SOFYA REZNIK VS. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. (L-4023-12, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5459-14T2
SOFYA REZNIK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.
and DCH MONTCLAIR, LLC,
Defendants-Respondents.
___________________________________
Submitted October 17, 2016 – Decided July 13, 2017
Before Judges Fisher and Ostrer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket
No. L-4023-12.
Jonathan J. Sobel, attorney for appellant.
Campbell Campbell Edwards & Conroy, P.C.,
attorneys for respondents (William J. Conroy,
Tiffany M. Alexander and Katherine A. Wang,
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff appeals from an order dismissing with prejudice her
product liability complaint against American Honda Motor Company,
Inc., and one of its dealers, DCH Montclair, LLC.1 She also appeals
from several interlocutory orders related to discovery. We reverse
these interlocutory orders and the dismissal with prejudice as to
Honda, but affirm the dismissal as to DCH on statute of limitations
grounds.
I.
We must review in detail the procedural history that
eventually led to the dismissal order. Plaintiff initially filed
her complaint pro se on October 4, 2012. She named only Honda
along with ten fictitious parties as defendants. She alleged that
two years earlier, she suffered significant injuries because the
airbag in her 2010 Acura TSX deployed with excessive force in a
car accident on October 4, 2010. She contended Honda defectively
designed and manufactured the airbag system.
DCH was added in an amended complaint filed a little over a
year later. Plaintiff, by then represented by counsel, alleged
that DCH leased the Acura to her a few months before the accident.
1
In her pleadings, plaintiff inaccurately denominated the
manufacturer as "Honda Motor Company" and the dealer as "DCH
Montclair Acura." The caption has been corrected.
2 A-5459-14T2
DCH later unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the amended complaint
on statute of limitations grounds.2
The lawsuit proceeded in fits and starts. There were issues
with service.3 Honda did not timely respond to interrogatories
and document demands.4 Also, plaintiff's deposition was started
on August 20, 2014, but not finished. The court extended the
original discovery end date (DED) from August 20, 2014 to March
31, 2015, and required completion of all written discovery by
October 9, 2014, party and third-party depositions by November 20,
service of plaintiff's expert reports by December 31, and
plaintiff's expert deposition by January 30, 2015. Defense expert
2
DCH filed a protective cross-appeal from that order, but
abandoned it, contending instead that its statute of limitations
argument provided an alternative basis for affirming the court's
subsequent dismissal with prejudice. We note that four different
trial judges handled this matter over the relevant period. In
general, we see no need to distinguish among them.
3
Plaintiff purported to serve Honda by causing delivery of the
summons and complaint to a dealership in Wayne in April 2013.
Seven months later, her counsel obtained entry of default against
Honda after purporting to serve its request for entry of default
by a mailing to the Wayne dealer. The dealer then contacted Honda.
Honda's counsel and plaintiff entered into a consent order in
December 2013 vacating the default judgment and permitting Honda
to file an answer.
4
Plaintiff served form discovery on Honda in April 2014.
Plaintiff obtained an order striking Honda's answer without
prejudice in July 2014 after receiving partial responses. Honda
provided its full response in August and sought an order vacating
the order, which was granted in October 2014.
3 A-5459-14T2
disclosures and depositions were slated for February and March
2015. The order also barred the parties from filing motions
"without first contacting the Court in writing and obtaining leave
of the Court."
Despite the court's order, discovery did not proceed as
planned. On November 13, 2014, DCH's counsel wrote to the court
to complain that plaintiff had not appeared at three previously
proposed dates for continuing her deposition. Plaintiff's counsel
reportedly had adjourned the depositions, citing plaintiff's
health. Defense counsel recounted that he asked plaintiff's
counsel for a "medical certificate," but received none. While
offering to file a formal motion, counsel asked the court to enter
a proposed form of order compelling plaintiff to appear for her
continued deposition on December 1 and 2, 2014. The court entered
the order the next day, without requiring defendant to file a
motion or indicating whether it sought or received any response
from plaintiff.5
Then, a dispute between plaintiff and her attorney arose. On
November 26, 2014, the day before Thanksgiving and five days before
5
The order merely recited that the matter was opened by DCH's
counsel and good cause for the order was shown. The order lacked
a statement of reasons and an indication whether it was opposed.
