STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. RASON LEACHÂ (09-08-1900, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2555-15T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RASON LEACH,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________________
Submitted May 16, 2017 – Decided June 27, 2017
Before Judges Vernoia and Moynihan.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County,
Indictment No. 09-08-1900.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Dianne Glenn, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Damon G. Tyner, Atlantic County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Mario C. Formica,
Chief Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
On the day defendant's trial was to begin, he agreed to plead
guilty to four counts of the indictment: first-degree robbery,
N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (count one); second-degree assault while eluding,
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(6) (count eight); and two counts of second-
degree distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A.
2C:35-5a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(2)(counts twelve and fifteen).
The following sentence was to be imposed pursuant to the plea
deal: count one - ten years subject to the No Early Release Act
(NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2; count eight - five years subject to
NERA, concurrent to count one; count twelve - a mandatory extended
term, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f, of eight years with four years of parole
ineligibility, consecutive to count one; count fifteen - five
years with two years of parole ineligibility, concurrent to count
one. The court represented if the bargained sentence was not
imposed, defendant would be allowed to withdraw his plea.
Defendant agreed to the plea terms. During the court's
colloquy with defendant regarding the robbery count, defendant
testified he delivered soap instead of cocaine during an arranged
sale of the drug on July 11, 2007; defendant received $1800 "and
some change" from the buyer. The buyer, unbeknownst to defendant
at the time of the sale, was a detective employed by the Atlantic
County Prosecutor's Office, who was working undercover. The
detective realized he was being duped. Defendant admitted he
threatened the detective with a "strap" — a handgun — in order to
keep the money the detective had paid. The judge asked, "So under
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the circumstances, do you agree and admit that you are guilty of
robbery by purposely putting [the buyer] in fear of bodily injury
immediately by threatening the use of a handgun?" Defendant
answered, "Yes."
Defendant was sentenced on April 16, 2010, in accordance with
the plea agreement. He received an aggregate sentence of eighteen
years in state prison; he was ineligible for parole, under NERA,
for approximately eight and one-half years on count one, and for
four years on count four.
Defendant's first appeal related only to the sentence imposed
so the matter was heard on our sentencing (ESOA) calendar; we
affirmed the trial court's sentence. See R. 2:9-11. A pro se
petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) was filed on May 6,
2014. The court heard argument on the petition and entered a
November 10, 2015 order, denying the petition without an
evidentiary hearing.
On appeal, defendant raises the following argument:
THIS COURT MUST REVERSE THE PCR COURT'S
NOVEMBER 10, 2015 ORDER, VACATE THE
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCE, AND
REMAND THE CASE BACK TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR A
NEW TRIAL AS THE TRIAL ATTORNEY PROVIDED
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN HE
INCORRECTLY ADVISED THE DEFENDANT THAT THE
BASIS FOR HIS PLEA AGREEMENT WAS SUFFICIENT
FOR A FIRST-DEGREE ROBBERY CONVICTION.
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We disagree and affirm the PCR court's denial of defendant's
petition.
Since the PCR court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing,
our review of the factual inferences drawn by the court from the
record is de novo. State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App.
Div. 2016) (citations omitted). Likewise, we review de novo the
PCR court's legal conclusions. Ibid.
In order to establish a case of ineffective assistance of
counsel, defendant must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of
success under the two-pronged test established by Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L. Ed.
2d 674, 698 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v.
Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). A defendant must show: (1) that
counsel was deficient or made egregious errors, so serious that
counsel was not functioning effectively as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and (2) the deficient
performance actually prejudiced the accused's defense.
Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed.
2d at 693; see also Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 52.
In State v. DiFrisco, our Supreme Court held a defendant who
seeks to vacate a guilty plea because of ineffective assistance
of counsel must prove:
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(i) counsel's assistance was not 'within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases' and (ii) 'that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, [the defendant] would not have pled
guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.'
[State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)
(citations omitted) (alteration in original),
cert. denied, DiFrisco v. New Jersey, 516 U.S.
1129, 116 S. Ct. 949, 133 L. Ed. 2d 873
(1996).]
A defendant "must convince the court that a decision to reject the
plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances."
State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 371 (App. Div. 2014)
(quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372, 130 S. Ct. 1473,
1485, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284, 297 (2010)).
Defendant initially argues that the factual basis for the
plea to the robbery count was inadequate because "he only admitted
he threatened the police officer after he obtained the money . .
