JOHN SMITH VS. ARVIND R. DATLA, M.D.(L-1527-15, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1339-16T3
JOHN SMITH, a fictitious
person,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff-Respondent,
July 12, 2017
v. APPELLATE DIVISION
ARVIND R. DATLA, M.D. and
CONSULTANTS IN KIDNEY
DISEASES, P.A.,
Defendants-Appellants.
____________________________________
Argued May 8, 2017 – Decided July 12, 2017
Before Judges Sabatino, Haas and Geiger.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division,
Mercer County, Docket No. L-1527-15.
Mark A. Petraske argued the cause for
appellants (Buckley, Theroux, Kline &
Petraske, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Petraske and
Teresa C. Finnegan, on the briefs).
Craig J. Hubert argued the cause for
respondent (Szaferman, Lakind, Blumstein &
Blader, PC, attorneys; Mr. Hubert, of
counsel and on the brief; Keith L. Hovey and
Brandon C. Simmons, on the brief).
E. Drew Britcher argued the cause for amicus
curiae New Jersey Association for Justice
(Britcher Leone, LLC, attorneys; Mr.
Britcher, of counsel; Jessica E. Choper, on
the brief).
William H. Mergner, Jr. argued the cause for
amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar
Association (New Jersey State Bar
Association, attorneys; Thomas H. Prol,
President, of counsel; Mr. Mergner and Liana
M. Nobile, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GEIGER, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned).
This appeal raises the unresolved issue of what statute of
limitations applies to a common-law invasion of privacy claim
arising out of a defendant harmfully revealing private facts
about a plaintiff to a third party. It also raises the related
question of what limitations period applies to a statutory cause
of action for a defendant's improper disclosure of a plaintiff's
HIV-positive status1 committed in violation of the AIDS
Assistance Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 26:5C-1 to -14. The trial court
held that both such claims are subject to a two-year statute of
limitations. The trial court further ruled that plaintiff's
1
"'HIV' means the human immunodeficiency virus or any other
related virus identified as a probable causative agent of AIDS."
N.J.S.A. 26:5C-15. "AIDS" means acquired immune deficiency
syndrome. Ibid. "HIV-positive" means having a positive
reaction on a "HIV related test" used to detect "any virus,
antibody, antigen or etiologic agent thought to cause or to
indicate the presence of AIDS." N.J.S.A. 26:5C-5. "HIV-
positive" refers to an individual infected with HIV but not yet
having AIDS. See Troum v. Newark Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 338 N.J.
Super. 1, 6, 10, 14 (App. Div.) (explaining that HIV and AIDS
occur as a seamless progression of a single pathology, with HIV
as the infection and AIDS being the manifestation of the
disease), certif. denied, 168 N.J. 295 (2001).
2 A-1339-16T3
medical malpractice claim was also subject to a two-year statute
of limitations. We affirm.
This civil action seeks monetary damages and an award of
attorney's fees for invasion of privacy, violation of the Act,
and medical malpractice. The first legal issue presented by
this appeal is whether the tort of invasion of privacy by public
disclosure of private facts is an "injury to the person" barred
by the two-year limitation period set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2,
or instead by the one-year limitation period for defamation set
forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3. The second legal issue is whether a
violation of the Act is subject to a one-year or two-year
limitation period. The third issue is whether a claim of
medical malpractice based upon the same wrongful public
disclosure of private medical facts is subject to a one-year or
two-year limitation period.
Before addressing these issues, we note the standard of
review that governs our analysis. Defendants moved to dismiss
the complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e) for "failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted." Because this appeal is from
the denial of such a dismissal motion, we must accept as true
plaintiff's version of the events. Rumbauskas v. Cantor, 138
N.J. 173, 175 (1994). Here, the issues raised by defendants do
3 A-1339-16T3
not involve a challenge to fact-finding on the part of the trial
court, but rather involve pure questions of law.
On appeal, we engage in a de novo review from a trial
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss filed
pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e). Rezen Family Assoc., LP v. Borough
of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 208 N.J. 366 (2011). Moreover, when analyzing pure
questions of law raised in a dismissal motion, such as the
application of a statute of limitations, we undertake a de novo
review. See Royster v. N.J. State Police, 227 N.J. 482, 493
(2017); Town of Kearny v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76, 91 (2013). A
"trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal
consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled
to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm.
of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
I.
The limited record in this interlocutory appeal reflects
that plaintiff John Smith2 was a patient of defendant, Dr. Arvind
R. Datla, a board-certified nephrologist. Co-defendant,
Consultants in Kidney Diseases, PA, is a medical practice
employing or owned by Dr. Datla. Dr. Datla was treating
2
In order to protect his identity, plaintiff is identified
fictitiously as John Smith in the public pleadings.