Cf. R. 1:6-2(a) ("The form of order shall note whether the motion
was opposed or unopposed.").
4 A-5459-14T2
the ordered deposition dates, plaintiff's counsel filed a
substitution of attorney, stating plaintiff would proceed pro se.
The form stated that plaintiff consented to the substitution, but
plaintiff had not signed it.
Plaintiff promptly contested her counsel's submission in a
letter to the court filed the same day. She denied she consented
to her attorney's withdrawal. She further contended her attorney
first disclosed her withdrawal as well as the court-ordered
depositions in a letter she had received the previous day.
Plaintiff asked the court to cancel the depositions and grant her
time to find a new attorney. The record does not reflect that the
court responded in any way.
Conflicting accounts of the attorney's representation of
plaintiff were similarly communicated to DCH's counsel. On the
same day as her substitution filing, plaintiff's counsel disclosed
the substitution to DCH attorneys via email — albeit only in
response to a fortuitously-timed inquiry into whether her client
would attend the December 1 deposition. In her email, plaintiff's
counsel responded that she could not comment on plaintiff's future
appearance as she had filed the substitution of counsel earlier
that day. Plaintiff's counsel also asserted she had notified her
client "verbally and in writing more than once" about the
5 A-5459-14T2
deposition dates.6 DCH's counsel then emailed plaintiff directly
to inquire if she would appear for the depositions.
Two days later, on November 28, plaintiff again relayed her
version of the story to DCH's counsel via email. Her message
noted, "Because my lawyer stopped representing me without my
consent and without permission of the Court, I need time to obtain
new counsel." She told counsel her depositions needed to be
rescheduled and her new attorney would "hopefully" contact him
shortly. Plaintiff thereafter did not appear for the depositions.
On December 1, 2014, DCH's counsel again wrote to the court,
with a copy to plaintiff, seeking an order dismissing plaintiff's
complaint without prejudice based on her failure to attend
depositions. Counsel again offered to file a formal motion if the
court so required. DCH's counsel provided a copy of the November
26 and November 28 emails.
On December 12, 2014, the court entered the requested order
dismissing plaintiff's amended complaint without prejudice for her
failure to appear at her deposition. The order again did not
6
DCH's counsel referred to a separate letter from plaintiff's
counsel, addressed to the court, which similarly disputed
plaintiff's claims to the court and counsel. However, DCH chose
not to include that alleged letter in the appellate record. The
record also does not reflect whether the court considered it, or
gave it more credence than plaintiff's version of events.
6 A-5459-14T2
require DCH to file a motion and did not specify whether opposition
was sought or received from plaintiff.
Plaintiff secured new representation. On December 22, 2014,
plaintiff retained a second attorney, according to plaintiff's
later-filed certification. She stated she paid $3000 and signed
a retainer agreement. She understood that, after the Christmas
holiday, her new attorney would file "the appropriate motions to
protect . . . and represent" her.
Her choice of replacement was unfortunate. The attorney did
not file a formal substitution of attorney, nor did he immediately
file any motions. Notably, he was in the midst of an investigation
by the Office of Attorney Ethics, which eventually resulted in a
temporary suspension from the practice of law on February 20,
2015.7
On February 9, 2015, DCH's counsel faxed a letter to the
trial court, seeking a third discovery sanction without a formal
motion. This time, DCH's counsel asserted plaintiff failed to
timely serve an expert report in accordance with the August case
7
The disciplinary action followed an effort, extending back to
the Spring of 2014, to conduct a demand audit of the attorney and
his law firm. In a subsequent Supreme Court order, he was ordered
to remain suspended for failing to cooperate with disciplinary
authorities. In addition, he was later suspended for gross
neglect, lack of diligence, failure to inform a client of the
status of a matter, and other violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
7 A-5459-14T2
management order. DCH's counsel copied the letter to plaintiff,
her former counsel, and to the second attorney (although the record
does not reflect how DCH's counsel learned of his involvement).
Four days later, the court entered the requested order, again
without requiring defendant to file a motion or noting whether the
court sought or considered opposition from plaintiff. A month
later, the court entered the same order, noting this time the
order was "unopposed". The court provided no explanation.
