STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DARRELL R. CRONE (14-09-2774, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0420-15T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DARRELL R. CRONE, a/k/a DARRYL
GRIER, DARNELL RASHAWN,
DARRELL R. GREER, and DARRELL
G. CRONE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________
Submitted September 24, 2018 – Decided October 2, 2018
Before Judges Fasciale and Rose.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 14-09-2774.
Jill R. Cohen, attorney for appellant.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Evgeniya Sitnikova, Deputy Attorney
General, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from his convictions for first-degree aggravated
manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1); first-degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A.
2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)(2); second-degree possession of a weapon
for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); second-degree unlawful
possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and second-degree certain persons
not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b). We affirm.
On appeal, defendant argues:
POINT I
THE . . . [JUDGE] IMPROPERLY INQUIRED INTO
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S TRIAL STRATEGY, WHICH
VIOLATED THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
(not raised below).
POINT II
THE LEAD DETECTIVE FROM THE
PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN ALLOWED TO NARRATE FOR THE JURY
WHAT HE BELIEVED THE VIDEO
SURVEILLANCE DEPICTS (not raised below).
POINT III
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE PHOTOGRAPH OF
DEFENDANT WEARING A BRACELET
IDENTICAL TO S-1 AFTER TWO WEEKS OF
TESTIMONY AND IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE
CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE WAS AN
IMPROPER DISCOVERY VIOLATION, SO
AFFECTING THE OUTCOME THAT THE
CONVICTION SHOULD BE OVERTURNED [(raised
below)].
A-0420-15T2
2
A. The evidence of the photograph should also
have been barred as it only came to existence
because the sister-in-law of the deceased had sat
through the trial and independently did research
into the case and produced the objectionable
photograph only to help the State bolster [its]
case, in violation of the [judge's] sequestration
order (not raised below).
B. Counsel was ineffective in not telling the
judge that his strategy would have been different
if he had known about the picture earlier as the
[j]udge would have excluded the evidence if he
indicated that his strategy would have been
different (not raised below).
POINT IV
THE JURY INSTRUCTION THAT WAS GIVEN TO
THE JURY DID NOT ACCURATELY PROTECT
THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS (not raised below).
POINT V
THE LOWER COURT INCORRECTLY CHARGED
THE JURY ON THE USE OF THE HANDGUN
TESTIMONY AS THERE WAS NO BASIS TO
CONSIDER A CURATIVE CHARGE UNDER N.J.
RULES OF EVIDENCE 404(b) (not raised below).
POINT VI
THE [JUDGE] IMPROPERLY CONDUCTED A
CHARGE CONFERENCE WITHOUT THE
DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE (not raised below).
POINT VII
COUNSEL'S CUMULATIVE ERRORS WERE IN
PLAIN ERROR, LED TO AN UNJUST RESULT,
AND HAD HE NOT COMMITTED THE ERRORS,
A-0420-15T2
3
THE VERDICT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT
(not raised below).
A. Counsel was ineffective for cross[-]examining
Dominique Sheppard with the numerous
inconsistencies as a refreshed recollection
instead of introducing it as a prior inconsistent
statement which would be substantive evidence
(not raised below).
B. Counsel was also ineffective in failing to
object to repeated hearsay introduced by the state
throughout the trial (not raised below).
Each of defendant's arguments, with the exception of defendant's
argument in Point III, are raised for the first time on appeal. We review these
arguments for plain error. R. 2:10-2. "Any error or omission shall be
disregarded by [this court] unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly
capable of producing an unjust result[.]" Ibid. In a jury trial, the possibility of
such an unjust result must be "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether
the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." State v.
Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971). Defendant carries the burden of showing plain
error. State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 421 (1998).
We begin by rejecting defendant's argument that the judge improperly
inquired into defense counsel's trial strategy. Defendant contends that in
response to defense counsel's objection to the admission of a photograph not
A-0420-15T2
4
produced in discovery but introduced by the State on the last day of the State's
case, the judge improperly inquired into defense counsel's trial strategy –
impinging on defendant's attorney-client privilege and work-product privilege.
The photograph showed defendant with another individual. In the photograph,
defendant appears to be wearing a bracelet that was found at the crime scene and
previously moved into evidence.