4 A-1339-16T3
plaintiff for acute kidney failure. During an emergent bedside
consultation in plaintiff's private hospital room on July 25,
2013, Dr. Datla discussed with plaintiff his medical condition.
While doing so, Dr. Datla disclosed plaintiff's HIV-positive
status in the presence of an unidentified third party who was
also in the room.3 Plaintiff claims that Dr. Datla thereby
revealed his HIV-positive status to the third party without his
consent.
Plaintiff sued defendants, pleading various related
theories. In his original complaint, plaintiff alleged invasion
of privacy based on the inappropriate disclosure of private,
confidential medical information to a third-party without
plaintiff's consent, in violation of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), 13
U.S.C.A. § 1320 (count one).4 He also alleged medical
malpractice based on the inappropriate disclosure (count two).
Plaintiff further alleged that after the disclosure, Dr. Datla
attempted "to create a fraudulent ruse by which [Dr. Datla]
would allege in front of the unauthorized third party and
3
The record does not reveal the third party's identity or his or
her relationship to plaintiff.
4
HIPAA "concerns the protection of personal medical information
and regulates its use and disclosure by 'covered entities.'"
Cmty. Hosp. Grp., Inc. v. Blume Goldfadden Berkowitz Donnelly
Fried & Forte, P.C., 381 N.J. Super. 119, 125 (App. Div. 2005).
5 A-1339-16T3
plaintiff that the medical information that had been disclosed
referred, in fact, to a different patient."
Plaintiff filed his complaint on July 1, 2015, almost two
years after the July 25, 2013 disclosure event. Plaintiff
contends that the disclosure of his HIV-positive status by
defendant was negligent, careless, reckless, willful and wanton.
Plaintiff claims that the disclosure caused him to endure pain
and suffering, emotional distress, other emotional injuries and
insult, and permanent injury with physiological consequences.
In his answer, Dr. Datla identifies himself as a board-
certified specialist in nephrology and asserts that he was
practicing nephrology in this case. After a Ferriera5
conference, plaintiff produced an affidavit of merit (AOM) from
a board-certified specialist in internal medicine.
Prior to the filing of plaintiff's amended complaint,
defendants simultaneously filed two separate motions to dismiss
plaintiff's complaint. One motion sought dismissal of
plaintiff's medical malpractice claim (count two) on grounds
that an AOM by a physician who is not a board-certified
nephrologist violates the Patients First Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-
27, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41, and the Court's holding in Nicholas v.
Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 487 (2013). The other motion sought
5
Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs., 178 N.J. 144 (2003).
6 A-1339-16T3
dismissal of plaintiff's invasion of privacy claim (count one)
on grounds that HIPAA does not provide for a private right of
action. The trial court denied each motion in separate orders
dated August 19, 2016. The judge found that because plaintiff's
medical malpractice claim did not involve Dr. Datla's specialty
as a nephrologist, an AOM by a board-certified internist was
sufficient. The judge further found that although there is no
private right of action under HIPAA6, plaintiff adequately
pleaded and could proceed under a common-law invasion of privacy
claim. Defendants did not move for leave to appeal either of
those orders.
On that same day, the trial court granted plaintiff leave
to amend his complaint. Plaintiff's amended complaint asserts
three causes of action: (1) invasion of privacy based on public
disclosure of private facts (count one); (2) medical malpractice
based on the improper disclosure (count two); and (3) violation
of the Act (count three). Plaintiff demands judgment for
compensatory damages, interest, attorney's fees, and costs of
suit, but he did not seek an award of punitive damages.
6
In Cmty Hosp. Grp., Inc., supra, 381 N.J. Super. at 126, we
held that a private right of action cannot be maintained under
HIPAA. Plaintiff, however, is no longer seeking relief under
HIPAA for defendants' alleged HIPAA violation.
7 A-1339-16T3
Subsequently, in September 2016, defendants filed a third
motion to dismiss the now-amended complaint, arguing that all
three claims were time-barred by a one-year statute of
limitations. Specifically, defendants argued that all three
claims were predicated on the public disclosure of private facts
and should be subject to the same statute of limitations.
Although New Jersey courts have not established a statute of
limitations for the public disclosure of private facts,
defendants analogized that type of invasion of privacy claim to
claims for placing plaintiff in a false light in the public eye
and defamation. Citing Rumbauskas, supra and Swan v. Boardwalk
Regency, 407 N.J. Super. 108 (App. Div. 2009), defendants
further argued that a one-year statute of limitations should
apply to all three counts because each count arose from the same
operative facts, albeit under different legal theories.
