STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MELVIN T. DICKERSON(W-2017-170-1303, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2734-16T7
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MELVIN T. DICKERSON,
Defendant-Respondent.
___________________________
Argued May 23, 2017 – Decided July 3, 2017
Before Judges Fasciale and Gilson.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Monmouth County, Complaint No.
W-2017-170-1303.
Ian D. Brater, Assistant Prosecutor, argued
the cause for appellant (Christopher J.
Gramiccioni, Monmouth County Prosecutor,
attorney; Mr. Brater, of counsel and on the
brief).
Cody T. Mason, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for respondent
(Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney;
Mr. Mason, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
The State, on leave granted, appeals from a February 7, 2017
order denying its application to detain defendant pretrial because
the State failed to produce certain discovery. The State also
appeals from a February 8, 2017 order denying its motion for
reconsideration. We affirm the part of the orders that compelled
discovery, but reverse the denial of the application for pretrial
detention and remand for a hearing.
I.
On January 31, 2017, an Asbury Park police officer applied
for a warrant to search premises used by a barbershop and hair
salon business (the Barbershop). That same day, a Superior Court
judge reviewed the application and issued a search warrant. The
following day, law enforcement officers executed the search
warrant.
When the police officers entered the Barbershop, there were
four individuals present, including defendant Melvin T. Dickerson
and co-defendant Julius D. Franklin. A search of the premises
revealed more than one-half ounce of suspected marijuana, a 9mm
sub-machine gun, a .38 caliber semi-automatic handgun, a stun gun,
various types of ammunition, two digital scales, a heat-seal
vacuum, a box of "Ziploc" vacuum sealer gallon bags, a RadioShack
Pro-94 radio suspected to be a police scanner, a cell phone, and
several documents and correspondence bearing defendant's name.
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Defendant was arrested and charged with ten crimes: two counts
of second-degree possession of a firearm while in the course of
committing a narcotics offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a); second-
degree unlawful possession of a machine gun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(a);
third-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
5(b)(1); third-degree possession of a defaced handgun, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-3(d); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a stun gun,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(h); fourth-degree unlawful interception and use
of police emergency communications, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-21; fourth-
degree possession of over one-half ounce of marijuana, N.J.S.A.
2C:35-10(a)(3); third-degree possession of marijuana with the
intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(11); and third-degree
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in a school
zone, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a).
Co-defendant Franklin was also arrested and charged with
drug-related and weapons-related offenses. The two other
individuals who were present at the Barbershop when the search
warrant was executed were not charged with any crimes and were
released.
The State moved to detain defendant pretrial under the
Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26.
Before the hearing, the State provided defense counsel with copies
of the complaints, the affidavit of probable cause, the preliminary
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law enforcement incident report (PLEIR), defendant's criminal
history, the Public Safety Assessment (PSA), an incident report
prepared by one of the officers who executed the search warrant,
the arrest report, and the search warrant.
The PSA assessed defendant's risk of failure to appear as
three on a scale of one to six, with one being a low risk and six
being a high risk. The PSA also assessed defendant's risk of new
criminal activity as three, again on a scale of one to six. The
PSA, therefore, recommended that defendant be released pretrial
on certain conditions, including monthly reporting.
The detention hearing was scheduled to be held on February
7, 2017. At the beginning of the hearing, defense counsel informed
the trial court that the State had not produced the affidavit
filed in support of the search warrant and supporting investigative
reports (collectively, search warrant information). After
confirming that defendant was seeking that information, the court
denied the State's application for defendant's detention without
conducting a hearing. Instead, the court ordered defendant
released subject to seven conditions, including weekly reporting
and a prohibition of possessing dangerous weapons.
The following day, on February 8, 2017, this court issued our
decision in State v. Robinson, 448 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div.),
aff'd and modified, ____ N.J. ____ (2017). That same day, the
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State moved for reconsideration of the order denying its
application to detain defendant pretrial. The trial court heard
and denied the motion for reconsideration on February 8, 2017.
The court explained the reasons for its denial on the record and
issued an order stating that the State was required to produce the
search warrant information before the pretrial detention hearing
and, because it failed to do so, the State's application was denied
and dismissed "without the holding of a detention hearing."
We granted the State's motion for leave to appeal.
II.
On appeal, the State argues:
THE ORDER DENYING THE STATE'S MOTION FOR
PRETRIAL DETENTION SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE
IT IS PREDICATED ON THE [TRIAL] COURT'S
ERRONEOUS LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT RULE 3:4-
2(c)(1)(B) AND ROBINSON REQUIRED THE STATE TO
TURN OVER THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT IN
ANTICIPATION OF THE PRETRIAL DETENTION HEARING
In its brief on appeal, the State makes two related arguments
regarding the scope of pretrial detention discovery. First, it
contends that the search warrant information does not fall within
the ambit of discovery called for under Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B).
