Hackensack Riverkeeper, Inc. and ny/nj Baykeeper

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1752-12T3
HACKENSACK RIVERKEEPER,
INC. and NY/NJ BAYKEEPER,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Appellants,
December 22, 2015
v. APPELLATE DIVISION
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
Respondent.
_______________________________________________
Argued May 19, 2015 – Decided December 22, 2015
Before Judges Messano, Ostrer and Tassini.
On appeal from the adoption of N.J.A.C. 7:7
by the Department of Environmental
Protection.
Christopher Len argued the cause for
appellants (Pringle, Quinn, Anzano, P.C.,
attorneys; Mr. Len and Edward Bonanno, on
the brief; Andrea Leshak, on the
supplemental brief).
Kristina Miles, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (John J.
Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney;
Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Ms. Miles, on the
briefs).
Litwin & Provence, L.L.C., attorneys for
amicus curiae American Littoral Society,
Inc. (Gordon N. Litwin and Andrew J.
Provence, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MESSANO, P.J.A.D.
In Borough of Avalon v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection, 403 N.J. Super. 590, 595 (App. Div.
2008), certif. denied, 199 N.J. 133 (2009) (Avalon), we
considered a challenge to certain regulations adopted in 2007 by
the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP),
"referred to as the Public Access Rules, which substantially
expanded [DEP's] authority over public access to beaches and
other tidal waterways." We found the regulations were "not
statutorily authorized and therefore invalid[]." Id. at 597.
In response, DEP embarked upon another round of rulemaking,
culminating in the 2012 adoption of new Public Access Rules (the
Rules). 44 N.J.R. 2559(a) (Nov. 5, 2012).
Hackensack Riverkeeper, Inc., and NY/NJ Baykeeper, two non-
profit organizations (collectively, appellants), quickly filed
this appeal. We granted a motion by the American Littoral
Society, Inc. (ALS), to appear as amicus curiae. The three
organizations' professed missions include the conservation of
coastal areas and the promotion of public and community access
thereto and, in the case of appellants, the waters, watersheds
and wetlands of this State.
2 A-1752-12T3
Appellants argue that DEP has again arrogated to itself the
management of lands held in public trust, which power is
reserved to the Legislature and has not been delegated to DEP.
They also argue the Rules are preempted by, or improperly
infringe upon, powers reserved to the State's municipalities.
Appellants further contend that the Rules are not authorized by
the Coastal Area Facility Review Act (CAFRA), N.J.S.A. 13:19-1
to -21, or any other statute.
DEP contends that the Rules are authorized pursuant to the
public trust doctrine, and the agency has been implicitly
recognized as the proper governmental authority to manage lands
held in public trust. Alternatively, DEP contends that CAFRA
authorizes promulgation of the Rules. The agency also asserts
that the Rules encourage cooperation with municipalities that is
wholly consonant with the Municipal Land Use Law (the MLUL),
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163. ALS similarly argues that the
Legislature has vested DEP with the authority to adopt
regulations necessary to promote and protect the waterfront.
Since the appeal was argued, DEP again revised the Rules.
See 47 N.J.R. 1392(a) (July 6, 2015). We asked appellants and
DEP to address these revised Rules and their impact, if any, on
the issues initially raised. Both sides assert that the
3 A-1752-12T3
revisions merely re-numbered the Rules and effectuated no
substantive changes.
We have considered the arguments in light of the record and
applicable legal principles. Some limited provisions of the
Rules could fall "within the fair contemplation of the
delegation of [an] enabling statute," CAFRA. In re N.J.A.C.
7:1B-1.1 et seq., 431 N.J. Super. 100, 116 (App. Div.) (citation
omitted), certif. denied, 216 N.J. 8 (2013). However, the Rules
apply to many municipalities that are not subject to CAFRA,
because that statute only applies to certain municipalities.
Moreover, the Rules far exceed the Legislature's limited
delegation of authority to DEP under CAFRA to regulate "land
uses in the coastal zone." Avalon, supra, 403 N.J. Super. at
601. We also agree with appellants that the Rules are not
authorized by any other legislative enactment or by the
Legislature's delegation of powers to DEP pursuant to the public
trust doctrine. We are constrained, therefore, to invalidate
the Rules.
I.