Plaintiff countered that he does not claim defamation, and that
the general two-year statute of limitations for personal injury
claims should apply to all three counts.
For purposes of their motion, defendants assumed that the
facts alleged in plaintiff's amended complaint were true.
Namely, they assumed that the unauthorized and improper
disclosure allegedly made by Dr. Datla in the presence of a
8 A-1339-16T3
third party that plaintiff was HIV-positive violated the Act,
and constituted invasion of privacy and medical malpractice.
Plaintiff concedes that, as his medical provider, Dr. Datla
lawfully possessed the confidential record that plaintiff was
HIV-positive. Plaintiff further concedes that the disclosure
that he was HIV-positive was truthful.
Defendants appeal from the October 19, 2016 order denying
their motion to dismiss. The judge held that a two-year statute
of limitations applied to all three counts. The judge focused
on the fact that the alleged harm resulted from the
dissemination of a truthful statement to a third party without
plaintiff's consent, rather than publication of a false
statement about plaintiff. In his oral decision, the judge
stated:
There are three separate claims here.
There's no doubt that there are three
separate claims but they arise from a common
core set of facts, which is the disclosure
of private information to the public.
The judge rejected the argument that the common set of facts
precluded different legal claims, concluding that "each claim
has different elements surrounding those common set of facts."
The judge found plaintiff's claims to be similar to an intrusion
claim. In describing defendants' conduct, the judge stated:
So it's not someone creating words or
creating a document, it's words or a
9 A-1339-16T3
document that was disclosed improperly, at
least that's the allegation. So it goes to
the issue of an intrusion [into] somebody's
private life.
The judge also held that plaintiff's malpractice claim was
subject to the two-year statute of limitations, as was his claim
under the Act because it was "a personal injury claim" that has
"an impact on the plaintiff's personhood."
We granted defendants' motion for leave to appeal the
October 19, 2016 order. On appeal, defendants raise the
following arguments: (1) the disclosure of private medical
information constitutes invasion of privacy; (2) New Jersey case
law imputes a one-year statute of limitations on invasion of
privacy claims based on words; (3) an invasion of privacy based
on public disclosure of private facts is directly analogous to
claims for placing plaintiff in a false light and defamation;
(4) claims for public disclosure of private facts are governed
by the one-year statute of limitations for defamation; and (5)
plaintiff's claim for public disclosure of private facts is
grossly dissimilar to invasion of privacy by intrusion.
II.
"Statutes of limitations are essentially equitable in
nature, promoting the timely and efficient litigation of
claims." Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282, 292 (1993) (citing
Ochs v. Federal Ins. Co., 90 N.J. 108 (1982)). They spare
10 A-1339-16T3
courts from litigating stale claims, penalize dilatoriness, and
serve as measures of repose. Farrell v. Votator Div., 62 N.J.
111, 115 (1973); Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130,
136 (1968).
Actions for personal injuries must be commenced within two
years after the cause of action accrues. Baird v. Am. Med.
Optics, 155 N.J. 54, 65 (1998) (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2).
"Where the damages sought are for injuries to the person, the
applicable statute is [N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2] which fixes the period
of two years irrespective of the form of the action." Burns v.
Bethlehem Steel Co., 20 N.J. 37, 39-40 (1955) (two-year personal
injury statute of limitations applied to hearing loss claim of
third-party beneficiary of contract between union and employer).7
7
See also Montells, supra, 133 N.J. at 298 (two-year personal
injury statute of limitations applied to claims under LAD);
Labree v. Mobil Oil Corp., 300 N.J. Super. 234, 242-44 (App.
Div.) (two-year personal injury statute of limitations applied
to action for retaliatory discharge under Workers' Compensation
Act), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 465 (1997); Goncalvez v. Patuto,
188 N.J. Super. 620, 630 (App. Div. 1983) (emotional distress
claim subject to two-year personal injury statute of
limitations); Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 118 N.J. Super. 116,
120 (App. Div. 1972), aff'd 63 N.J. 130 (1973) (claim arising
out of sales transaction was essentially a personal injury
action subject to the two-year statute of limitations); Atl.
City Hosp. v. Finkle, 110 N.J. Super. 435, 438 (Law Div. 1970)
(claim for personal injuries under breach of warranty theory
subject to two-year statute of limitations); Montgomery v.
DeSimone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998) (civil rights
claims under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 subject to New Jersey's two-year
statute of limitations for personal injury actions).
11 A-1339-16T3
Claims for defamation are subject to the one-year statute
of limitations imposed by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3, and must be filed
within one year after the publication of the alleged libel or
slander. Rumbauskas, supra, 138 N.J. at 183.