When the State moved to admit the photograph, defense counsel objected
on the basis of prejudice. The judge inquired whether defense counsel would
have proceeded differently had counsel known about the photograph prior to
trial, because counsel did not object or make a prejudicial effect argument when
the State initially entered the bracelet into evidence. When defense counsel
objected due to the lateness of the photograph and informed the judge that he
might have objected to the bracelet being admitted into evidence had the
photograph been produced earlier, the judge expressed the same lateness
concern, but then asked, "[s]o you would not have tried your case any differently
had you had the photograph other than objecting to it? We would be in the same
situation is what you're telling the [c]ourt?" Defense counsel responded, "as far
as I can think off the top of my head, besides objecting to maybe the bracelet
coming in, I don't know of anything else specifically at this moment." The judge
A-0420-15T2
5
then repeatedly offered to provide defense counsel with time to think about his
response, but counsel denied the offers and instead stated that he would have
tried to locate the other individual in the photograph.
The judge then conducted an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing, where the woman who
produced the photograph to the State – who was also the victim's sister-in-law –
testified that she found the photograph on Facebook that morning. Before
ruling, the judge required the State to make all attempts to produce the other
person identified in the photograph for defense counsel. The State produced
the individual in less than two hours, and defense counsel confirmed that he
spoke with the individual, but again objected to the photograph being admitted
on the grounds of lateness and prejudice. He did not articulate how it was
prejudicial.
To understand defense counsel's objection, the judge repeatedly asked
how counsel's cross-examinations and trial preparation would have been
different. Defense counsel did not object to the judge's questions, and in
response, asserted that other than objecting to the bracelet entering evidence, he
would not have done anything differently. After conducting an N.J.R.E. 104
hearing with the individual in the photograph, the judge admitted the photograph
into evidence.
A-0420-15T2
6
The judge's questions did not improperly inquire into counsel's trial
strategy, but instead provided counsel with opportunities to explain his
objection. As the judge explained, "[e]vidence by nature is prejudicial," and
defense counsel only made a "blanket statement" that the photograph was
prejudicial. In his oral ruling, the judge explained that he questioned defense
counsel about how the photograph was prejudicial, directed him to take time to
think about it, and provided him with the opportunity to argue the prejudicial
effect. The judge thoroughly explained his reasoning, and even supplemented
the record with an additional explanation during the following trial day. Thus,
he did not commit plain error.
We next turn to defendant's contention that the judge improperly
permitted the photograph into evidence, and review that ruling for an abuse of
discretion, due to defense counsel's objection at trial. State v. Marrero, 148 N.J.
469, 483-84 (1997). Defendant's reliance on N.J.R.E. 615, governing the
sequestration of witnesses, as well as Rule 3:13-3, governing discovery, is
misplaced.
N.J.R.E. 615 permits a judge to "enter an order sequestering witnesses,"
in an effort "to prevent prospective witnesses from hearing what the other
witnesses detail in their evidence, 'for the less a witness hears of another's
A-0420-15T2
7
testimony the more likely is he to declare his own knowledge simply and
unbias[]ed,'" State v. DiModica, 40 N.J. 404, 413 (1963) (quoting State v.
Zellers, 7 N.J.L. 220, 226 (Sup. Ct. 1824)). "Absent a clear showing of
prejudice[,] an inadvertent violation of a sequestration order does not trigger
automatic exclusion of the witness' testimony." State v. Williams, 404 N.J.
Super. 147, 160 (App. Div. 2008).
The woman, as the victim's family member, was present for a few days of
the trial, and was never an intended witness. There was no reason for her to be
sequestered from the courtroom, and she was properly present as an observer.
"There should be no exclusion of testimony where, as here, there was no
intention to call the witness at the time he or she was in the courtroom as an
observer[.]" State v. Dayton, 292 N.J. Super. 76, 91 (App. Div. 1996).
Rule 3:13-3(f) confers a continuing obligation on the State to provide
discovery. The State provided the photograph to defense counsel immediately
after the State came into possession of it, and further produced the woman for
defense counsel. The judge offered counsel time to think about and elaborate
on his objection, which he declined; gave defense counsel an opportunity to
speak with the woman; and conducted two N.J.R.E. 104 hearings. At the first
hearing, the woman explained that she found the photograph that morning while
A-0420-15T2
8
scrolling through Facebook. She explained that she found the photograph
relevant "[b]ecause [defendant] had the bracelet on that I seen in the [c]ourt from
the previous days, and when [another witness] was describing him, he had the
goatee and everything."
The judge was satisfied that the State had no previous knowledge of the
photograph, and considered defense counsel's position that he would have done
"nothing differently" if he had the photograph earlier. A review of the record
reveals no evidence to indicate that the judge abused his discretion in allowing
the photograph into evidence.
We see no error as to defendant's argument that improper hearsay and
improper lay or expert opinion resulted when the detective provided the jury
with narration of video surveillance of the incident where the victim was fatally
shot.1 During the trial, the detective testified based on his personal observations
of the video while it simultaneously played in court for the jury. In response to
the State's questions, the detective noted occurrences in specific time frames.
