KRIZ RAMROOP VS. STEVEN A. RAMROOP (L-2353-17, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1289-17T1
KRIZ RAMROOP, RAWLSON RAMROOP,
ELIZABETH MOHABIR, and AMANDA
GOSSAI,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
STEVEN A. RAMROOP and LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents.
______________________________________
Submitted September 24, 2018 – Decided October 11, 2018
Before Judges Sabatino and Sumners.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-2353-17.
Manning, Caliendo & Thomson, PA, attorneys for
appellants (Vincent P. Manning, on the brief).
Law Offices of Styliades and Jackson, attorneys for
respondents (Madhumita Dey, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiffs Kriz Ramroop, Rawlson Ramroop, Elizabeth Mohabir, and
Amanda Gossai, were passengers in a car owned and operated by defendant
Steven A. Ramroop and insured by defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,
which was involved in an automobile accident. They appeal from the motion
court's order granting defendants' motion to dismiss their complaint because it
was filed the day after the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations period
for personal injury claims. Since plaintiffs did not assert any viable equitable
basis to toll the statute of limitations, we affirm.
The motion record revealed the following. On August 16, 2015, Steven
A. Ramroop was driving his car, in which plaintiffs were passengers, when he
lost control, causing it to overturn and collide into a utility pole. Two weeks
later, Liberty Mutual informed plaintiffs that it would provide them with
Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits under Ramroop's policy upon their
submission of various requested documentation.1
1
With respect to Mohabir, the carrier changed its position and denied her PIP
benefits a little over a year later after it discovered that she resided in a
household where there were "several vehicles registered" to a single family
member.
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On November 16, Liberty Mutual denied plaintiffs' claims for personal
injuries based on its position that their respective injuries did not vault the verbal
threshold.
On August 17, 2017, at 5:14 p.m. – two years and a day after the car
accident – plaintiffs e-filed their personal injury complaint against defendants.
In lieu of filing an answer, defendants filed a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a claim on the basis that the complaint was filed
after expiration of the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims
prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a).
Commenting that it was "loathe" to dismiss plaintiffs' claims when their
complaint was filed seventeen hours late, 2 the court granted defendants' motion
to dismiss based upon N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a). The court stated there was no doubt
that plaintiffs were aware their claims arose on August 16, 2015, thus there were
no equitable principles, such as discovery of their claims, to toll the statute of
limitations after the accident date, as was recognized in Negron v. Llarena, 156
N.J. 296, 300 (1998) and W.V. Pangborne & Co., Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Transp.,
116 N.J. 543, 563 (1989). This appeal followed.
2
The complaint was e-filed on August 17.
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3
Although defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, R. 4:6-2(e), and the court entered
an order dismissing the complaint, we consider the order as one granting
summary judgment because the court considered facts beyond those alleged in
the complaint, R. 4:6-2(e). We therefore review the court's order de novo,
applying the same standard as the trial court. Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Human
Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 330 (2010). We determine whether defendants, as the
moving party, demonstrated the absence of genuine issues of material fact, and
whether the court correctly determined defendants were entitled to judgment as
a matter of law, owing no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. N.J.
Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Alloway Twp., 438 N.J. Super. 501, 507 (App. Div.
2015).
There is no dispute that the complaint was filed a day after the two-year
limitations period applicable to personal injury actions. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a).
Plaintiffs, however, argue the statute of limitations should have been relaxed
because they substantially complied with the statute. We disagree.
Statutes of limitations "are based on the goals of achieving security and
stability in human affairs and ensuring that cases are not tried on the basis of
stale evidence." Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 256 (1982). "Consistent with
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that purpose, 'where defendants are on notice of the claims, and no significant
prejudice results, the policy reasons for upholding a strict statute of limitations
recede.'" Price v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 182 N.J. 519, 524 (2005) (quoting W.V.
Pangborne & Co., Inc., 116 N.J. at 563)). Thus, "[f]lexible applications of
procedural statutes of limitations may be based on equitable principles, such as
the discovery rule, or estoppel[.]" Id. at 524-25 (internal citation omitted).
Here, there was no equitable reason to toll the statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs were well aware that their injury claims arose when the accident
occurred on August 16, 2015, and there was no "intentional inducement or
trickery by . . . defendant[s]," which caused plaintiffs to miss the filing deadline.
Binder v. Price Waterhouse & Co., LLP, 393 N.J. Super. 304, 313 (App. Div.
2007) (citation omitted). Even though defendants did not contend the late filing
prejudiced them, plaintiffs' tardy filing cannot be overlooked absent a sufficient
equitable reason. None of the cases cited by plaintiffs afford them relief from
the application of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a) under the circumstances of this case.
Simply put, there is no grace period that allows a delay in the enforcement of
the statute and the unfortunate effect of dismissing plaintiffs' complaint because
it was filed a day late.
Affirmed.
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