On March 25, 2015, plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a motion
to place the case on the inactive list. In support, she submitted
the certification recounting the aforementioned struggles with her
attorneys. She again asserted that her first attorney withdrew
without her consent. She said she was unaware that her first
attorney had adjourned a deposition scheduled for October 30,
2014, nor was she aware of the December 1 and 2 deposition dates
until she received her attorney's withdrawal letter on November
25, 2014. Plaintiff also contended she paid her attorney $2500
for an expert and "thought that she had secured what she needed
to present my case." She also stated that she terminated her
second attorney's representation by letter after learning that he
8 A-5459-14T2
"did nothing" to advance her case.8 She also noted that she had
not been aware of the attorney's suspension. Lastly, plaintiff
stated she attached emails and reports from doctors describing
serious surgery scheduled for April, which she anticipated would
disable her from attending to the case until at least June 15.9
On May 11, 2015, the presiding judge denied plaintiff's
motion. Noting the matter had 624 days of discovery, the judge
wrote, "what is going on?" without addressing the facts plaintiff
presented in her certification. On the same day, the judge also
denied a motion, apparently filed by plaintiff's second attorney,
seeking reinstatement of plaintiff's complaint.10 The court noted
the attorney had never filed a substitution of attorney and a
trial date was already set.11
On June 9, 2015, plaintiff's third and present counsel filed
a formal "substitution of counsel" signed by both counsel and
8
In a subsequent letter to the court in April 2015, plaintiff
stated that the termination letter was dated March 9, 2015, and
she had filed a fee arbitration to secure the return of her $3000.
9
Plaintiff chose not to include those medical records in the
record.
10
The supporting papers are not before us, so it is unclear when
he filed the motion papers or what they said. The proposed form
of order inexplicably referred to a dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint for failure to prosecute, although no such dismissal was
ever ordered.
11
An April 28 notice set trial for June 29, 2015.
9 A-5459-14T2
plaintiff. In a series of motions, her new counsel sought orders:
reinstating the complaint, extending the DED, vacating the
preclusion of expert testimony, and adjourning the trial date. He
filed supporting certifications of counsel and plaintiff, which
recounted the facts and procedural history set forth above. In
particular, plaintiff reiterated that she did not consent to her
first attorney's withdrawal and that her attorney did not timely
inform her of discovery deadlines and obligations. She also
described her ill-fated retention of the second attorney, noting
he did not inform her of his suspension.
On June 26, 2015, the trial court denied all the motions.
Regarding the motion to vacate the dismissal, the court stated:
This application is denied for a myriad of
reasons. Plaintiff's attorney is not properly
in the case. Attorney must file a motion. In
that motion they must represent that their
substituting in as new counsel will not cause
a delay. Also this matter has had 624 days
of discovery and there is a long list of
plaintiff's failure[s] to comply with court
orders regarding her discovery obligations.
In denying the motion to extend discovery, the court added that
plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 4:24-1(c) or to demonstrate
exceptional circumstances why she "consistently violated court
orders[.]" As for the motion to vacate the order suppressing
expert testimony, the court added, "Plaintiff also attempted to
10 A-5459-14T2
have attorneys who were suspended from the practice of law engage
in motion practice on her behalf."
On the day that had been set for trial, June 29, 2015, the
court granted defendants' joint motion filed that same day to
dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint with prejudice. In an oral
statement of reasons, the judge noted that plaintiff could not
meet her burden to establish liability without an expert. The
judge also noted potential spoliation of evidence issues because
plaintiff did not preserve the Acura involved in the accident.
On appeal, plaintiff challenges: the substitution of attorney
in November 2014; the December 2014 order dismissing her complaint
without prejudice; the February and March 2015 orders barring
expert testimony; the June 2015 orders denying her motions to
reinstate her complaint, extend discovery, allow expert testimony,
and adjourn the trial date; and the June 2015 order, issued on the
day of trial, dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
II.
Absent an injustice, we shall not disturb a trial court's
reasoned exercise of discretion in managing discovery and its
trial calendar — including decisions whether to extend deadlines,
impose sanctions for discovery violations, and adjourn a trial.
See, e.g., J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 480 (2011) ("Our courts
have broad discretion to reject a request for an adjournment that
11 A-5459-14T2
is ill founded or designed only to create delay . . . ."); Pomerantz
Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371 (2011) (appellate
courts apply deferential standard in reviewing trial court
decisions on discovery extensions); Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J.
