JESSE ROSENBLUM VS. BOROUGH OF CLOSTER Â (L-1020-15, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0097-15T2
JESSE ROSENBLUM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BOROUGH OF CLOSTER and
BEVERLY ANN WATKINS,
Defendants-Respondents.
________________________________
Argued January 10, 2017 – Decided July 12, 2017
Before Judges Reisner and Sumners.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-
1020-15.
Jesse Rosenblum, pro se appellant.
JoAnn Riccardi argued the cause for respondent
(Edward Rogan & Associates, attorneys; Ms.
Riccardi, on the brief).
Donna J. Vellekamp, attorney for respondent
Beverly Ann Watkins, join in the brief of
respondent Borough of Closter.
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Jesse Rosenblum appeals Law Division orders of: May
27, 2015, dismissing his complaint challenging defendant Borough
of Closter's property tax assessment of property owned by defendant
Barbara Ann Watkins and sanctioning him legal fees and costs in
the amount of $1747.50; June 8, 2015, sanctioning him additional
legal fees and costs of $702.50; and July 20, 2015, denying his
motion for reconsideration. We affirm substantially for the
reasons stated by Judge Lisa A. Firko in her comprehensive written
riders to the May 27 and July 20 orders. We add these comments.
Plaintiff initially filed a complaint in the Tax Court,
regarding farmland assessments on Watkins' property for the years
1997 through 2000, which was dismissed. We affirmed on appeal.
Rosenblum v. Borough of Closter, No. A-1696-09 (App. Div. March
30, 2011). Plaintiff then filed complaints with the Tax Court
regarding assessments on the same property for the years 2005,
2006, 2009, 2010, and 2011. After the Tax Court dismissed the
complaint on summary judgment, we reversed and remanded for a
trial on the merits. Rosenblum v. Borough of Closter, No. A-3340-
11 (App. Div. May 30, 2013). Upon remand, after Watkins withdrew
her applications seeking farmland assessments, the Tax Court
entered an order on December 27, 2013, providing the matter was
dismissed with prejudice because plaintiff withdrew his complaint
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on the understanding that the Borough would assess Watkins'
property fairly and consistently with applicable law.
Thereafter, the Borough issued new assessments of the
property. Dissatisfied with the assessments, plaintiff sought a
conference with the Tax Court. The request was denied, as was his
subsequent motion to schedule a trial before the court. In
response, plaintiff filed a four-count complaint with the Law
Division alleging that: (1) Watkins and the Borough breached their
"agreement" with him by refusing "to negotiate the finding of fair
assessible [sic] values which is a condition precedent in the
Judgments of the Tax Court"; (2) Watkins paid roll-back taxes for
2012 and 2013 "based on the disputed valuations being contested
herein"; (3) Watkins falsely-swore her tax applications by
inflating the acreage of cropland and pastures on her property;
and (4) that Watkins and the Borough were engaged in a conspiracy
to illegally qualify her property as farmland.1
In lieu of filing an answer, the Borough filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
Rule 4:6-2(a), and failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, Rule 4:6-2(e), and sought sanctions under Rule 1:4-
1
Approximately nine months later, Watkins sold the property and
paid all tax arrearages.
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8(b)(1) for filing a frivolous complaint. Watkins joined the
motion. Argument was held on May 8, 2015.
On May 27,2 Judge Firko entered an order dismissing
plaintiff's complaint with prejudice as to both defendants and
requiring plaintiff to pay the Borough $1,747.50 in legal fees and
costs. In the written rider to her decision, the judge explained
that the Law Division does not have jurisdiction to hear tax
appeals and that the complaint should have been filed in the Tax
Court. Furthermore, the complaint was untimely, as it was not
filed within the statutory time period to file a tax appeal or
seek leave to appeal to a reviewing court. See N.J.S.A. 54:3-21;
R. 2:4-1.
With respect to sanctions, Judge Firko noted that the Borough
served plaintiff with a notice pursuant to Rule 1:4-8 that his
action was frivolous and sanctions would be sought if it was not
dismissed. The judge noted that plaintiff was not the usual pro
se litigant, having filed numerous "procedurally sound" tax
appeals in the past, and "it was patently unreasonable for [him]
to file a tax claim with the Law Division."
On June 8, 2015, the trial court entered a separate order
requiring plaintiff to pay an additional $702.50 to the Borough
2
Although the order is dated "May 29, 2015," it is marked as
filed on "May 27, 2015."
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in accordance with an unopposed affidavit by its counsel detailing
fees for arguing the motion and submission of a proposed form of
order.
Finally, on July 20, 2015, Judge Firko entered an order
denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. She attached a
written rider to the order, with a detailed explanation that the
motion failed to satisfy Rule 4:49-2 by showing that the initial
decision was palpably incorrect or irrational.
On appeal, plaintiff essentially argues that the Borough's
assessments from June 20, 2014 were unfairly low, and therefore
he should have the opportunity to file a complaint in the Law
Division. Although plaintiff's Notice of Appeal states that he
is challenging the June 8, 2015 sanction order and the July 20,
2015 reconsideration order, he does not make any argument before
us regarding them.
Our review of a trial court's dismissal of a complaint based
upon the pleadings pursuant to Rule 4:6-2 motion is de novo. Flinn
v. Amboy Nat'l Bank, 436 N.J. Super. 274, 287 (App. Div. 2014).
"[O]ur inquiry is limited to examining the legal sufficiency of
the facts alleged on the face of the complaint." Green v. Morgan
Props., 215 N.J. 431, 451 (2013) (quoting Printing Mart-
Morristown, supra, 116 N.J. at 746). "On appeal, review is plenary
and we owe no deference to the trial judge's conclusions." State
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v. Cherry Hill Mitsubishi, Inc., 439 N.J. Super. 462, 467 (App.
Div. 2015) (citing Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of
Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
208 N.J. 386 (2011)).
Appellate review is "one that is at once painstaking and
undertaken with a generous and hospitable approach." Green, supra,
215 N.J. at 451 (quoting Printing Mart-Morristown, supra, 116 N.J.
at 746). Nonetheless, dismissal is required "where the pleading
does not establish a colorable claim and discovery would not
develop one." Cherry Hill Mitsubishi, Inc., supra, 439 N.J. Super.
at 467 (citing Camden Cnty. Energy Recovery Assocs. v. N.J. Dep't
of Envtl. Prot., 320 N.J. Super. 59, 64 (App. Div. 1999), aff'd
o.b., 170 N.J. 246, 786 (2001)).
Having reviewed the record in light of the applicable legal
standards, Judge Firko's decision to dismiss plaintiff's complaint
with prejudice and sanction him fees and costs is legally
unassailable. Plaintiffs' appellate arguments are without
sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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