CRAIG ROGERS VS. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN'S Â RETIREMENT SYSTEM(BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMNT SYSTEM)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0938-15T3
CRAIG ROGERS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE
AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT
SYSTEM,
Respondent-Respondent.
_____________________________________________________________
Submitted April 25, 2017 – Decided June 15, 2017
Before Judges Gilson and Sapp-Peterson.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees, Police
and Firemen's Retirement System, PFRS No.
3-10-046274.
Fusco & Macaluso Partners, LLC, attorneys for appellant
(Amie E. DiCola, on the briefs).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney
for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Amy Chung, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Craig Rogers appeals from the final agency
decision of the Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement
System (Board), denying his application for accidental disability
and granting him ordinary disability. The Board adopted the
findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who concluded that
petitioner failed to meet "his burden of presenting sufficient
competent and credible evidence of facts essential to his claim."
We affirm.
Petitioner, a more than eighteen-year veteran of the City of
Newark Police Department, sustained an injury during a training
course conducted on October 25, 2011. The course was part of a
four-day mandatory training program designed to instruct officers
in physical combat skills as an alternative to using deadly force.
Petitioner was performing his physical exercises on a large one-
inch-thick foam mat. The mat consisted of several sections all
joined together by duct tape.
Just before his injury, petitioner was training on the mat,
along with six of his colleagues. The colleagues were all present
at the time petitioner sustained his injury. According to
petitioner, he had been seated performing physical exercises, when
his instructor directed him to stand. As he stood up the seam of
the mat separated, causing the mat to buckle under him, resulting
in his fall.
On June 11, 2012, petitioner applied for accidental
disability retirement benefits. In the application, petitioner
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certified that he became disabled as a result of "injuries
sustained during physical combat training, torn meniscus, ligament
in the left knee." On January 14, 2013, the Board denied
petitioner's application. The Board found that petitioner was
totally and permanently disabled from performing his duties as a
law enforcement officer as a result of the October 25, 2011
incident, but concluded that the incident causing his injuries was
"not undesigned and unexpected." The Board granted petitioner
ordinary disability benefits as of October 1, 2012.
Petitioner timely appealed this decision and requested a
hearing before the Office of Administrative Law, which was granted.
After a series of adjournment requests on the part of both sides,
the ALJ conducted a hearing. The sole issue to be resolved was
whether the October 25, 2001 incident causing petitioner's injury
was an "undesigned and unexpected" traumatic event.
Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a written opinion in
which he concluded that petitioner failed to meet "his burden of
presenting sufficient competent and credible evidence of facts
essential to his claim." The ALJ found that neither in
petitioner's application for accidental disability nor in the
orthopedist's report, issued two years after the incident, were
there any references to a defective or malfunctioning mat. The
ALJ noted "petitioner acknowledged that the only report in the
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record that mentions the mat in connection with his injury is the
Police Investigation Report." The ALJ additionally observed that
there were other colleagues present, none of whom sustained any
injury, as well as petitioner's instructor, who was not called to
testify during the hearing. The ALJ found that petitioner's
testimony was not credibly corroborated and that the nature of his
injury could not be characterized as "'extraordinary or unusual'
because injuring his left knee while exercising is neither
extraordinary nor unusual in common experience." The ALJ also
noted that the "record shows that the instructor was present at
the time of incident; however, he was not called to testify."
On September 25, 2015, the Board adopted this decision,
denying accidental disability benefits to petitioner, but awarding
ordinary disability benefits to him. This appeal followed.
On appeal petitioner contends he is entitled to accidental
disability because his accident met the statutory definition of a
"traumatic event" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7, and because he
is permanently and totally disabled from his regular and assigned
duties as a direct result of the October 25, 2011 incident.
Our scope of review of "administrative agency action is
limited. An administrative agency's final quasi-judicial decision
will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair
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support in the record.'" Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's
Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (quoting In re Herrmann, 192
N.J. 19,27-28 (2007)).