411, 428 (2006) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion a "trial
court's decision to bar defendants' requested amendments to their
interrogatory answers [to add experts] and deny a further discovery
extension"); Abtrax Pharms. v. Elkins-Sinn, 139 N.J. 499, 517
(1995) (stating appellate courts shall review dismissal of
complaint with prejudice "for discovery misconduct" under an abuse
of discretion standard and shall not interfere "unless an injustice
appears to have been done"). We are mindful that, without
consistent enforcement of the rules, "the efficacy of our rules
is destroyed by the gradual cumulation of exceptions." Jansson
v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 198 N.J. Super. 190, 196 (App. Div.
1985). However, we are not obliged to defer to discovery orders
that are "based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable
law." Pomerantz Paper Corp., supra, 207 N.J. at 371 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
An abuse of discretion "arises when a decision is made without
a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established
policies, or rested on an impermissible basis." Flagg v. Essex
Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (internal quotation
12 A-5459-14T2
marks and citation omitted). In this case, the dismissal with
prejudice of plaintiff's complaint rests on the foundation of the
multiple orders that preceded it. Those prior orders suffer from
several infirmities that constrain us to reverse.
In particular, three were entered in violation of the rules
governing motion practice. Fundamental to the motion practice
rules are the principles that the court may enter an order to a
party's prejudice only upon proper notice, based upon competent
evidence, and after a fair opportunity to respond. The court
violated these principles in entering the three orders, in response
to defense counsel's informal letters, that compelled plaintiff
to attend depositions, dismissed her complaint for failing to
appear at such depositions, and barred expert testimony.
The court also misapplied the rules governing the
substitution and withdrawal of counsel. Specifically, the court
erred in failing to review plaintiff's first counsel's withdrawal
once plaintiff protested that she did so without consent, and in
later concluding that plaintiff's third counsel needed defendants'
consent and leave of court to appear in place of plaintiff pro se.
The trial court then preserved, rather than corrected, these
multiple errors in denying plaintiff's omnibus motion to restore
her complaint, extend discovery, allow her to retain an expert,
and adjourn trial.
13 A-5459-14T2
Turning to the first three orders, "[a]n application to the
court for an order shall be by motion," Rule 1:6-2(a) — not
letters, as defense counsel utilized here. Even if we were to
construe the letters as motions, they fail to meet the requirements
governing motion practice in at least three respects. First, a
motion "shall state the time and place when it is to be presented
to the court . . . ." Ibid. Specifically, a movant must provide
the other party with a notice of motion, alerting her to the return
date, which is generally no sooner than sixteen days. See R. 1:6-
3(a); 3 New Jersey Practice, Civil Practice Forms § 10.2, at 330
(James H. Walzer) (6th ed. 2006) ("Every motion shall state the
time and place when it is to be presented to the court . . . .").
Defense counsel provided no such notice, and his letters identified
no return date or other deadline by which plaintiff was obliged
to respond.
Second, if the motion "relies on facts not of record or not
subject of judicial notice, it shall be supported by affidavit
made in compliance with R. 1:6-6." R. 1:6-2(a). Here, defense
counsel supported his application by his own unsworn assertions
in his letter.
Third, discovery motions in particular must be accompanied
by the movant's attorney's certification that the attorney made a
good faith attempt to confer orally with the attorney for the
14 A-5459-14T2
other side, or sent a letter advising the attorney for the
defaulting party that a motion would be filed. Rule 1:6-2(c).
Counsel provided none. Particularly after plaintiff's first
counsel withdrew, defense counsel was obliged to confer orally
with plaintiff or send a warning letter directly to her, yet there
is no evidence that occurred.
Furthermore, our court rules strictly limit the circumstances
in which a party may secure relief ex parte. "When the rules do
not provide for ex parte applications, they are prohibited, with
the possible exception of extraordinary circumstances which would
warrant a relaxation of the rules pursuant to R. 1:1-2." Scalza
v. Shop Rite Supermarkets, Inc., 304 N.J. Super. 636, 640 (App.
Div. 1997) (noting that "a motion to dismiss a complaint for
failure to abide by a court order requiring more specific answers
to interrogatories is not such an emergent matter"); cf. R. 4:52-
1(a) and R. 4:67-2(a) (permitting ex parte applications for
emergent relief).