In their latest iteration, the Rules amend DEP's Coastal
Zone Management (CZM) regulations, N.J.A.C. 7:7. The CZM
regulations "establish[] the rules . . . regarding the use and
development of coastal resources[,]" and "are used in reviewing
4 A-1752-12T3
applications for coastal permits under [CAFRA]" and other
statutes. N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.1(a) (emphasis added). The CZM
regulations list "eight broad coastal goals," including
"[m]eaningful public access to and use of tidal waterways and
their shores." N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.1(c). The CZM regulations apply
to all DEP "actions and decisions," N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.2(a),
regarding the "coastal zone," defined as including not only
geographic areas subject to CAFRA, but also all other coastal
waters and tidal wetlands. N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.2(b).
In particular, appellants' challenge focuses on N.J.A.C.
7:7-9.48, the public trust rights rule, and N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9,
the public access rule (before DEP's July 2015 re-codification,
N.J.A.C. 7:7E-3.50 and N.J.A.C. 7:7E-8.11, respectively).1
Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.48(b), public access to "lands and
waters subject to public trust rights" must be provided in
accordance with N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9, and any development "that
does not comply with N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9 . . . is discouraged
. . . ." N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9, in turn, encourages, but does not
require, municipalities to create Municipal Public Access Plans
(MPAPs) that, among other things, identify current public access
points and corresponding signage, incorporate parking and other
1
See 46 N.J.R. 1051(a), 1053-57 (June 2, 2014) (DEP's table
cross-referencing the Rules as adopted in 2012 with the changes
proposed in 2014 and adopted in 2015).
5 A-1752-12T3
amenities to the maximum extent practicable, and plan for future
public access. N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(c)-(e).
DEP explained in 2012 that the new regulations
encourage municipalities to take an active
role in designing and ensuring public access
to beaches and tidal waters in ways that
will work best for their respective
circumstances. . . . Under the rules in
place prior to this adoption, the Department
evaluated public access only when an
applicant applied to the Department for a
coastal permit and was required to provide
public access under those rules. The
adopted rules enhance public access
opportunities by encouraging municipalities
to work with the Department to develop plans
to help ensure that the public's access
needs are met in a comprehensive and
systematic approach. The Department will
work with the municipalities on development
of their access plan, and the plan will be
required to meet the goals of the public
access rules.
[44 N.J.R. at 2602 (response to comment 234)
(emphasis added).]
More than two hundred municipalities are eligible to submit
MPAPs.2
A municipality, as part of its MPAP implementation
strategy, may create its own dedicated Public Access Fund, to
which developers contribute in lieu of providing public access
onsite. N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(f). The Rules provide formulae
2
See http://www.state.nj.us/dep/cmp/access/mpamunis.htm (list
of eligible municipalities) (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
6 A-1752-12T3
required to be used for the calculation of appropriate
contributions based upon the particular development. N.J.A.C.
7:7-16.9(f)(1) and (2).
After public notice and comment, and DEP review and
approval, a municipality must incorporate its MPAP into its
master plan, see N.J.S.A. 40:55D-5 and -28. N.J.A.C. 7:7-
16.9(j). At five-year intervals thereafter, a municipality must
provide DEP with a report detailing the status of all projects,
an accounting of its dedicated Public Access Fund, and a list of
problems and proposed remedies to assure compliance with the
MPAP. N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(j)(4). Any changes to the MPAP or to
the terms of a contribution made to the Public Access Fund must
be submitted first to DEP for "review and approval." N.J.A.C.
7:7-16.9(l). In addition, if the municipality fails to
implement or comply with its approved MPAP, DEP must "revoke its
approval." N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(m).
Once an MPAP is adopted as part of a municipality's master
plan, "public access required to satisfy the conditions of a
coastal permit for development in the municipality for permit
applications filed with [DEP] . . . shall be provided in
accordance with the [MPAP]." N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(k). However, if
a municipality does not adopt an MPAP, "public access along and
use of the beach and the shores shall be provided" in accordance
7 A-1752-12T3
with the regulations. N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(n). Depending upon the
nature and size of any particular commercial or residential
development, on-site access must be provided. N.J.A.C. 7:7-
16.9(n)(1) and (2). In addition, a municipality must have an
approved MPAP before DEP will approve a general permit for beach
and dune maintenance. N.J.A.C. 7:7-6.2(b).
During argument, we asked the Deputy Attorney General
representing DEP whether municipalities that did not adopt an
MPAP could suffer other negative consequences, specifically
eligibility for Green Acres funding. See 44 N.J.R. at 2630-32
(comments and responses 464-83). We were assured that they
would not. However, we note that DEP's current Green Acres
regulations provide:
(a) The following are ineligible to
apply for Green Acres funding:
. . . .