Second, the State argues that Rule 3:5-6(c) makes the search
warrant information confidential and subject to disclosure only
after an indictment is issued or the State makes a pre-indictment
plea offer. The State also argues that, as a sanction for not
5 A-2734-16T7
producing the discovery, the trial court erred in not holding a
hearing on the State's detention application. We address each of
these arguments in turn.
A. Pretrial Detention Discovery
The discovery that the State must produce when it seeks to
detain a defendant before trial under the CJRA is governed by Rule
3:4-2(c)(1)(B). In February 2017, when the State sought to detain
defendant, the rule provided:
[I]f the prosecutor is seeking pretrial
detention, the prosecutor shall provide the
defendant with all statements or reports in
its possession relating to the pretrial
detention application. All exculpatory
evidence must be disclosed.
[R. 3:4-2(c)(1)(B).]
Effective May 10, 2017, our Supreme Court modified and issued
a new version of Rule 3:4-2(c), which provides:
(c) Procedure in Indictable Offenses. At the
defendant's first appearance before a judge,
if the defendant is charged with an indictable
offense, the judge shall
(1) give the defendant a copy of the
complaint, discovery as provided in
subsections (A) and (B) below, and inform
the defendant of the charge;
(A) if the prosecutor is not seeking
pretrial detention, the prosecutor
shall provide the defendant with a
copy of any available preliminary
law enforcement incident report
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concerning the offense and the
affidavit of probable cause;
(B) if the prosecutor is seeking
pretrial detention, the prosecutor
shall provide the defendant with (i)
the discovery listed in subsection
(A) above, (ii) all statements or
reports relating to the affidavit of
probable cause, (iii) all
statements or reports relating to
additional evidence the State
relies on to establish probable
cause at the hearing, (iv) all
statements or reports relating to
the factors listed in N.J.S.A.
2A:162-18(a)(1) that the State
advances at the hearing, and (v) all
exculpatory evidence.
[State v. Robinson, supra, slip op. at 33.]
In Robinson, the Supreme Court addressed the scope of
discovery to be provided by the State when it seeks the pretrial
detention of a defendant. Id. at 29-32. Initially, the Court
gave an overview of the CJRA and explained the purpose of pretrial
detention discovery. Id. at 3-10. The Court explained that at a
pretrial detention hearing, the State is required to present "both
some proof about the crime - - sufficient to establish probable
cause - - and proof relating to the risk of flight, danger, or
obstruction." Id. at 27. The Court then identified the interests
that were involved in the detention hearing and explained, "the
scope of the discovery rule in detention cases must reflect what
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is at stake." Ibid. Accordingly, the Court identified the State's
interest in public safety and the defendant's interest in his or
her liberty. Ibid. The Court also reasoned that a "discovery
rule should set forth a workable standard" that accounts for the
"tight timeframe" involved in a detention hearing. Id. at 27-28.
To balance those interests and aims, the Court identified
twelve principles that "should govern the disclosure of evidence
at a detention hearing[.]" Id. at 29. Those principles are:
1. . . . [B]ecause the [CJRA] calls for a
determination of probable cause and an
assessment of the risk of danger, flight, and
obstruction, which may include consideration
of the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the weight of the evidence, discovery
should likewise be keyed to both areas. See
N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1); -19(e)(2); -20(a),
(b).
2. The complaint must be disclosed.
3. The Public Safety Assessment must be
disclosed.
4. The affidavit of probable cause must be
disclosed. . . .
5. Any available PLEIR should be disclosed.
6. All statements and reports relating to
the affidavit of probable cause should be
disclosed. . . .
7. All statements or reports that relate to
any additional evidence the State relies on
to establish probable cause at the detention
hearing should be disclosed. . . .
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8. Statements and reports related to items
that appear only in the PLEIR need not be
disclosed. . . .
9. Statements and reports relating to the
risk of flight, danger, and obstruction,
N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1), which the State
advances at the hearing, should be disclosed.
. . .
10. The phrase "statements and reports"
refers to items that exist at the time of the
hearing. The terms plainly include relevant
police reports. . . .
11. . . . [S]tatements and reports encompass
reports that are in the possession of the
prosecutor, law enforcement officials, and
other agents of the State. . . .
12. All exculpatory evidence must be
disclosed.
[Id. at 29-32.]
In Robinson, the Court held that the State had to produce an
initial police report about the witnesses to an alleged murder,
including copies of the statements or reports of eyewitnesses.