The applicable statute of limitations for three of the four
types of invasion of privacy have already been determined by our
courts. Specifically, claims for invasion of privacy based on
intrusion on seclusion are subject to the two-year statute of
limitations imposed by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. Id. at 182. Claims
for invasion of privacy based on placing plaintiff in a false
light are subject to the one-year statute of limitations imposed
by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3. Swan, supra, 407 N.J. Super. at 122-23.
Claims for invasion of privacy based on a person's name or
likeness are subject to the six-year statute of limitations
imposed by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1. Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., 97
N.J. Super. 327, 355 (Law Div. 1967).
In McGrogan v. Till, 167 N.J. 414 (2001), the Court set
forth the test to be employed when determining the appropriate
statute of limitations to apply.
The holdings in Montells and Labree
recognize that in the analysis of which
statute of limitations period should apply
to a cause of action, the concept of "nature
of the injury" is not to be subjected to a
complaint-specific inquiry. The "nature of
the injury" is used to determine the "nature
of the cause of action" or the general
12 A-1339-16T3
characterization of that class of claims in
the aggregate. That analysis precedes
resolution of the question of which statute
of limitations applies to a type of cause of
action, and does not contemplate an analysis
of the specific complaint and the injuries
it happens to allege.
[Id. at 422-23.]
Consistent with other statutes such as the Law Against
Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, and the New Jersey
Civil Rights Act (NJCRA), N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2, we must then
look to the most analogous cause of action to determine the
appropriate statute of limitations. See Montells, supra, 133
N.J. at 291-92. In doing so, the focus is on the nature of the
injury, not the underlying legal theory of the claim when
determining which statute of limitations applies. Id. at 291
(citing Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 145 (1973));
Brown v. N.J. Coll. of Med. & Dentistry, 167 N.J. Super. 532,
535 (Law Div. 1979).
In Montells, the Court held that a single statute of
limitations should apply to all LAD claims despite the varied
injuries and requested relief. Montells, supra, 133 N.J. at
291. The Court recognized that although LAD "vindicates
economic rights and some rights that sound in contract, the
statute strikes directly at conduct that injures the personhood
13 A-1339-16T3
of another. A discrimination claim cuts most deeply at the
personal level." Id. at 293.
While plaintiff's three causes of action arise out of the
same operative facts, those common facts can give rise to
different claims. See, e.g., Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel
Pub. Co., 104 N.J. 125, 133 (1986) (a statement about the poor
quality of a product implying that the seller is fraudulent may
be actionable under actions for defamation and product
disparagement, which stem from different branches of tort law);
Ramanadham v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 188 N.J. Super. 30, 33 (App.
Div. 1982) (claims included breach of contract and violation of
the Consumer Fraud Act). By way of further example, a common
core of facts may give rise to an action against a nursing home
for negligence, breach of contract, consumer fraud, and
violations of federal mandates.
We will now analyze the applicable statute of limitations
for each of the three counts of the amended complaint.
III.
A. INVASION OF PRIVACY
Count one alleges an invasion of privacy by public
disclosure of private facts. Invasion of privacy
is not one tort, but a complex of four. The
law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds
of invasion of four different interests of
the plaintiff, which are tied together by
14 A-1339-16T3
the common name, but otherwise have almost
nothing in common except that each
represents an interference with the right of
the plaintiff to "be left alone."
[William L. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 112
(3d ed. 1964).]
The four classifications of "invasion of privacy" propounded by
Dean Prosser are:
(1) intrusion (e.g., intrusion on
plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion,
as by invading his or her home, illegally
searching, eavesdropping, or prying into
personal affairs); (2) public disclosure of
private facts (e.g., making public private
information about plaintiff); (3) placing
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye
(which need not be defamatory, but must be
something that would be objectionable to the
ordinary reasonable person); and (4)
appropriation, for the defendant's benefit,
of the plaintiff's name or likeness.
[Rumbauskas, supra, 138 N.J. at 180 (citing
W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton
on the Law of Torts § 117 (5th ed. 1984)).]
Dean Prosser further noted:
It should be obvious at once that these four
types of invasion may be subject, in some
respects at least, to different rules; and
that when what is said as to any one of them
is carried over to another, it may not be at
all applicable, and confusion may follow.
[William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L.
Rev. 383, 389 (1960).]
"Prosser adds that almost all the confusion in the area is
caused by the failure to separate and distinguish the four forms
15 A-1339-16T3
of invasion of privacy and to realize that they call for
different treatment." Rumbauskas, supra, 138 N.J. at 180
(citing Privacy, supra, 48 Cal. L. Rev. at 407).