Here, the relief provided in response to the first two letters
was essentially ex parte, as plaintiff had no practical opportunity
to respond. This is particularly obvious in the case of the
deposition order, which the court entered the day after defense
counsel requested it. The order excluding expert testimony,
15 A-5459-14T2
entered four days after the application, was not much better. No
Rule sanctions the provision of ex parte relief in this context.
Although a court has the authority in "rare case[s]" to relax
the motion practice rules in cases of significant public interest,
see Enourato v. N.J. Bldg. Auth., 182 N.J. Super. 58, 64-66 (App.
Div. 1981), aff'd 90 N.J. 396 (1982), nothing exceptional about
this case warranted disregarding motion practice rules. Nor did
the court's case management order authorize the procedure here.
Perhaps most puzzling of all is the fact that the court's
actions were contrary to its own order, which explicitly required
the parties to seek its permission before filing motions. We need
not explore whether the court was justified, absent any record of
harassing or frivolous motion practice, to require leave in advance
to file motions. But see Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39,
58 (App. Div. 2010) (stating that "enjoining the filing of motions
should be considered only following a determination that the
pleadings demonstrate the continuation of vexatious or harassing
misuse of judicial process"). Even assuming the order was
appropriate, it did not grant the parties leave to secure orders
outside the motion practice rules.
While the court responded to defense counsel's informal
letter applications, it failed to respond at all to plaintiff's
pro se letter protesting the withdrawal of her attorney without
16 A-5459-14T2
consent. Plaintiff's counsel needed her client's consent, or
leave of court, to withdraw. See R. 1:11-2(a)(1) ("[P]rior to the
fixing of a trial date in a civil action, an attorney may withdraw
upon the client's consent provided a substitution of attorney is
filed naming the substituted attorney or indicating that the client
will appear pro se."). Counsel did not seek leave of court. She
filed a substitution of attorney that conspicuously omitted
plaintiff's signature indicating her consent. In response,
plaintiff asserted in a letter to the court she did not give
consent, and she was unaware of the deposition order.
We recognize that plaintiff's counsel allegedly disputed her
client's representations in a letter submitted to the court
(although the letter is not before us). Yet, counsel's reported
response at most created a factual dispute that the court was
obliged to resolve. Notably, plaintiff eventually supported her
position with certifications. None by her counsel was submitted
to the court. Thus, the court erred in failing to address the
propriety of plaintiff's first counsel's withdrawal.
The prejudice plaintiff suffered as a result of this error
is plain. The court's failure to examine counsel's withdrawal and
alleged lack of diligence in representing plaintiff played a
critical role in the orders dismissing plaintiff's complaint
without prejudice and barring an expert. Plaintiff contended to
17 A-5459-14T2
the court and defense counsel that her attorney failed to inform
her of the December 1 ordered deposition in a timely manner;
withdrew without consent; and left her unprepared to attend her
deposition. If all that were true — and there is no competent
evidence under Rule 1:6-6 to dispute it — plaintiff's failure to
attend was excusable. Nonetheless, the court dismissed her
complaint without prejudice for failure to attend the deposition
without addressing plaintiff's reasons for doing so. The order
barring plaintiff's expert was likewise tainted by the court's
failure to determine whether plaintiff was abandoned and disserved
by her first attorney.
The court also erred in denying the four motions filed by
plaintiff's third attorney, which would have given plaintiff a
chance to get her case back on track. First, the court misapplied
Rule 1:11-2(a)(2) in ruling that counsel was not permitted to
appear in place of plaintiff pro se. After a civil trial date is
set, "an attorney may withdraw without leave of court only upon"
filing: (1) the "client's written consent[] [and] a substitution
of attorney" signed by both the withdrawing and entering attorneys;
(2) "a written waiver by all other parties of notice and the right
to be heard"; and (3) "a certification by both the withdrawing
attorney and the substituted attorney that the withdrawal and
substitution will not cause or result in delay." Ibid. (emphasis
18 A-5459-14T2
added). By its plain language, the rule applies to the withdrawal
of an attorney, not a self-represented party.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has expressly ordered that a
substitution is not required of an attorney taking the place of a
pro se party:
Pursuant to N.J. Const. Art. VI., sec. 2 par.
