STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. SANDRA NOLLEYÂ (A-34-15, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3984-15T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SANDRA NOLLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
Submitted March 14, 2017 – Decided July 14, 2017
Before Judges Koblitz and Rothstadt.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Municipal
Appeal No. A-34-15.
Stern & Eisenberg, PC, attorneys for appellant
(Evan Barenbaum, on the brief).
Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Maura Murphy Sullivan,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Sandra Nolley appeals from an April 7, 2016 Law
Division order denying her municipal appeal and convicting her de
novo of obstructing the administration of law or other governmental
function, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1, a disorderly persons offense.
On appeal, defendant argues:
DEFENDANT DID NOT COMMIT A VIOLATION
OF OBSTRUCTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW OR OTHER GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION.
According to defendant, the evidence adduced at trial did not
support her conviction. She claims there was no evidence that she
engaged in any criminal conduct; rather, she merely refused to
provide police officers with her identification, which is not a
crime. She also claims that the State presented no evidence
"substantiating that [she] engage[d] in 'means of flight,
intimidation, force, violence, or physical interference or
obstacle' that would satisfy the components of the obstruction
charge. N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a). The State argues we should affirm,
as "the refusal to leave a scene when ordered to do so by police
is a physical act that violates the obstruction statute."
We have reviewed the parties' contentions in light of our
review of the record and applicable legal principles. We reverse.
At the municipal trial, Officer Matthew Olivieri testified
that on May 23, 2015, at approximately 1:20 a.m. he responded to
a call from Chris VanSciver to "remove an unwanted female" from
an apartment. Upon arriving at the apartment, they were met by
the caller, who invited them to come in. On entering, the officer
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found defendant in the living room, and was informed that Chris's1
father, Lester VanSciver, was asleep in another room. Olivieri
testified that "at that point, [he] advised [defendant] that
[Chris] did not want her there and asked her to leave several
times." Defendant told the officers she was there to visit Lester.
The officer asked for identification from defendant, which she
refused to produce. Olivieri stated defendant recited the slogan
"Hands up. Don't shoot" and that when she continued to refuse to
leave the apartment or provide identification, he placed her under
arrest for obstruction.
Defendant testified that she was in the apartment to visit
Lester, who was going to help repair her car. She stated it was
Lester's apartment, not Chris's, and she did not know why Chris
called the police.
The municipal court judge found defendant guilty of
obstruction and fined her $750 plus costs. Defendant appealed to
the Law Division. The judge who considered the appeal, conducted
a trial de novo on the record and also found defendant guilty of
obstruction, but reduced the fine to $250. The judge stated that
she was satisfied that the State proved all the elements of the
offense and that defendant's repeated refusal to leave the
1
To avoid confusion between Chris VanSciver and his father,
Lester VanSciver, they are referred to by first name.
3 A-3984-15T1
apartment "constitute[d] . . . physical interference and
obstruction in violation of [N.J.S.A.] 2C:29-1."
We begin our review by acknowledging it is limited. We are
bound to uphold the Law Division's findings if supported by
sufficient credible evidence in the record. State v. Reece, 222
N.J. 154, 166 (2015). "Our review of the factual record is . . .
limited to determining whether there is sufficient credible
evidence in the record to support the Law Division judge's
findings." State v. Powers, 448 N.J. Super. 69, 72 (2016) (citing
State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161-62 (1964)). Only if the Law
Division's decision was so clearly mistaken or unwarranted "that
the interests of justice demand intervention and correction," can
we review the record "as if [we] were deciding the matter at
inception and make [our] own findings and conclusions." Johnson,
supra, 42 N.J. at 162; see also State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368,
383 (2015). But, like the Law Division, we are in no position to
"weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or make
conclusions about the evidence," and should therefore defer to the
municipal court's credibility findings. State v. Barone, 147 N.J.
599, 615 (1997); State v. Cerefice, 335 N.J. Super. 374, 383 (App.
Div. 2000). However, "a reviewing court owes no deference to the
trial court in deciding matters of law." State v. Mann, 203 N.J.
328, 337 (2010).
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With our limited standard of review in mind, we turn to the
statute which defendant was convicted of violating. N.J.S.A.
2C:29-1, obstructing administration of law or other governmental
function, provides:
A person commits an offense if he purposely
obstructs, impairs or perverts the
administration of law or other governmental
function or prevents or attempts to prevent a
public servant from lawfully performing an
official function by means of flight,
intimidation, force, violence, or physical
interference or obstacle, or by means of any
independently unlawful act. This section does
not apply to failure to perform a legal duty
other than an official duty, or any other
means of avoiding compliance with law without
affirmative interference with governmental
functions.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) (emphasis added).]
"The purpose of this statute is 'to prohibit a broad range
of behavior designed to impede or defeat the lawful operation of
government,'" and confines its limits to "(1) violent or physical
interference, [or] (2) other acts which are 'unlawful'
independently of the purpose to obstruct the government." State
v. Camillo, 382 N.J. Super. 113, 116-17 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting
Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission,
Vol. II, 1971, at 280). Under the statute, "not just any
interference with the administration of law constitutes the
criminal act of obstruction." Id. at 118.
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Simply obstructing, impairing or perverting
the administration of law or the governmental
function is no longer a statutory violation;
the obstruction must be carried out in a
manner described in the statute: "by means of
flight, intimidation, force, violence, or
physical interference or obstacle, or by means
of any independently unlawful act." N.J.S.A.
2C:29-1.
[Ibid. (emphasis added).]
In determining whether a defendant violated the statute, a
court should not "loosely interpret what it means" to violate a
criminal statute in order to find defendant guilty of "an
independently unlawful act," pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1.
Powers, supra, 448 N.J. Super. at 76.
Applying these guiding principles, the record here is devoid
of any indication that defendant obstructed within the meaning of
the statute. There was no finding made that defendant was guilty
of an independently unlawful act, such as trespass, and defendant's
mere refusal to leave the apartment or provide identification did
not rise to the level of physical interference when defendant was
seemingly on the premises lawfully. See Camillo, supra, 382 N.J.
Super. at 115, 118. Further, contrary to the State's argument,
defendant's failure to turn over her identification or leave the
apartment was not the equivalent of a defendant's failure to leave
a scene while officers try to effectuate an arrest. See State v.
Hernandez, 338 N.J. Super. 317, 323-24 (App. Div. 2001). There
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was simply no aspect of defendant's conduct that violated the
statute.
Reversed and remanded for entry of an order vacating
defendant's conviction. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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