"Generally, courts afford substantial deference to an
agency's interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged
with enforcing." Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's
Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007). "Such deference has been
specifically extended to state agencies that administer pension
statutes[,]" because "'a state agency brings experience and
specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating
a legislative enactment within its field of expertise.'" Piatt
v. Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div.
2015) (quoting In re Election Law Enf't Comm'n Advisory Op. No.
01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010)).
In order to secure the accidental disability benefits, an
applicant must prove each of the following elements:
1. that he is permanently and totally
disabled;
2. as a direct result of a traumatic event
that is
a. identifiable as to time and place,
b. undesigned and unexpected, and
c. caused by a circumstance external to
the member (not the result of pre-
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existing disease that is aggravated
or accelerated by the work);
3. that the traumatic event occurred during
and as a result of the member's regular or
assigned duties;
4. that the disability was not the result of
the member's willful negligence; and
5. that the member is mentally or physically
incapacitated from performing his usual or any
other duty.
[Russo, supra, 206 N.J. at 30 (quoting
Richardson, supra, 192 N.J. at 212-13).]
Here, the only disputed issue before the ALJ was whether the
injury-producing event was "undesigned and unexpected."
The ALJ explained that "[t]here is no reason to expect that
a seam in a mat held together by duct tape, won't give way if one
moves from a seated position to a standing position with one foot
admittedly on the tape[,]" and as such, no "unexpected happening"
occurred. The ALJ further determined that petitioner stood at the
point where multiple mats were held together by duct tape, and
that the mat "gave in, which was the intended purpose for the mat
under increased pressure and weight."
Petitioner did not call any witnesses to corroborate the
testimony or provide any evidence of the mat's alleged defects.
Petitioner was the only witness who testified about the defective
mat, and how the injury sustained was caused by this alleged
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defect. While the incident report corroborates petitioner's
testimony that the foam mat "gave in" when he stood up, as the ALJ
found, that is the intended purpose of a foam mat. Petitioner
produced no competent contrary evidence nor did he produce any
evidence that the particular mat was otherwise defective.
Furthermore, as correctly stated by the ALJ, petitioner only
provided photographs of the mat that were taken "a significant
period after the date of the incident." Petitioner's reliance
upon Moran v. Bd. Of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 438 N.J.
Super. 346 (App. Div. 2014), and Brooks v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.
Ret. Sys., 425 N.J. Super. 277 (App. Div. 2012), is misplaced. In
both cases, the inquiry involved a question of law applied to
undisputed facts. Here, by contrast, the inquiry is factual.
Petitioner argues the injury occurred because of a defective
foam mat. However, documentary evidence reflected that petitioner
never causally linked his injury to a defective mat. Petitioner
failed to produce other witnesses to corroborate his contention,
although six colleagues and an instructor were present at the time
he sustained his injury. Further, petitioner presented no expert
testimony establishing that the mat was defective either in form
or the manner in which it was connected to other mats with duct
tape. The ALJ did not credit petitioner's testimony.
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Under the arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable standard,
our scope of review is guided by three major inquiries: (l) whether
the agency's decision conforms with relevant law; (2) whether the
decision is supported by substantial credible evidence in the
record; and (3) whether in applying the law to the facts, the
administrative agency clearly erred in reaching its conclusion.
In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011).
When an agency decision satisfies such criteria, we accord
substantial deference to the agency's fact-finding and legal
conclusions, acknowledging "the agency's 'expertise and superior
knowledge of a particular field.'" Circus Liquors, Inc. v.
Governing Body of Middletown, 199 N.J. 1, 10 (2009) (quoting
Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)).
We will not substitute our judgment for the agency's even though
we might have reached a different conclusion. Stallworth, supra,
208 N.J. at 194; see also In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656-57 (1999)
(discussing the narrow appellate standard of review for
administrative matters).
Applying these principles here, we discern no basis for
disturbing the Board's decision rejecting petitioner's claim for
accidental disability benefits and awarding ordinary disability
benefits.
Affirmed.
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