The State repeatedly informed the judge that the detective's observation
testimony was meant to establish the record. Defense counsel did not object to
this line of questioning.
1
The parties did not produce the video on appeal.
A-0420-15T2
9
Defendant relies on State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011), to assert that
the detective did not provide lay opinion, and instead improperly acted as an
expert. Lay opinion testimony is governed by N.J.R.E. 701, which permits lay
witness testimony "in the form of opinions or inferences . . . if it (a) is rationally
based on the perception of the witness and (b) will assist in understanding the
witness' testimony or in determining a fact in issue." The opinion testimony of
police officers, who are not called as experts, must be "firmly rooted in the
[officers'] personal observations and perceptions" as lay witnesses . McLean,
205 N.J. at 459. However, expert or lay opinion "is not a vehicle for offering
the view of the witness about a series of facts that the jury can evaluate for itself
. . . ." Id. at 462.
The detective's testimony did not exceed the bounds of permissible lay
opinion testimony, but instead satisfied both prongs of N.J.R.E. 701. First, the
detective described what he observed in the video based on his own perception.
See id. at 459. The jury was able to watch the same footage that the detective
was observing and could evaluate the detective's credibility. Second, the
detective's testimony assisted the jury in ascertaining the significance of various
individuals' movements in the video. The video was lengthy, spanning many
hours, and the detective's testimony during specific clips provided the jury with
A-0420-15T2
10
a manageable play-by-play description. His testimony provided for the
development of the record.
"Moreover, any prejudice arising from [the detective's] [testimony] was
dissipated by the jurors' ability to view and review the videotapes for
themselves." State v. Loftin, 287 N.J. Super. 76, 100 (App. Div. 1996). The
jury watched the video without explanatory testimony throughout the trial,
including during the parties' closings. Further, during jury deliberations, the
jury requested to watch various clips of the surveillance video, and the judge
properly satisfied those requests.
Defendant also asserts that the detective improperly identified defendant
as the shooter in the surveillance video. This contention is meritless. The
detective did not identify defendant in the surveillance video, but instead
testified that in the early phases of the investigation, in which he conducted
many interviews, he tentatively suspected defendant as the shooter. During the
detective's direct examination, the judge asked counsel to approach sidebar and
asked the prosecutor to ensure that the detective was not going to identify
anyone in the video, which the prosecutor did and further explained that the
detective did not know defendant. On cross-examination, defense counsel
improperly stated that the detective previously identified defendant in the video,
A-0420-15T2
11
eliciting an objection from the State, and requiring the judge to clarify "for the
record, the defendant was never identified by [the detective] as the person in the
video."
We see no plain error concerning the detective's testimony that brought
about "an unjust result and which substantially prejudiced . . . defendant's
fundamental right to have the jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense."
State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 576-77 (1999) (quoting State v. Irving,
114 N.J. 427, 444 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We reject defendant's assertion that the judge incorrectly charged the jury
regarding a witness's testimony that she previously observed defendant with a
weapon. Defense counsel elicited the testimony on cross-examination. The
judge instructed the jury:
[O]ur rules do permit evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts under certain circumstances. You may not,
however, under any circumstance use this evidence to
decide that the [d]efendant has a tendency to commit
crimes or that he is a bad person.
That is, you may not decide that just because the
[d]efendant has committed other crimes, wrongs, or
acts, he must be guilty of the present crimes.
Defense counsel did not object, and failed to request a curative or limiting
instruction. "Alleged errors induced by counsel 'ordinarily are not a basis for
A-0420-15T2
12
reversal on appeal.'" State v. Yough, 208 N.J. 385, 399 (2011) (quoting State v.
Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 345 (1987)). The judge properly instructed the jury not
to consider the testimony as propensity evidence, as prohibited under N.J.R.E.
404(b). Regardless of this testimony, the State presented substantial evidence
to allow a reasonable jury to find defendant guilty, including witness
identification, surveillance video, and physical evidence.
We will not entertain defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective
on direct appeal. "Our courts have expressed a general policy against
entertaining ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal because
such claims involve allegations and evidence that lie outside the trial record."
State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 460 (1992). Courts "routinely decline to
entertain ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal . . . ." State
v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 145 (2011).
To the extent defendant argues his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel, the record is not sufficiently developed and is better suited
for a post-conviction relief application. State v. Wiggins, 291 N.J. Super. 441,
452 (App. Div. 1996). The resolution of defendant's arguments requires an
inquiry into why counsel proceeded in the manner he did, and whether those
decisions were the result of trial strategy. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
A-0420-15T2
13
668, 689 (1984). Accordingly, this claim would be better raised in a petition for
post-conviction relief.
We conclude defendant's remaining arguments to be without sufficient
merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
A-0420-15T2
14