4. Any local government unit that does
not currently provide, or have active plans
to provide, public access to the waterfront
and to tidally-flowed and dry sand areas
subject to the Public Trust Doctrine,
consistent with the requirements of the
Coastal Zone Management Rules at N.J.A.C.
7:7E–8.11 and governing law.
[N.J.A.C. 7:36-3.2(a)(4) (emphasis added).]
This "carrot-and-stick" approach to secure submission of
MPAP applications for approval and municipal compliance
8 A-1752-12T3
thereafter was publicly acknowledged by DEP. When the Rules
were first issued in 2012, the agency declared that there were
"adequate incentives for municipalities to want to develop and
seek Department approval of [MPAPs]." 44 N.J.R. at 2631
(response to comments 465-68). DEP explained that it was
not penalizing municipalities which do not
have a [MPAP]. These municipalities will
still be able to conduct beach and dune
maintenance pursuant to an individual permit
if they choose to not prepare a Municipal
Public Access Plan. The Department believes
that this differential treatment is
appropriate to encourage the public access
benefits that can be achieved through the
cooperative planning effort reflected by a
Department-approved [MPAP].
[44 N.J.R. at 2606 (response to comment
261).]
DEP's Commissioner called the consequences for municipalities
not participating in the MPAP scheme "'the club if we need it.'"3
II.
We set some well-known guideposts that inform our review.
"Judicial review of agency regulations begins with a presumption
that the regulations are both valid and reasonable[,]" and "the
party challenging a regulation has the burden of proving that
3
Jacqueline L. Urgo, N.J. sets in motion letting local decisions
rule on beach access, The Philadelphia Inquirer (Apr. 5, 2011),
http://articles.philly.com/2011-04-05/news/29384729_1_beach-
access-public-access-long-beach-township. The document is
contained in DEP's appendix.
9 A-1752-12T3
the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable."
N.J. Ass'n of Sch. Adm'rs v. Schundler, 211 N.J. 535, 548 (2012)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "[W]e must
give great deference to an agency's interpretation and
implementation of its rules enforcing the statutes for which it
is responsible." In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, 180
N.J. 478, 488-89 (2004) (citing In re Distrib'n of Liquid
Assets, 168 N.J. 1, 10-11 (2001)).
Accordingly, a challenger must "demonstrat[e] an
inconsistency between the regulation and the statute it
implements, a violation of policy expressed or implied by the
Legislature, an extension of the statute beyond what the
Legislature intended, or a conflict between the enabling act and
other statutory law that cannot be harmonized." N.J. Ass'n of
Sch. Adm'rs v. Cerf, 428 N.J. Super. 588, 596 (App. Div. 2012),
certif. denied, 213 N.J. 536 (2013). "While findings of ultra
vires actions are disfavored, [o]ur role is to enforce the will
of the Legislature because [s]tatutes cannot be amended by
administrative fiat." In re Agric., Aquacultural, &
Horticultural Water Usage Certification Rules, 410 N.J. Super.
209, 223 (App. Div. 2009) (alterations in original) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). "[I]f the regulation is
10 A-1752-12T3
plainly at odds with the statute, we must set it aside." In re
Freshwater Wetlands, supra, 180 N.J. at 489.
With these standards in mind, we consider the specific
arguments raised on appeal.
A.
Appellants argue that, by invoking the public trust
doctrine, DEP has again arrogated to itself the regulation of
public access to the State's waterways and shorelines. They
contend that unless we are prepared to contradict our decision
in Avalon, the result must be the same, and the Rules must be
stricken. DEP argues that Avalon has limited application to
this case because there we only considered a specific as-applied
challenge to two particular provisions of the 2007 regulations
that are no longer contained in the Rules. However, we agree
with appellants that, absent express authorization from the
Legislature, the public trust doctrine alone cannot justify
DEP's adoption of the Rules.
The public trust doctrine encompasses the "legal principle
that the State holds 'ownership, dominion and sovereignty' over
tidally flowed lands 'in trust for the people.'" City of Long
Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 203 N.J. 464, 474 (2010) (quoting
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 316-17,
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821, 105 S. Ct. 93, 83 L. Ed. 2d 3911 A-1752-12T3
(1984)). Accord Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach
Club, Inc., 185 N.J. 40, 51 (2005); Borough of Neptune City v.
Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 304-05 (1972). The
doctrine's principles appear in English common law, and its
roots can be traced back to Roman civil law. Raleigh Ave.,
supra, 185 N.J. at 51-52; State v. Vogt, 341 N.J. Super. 407,
422 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 206 (2001). As a
result, a "'State can no more abdicate its trust over property
in which the whole people are interested . . . than it can
abdicate its police powers.'" Matthews, supra, 95 N.J. at 319(quoting Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453, 13 S.
Ct. 110, 118, 36 L. Ed. 1018, 1043 (1892)); E. Cape May Assocs.
v. State, Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 343 N.J. Super. 110, 142 (App.
Div.) ("the sovereign never waives its right to regulate the use
of public trust property"), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 211 (2001).
As the Court has reiterated:
Like many common-law principles, the
public trust doctrine has adapted to the
changing conditions and needs of the public
it was created to benefit. Today, public
rights in tidal lands are not limited to the
ancient prerogatives of navigation and
fishing, but extend as well to recreational
uses, including bathing, swimming and other
shore activities.
[Long Branch, supra, 203 N.J. at 475
(citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).]
12 A-1752-12T3
"Whether natural, or man-made, the beach is an adjunct to ocean
swimming and bathing and is subject to the Public Trust
Doctrine." Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174, 180
(1978). Therefore, "reasonable access to the sea is integral
to the public trust doctrine[, because] without access the
doctrine has no meaning." Raleigh Ave., supra, 185 N.J. at 53(citation omitted). The Court has held that, pursuant to the
public trust doctrine, the public's right to access the beach
includes "access to and use of privately-owned dry sand areas as
reasonably necessary." Matthews, supra, 95 N.J. at 326(emphasis added).
In Avalon, we considered a municipality's challenge to two
provisions of the 2007 rules that required public access to
municipal beaches "at all times," and conditioned eligibility
for appropriations from the "'Shore Protection Fund,'" N.J.S.A.
13:19-16.1, upon a municipality's agreement to provide
additional parking spaces and restrooms, and acquire the land
for these facilities by condemnation if necessary. Avalon,
supra, 403 N.J. Super. at 595. Regarding the requirement of
public access at all times, we noted that the Legislature had
specifically granted municipalities the authority to exercise
their police powers over publicly-owned lands. Id. at 598
(citing N.J.S.A. 40:48-2). We further observed that the
13 A-1752-12T3
Legislature had "recognized that seashore municipalities have
'exclusive control' over municipally-owned beaches." Id. at 599
(citing N.J.S.A. 40:61-22.20).4 We held:
In contrast to the express legislative
delegation of broad general powers to
municipalities to exercise exclusive control
over municipally-owned beaches, the
Legislature has not delegated any authority
to the DEP to preempt or supervise a
municipality's operation of its beaches.
Moreover, we perceive no basis for implying
such authority. It is the municipality, not
the DEP, that owns and operates and
4
N.J.S.A. 40:61-22.20(a) (emphasis added), entitled "Municipal
control over beaches, etc.; fees," provides in pertinent part:
The governing body of any municipality
bordering on the Atlantic Ocean, tidal water
bays or rivers which owns . . . lands
bordering on the ocean, tidal water bays or
rivers, or easement rights therein, for a
place of resort for public health and
recreation and for other public purposes
shall have the exclusive control, government
and care thereof and of any boardwalk,
bathing and recreational facilities,
safeguards and equipment, . . . and may
. . . make and enforce rules and regulations
for the government and policing of such
lands, boardwalk, bathing facilities,
safeguards and equipment; provided, that
such power of control, government, care and
policing shall not be construed in any
manner to exclude or interfere with the
operation of any State law or authority with
respect to such lands, property and
facilities.
DEP has not asserted that the exercise of municipal authority
under this statue is pre-empted by other legislation or by
application of the public trust doctrine.
14 A-1752-12T3
therefore bears responsibility for the
management of its beaches.
[Ibid.]
Distinguishing "public trust doctrine cases the DEP relie[d]
upon," we concluded "the . . . doctrine does not provide any
basis for a DEP rule that preempts the statutory authority of
municipalities to regulate municipally-owned beaches, including
deciding when they shall be open to the public." Id. at 600.
We also rejected DEP's assertion that the public trust
doctrine justified adoption of the second regulation at issue.
Id. at 605.
The essential thrust of the cases dealing
with application of the public trust
doctrine to municipally-owned beaches has
been that a municipality must provide non-
residents with the same access to its
beaches as its own residents . . . .