. ." Defendant did not make this argument to the PCR court. In
his brief to the PCR court in support of his petition, defendant
claimed, "[t]here was neither a weapon nor a simulated weapon;
there was only a verbal threat on the part of the defendant." No
mention was made of the timing of the threat. We will not consider
an argument on appeal that defendant did not pose to the PCR court.
State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 404 (2004). Moreover, the adequacy
of the factual basis for the plea should have been raised on direct
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appeal, and is barred from consideration here. R. 3:22-4; State
v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 583-584 (1992).
Defendant also contends the factual basis for the plea did
not contain an admission that he brandished a handgun or made an
overt gesture that would lead the detective to believe defendant
had a handgun. He claims counsel was ineffective because he
informed defendant "that the police officer's subjective belief
that the defendant had a weapon was enough to sustain a first-
degree robbery." Defendant avers he would not have pleaded guilty
but for this erroneous advice.
This issue was first raised at sentencing when defense counsel
told the court:
[T]he problem with this thing is—and I've
tried to explain it to [defendant] a number
of times—his contention was he never had a
gun, although the police officer said he did,
but he said he never had a gun and he couldn't
understand how he could be guilty of the
first-degree robbery, armed robbery, without
a gun. But I did explain to him it's a—
basically a subjective test what the . . .
victim has original belief and believing that
he is armed or not [sic]. And I think based
on the facts of this case . . . that was pretty
evident even from what Mr. Leach said. . . .
[B]ut he said he never did have a gun.
As the PCR court noted, counsel was not incorrect. Our
Supreme Court held in State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576 (2014),
certif. denied, 221 N.J. 566 (2015), a first-degree robbery
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conviction will stand if the victim possessed an actual and
reasonable subjective belief, under the totality of the
circumstances, that the perpetrator was armed with a real or
simulated deadly weapon. See also State v. Dekowski, 218 N.J. 596
(2014).
Defendant's counsel correctly observed that, under the facts
of this case, the detective had a reasonable belief that defendant
was armed with a handgun, a belief validated by defendant's
admission during the plea colloquy that he threatened the detective
with a "strap" in order to retain the money.1
Accepting, arguendo, defendant's contention that he was not
in possession of a handgun, the totality of the circumstances
justified the detective's reasonable belief that defendant was
armed with a gun during the robbery. The plea transcript reveals
that defendant sold drugs to the detective on two occasions prior
to July 11, 2007. On May 24, 2007 he sold "[a] little over half
ounce" of cocaine for $500; and on June 14, 2007 he sold over one-
half ounce of cocaine for approximately $1300. The detective,
therefore, knew defendant was a distributor of significant
quantities of drugs. Drug dealers often carry guns. State v.
1
When given the opportunity to address the court at sentencing,
defendant declined. He did not address counsel's comment that,
contrary to defendant's admission during the plea, defendant said
he never had a gun.
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Samuels, 189 N.J. 236, 257 (2007) (Albin, J., dissenting). The
threat by defendant, even without an overt gesture suggesting he
was armed, was, therefore, sufficient under these circumstances
to justify a reasonable belief that he was armed with a deadly
weapon.
Counsel did not err if he advised defendant that, under the
totality of the circumstances, the detective's subjective belief
that defendant was armed was sufficient to establish defendant's
guilt on the robbery charge. Defendant fails to meet the first
prong of the Fritz/Strickland standard.
Defendant also fails to establish a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's advice, he would not have pleaded guilty.
Only the detective and defendant were involved in this transaction.
The detective alleged, as defendant admitted during his plea
colloquy, that defendant had a gun, and actually threatened the
detective with it during the theft of the money. If defendant
testified, he faced possible impeachment with nine sanitized
indictable convictions, decreasing the likelihood that any
testimony contrary to the detective's allegations would be
believed. If convicted, he faced both discretionary and mandatory
extended terms. As the PCR judge noted, defendant faced possible
life imprisonment if an extended term was imposed on the first-
degree robbery. We agree with the PCR judge that it is unlikely
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defendant would have gone to trial in light of the court's promise
of an aggregate sentence of eighteen years with over twelve years2
of parole ineligibility.
Affirmed.
2
The parole ineligibility period would likely have been twelve
and one-half years: eighty five percent of the ten year sentence
for robbery (approximately eight and one-half years) and four
years for distribution.
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