3, it is ORDERED that the provisions of Rule
1:11-2 ("Withdrawal or Substitution") of the
Rule Governing the Courts of the State of New
Jersey are supplemented and relaxed so as to
require an "attorney retained by a client who
had appeared pro se" to file a Notice of
Appearance, rather than a Substitution of
Attorney.
[Notice to the Bar from Stuart Rabner, Chief
Justice, Relaxation of Rule 1:11-2 to Require
a Notice of Appearance Where an Attorney
Initially Appears In a Matter (Feb. 20, 2015),
http://njcourts.gov/notices/2015/n150227f.
pdf.]
In the accompanying notice to the bar, the Acting Administrative
Director of the Courts explained: "A Substitution of Attorney
pleading should be used only in those situations (1) where an
attorney seeks to withdraw from a matter or (2) where one attorney
is being substituted for another attorney in the matter." Notice
to the Bar from Glenn A. Grant, Acting Administrative Director,
Superior Court of New Jersey, Relaxation of Rule 1:11-2 to Require
a Notice of Appearance Where an Attorney Initially Appears In a
19 A-5459-14T2
Matter (Feb. 20, 2015), http://njcourts.gov/notices/2015/
n150227f.pdf.
The court also erred in concluding that plaintiff "attempted
to have attorneys who were suspended from the practice of law
engage in motion practice on her behalf." The court's reasoning
presumed, without any evidential support, that plaintiff was aware
of her second attorney's suspension. To the contrary, the
plaintiff certified, without dispute, that she was unaware of the
suspension and was victimized by that attorney's lack of diligence.
Further, the court faulted plaintiff alone for the fact that
discovery was incomplete, despite plaintiff's certification that
she was disserved by her first and second attorneys, that the
first withdrew without consent, and the second was suspended.
In its discretion, the trial court may for "good cause" grant
a motion to extend discovery. R. 4:24-1. Extensions should not
be mechanically denied if neither an arbitration nor trial date
has been set. See Ponden v. Ponden, 374 N.J. Super. 1, 9-11 (App.
Div. 2004), certif. denied, 183 N.J. 212 (2005). After the
arbitration or trial date has been set a movant must demonstrate
"exceptional circumstances," R. 4:24-1, in other words, "something
unusual or remarkable." Rivers v. LSC P'ship, 378 N.J. Super. 68,
78 (App. Div.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),
certif. denied, 185 N.J. 296 (2005). A movant must demonstrate:
20 A-5459-14T2
(1) why discovery has not been completed
within time and counsel's diligence in
pursuing discovery during that time; (2) the
additional discovery or disclosure sought is
essential; (3) an explanation for counsel's
failure to request an extension of the time
for discovery within the original time period;
and (4) the circumstances presented were
clearly beyond the control of the attorney and
litigant seeking the extension of time.
[Id. at 79.]
Plaintiff effectively requested an extension of discovery in
March, before the DED and before the trial date was set, by
requesting that the case be placed on the inactive list because
of her impending surgery. Although plaintiff does not appeal the
order denying that motion, we note that the court failed to address
the reasons plaintiff presented, including her assertions that:
her attorneys disserved her, the first withdrew without consent,
and the second was suspended.
In any event, we are satisfied that plaintiff presented
exceptional circumstances to justify an extension of discovery
and, perforce, an adjournment of trial. We recognize an attorney's
mismanagement or neglect may fall short of establishing
exceptional circumstances. See Huszar v. Greate Bay Hotel &
Casino, Inc., 375 N.J. Super. 463, 474 (App. Div.) (finding no
exceptional circumstances where "the delay rests squarely on
plaintiff's counsel's failure to retain an expert and pursue
21 A-5459-14T2
discovery in a timely manner"), certif. granted and summarily
remanded, 185 N.J. 290 (2005); Martinelli v. Farm-Rite, Inc., 345
N.J. Super. 306, 311-12 (App. Div. 2001), certif. denied, 171 N.J.
338 (2002); Rodriguez v. Luciano, 277 N.J. Super. 109, 112-13
(App. Div. 1994).