In contrast to invasion of privacy torts involving
appropriation or false light, the tort of "invasion of privacy
by unreasonable publication of private facts occurs when it is
shown that 'the matters revealed were actually private, that
dissemination of such facts would be offensive to a reasonable
person, and that there is no legitimate interest of the public
in being apprised of the facts publicized.'" Romaine v.
Kallinger, 109 N.J. 282, 297 (1988) (quoting Bisbee v. John C.
Conover Agency, 186 N.J. Super. 335, 340 (App. Div. 1982)). We
determine that the defendants' unauthorized disclosure of
plaintiff's HIV-positive status falls within the second type of
invasion of privacy: public disclosure of private facts.
We find no binding precedent determining the appropriate
statute of limitations to apply to claims for invasion of
privacy based on improper disclosure of private facts.
The pivotal question becomes whether plaintiff's injuries
for invasion of privacy is more like an "injury to the person"
under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a), as to which a two-year statute of
limitation applies, or like injuries for defamation under
16 A-1339-16T3
N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3, as to which the one-year statute of limitation
applies. See Montells, supra, 133 N.J. at 291.
In Rumbauskas, a victim of stalking and death threats
brought an action for invasion of privacy claiming intrusion on
seclusion. The Court held that such an action "constitutes a
claim for 'injury to the person' of the plaintiff and is
governed by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in
N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2," because the "defendant's conduct struck
directly at the personhood of plaintiff" and "cuts most deeply
at the personal level." Rumbauskas, supra, 138 N.J. at 182.
In its analysis, the Supreme Court discussed the difficulty
in determining the statute of limitations applicable to false
light claims:
Jurisdictions throughout the country have
struggled with the classification of actions
for invasion of privacy. One of the most
familiar difficulties is determining whether
placing one in a false-light in the public
eye should be regarded as defamatory in
nature, thereby subjecting causes of action
to the specific statutes of limitations
applicable to defamation claims. For
example, because of the inherent
similarities between false-light and
defamation claims, the Supreme Court of
Washington concluded that the same statute
of limitations applies to both types of
claims. Eastwood v. Cascade Broadcasting
Co., 106 Wash. 2d 466 (1986). Similarly, the
Supreme Court of California recognized the
inherent similarities between false light
invasion of privacy and defamation in
Fellows v. National Enquirer, Inc., 42 Cal.
17 A-1339-16T3
3d 234 (1986). See also Covington v. The
Houston Post, 743 S.W. 2d 345, 348 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1987) (holding that personal injury
statute of limitations applied to false
light defamation).
[Id. at 180-81.]
After confirming that "[t]he limitations periods applicable
to actions involving other types of invasion of privacy [i.e.,
not involuntary stalkings or threats of violence] are not before
us[,]" id. at 183 (emphasis added), the Court stated in dicta:
Invasion-of-privacy actions based on
appropriation remain governed by the six-
year statute of limitations period set forth
in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1. See Canessa, supra, 97
N.J. Super. at [355]. Regarding actions for
public disclosure of private facts or
placing one in a false light, case law in
other jurisdictions indicates that such
actions are subject to the limitations
period for defamation claims, which is one
year in New Jersey. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3.
[Ibid. (emphasis added).]
In Swan, supra, 407 N.J. Super. at 122-23, we held that
plaintiff's false light invasion of privacy claim was subject to
the one-year statute of limitations for defamation actions
imposed by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3. In reaching that decision, we
noted that the motion judge found that plaintiff's false light
claim "was similar to defamation in that it 'subject[ed] the
victim to the consequences of defamation without the explicit
nature of the claim.'" Id. at 121. We then emphasized:
18 A-1339-16T3
Based on our analysis of the record and the
applicable law, we, too, are persuaded that
the nature of plaintiff's invasion of
privacy claim is essentially one of
defamation, and [based on the facts
presented] that the type of alleged
objectionable conduct by defendant is
dissimilar to that giving rise to the two-
year statute of limitations ("intrusion on
seclusion"), Rumbauskas, supra, or six-year
limitations period ("appropriation"),
Canessa, supra. After considering Dean
Prosser's analysis and its review of the
case law in New Jersey and other
jurisdictions, the Rumbauskas Court was
clearly of the opinion that different
statutes of limitations would apply
depending on the actual nature of the
"invasion of privacy" claim. The Court
quoted approvingly of decisions in other
jurisdictions that applied the same statute
of limitations to false light and defamation
claims, Rumbauskas, supra, 138 N.J. at 180-
82, giving the reader every reason to
believe that although the Court did not have
to reach the issue, it also would conclude
that the one-year statute of limitations
governing defamation actions would be
applied in a "false light" action that was
clearly grounded in allegations which were
defamatory in nature.
. . . .