However, the Court has never held that
the public trust doctrine requires a
municipality that owns and operates a beach
to provide a specified number of parking
spaces and restrooms in proximity to the
beach or that the DEP has the authority to
impose such requirements upon a
municipality. Therefore, we conclude that
the public trust doctrine does not provide
authorization for the DEP rules imposing
these requirements.
[Ibid.]
In this case, DEP correctly notes that the Rules do not
compel municipalities to do anything, but rather encourage
15 A-1752-12T3
affected municipalities to cooperate with DEP in planning for
access through adoption of an MPAP. DEP argues that the public
trust doctrine, as interpreted by the Court, authorizes the
agency to act as steward of the State's coastal resources,
including assuring public access. See, e.g., N.J.A.C. 7:7-
16.9(aa) (describing DEP as "the State entity managing public
access along the shore," with "an obligation to ensure" access
under the public trust doctrine). However, consistent with our
assessment in Avalon, the cases DEP relies upon do not persuade
us that the public trust doctrine can serve as the fount of the
agency's regulatory power.
For example, DEP claims that in Lusardi v. Curtis Point
Property Owners Ass'n, 86 N.J. 217 (1981), the Court recognized
the agency "was one of three State entities charged with
promoting the State's interest in public access under the
[p]ublic [t]rust [d]octrine." DEP further asserts that Lusardi
and Matthews demonstrate that "even where the State as a whole
holds title to public trust lands, the ability to regulate it
has been passed to [] DEP." We disagree.
The Court in Lusardi considered whether a municipal zoning
ordinance that prohibited recreational use of privately-owned
oceanfront property was "an unreasonable exercise of the zoning
power in light of judicial, legislative and executive
16 A-1752-12T3
pronouncements establishing a statewide policy of encouraging
recreational use of dry sand beach areas." Lusardi, supra, 86
N.J. at 222. The Court found expressions of this "statewide
policy" in the public trust doctrine, legislation and the
coastal development policies promulgated by DEP. Id. at 227-28.
However, the Court made clear that "the public trust doctrine
[wa]s not directly applicable to th[e] case, which concern[ed]
the exercise of zoning power." Id. at 228. To the extent the
Court found DEP's regulations were "the most detailed expression
of this State's policies concerning the appropriate uses of
shoreline resources," it did so with reference to specific
statutory powers under CAFRA. Id. at 229.
Similarly, DEP's reliance upon Matthews is misplaced. In
Matthews, supra, 95 N.J. at 326, the Court relied exclusively
upon the public trust doctrine to conclude that "private
landowners may not in all instances prevent the public from
exercising its rights under the public trust doctrine[,]" and
"[t]he public must be afforded reasonable access to the
foreshore as well as a suitable area for recreation on the dry
sand." The Court's only mention of DEP's role was in a
footnote, recognizing that pursuant to CAFRA, the agency's
regulations supported unrestricted access to beaches. Id. at
325 n.8.
17 A-1752-12T3
Lastly, we reject DEP's claim that Raleigh Avenue
recognized the agency's independent regulatory authority
pursuant to the public trust doctrine. Without reciting the
tangled facts of the case, it suffices to say that the Court
rejected the property owner's claim that DEP "lack[ed]
jurisdiction to approve any fees charged" to the public for
services associated with the beach. Raleigh Ave., supra, 185
N.J. at 60. However, the Court made clear that it was "the
boardwalk pathway over the dunes to the . . . beach [which]
qualifies as a development, thereby triggering the DEP's CAFRA
jurisdiction over related use of the beach and ocean." Id. at
61.
The Legislature spoke clearly regarding municipally-owned
beaches when it enacted N.J.S.A. 40:61-22.20(a), and
municipally-owned property in general, when it enacted N.J.S.A.
40:48-1 (providing that "every municipality" may adopt and
enforce ordinances to "[m]anage, regulate and control the . . .
property . . . of the municipality"). Case law that has
developed regarding the public trust doctrine, including those
which have expanded its reach to privately-owned property, do
not support DEP's contention that the Legislature implicitly
delegated regulatory powers to the agency. DEP was not
18 A-1752-12T3
authorized to promulgate the Rules under the public trust
doctrine.
B.
Appellants next argue that DEP lacks the authority to
promulgate the Rules pursuant to CAFRA or any other statute,
and, as already noted, that the Rules conflict with the
Legislature's specific grant of authority to municipalities to
regulate municipally-owned land. DEP counters by arguing the
Rules were authorized pursuant to CAFRA.5 The agency also argues
that the Rules do not conflict with the MLUL.