However, we have more here. Accepting plaintiff's
certifications as true — as they are undisputed by any competent
evidence in the form of a certification of her prior counsel to
the contrary — she was disserved and then abandoned by her first
attorney. When she sought the court's intervention, none was
forthcoming. She diligently sought and retained new counsel, paid
a fee, and anticipated that he would soon correct any deficiencies
in discovery. Instead, the attorney did not formally substitute
in; he apparently did little on plaintiff's behalf; and he was
suspended from the practice of law and thereby disabled from
representing her even if he intended to do so.
Under these circumstances, it would defeat the ends of justice
to require plaintiff to suffer the consequences of her attorneys'
actions. Cf. Kosmowski v. Atl. City Med. Ctr., 175 N.J. 568, 574
(2003) (stating, regarding whether to adjourn a case due to an
expert's unavailability, the court must consider both "the
salutary principle that the sins of the advocate should not be
visited on the blameless litigant," and the court's case
22 A-5459-14T2
management prerogatives (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)); Parker v. Marcus, 281 N.J. Super. 589, 592-95 (App.
Div. 1995) (in context of Rule 4:50-1(f) motion, finding
exceptional circumstances that warranted relieving party of
consequences of negligent conduct of case by attorney later
disbarred), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 324 (1996).
Given the foregoing conclusions, we need say little about the
day-of-trial order dismissing plaintiff's complaint with
prejudice. The trial judge newly assigned the case was bound by
the prior orders. It was readily apparent to him, focusing on the
current posture of the case, that plaintiff could not proceed to
present a prima facie case, even if her complaint were restored,
because she had not obtained an expert. Moreover, the trial court
had previously denied her motion to extend discovery; as a result,
she could not cure that deficiency. In other words, the court's
order was foreordained by the preceding orders. As we reverse
those orders, we reverse as well the order dismissing the complaint
with prejudice as to Honda.12 However, for the reasons set forth
below, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint against DCH.
12
We decline to affirm the dismissal order on the independent
ground that plaintiff did not preserve the vehicle. Plaintiff has
yet to present the report of an expert describing the nature of
the alleged defect in the air bag system. Therefore, it is
premature to determine the prejudice resulting from the failure
23 A-5459-14T2
III.
In November 2013, over three years after the accident,
plaintiff filed an amended complaint identifying DCH for the first
time. The trial court erred in denying DCH's motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground plaintiff failed to satisfy the
applicable two-year statute of limitations. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-
2. In particular, the court erred in applying Rule 4:26-4, which
permits a plaintiff to sue a fictitiously named party, later amend
a complaint to substitute the party's true name, and have the
amended complaint "relate back" for statute of limitations
purposes to the filing of the original complaint. See Greczyn v.
Colgate-Palmolive, 183 N.J. 5, 17 n.3 (2005) ("Fictitious-party
practice renders the initial filing against the identified but
unnamed defendant timely in the first instance, subject only to
diligent action by the plaintiff to insert defendant's real
name."); Claypotch v. Heller, Inc., 360 N.J. Super. 472, 480 (App.
Div. 2003) (stating that the amended complaint substituting the
real name of a fictitiously named party is said to "relate back"
to the date the complaint was originally filed).
Rule 4:26-4 provides, in relevant part:
to preserve the vehicle. Cf. Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc.,
197 N.J. 81, 118 (2008) (noting that a spoliation claim requires
a showing that "the evidence was material to the litigation"
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
24 A-5459-14T2
In any action, . . . if the defendant's true
name is unknown to the plaintiff, process may
issue against the defendant under a fictitious
name, stating it to be fictitious and adding
an appropriate description sufficient for
identification. Plaintiff shall on motion,
prior to judgment, amend the complaint to
state defendant's true name, such motion to
be accompanied by an affidavit stating the
manner in which that information was obtained.
The purpose of the rule is "to protect a diligent plaintiff who
is aware of a cause of action against a defendant but not the
defendant's name, at the point at which the statute of limitations
is about to run." Greczyn, supra, 183 N.J. at 17-18. Upon
learning the real name of a defendant, the diligent plaintiff may
seek permission to file an amended complaint, specifically
identifying the defendant who was previously named fictitiously.
R. 4:26-4.
A plaintiff invoking fictitious party practice must satisfy
four requirements. First, the plaintiff must not know the identity
of the fictitiously named defendant. R. 4:26-4. Second, the
fictitiously named defendant must be described with sufficient
detail to allow identification. Ibid. Third, a party seeking to
amend a complaint to identify a defendant previously named
fictitiously must provide proof of how it learned the defendant's
identity. Ibid.