Neither law nor logic justifies why Count
Two of plaintiff's complaint labelled
"Defamation" should be subject to a one-year
statute of limitations while the same claims
re-labelled "False Light/Invasion of
Privacy" in Count Three should be governed
by a longer limitations period.
[Id. at 121-23 (emphasis added).]
19 A-1339-16T3
Defendants argue that plaintiff's invasion of privacy claim
is based on words rather than intrusive conduct, and, therefore,
are analogous to placing plaintiff in a false light and
defamation, thus subjecting plaintiff's claims to a one-year
statute of limitations. We disagree.
Unlike a typical defamation claim, the confidential
information allegedly disclosed by Dr. Datla to a third person
was true, not false. The disclosed medical information did not
place plaintiff in a false light. Here, plaintiff does not
allege and did not plead defamation. He does not claim that the
disclosure that he was HIV-positive was false or placed him in a
false light.
The LAD prohibits discrimination based on an individual's
disability, including their HIV/AIDS status. N.J.S.A. 10:5-
5(q). See Estate of Behringer v. The Med. Ctr. at Princeton,
249 N.J. Super. 597, 642-44 (Law Div. 1991); see also Poff v.
Caro, 228 N.J. Super. 370, 376-78 (Law. Div. 1987). LAD claims
are subject to the two-year statute of limitations. Montells,
supra, 133 N.J. at 298.
The United States Constitution protects individuals from
governmental disclosure of their infection by the AIDS virus.
Doe v. Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 382 (D.N.J. 1990).
"Disclosure of a family member's medical condition, especially
20 A-1339-16T3
exposure to or infection with the AIDS virus is a disclosure of
a 'personal matter.'" Ibid. Patients have a privacy right in
their medical records and medical information. United States v.
Westinghouse, 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (employee medical
records clearly within zone of privacy protection); see also In
re Search (Sealed), 810 F.2d 67, 71 (3d Cir.) (medical records
clearly within constitutional sphere of right to privacy), cert.
denied, 483 U.S. 1007, 107 S. Ct. 3233, 87 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987).
The heightened privacy interest of an individual's HIV-positive
status rises to a constitutional dimension when the improper
disclosure of that information is committed by a law enforcement
officer acting under color of law, subjecting the officer to
liability under Section 1983 for violating the individual's
constitutional right to privacy. Doe, supra, 729 F. Supp. at
385. Claims under Section 1983 are subject to a two-year
statute of limitations. Montgomery, supra, 159 F.3d at 126 n.4.
We find that claims for unauthorized disclosure of a
person's HIV-positive status align more closely with
discrimination claims based on improper disclosure of an
individual's HIV/AIDS status brought under LAD, NJCRA, and
Section 1983, all of which are subject to a two-year statute of
limitations.
21 A-1339-16T3
We further find that claims for unauthorized disclosure of
a person's HIV-positive status also more closely align to an
intrusion on plaintiff's solitude or seclusion than defamation
or invasion of privacy by placing plaintiff in a false light.
In that regard, we note that a false light claim involves the
publication of misleading information and is akin to defamation.
Defendants' conduct did not involve publishing false or
misleading statements about plaintiff. The Court's dictum in
Rumbauskas, supra, 138 N.J. at 183, observing that "case law in
other jurisdictions" applies the same limitations period for
false light claims as for tortious disclosure of private facts,
does not require such equivalency in our State, especially given
the type of claim that has been factually presented here.
Accordingly, we hold that plaintiff's claim for invasion of
privacy by public disclosure of private facts is subject to the
two-year statute of limitations imposed by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.
B. THE ACT
The Act provides that a record maintained by a health care
provider, health care facility, or laboratory, "which contains
identifying information about a person who has or is suspected
of having AIDS or HIV infection is confidential and shall be
disclosed only for the purposes authorized by [the Act]."
N.J.S.A. 26:5C-7. Contents of such confidential records may be
22 A-1339-16T3
disclosed without the "prior written informed consent" of the
person who is the subject of the confidential record only under
limited circumstances. N.J.S.A. 26:5C-8 to -13. "Any record
disclosed under [the Act] shall be held confidential by the
recipient of the record and shall not be released unless the
conditions of [the Act] are met." N.J.S.A. 26:5C-11.
The Act provides for a private right of action and a wide-
range of relief for the improper disclosure of a person's HIV-
positive status:
A person who has or is suspected of having
AIDS or HIV infection who is aggrieved as a
result of the violation of this act may
commence a civil action against the
individual or institution who committed the
violation to obtain appropriate relief,
including actual damages, equitable relief
and reasonable attorney's fees and court
costs. Punitive damages may be awarded when
the violation evidences wantonly reckless or
intentionally malicious conduct by the
person or institution who committed the
violation.
