DCPP VS. D.N.L. AND M.J., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF M.N.J. (FG-07-0140-18, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (CONSOLIDATED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NOS. A-2237-18T1
A-2238-18T1
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
D.N.L. and M.J.,
Defendants-Appellants.
_____________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF M.N.J.,
a Minor.
_____________________________
Submitted August 1, 2019 – Decided August 7, 2019
Before Judges Whipple and Firko.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket
No. FG-07-0140-18.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant D.N.L. (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel; Ruth Ann Harrigan, Designated
Counsel, on the briefs).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant M.J. (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel; James Daniel O'Kelly,
Designated Counsel, on the briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Dana L. Paolillo, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
attorney for minor (Joseph Hector Ruiz, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In these consolidated appeals, D.N.L. (mother) and M.J. (father), parents
of M.N.J., appeal the trial court's January 8, 2019 judgment of guardianship after
trial. We affirm.
M.N.J. was removed from his mother and father after he was born in April
2017. M.N.J. is medically fragile. The Division of Child Protection and
Permanency (Division) filed a complaint for care and custody on May 17, 2017,
which the court granted after determining removal was necessary to avoid risk
to M.N.J.'s life, safety and health. Mother lost custody of her four other children
whom the Division removed from her care years earlier because of her
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instability, untreated substance abuse and extensive history with the Divisi on.
Father is incarcerated. M.N.J. lived in a foster home for a short period of time
after his birth before he was returned to a medical facility where he has remained
for the past two years. At the time of the guardianship trial, the Division's plan
for M.N.J. was release from the medical facility followed by select-home
adoption.
The record in this matter is extensive and we need not repeat in detail the
history of the Division's involvement with mother and father because both
parents' arguments are narrowly focused on prongs three and four of the best
interests test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3) and (4). We incorporate by reference
the factual findings and legal conclusions contained in Judge James R.
Paganelli's written opinion and focus on the facts relevant to the arguments
raised.
When M.N.J. was born, doctors placed him on a feeding tube and treated
him for jaundice. A week after his birth, the Division caseworker met with
mother and father at the Division offices. The Division's original plan was to
place the child with father; however, when they discovered father's criminal
history, they requested he undergo a psychological and a substance abuse
evaluation. The psychologist opined father was not capable of parenting a
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newborn and offered a guarded prognosis for reunification. Father identified his
sister, L.J., as willing to assist in caring for M.N.J. The worker cautioned father
that if the child was placed with L.J., he would not be permitted to reside in
L.J.'s home with his son until he completed recommended services and the
Division had no concerns. L.J., however, would not take M.N.J. unless father
could be in the home. The Division asked L.J. whether she would allow mother
to reside in the home if she cared for M.N.J. and L.J. refused. Father continued
to have supervised visits with M.N.J. until his arrest and subsequent
incarceration in 2017. The Division could not extend visits to the prison because
of M.N.J.'s medical issues.
In July 2017, mother and the Division discussed placing M.N.J. with
father's cousin, M.O., but M.O. refused to attend training until she knew the
Division would approve her home and did not respond to the Division's
subsequent attempts to contact her. In November 2017, the Division reached
out to another relative, A.O., who had expressed an interest in caring for M.N.J.,
but she never contacted the Division and was ultimately ruled out as a caretaker
for M.N.J.
The Division explored other relatives. On February 20, 2018, the Division
wrote to father's adult son, I.J., to inquire if he was still interested in caring for
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M.N.J. He was eventually ruled out because of housing insecurity. In
September 2018, the Division began to assess mother's sister, P.H., as a potential
resource parent by conducting a background check and scheduling a home
assessment. The home assessment did not occur, but P.H. was not ruled out as
a placement. On October 15, 2018, the Division wrote to L.J. asking her to
contact the Division to be assessed as a caregiver.
During the guardianship trial, the adoption supervisor testified that if the
Division were granted guardianship of M.N.J., the plan would be select-home
adoption. Two potential adoptive families had already been identified through
the exchange unit based on M.N.J.'s medical issues. The Division was not
permitted to contact those families until the Division was granted guardianship.