5
We note, however, that DEP's only stated "rationale" for
adoption of the Rules was the public trust doctrine. See
N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.48(c); N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(aa). Additionally, at
two points in its brief, in single sentences without any legal
argument, DEP cites N.J.S.A. 13:1B-3(e) and N.J.S.A. 13:1D-9 as
providing the statutory authority for promulgating the Rules.
We have refused to consider such "cursory discussion[s]" of
legal arguments not properly raised in separate point headings.
Mid-Atlantic Solar Energy Indus. Ass'n v. Christie, 418 N.J.
Super. 499, 508 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 207 N.J. 190(2011). In any event, neither cited statute provides support
for DEP's argument. N.J.S.A. 13:1B-3(e) simply provides that as
part of his powers, the Commissioner may "[a]dopt, issue and
promulgate . . . such rules and regulations as may be authorized
by law[.]" N.J.S.A. 13:1D-9 vests DEP with broad powers
primarily linked to general functions of conservation,
education, environmental and ecological protection and pollution
control. There is no mention of DEP's authority to plan for or
implement public access to coastal areas.
19 A-1752-12T3
(1)
Some additional standards govern our consideration of
whether the Rules are authorized by CAFRA. "[W]hen a regulation
is challenged as contrary to the agency's statutory authority[,]
. . . the issue turns on statutory construction." In re
Adoption of N.J.A.C. 7:15-5.24(b), 420 N.J. Super. 552, 564
(App. Div.) (citing N.J. State League of Municipalities v. Dep't
of Cmty. Affairs, 158 N.J. 211, 222 (1999)), certif. denied, 208
N.J. 597 (2011). "[O]ur task in statutory interpretation is to
discern and effectuate the Legislature's intent." N.J. Dep't of
Envtl. Prot. v. Huber, 213 N.J. 338, 365 (2013) (citing Hubner
v. Spring Valley Equestrian Ctr., 203 N.J. 184, 194 (2010)).
We begin by looking at the statute's "plain language," read
"sensibly [and] in the context of the overall scheme in which
the Legislature intended the provision to operate." Ibid.(citations omitted). "[A]n agency's legislative authority can
be implied by the statute or by 'the entire legislative scheme
of which it is a part.'" In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 7:15-
5.24(b), supra, 420 N.J. Super. at 564 (quoting In re Stormwater
Mgmt. Rules, 384 N.J. Super. 451, 461 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 188 N.J. 489 (2006)). "A court will imply powers to
enable the agency to effectuate the intent of the statute."
Ibid.20 A-1752-12T3
"The primary purpose of CAFRA is to protect the unique and
fragile coastal zones of the State." In re Egg Harbor Assocs.
(Bayshore Centre), 94 N.J. 358, 364 (1983). "Although CAFRA is
principally an environmental protection statute, the powers
delegated to DEP extend well beyond protection of the natural
environment. Succinctly stated, the delegated powers require
DEP to regulate land use within the coastal zone for the general
welfare." Ibid.By enacting CAFRA, the Legislature intended to limit
potential adverse environmental impacts while encouraging
development of compatible land uses in the coastal zone. Seigel
v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 395 N.J. Super. 604, 615 (App.
Div.) (citing N.J.S.A. 13:19-2), certif. denied, 193 N.J. 277(2007). Thus, "[e]ach agency decision involving an application
for development under CAFRA invokes these 'competing policy
considerations.'" Ibid. (quoting In re Cape May Cty. Mun.
Utils. Auth., 242 N.J. Super. 509, 516 (App. Div. 1990)). CAFRA
specifically was intended to "preserve[] the most ecologically
sensitive and fragile area from inappropriate development and
provide[] adequate environmental safeguards for the construction
of any developments in the coastal area." N.J.S.A. 13:19-2
(emphasis added).
21 A-1752-12T3
We have previously discussed at length CAFRA's permitting
process and DEP's regulatory authority under the statute. See,
e.g., Dragon v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 405 N.J. Super. 478,
494-97 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 199 N.J. 517 (2009).
Succinctly stated, "CAFRA expressly requires that any
development within the State's specified 'coastal area' either
(1) be conducted under a permit issued pursuant to N.J.S.A.
13:19-5 or -5.1, or (2) be an activity that is explicitly
exempted from the permitting requirement by N.J.S.A. 13:19-5.2
or -5.3." Id. at 494.