[N.J.S.A. 26:5C-14(a).]
"Each disclosure" made in violation of the Act "is a separate
and actionable offense." N.J.S.A. 26:5C-14(b).
In order to recover for a violation of the Act, plaintiff
must prove that defendants failed to maintain the
confidentiality of his medical records, which disclosed his HIV-
positive status without his prior written informed consent.
23 A-1339-16T3
N.J.S.A. 26:5C-8; see Behringer, supra, 249 N.J. Super. at 634
n.11.
The Act is a remedial statute that promotes a strong public
policy of the State and, therefore, should be construed
liberally to effectuate its important social goal. See
Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 214 N.J. 518, 555 (2013)
(citing Abbamount v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ., 138 N.J. 405,
431 (1990)) (involving the Conscientious Employee Protection
Act); Nini v. Mercer Cnty. Cmty. Coll., 202 N.J. 98, 108-09
(2001) (involving the Law Against Discrimination). Because it
is remedial in nature, the Act must be applied "to the full
extent of its facial coverage." See Bergen Commercial Bank v.
Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 216 (1999) (quoting Peper v. Princeton
Univ. Bd. of Trs., 77 N.J. 55, 68 (1978)).
Notably, the Act does not contain a statute of limitations.
We find no published opinion determining the appropriate statute
of limitations to apply to the Act.
We further note that defamation claims are subject to the
single publication rule. Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
Inc., 131 N.J. Super. 371 (Law Div. 1974), aff'd o.b., 141 N.J.
Super. 563 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd o.b., 74 N.J. 461 (1977). In
Barres, the court found that the reasons underlying the single
publication rule are consistent with the Legislature's
24 A-1339-16T3
determination to impose a short, one-year period of limitation
for libel. Id. at 387. In stark contrast, each disclosure made
in violation of the Act is a separate and actionable offense.
N.J.S.A. 26:5C-14(b).
In addition, in contrast to a defamation claim where a
lawsuit provides the opportunity for the defamed person to
vindicate his or her reputation, the profound damage that can
result from an unauthorized disclosure of an individual's HIV-
positive status cannot be adequately remedied by ordinary
damages for reputational harm recoverable in a defamation
lawsuit. Thus, the Act provides for the right to recover actual
damages, equitable relief, punitive damages, and attorney's
fees. N.J.S.A. 26:5C-14(a). Moreover, the interest protected
by the Act is not the reputation of the HIV-positive individual,
but instead that person's right to control access to his or her
private medical information.
Plaintiff's claim for violation of the Act is most
analogous to the category of invasion of privacy claims that are
grounded on an allegation that defendant improperly disclosed
private facts concerning the plaintiff to a third party.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we hold that
plaintiff's claim for violation of the Act is subject to the
two-year statute of limitations imposed by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.
25 A-1339-16T3
C. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
"In a medical-malpractice action, the plaintiff has the
burden of proving the relevant standard of care governing the
defendant-doctor, a deviation from that standard, an injury
proximately caused by the deviation, and damages suffered from
the defendant-doctor's negligence." Komodi v. Picciano, 217
N.J. 387, 409 (2014).
HIPAA requires health care providers and health care
facilities to protect personal medical information from
unauthorized disclosure. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320(d)-6(a)(3);
Cmty. Hosp. Grp., supra, 381 N.J. Super. at 125. Health care
providers and health care facilities are also required by the
Act to maintain the confidentiality of medical records
containing "identifying information about a person who has or is
suspected of having AIDS or HIV infection[.]" N.J.S.A. 26:5C-7.
Aside from the confidentiality requirements imposed by the
Act and HIPPA, physicians are also under a common law duty to
maintain the confidentiality of patient records and information.
The physician-patient privilege has a strong
tradition in New Jersey. The privilege
imposes an obligation on the physician to
maintain the confidentiality of a patient's
communications. Stempler v. Speidell, 100
N.J. 368 (1985). This obligation of
confidentiality applies to patient records
and information and applies not only to
physicians but to hospitals as well. Unick
v. Kessler Memorial Hosp., 107 N.J. Super.
26 A-1339-16T3
121 (Law Div. 1969). This duty of
confidentiality has been the subject of
legislative codification, which reflects the
public policy of this State. N.J.S.A.
2A:84A-22.1 et seq. The patient must be
able "to secure medical services without
fear of betrayal and unwarranted
embarrassment and detrimental disclosure. .
. ." Piller v. Kovarsky, 194 N.J. Super.
392, 396 (Law Div. 1984).
[Behringer, supra, 249 N.J. Super. at 632.]
