N.J. at 139-40. Roddy specifically denied advising defendant
that he would not be deported. Although defendant testified to
the contrary, we defer to Judge Wild's determination that Roddy's
testimony was credible and defendant's testimony was not. See
State v. L.A., 433 N.J. Super. 1, 17 (App. Div. 2013) ("When
reviewing a PCR court's determination, we generally defer to the
court's factual findings, including credibility determinations,
if they are supported by 'adequate, substantial and credible
evidence.'" (quoting Harris, 181 N.J. at 415)).
Moreover, the credible evidence supports the court's
conclusion that Roddy provided constitutionally effective
assistance by advising defendant that he was deportable and that
he had the opportunity to confer with immigration counsel.
Notably, Judge Wild also found credible Hamson's testimony that
defendant provided affirmative responses to the questions on the
plea form confirming he understood he may be deported and had the
opportunity to confer with immigration counsel. Defendant
therefore did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
plea counsel's performance was deficient under the first prong of
the Strickland standard.
We are also satisfied that defendant did not sustain his
burden of establishing the second prong of the Strickland standard
15 A-5364-15T4
because he failed to present "sufficient evidence to show 'a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [he or she]
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.'" State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 376 (App. Div.
2014) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
Defendant was required to demonstrate that "had he been properly
advised, it would have been rational for him to decline the plea
offer and insist on going to trial and, in fact, that he probably
would have done so[.]" State v. Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. 475, 486
(App. Div. 2011) (citing Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372).
Defendant did not offer any evidence beyond his bare
conclusory assertion that he would not have pled guilty had he
known of the immigration consequences. Standing alone, this does
not demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel's
alleged deficiency defendant would not have accepted the plea
bargain. See State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App.
Div. 1999) (holding "a petitioner must do more than make bald
assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel").
Defendant's remaining arguments with respect to counsel's
alleged failure to review discovery with him or advise him of the
availability of the PTI program are without sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
16 A-5364-15T4
Defendant's failure to prove both prongs of the Strickland standard
by a preponderance of the evidence required the denial of his PCR
petition. Nash, 212 N.J. at 542.
Affirmed.
17 A-5364-15T4