ANDREW K. BONNER, JR. VS. CUMBERLAND REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOLÂ (L-860-14, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4133-15T1
ANDREW K. BONNER, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CUMBERLAND REGIONAL HIGH
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Respondent.
_________________________________
Argued May 24, 2017 – Decided June 27, 2017
Before Judges Accurso and Manahan.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Cumberland County, Docket No.
L-860-14.
Andrew K. Bonner, Jr., appellant, argued the
cause pro se.
Stefani C. Schwartz argued the cause for
respondent (Schwartz Simon Edelstein & Celso
LLC, attorneys; Ms. Schwartz, of counsel and
on the brief, Saiju George, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Andrew K. Bonner, Jr. appeals the grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendant Cumberland Regional School District
Board of Education.1 We affirm for the reasons set forth in the
comprehensive fourteen-page written opinion of Judge Darrell M.
Fineman. We add only the following.
This matter arises out of alleged incidents of bullying and
harassment perpetrated against plaintiff while he was a student
at Cumberland Regional High School (CRHS) from September 2010
through June 2013. In 2009, CRHS adopted a "Harassment,
Intimidation, and Bullying" policy (HIB) providing for the
procedure for filing a complaint, the investigation process, and
the punishment for violations of the HIB.2
The HIB defines "harassment, intimidation, or bullying" as
any gesture, any written, verbal or physical
act, or any electronic communication, as
defined in N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14, whether it be
a single incident or a series of incidents
that:
1. Is reasonably perceived as being
motivated by either any actual or
perceived characteristic, such as race,
color, religion, ancestry, national
origin, gender, sexual orientation,
gender identity and expression, or a
mental, physical or sensory disability,
or by any other distinguishing
characteristic;
2. Takes place on school property, at any
school-sponsored function, on a school
1
Defendant was improperly pled as Cumberland Regional High
School District.
2
The policy was revised in 2011, and again in 2014.
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bus, or off school grounds, as provided
for in N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15.3;
3. Substantially disrupts or interferes
with the orderly operation of the school
or the rights of other students; and that
a. A reasonable person should know,
under the circumstances, that the
act(s) will have the effect of
physically or emotionally harming a
student or damaging the student's
property, or placing a student in
reasonable fear of physical or
emotional harm to his/her person or
damage to his/her property; or
b. Has the effect of insulting or
demeaning any student or group of
students; or
c. Creates a hostile environment for
the student by interfering with a
student's education or by severely
or pervasively causing physical or
emotional harm to the student.
In accordance with the policy, plaintiff and his parents filed a
HIB complaint with CRHS on November 29, 2012. The complaint
alleged plaintiff was the victim of pervasive harassment by
students, teachers, and coaches.
Thereafter, John Mitchell, principal of CRHS and HIB
coordinator, together with Joseph Spoltore, a bullying specialist,
conducted an investigation into plaintiff's complaint, which
included interviews with all involved parties. On December 3,
2012, both Mitchell and Spoltore concluded plaintiff's claims were
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unfounded based on their inability to obtain sufficient
corroborating evidence and the inconsistencies in plaintiff's
recounting of the alleged predicate events. By letter dated
December 10, 2012, plaintiff and his parents were advised of the
HIB investigation results. Plaintiff did not appeal the findings
to the New Jersey Commissioner of Education pursuant to N.J.S.A.
18A:37-15(b)(6)(e).
On October 24, 2014, plaintiff filed a complaint against
defendant alleging, amongst other claims, negligence, "reckless
endangerment of numerous children," violations of the HIB policy,
the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1
to -42, public transportation laws, medical privacy laws, and/or
"intellectual property theft." Defendant filed an answer and an
amended answer. Prior to the expiration of discovery, defendant
moved for summary judgment, which was denied without prejudice.
After the conclusion of discovery, defendant again moved for
summary judgment. On April 11, 2016, the judge granted summary
judgment in favor of defendant. This appeal followed.
Plaintiff raises the following arguments on appeal:
POINT I
[PLAINTIFF] WAS NOT AFFORDED THE OPPORTUNITY
TO APPEAL THE HIB FINDING AND [DEFENDANT'S]
HIB INVESTIGATION PROCESS WAS FLAWED.
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POINT II
A STUDENT HAS A RIGHT TO ACHIEVE AN EDUCATION
FREE OF HARASSMENT AND [PLAINTIFF'S] CLAIMS
AS OUTLINED CONSTITUTE HIB UNDER THE NJLAD.
POINT III
DISCLOSURE OF [PLAINTIFF'S] MEDICAL
INFORMATION WAS IN VIOLATION OF FERPA.
Our review of a ruling on summary judgment is de novo,
applying the same legal standard as the trial court. Nicholas v.
Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 477-78 (2013). Summary judgment must be
granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a
matter of law." Town of Kearny v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76, 91 (2013)
(quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).
Thus, we consider, as the judge did, whether "the competent
evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a
rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor
of the non-moving party." Ibid. (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)). If there is no genuine issue
of material fact, we must then "decide whether the trial court
correctly interpreted the law." Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396
5 A-4133-15T1
N.J. Super. 486, 494 (App. Div. 2007), certif. denied, 195 N.J.
419 (2008). We accord no deference to the trial judge's
conclusions on issues of law and review issues of law de novo.
Nicholas, supra, 213 N.J. at 478.
Having considered appellant's arguments in light of the
discovery record, our standard of review and the controlling law,
we find them to be without sufficient merit to warrant discussion
in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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