"The requirement of confidentiality is to protect the
patient." Id. at 638. Indeed, the purpose of the patient-
physician privilege is to enable the patient to secure medical
services without fear of unwarranted detrimental disclosure of
information "which might deter him from revealing his symptoms
to a doctor to the detriment of his health." Piller, supra, 194
N.J. Super. at 396. The Hospital Patients Bill of Rights Act
incorporates the privilege and protects the right of hospital
patients to privacy and confidentiality of their medical records
to the extent consistent with providing adequate medical care.
N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.8(f), (g); Kinsella v. N.Y.T. Television, 382
N.J. Super. 102, 107 (App. Div. 2005).
In Behringer, the court held that a medical center's
failure to take such reasonable measures as are necessary to
ensure confidentiality of HIV test results was a breach of the
duty and obligation to keep such records confidential, rendering
27 A-1339-16T3
the medical center liable for damages caused by this negligent
breach. Behringer, supra, 249 N.J. Super. at 638, 641-42.
Medical records revealing a patient's HIV-positive status
are afforded heightened confidentiality.
The sensitive nature of medical information
about AIDS makes a compelling argument for
keeping this information confidential.
Society's moral judgments about the high-
risk activities associated with the disease,
including sexual relations and drug use,
make the information of the most personal
kind. Also, the privacy interest in one's
exposure to the AIDS virus is even greater
than one's privacy interest in ordinary
medical records because of the stigma that
attaches with the disease. The potential
for harm in the event of a nonconsensual
disclosure is substantial; plaintiff's brief
details the stigma and harassment that comes
with public knowledge of one's affliction
with AIDS.
[Doe, supra, 729 F. Supp. at 384.]
Defendants argue that because plaintiff's claim for medical
malpractice arises out of the same operative facts as his claim
for invasion of privacy, they are subject to the same one-year
statute of limitation. We disagree.
Subject to the application of the discovery rule, claims
for medical malpractice are generally subject to the two-year
statute of limitations imposed by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, and must be
filed within two years of the accrual of the cause of action.
Caravaggio v. D'Agostini, 166 N.J. 237, 244-46 (2001); Troum,
28 A-1339-16T3
supra, 338 N.J. Super. at 15-16 (citing Vispisiano v. Ashland
Chem. Co., 107 N.J. 416, 426-27 (1987)).
The breach of a physician's duty to maintain the
confidentiality of his patient's medical records is a deviation
from the standard of care, giving rise to a personal injury
claim based upon negligence, not defamation or placing plaintiff
in a false light.
In addition, plaintiff's claim for medical malpractice is
most analogous to the category of invasion of privacy claims
that are grounded on an allegation that defendant improperly
disclosed private facts concerning the plaintiff to a third
party.
For these reasons, we hold that plaintiff's medical
malpractice claim asserted in count two is subject to the two-
year statute of limitations imposed by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.
IV.
In summary, viewing the pleaded facts in a light most
favorable to plaintiff, we find the improper disclosure of
plaintiff's HIV-positive status to a third-party without
plaintiff's prior informed consent to constitute a violation of
the Act, an invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private
facts, and medical malpractice. Regardless of the tort
specifically pled, defendant's conduct "struck directly at the
29 A-1339-16T3
personhood of plaintiff." Rambauskaus, supra, 138 N.J. at 182.
Here, like the claims in Montells and Rambauskaus, defendant's
conduct "cuts most deeply at the personal level." See ibid.Accordingly, we hold that an action for invasion of privacy by
public disclosure of private facts that is premised on conduct
such as the unauthorized disclosure of plaintiff's HIV-positive
status present here constitutes a claim for "injury to the
person" of the plaintiff and is governed by the two-year statute
of limitations set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. See ibid. We
further hold that plaintiff's claims for medical malpractice and
violation of the Act, which arise from the same operative facts,
are likewise governed by the two-year statute of limitations set
forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order denying
defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint.8
8
Given that plaintiff's counsel has clarified to us that his
client's claims solely involve defendants' wrongful disclosure
of truthful facts, we need not address or resolve here what
statute(s) of limitations would apply to a defendant's "mixed"
statement that contains both truthful and false elements. For
example, a simple version of such a mixed statement might be, "P
has AIDS," if it truthfully revealed that P is HIV-positive but
falsely asserted that P has contracted AIDS. The statement's
truthful aspect could comprise the tort of invasion of privacy
by disclosure, while the false aspect could be regarded as libel
or slander. We leave for a future day the resolution of whether
such harmful speech, with mixed components of truth and falsity,
would trigger a two-year statute of limitations, a one-year
period, or both.
30 A-1339-16T3
Affirmed.
31 A-1339-16T3