In Avalon, we rejected DEP's argument that CAFRA authorized
the 2007 rule requiring public access to beaches at all times.
Avalon, supra, 403 N.J. Super. at 601. We held that "even
though CAFRA delegates authority to the DEP to regulate certain
land uses within the coastal zone, it does not preempt municipal
regulation under the [MLUL]." Ibid. (citing Bubis v. Kassin,
184 N.J. 612, 630 (2005); Lusardi, supra, 86 N.J. at 229).
Therefore, DEP's regulatory powers under CAFRA extended to "land
uses in the coastal zone, [but] the Legislature did not
authorize [] DEP to preempt the basic municipal power to manage
and control municipally-owned beaches, including deciding when
those areas should be open to the public." Id. at 601.
22 A-1752-12T3
As to the requirement of additional parking and bathroom
facilities contained in the 2007 version of the Rules, we
recognized that "CAFRA does not include any provision
authorizing [] DEP to condition the issuance of [] a permit upon
a municipality agreeing to provide additional parking spaces or
restrooms in order to facilitate public access to the beach."
Id. at 606. We rejected the agency's claim that because Raleigh
Avenue recognized DEP's jurisdiction to monitor beach fees, the
agency "ha[d] implied authority to impose whatever additional
obligations [] DEP deem[ed] appropriate to facilitate public
access to the beach." Id. at 607. We noted, DEP's authority to
review beach fees "can be viewed as 'incidental' to the powers
the Legislature expressly granted to [] DEP under CAFRA," but
prescribing parking and bathroom facilities involved important
policy questions within the "exclusive province of the
Legislature." Id. at 607-08. "The Legislature could of course
delegate authority for making these decisions to [] DEP.
However, CAFRA does not contain such a delegation of authority."
Id. at 608.
The only connection we discern between CAFRA's permitting
process and the most recent iteration of the Rules is that
applicants for CAFRA permits in municipalities that have adopted
approved MPAPs may satisfy public access requirements "in
23 A-1752-12T3
accordance with the [MPAP]."6 N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(c) and (k). As
already mentioned, in towns without approved MPAPs, an applicant
must comply with other provisions of the Rules that place
significant restrictions upon him or her. N.J.A.C. 7:7-
16.9(c)(2) and (n). For example, pursuant to N.J.A.C.
7:7-16.9(u), public access areas must be clearly marked by signs
approved by DEP, and, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9(z), "areas
set aside for public access to tidal waterways and their shores
shall be permanently dedicated for public use through the
recording of a Department approved conservation restriction."
Perhaps DEP could choose to adopt a different permitting
process in municipalities that have adopted an MPAP. The
precise question is not before us, nor do we need to decide the
issue. We conclude that any nexus between CAFRA's general
statutory purposes, its permitting processes and the Rules is
limited at best, and it cannot justify the broad and pervasive
regulatory regime imposed by the Rules taken as a whole.
Lastly, we note that CAFRA applies only to a well-defined
"coastal area." N.J.S.A. 13:19-4. That "coastal area" is not
6
The record included DEP's template for formulating an MPAP, as
well as one MPAP submitted by a municipality. Given the lack of
specificity contained in these documents, it is unclear how a
private landowner applying for an individual permit under CAFRA,
for example, would necessarily satisfy his or her "public access
requirements" by simply relying on the approved MPAP.
24 A-1752-12T3
co-extensive with the "coastal zone," to which the Rules
specifically apply. In short, CAFRA does not serve as explicit
or implicit authority for DEP to promulgate the Rules.
(2)
For the sake of completeness, we address appellants'
argument that the Rules conflict with provisions of the MLUL and
other statutes that embody the Legislature's express delegation
of powers to municipalities. Specifically, they argue DEP
cannot require that a municipality wishing to adopt an MPAP
incorporate same in its master plan, nor can DEP authorize the
creation of municipal Public Access Funds.
The MLUL is "a comprehensive statute that allows
municipalities to adopt ordinances to regulate land development
'in a manner which will promote the public health, safety,
morals and general welfare' using uniform and efficient
procedures." Rumson Estates, Inc. v. Mayor & Council of Fair
Haven, 177 N.J. 338, 349 (2003) (quoting Levin v. Twp. of
Parsippany-Troy Hills, 82 N.J. 174, 179 (1980)). However, a
municipality's power "must be exercised in strict conformity
with the delegating enactment — the MLUL." Toll Bros. v. Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 194 N.J. 223, 243 (2008).