Id. at 41. The Court also held that when the eyewitnesses made
an identification, the State was required to produce the
information concerning the identification process, along with
copies of any photographs used in the identification process.
Ibid. Finally, the Court held that the State need not disclose
surveillance videos. Ibid.
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"A trial court's resolution of a discovery issue is entitled
to substantial deference and will not be overturned absent an
abuse of discretion." State v. Stein, 225 N.J. 582, 593 (2016).
Nevertheless, appellate review of the meaning of a court rule,
such as Rule 3:4-2(c), is de novo. State v. Robinson, supra, slip
op. at 25.
Applying the principles identified in Robinson and Rule 3:4-
2(c)(1)(B), we hold that the State needed to produce the search
warrant information, including the affidavit submitted in support
of that search warrant and all existing supporting investigative
reports leading to the search warrant application. This result
is compelled by the language of Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B) and the sixth,
seventh, and tenth principles identified by the Supreme Court in
Robinson. Id. at 30-32.
In its original form, Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B) called for the
production of "all statements or reports in [the State's]
possession relating to the pretrial detention application." As
revised by the Supreme Court in Robinson, the rule now calls for
the production of "all statements or reports relating to the
affidavit of probable cause . . . [and] all statements or reports
relating to additional evidence the State relies on to establish
probable cause at the hearing[.]" Id. at 33
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Under either version of the rule, the State was obligated to
produce the search warrant information. Here, defendant was
charged with weapons-related and drug-related offenses based on
items seized pursuant to a search warrant. Thus, the charges
depended not only on the items seized, but the validity of the
seizure of the items. Moreover, the affidavit of probable cause
stated "PURSUANT TO THE EXECUTION OF A SEARCH WARRANT ON 02/01/2017
THE ACCUSED WAS ARRESTED AFTER BEING FOUND TO BE IN POSSESSION OF
SUSPECTED CDS, WEAPONS, AND CONTRABAND." Accordingly, the search
warrant information should have been considered statements or
reports relating to the pretrial detention application and
relating to the affidavit of probable cause.
The State argues that the search warrant information was not
called for under Rule 3:4-2(c) because the State was relying only
on the items seized. The items, however, were seized under a
search warrant and, if the search warrant were invalid, that would
affect the probable cause of the charges against defendant. See
State v. Dispoto, 189 N.J. 108, 123 (2007) (holding that the
evidence obtained through an invalid search warrant constitutes
fruits of the poisonous tree and must be suppressed). We are not
suggesting that a pretrial detention hearing should morph into a
suppression hearing. Instead, we hold that when the State's
evidence is largely dependent on items seized under a search
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warrant, the affidavits submitted in support of the application
for the search warrant and related police reports are relevant
evidence relating to the issue of probable cause in a pretrial
detention hearing.
B. Rule 3:5-6(c)
The State also argues that under Rule 3:5-6(c), the search
warrant information is confidential and is subject to disclosure
to defendant only at a later phase of the criminal process. Rule
3:5-6(c) provides:
All warrants that have been completely
executed and the papers accompanying them,
including the affidavits, transcript or
summary of any oral testimony, duplicate
original search warrant, return and inventory,
and any original tape or stenographic
recording shall be confidential except that
the warrant and accompanying papers shall be
provided to the defendant in discovery
pursuant to [R.] 3:13-3 and available for
inspection and copying by any person claiming
to be aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure upon notice to the county prosecutor
for good cause shown.
The State focuses on the reference to Rule 3:13-3 and contends
that because Rule 3:5-6(c) does not refer to Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B),
the State need only disclose a search warrant and the related
materials to defendant after an indictment is filed or unsealed
12 A-2734-16T7
or if the State makes a pre-indictment plea offer. We reject this
interpretation of Rule 3:5-6(c).
Rule 3:5-6(c) provides that a search warrant and related
materials are confidential, subject to two exceptions. The first
exception is that a criminal defendant has access to a warrant and
the accompanying papers as provided in Rule 3:13-3, which governs
criminal discovery. Second, any person claiming to be aggrieved
by an unlawful search and seizure is entitled to inspect and copy
the papers accompanying a warrant on good cause shown. Ibid.Here, because defendant is seeking the information, we apply the
first exception.
Rule 3:5-6(c), like Rule 3:13-3, must now be read in harmony
with Rule 3:4-2(c). Accordingly, if any documents or information
are subject to disclosure under Rule 3:4-2(c), that rule controls
the timing of disclosure.
To the extent that the State has confidentiality concerns,
such concerns can be addressed by applying for a protective order.
