TOWER LIEN, LLC VS. CARLOS CEPEDAÂ (F-14539-13, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2446-15T3
TOWER LIEN, LLC,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CARLOS CEPEDA,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., RAMIN
GHOBADI, M.D. and STATE OF NEW
JERSEY,
Defendants.
_____________________________
Submitted May 30, 2017 – Decided June 15, 2017
Before Judges Haas and Currier.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Passaic County,
Docket No. F-14539-13.
Carlos Cepeda, appellant pro se.
Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland & Perretti, LLP,
attorneys for intervenor-respondent Michael
H. Tong (Michael R. O'Donnell, of counsel;
Jorge A. Sanchez and John C. Kessler, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Carlos Cepeda appeals from the October 30, 2015
order denying his motion to vacate the final judgment of
foreclosure. We affirm.
After defendant became delinquent on the real estate taxes
for property he owned, the property was acquired at a tax sale
auction in 2010 by Tower Lien, LLC (Tower). Defendant was advised
that Tower had acquired a lien and the actions he needed to take
to redeem the property. When the property was not redeemed, Tower
filed a summons and complaint to foreclose the tax sale
certificate. Although personally served with the complaint,
defendant did not file an answer or otherwise respond.
A request to enter default was filed in June 2013. A
subsequent order setting the time, place and amount of redemption
was issued and mailed to defendant; however, he did not appear on
the set date to redeem the property. Final judgment was entered
on November 1, 2013. The property was subsequently sold and
transferred to a new owner, Michael H. Tong. Written notice was
provided to defendant of Tong's ownership of the property.1
1
Defendant was living at the property at the time of Tong's
purchase. He continued to reside there during the pendency of
this litigation and made monthly rent payments to Tong.
2 A-2446-15T3
Almost two years after the entry of final judgment, in August
2015, defendant filed a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to
Rule 4:50-1(d). He argued that he had been "in and out of the
count[r]y" and was unable to oppose the foreclosure complaint. He
further asserted that the final judgment should be rendered void
because the certification supporting the motion was executed by
Tower's attorney, not by an employee of the company.
Tong moved to intervene in the matter and opposed defendant's
motion. Although advised of the date and time for oral argument,
defendant failed to appear in court. On October 30, 2015, the
trial judge granted Tong's motion to intervene and denied
defendant's motion to vacate the judgment. The judge found that
defendant's arguments were without merit and that he had failed
to provide any proofs that he had not been properly served with
the complaint.
On appeal, defendant does not re-assert his argument that
Tower's certification was deficient; he argues instead, and for
the first time, that he was not properly served with the complaint.
Although we generally do not consider arguments raised for the
first time on appeal, Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J.
229, 234 (1973), we recognize that the trial judge mentioned the
issue of personal service in her ruling. The judge noted the lack
3 A-2446-15T3
of proofs presented on this issue and concluded that there was no
indication that service was improper.
Defendant's argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). In his
appendix, defendant attached the process server's affidavit of
service, which notes that defendant was personally served on May
9, 2013 with the pleadings. He has presented no proofs to the
contrary. See Goldfarb v. Roeger, 54 N.J. Super. 85, 90 (App.
Div. 1959) (stating "uncorroborated testimony . . . alone is not
sufficient to" contest an affidavit in support of service).
Affirmed.
4 A-2446-15T3