Two goals of the MLUL are:
To provide sufficient space in
appropriate locations for a variety of
25 A-1752-12T3
agricultural, residential, recreational,
commercial and industrial uses and open
space, both public and private, according to
their respective environmental requirements
in order to meet the needs of all New Jersey
citizens.
. . . .
To promote the conservation of historic
sites and districts, open space, energy
resources and valuable natural resources in
the State and to prevent urban sprawl and
degradation of the environment through
improper use of land . . . [.]
[N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(g) and (j) (emphasis
added).]
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-28(b) requires that a master plan must include
"[a] statement of objectives, principles, assumptions, policies
and standards" and "[a] land use plan element . . . ." N.J.S.A.
40:55D-28(b)(1) and (b)(2). The statute then sets forth
fourteen other discretionary elements.
The land use plan element requires consideration of
"topography, soil conditions, water supply, drainage, flood
plain areas, marshes, and woodlands[.]" N.J.S.A. 40:55D-
28(b)(2)(a). Discretionary elements include a "recreation plan
element," that includes "a comprehensive system of areas and
public sites for recreation[,]" and a "conservation plan
element" that provides "for the preservation, conservation, and
utilization of natural resources, including . . . marshes,
26 A-1752-12T3
wetlands, harbors, rivers and other waters . . . ." N.J.S.A.
40:55D-28(b)(7) and (8).
Given this extensive list of a master plan's permissible
contents, we reject appellants' argument that, by permitting
municipalities to adopt an MPAP and requiring them to
incorporate it as part of their master plans, the Rules violate
this portion of the MLUL. Adopting an MPAP seems consistent
with these required and permitted portions of a master plan.7
However, we note that the MLUL provides that a master plan
must be periodically re-examined, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-89, the
reexamination report must include specific recommendations as to
amendments to the master plan, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-89(d), and the
failure to adopt a re-examination report "constitute[s] a
rebuttable presumption that the municipal development
regulations are no longer reasonable." N.J.S.A. 40:55D-89.1.
We express substantial doubt that those provisions of the Rules
requiring the regular update of MPAPs and prohibiting amendment
without DEP approval can be harmonized with these provisions of
the MLUL.
7
We note that the Legislature anticipated that a master plan
could designate private property for anticipated public use, and
the Planning Board could reserve those locations for one year,
subject to just compensation to an affected developer. See
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-44.
27 A-1752-12T3
We do agree with appellants that the creation of municipal
Public Access Funds by which participating municipalities may,
pursuant to the Rules, receive monetary contributions from
permit applicants is, absent a specific legislative grant of
authority, ultra vires. In New Jersey Shore Builders Ass'n v.
Township of Jackson, 199 N.J. 449 (2009), the Court concluded
that the municipal appellants lacked the authority to promulgate
ordinances that required developers to set aside open space or
make payments in lieu thereof. Id. at 452. The Court
recognized that the "statutory authority that permits a
municipality to require contributions for off-tract improvements
is limited." Id. at 453 (citing N.J.S.A. 40:55D-42 ("referring
to contributions for off-tract improvements to water, sewer,
drainage, and street improvements only")).
DEP cites no statutory authority by which municipalities
may accept monetary contributions from permit applicants simply
by adopting an MPAP, and no such authority is provided by the
MLUL or any other statute that we located. Those provisions of
the Rules that empower a municipality to create a Public Access
Fund lack any statutory authority and are ultra vires.
III.
In sum, we conclude that absent a specific legislative
grant of authority, DEP was not authorized by the public trust
28 A-1752-12T3
doctrine to promulgate the Rules. We further conclude that
CAFRA's permitting provisions might implicitly authorize limited
portions of the Rules, but it is not our task to identify which
limited portions of the Rules could be so authorized. Given
their 1) application beyond CAFRA's territorial limits, and 2)
their extensive scope, the Rules exceed any implied grant of
legislative authority under the statute. Lastly, we conclude
that the creation of a municipal Public Access Fund would be an
ultra vires exercise of municipal power, and, while the MLUL
could authorize adoption of a MPAP as part of a municipal master
plan, the provisions of the MLUL that govern amendment of the
master plan leave no room for DEP's pervasive involvement in the
process as set forth in the Rules.
We therefore conclude that the Rules must be stricken, and
we invalidate N.J.A.C. 7:7-9.48, the public trust rights rule,
and N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9, the public access rule, as well as any
other provisions of the regulations that rely upon those two
sections.
29 A-1752-12T3