Indeed, the Supreme Court addressed this confidentiality issue in
State v. Robinson, supra, slip op. at 34. In that regard, the
Supreme Court explained:
In appropriate cases, the prosecutor "may
apply for a protective order to redact, delay,
or withhold the disclosure of materials that
would expose witnesses and others to harm,
hinder or jeopardize ongoing investigations or
13 A-2734-16T7
prosecutions, undermine the secrecy of
informants and confidential information which
the law recognizes, or compromise some other
legitimate interest." State in Interest of
N.H., 226, N.J. 242, 256 (2016) (citing R.
3:13-3(a)(1), (e)(1)). The prosecutor may
bring an application directly to the judge who
will preside over the detention hearing.
[Id. at 34.]
Here, the State did not seek a protective order. Moreover,
the State made no argument that the search warrant information
contains confidential information or that the disclosure of the
information would expose witnesses or others to harm. Furthermore,
the State itself produced the search warrant. While we reject
defendant's argument that the production of the search warrant
acted as a waiver of the confidentiality of the search warrant
information, the production of the search warrant without a
companion application for a protective order demonstrates that,
in this case, there were no confidentiality concerns.
In summary, we hold that Rule 3:4-2(c)(1)(B) required the
State to produce to defendant the search warrant information before
the detention hearing. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's
order compelling that production.
C. The Appropriate Sanction
Lastly, we address the appropriate sanction for a failure to
produce pretrial detention discovery.
14 A-2734-16T7
The State is obligated to produce discovery under Rule 3:4-
2(c), and that obligation is not optional. Moreover, the State
must comply with its discovery obligations in good faith. State
v. Robinson, supra, slip op. at 35 (explaining that the State must
apply Rule 3:4-2(c) in "good faith").
If the State fails to act in good faith or if the State
refuses to comply with a directive or order of the court, then it
is subject to appropriate sanctions for failure to produce
discovery. Rule 3:13-3(f) authorizes a trial court to take
appropriate action when there has been a failure of compliance by
the State with its duty to disclose relevant information. The
rule provides,
[i]f at any time during the course of the
proceedings it is brought to the attention of
the court that a party has failed to comply
with this rule or with an order issued
pursuant to this rule, it may order such party
to permit the discovery of materials not
previously disclosed, grant a continuance or
delay during trial, or prohibit the party from
introducing in evidence the material not
disclosed, or it may enter such other order
as it deems appropriate.
[R. 3:13-3(f).]
"The choice of sanctions appropriate for discovery-rule
violations is left to the broad discretion of the trial court."
State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 134 (1991), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
929, 113 S. Ct. 1306, 122 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1993). The trial court,
15 A-2734-16T7
however, needs to make specific findings and explain the reasons
for imposing a sanction. State v. Clark, 347 N.J. Super. 497,
508-09 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting State v. Laganella, 144 N.J.
Super. 268, 282-83 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 74 N.J. 256(1976)). "An adjournment or continuance is a preferred remedy
where circumstances permit." Id. at 509. Moreover, because
pretrial detention applications implicate public safety issues and
a defendant's civil liberties, the trial court's response to a
discovery issue should seek to accommodate both interests. See
N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15.
Accordingly, if the State has a good faith position for not
producing certain discovery, there should be a disclosure to
defendant, defense counsel, and the court. The court should then
make a ruling and, if appropriate, direct the production of the
relevant discovery. If at that point, the State refuses to provide
the discovery, the court can fashion an appropriate sanction and
should explain the reasons for the sanctions imposed. Moreover,
to the extent that there are legitimate discovery disputes, they
need to be addressed within the tight timeframes involved in a
pretrial detention application. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(d)(1)
(allowing the detention hearing to be continued for up to three
days upon the prosecutor's request or up to five days at the
defendant's request). Consequently, candor and good faith by the
16 A-2734-16T7
State is necessary and an intentional failure to comply with
discovery obligations is an appropriate consideration when
determining the sanction.
Here, the trial court never addressed the appropriate
sanction and never explained the reasons for imposing a sanction.
Instead, when the trial court was informed that the State had not
produced the search warrant information, the court, without
holding a hearing, ordered defendant to be released on certain
conditions. Thus, the court never gave the State the opportunity
to produce the search warrant information. In the transcripts of
the proceedings held on February 7 and 8, 2017, there are hints
that the trial court had previously addressed the scope of
discovery the State needed to produce before a pretrial detention
hearing. The record, however, is insufficient to allow us to
evaluate whether the State was acting in good faith and whether
the court considered a sanction less than a denial of the State's
application for pretrial detention. Consequently, we vacate the
portions of the orders that denied the State's application for
defendant's pretrial detention for failure to produce discovery
and we remand for a detention hearing.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further
proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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