After considering all of the evidence in the record and applying the four prong
best interests test, Judge Paganelli granted guardianship to the Division and
terminated the parental rights of both mother and father. This appeal followed.
Mother argues:
POINT I
THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO MAKE A
DETERMINATION SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD
THAT [THE DIVISION] CONSIDERED
ALTERNATIVES TO TERMINATION.
A-2237-18T1
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POINT II
REVERSAL IS WARRANTED BECAUSE THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED DID NOT SUPPORT THE
[TRIAL] COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS WOULD
DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD.
Father argues:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'[S] PRONG THREE ANALYSIS
OF ALTERNATIVES TO TERMINATION OF M.J.'S
PARENTAL RIGHTS WAS LEGALLY
ERRONEOUS AND NOT BASED ON
SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE
RECORD BELOW.
A. At The Conclusion Of The Guardianship Trial,
A Plausible Alternative To Termination Of M.J.'s
Parental Rights Existed.
B. Placement Of M.N.J. With P.H. Will Serve
His Best Interests.
C. The Trial Court's Conclusion That Adoption
Was Likely And Feasible Was Legally
Erroneous.
D. A Potential Caregiver Is Entitled To Receive
Information About The Availability Of [Kinship
Legal Guardianship] As An Alternative To
Termination Of Parental Rights.
POINT II
[THE DIVISION] FAILED TO MAKE
REASONABLE EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF M.J.
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POINT III
WITHOUT A PROPER ASSESSMENT OF
ALTERNATIVES TO THE TERMINATION OF
M.J.'S PARENTAL RIGHTS, THE TRIAL COURT
COULD NOT DETERMINE WHETHER
TERMINATION WOULD DO MORE HARM THAN
GOOD.
We are satisfied that, commencing with the Division's involvement with
mother, continuing up to and including trial in December 2018 and January
2019, M.N.J. has been endangered by the parental relationship with mother and
father because their own circumstances, substance abuse, instability and
recurring incarceration have rendered them unable to care for their child. Both
mother and father endangered the child through their inability to address the
child's complex medical needs. The credible expert evidence demonstrates both
parents lack the capacity to care for the child and are incapable of providing a
safe, stable and permanent home.
We first address mother's argument. We reject the assertion that the
Division did not consider alternatives to termination. Potential placements with
several other family members were considered. The Division attempted to
assess some potential family placements numerous times and ruled out those
family members when they did not respond to Division contact. Mother argues
the record demonstrates that at the time of trial a feasible placement with P.H.,
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including a Kinship Legal Guardianship (KLG), was not fully explored, despite
the fact that P.H. had previously been approved as a resource parent.
P.H. was not ruled out as a placement and remains a potential placement.
However, N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6(d)(3)(b) states that KLG is proper only when
adoption is "neither feasible nor likely." See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs.
v. H.R., 431 N.J. Super. 212, 230-31 (App. Div. 2013). The Division's position
at trial, accepted by the judge and supported by the record, was that select-home
adoption was feasible and likely. Thus, placement with P.H. was not a viable
alternative to termination of parental rights as mother suggests.
We reject father's arguments as well. We have previously said that KLG
"is not intended as an equally available alternative to termination that must be
considered in order to satisfy the third element of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1[(a)]."
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.V., 362 N.J. Super. 76, 88 (App. Div.
2003).
Judge Paganelli carefully reviewed the evidence presented and thereafter
concluded that the Division had met all of the legal requirements for a judgment
of guardianship by clear and convincing evidence. Potential adoptive famil ies
have been identified for the child's therapeutic needs. See N.J. Div. of Youth &
Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 611 (1986) (explaining that termination of
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parental rights may precede the establishment of a definite permanency plan
when justice so requires). And the judge also ruled that, even if the Division is
unsuccessful in achieving permanent placement, there would still be no
circumstances under which the child should be reunited with mother or father.
See In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 357 (1999) ("In all our
guardianship and adoption cases, the child's need for permanency and stability
emerges as a central factor.").
The judge's opinion comports with the statutory requirements of N.J.S.A.
30:4C-15.1(a). See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420,
448-49 (2012); K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 347-48. We therefore affirm substantially
for the reasons the judge expressed in his comprehensive, well-reasoned
opinion.
Affirmed.
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