25 A-5459-14T2
Fourth, although not expressly stated in the rule, the party
invoking the rule must act diligently in attempting to identify
the defendant. Matynska v. Fried, 175 N.J. 51, 53 (2002);
Claypotch, supra, 360 N.J. Super. at 479-80; Mears v. Sandoz
Pharms., Inc., 300 N.J. Super. 622, 629 (App. Div. 1997). A
showing of diligence is a threshold requirement for resort to
fictitious party practice. See Matynska, supra, 175 N.J. at 53
(referring to the "due diligence threshold"); Claypotch, supra,
360 N.J. Super. at 479-80 (stating that defendant may use
fictitious name "only if a defendant's true name cannot be
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence prior to filing the
complaint" (emphasis added)).
If a plaintiff did not use diligence, and a
court still permitted him or her to amend his
or her original complaint to name a previously
unknown defendant, it would not only fail to
penalize delay on the plaintiff['s] part, but
would also disregard considerations of
essential fairness to [the] defendant[],
thereby violating the purpose behind the
statute of limitations.
[Mears, supra, 300 N.J. Super. at 630
(internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).]
We recognize that the court in Claypotch held that "[i]n
determining whether a plaintiff has acted with due diligence . . .
a crucial factor is whether the defendant has been prejudiced by
the delay . . . ." Claypotch, supra, 360 N.J. Super. at 480.
26 A-5459-14T2
However, the absence of prejudice to defendant does not necessarily
imply that plaintiff has exercised due diligence.13 Instead, where
the Court has found that a party had acted diligently, the Court
considered the absence of prejudice to the defendant as a factor
supporting its conclusion that allowing an amendment served the
interests of justice and fairness. Farrell v. Votator Div. of
Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 122-23 (1973). However, "[t]here
cannot be any doubt that a defendant suffers some prejudice merely
by the fact that it is exposed to potential liability for a lawsuit
after the statute of limitations has run." Mears, supra, 300 N.J.
Super. at 631.
Applying the aforementioned requirements to the present
matter, it is clear plaintiff failed to meet her burden. First,
she presumably knew the name of the car dealer that leased her
Acura. If she did not know its precise corporate name, she could
have referred to her lease or simply asked someone at the
dealership. The rule is unavailable to a plaintiff who could have
13
While it is true that greater diligence by a plaintiff will
generally result in lesser prejudice to defendant (because there
will be correspondingly less delay in substituting the defendant
for a fictitious party), the converse is not necessarily true.
Lesser prejudice to defendant does not necessarily imply greater
diligence by plaintiff. Asserting that it does is an example of
"affirming the consequent" or "converse error." Prejudice may be
a function of lack of diligence, but diligence is not a function
of lack of prejudice.
27 A-5459-14T2
easily identified a defendant before filing the complaint.
Claypotch, supra, 360 N.J. Super. at 479-80; Mears, supra, 300
N.J. Super. at 629.
Second, she failed to describe any of the fictitious parties
with sufficient detail to indicate she sought to hold the dealer
liable. Certainly, she failed to allege any wrongdoing by the
unnamed lessor of the vehicle instead. Instead, she described the
"ABC Corporations 1-10" as follows:
Fictitious entities who, as wholly or
partially owned subsidiaries, or in
partnership or combination with or under the
control of the named defendant, acted
purposely, intentionally, fraudulently and
negligently with regard to certain duties owed
to the plaintiff and in acting purposely,
intentionally, fraudulently and negligently
caused the plaintiff to suffer damages as are
set forth herein.
The remaining factors are plainly inapplicable here:
plaintiff did not provide any proof as to how she learned the
dealer's identity, nor did she demonstrate that she acted
diligently in identifying and naming the fictitious party.
Consequently, plaintiff was not entitled to rely on
fictitious party practice to name DCH after the limitations period
had run. Therefore, the court should have dismissed the complaint
against DCH as time-barred. On that basis, we affirm the court's
later order dismissing the complaint against DCH. See State v.
28 A-5459-14T2
Heisler, 422 N.J. Super. 399, 416 (App. Div. 2011) (stating the
appellate court may "affirm the trial court's decision on grounds
different from those relied upon by the trial court").
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
29 A-5459-14T2