GREG VOCI VS. HARD CHEESE AC, LLC (L-1189-17, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5916-17T1
GREG VOCI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HARD CHEESE AC, LLC, and
THE CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY
ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT,
Defendants-Respondents.
________________________________
Submitted May 29, 2019 – Decided July 11, 2019
Before Judges Yannotti and Gilson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. L-1189-17.
Monzo Catanese Hillegass, PC, attorneys for appellant
(F. Thomas Hillegass and John P. Amenhauser, on the
briefs).
Testa Heck Testa & White, PA, attorneys for respondent
Hard Cheese AC, LLC (Todd W. Heck, on the brief).
John Scott Abbott, attorney for respondent the City of
Atlantic City Zoning Board of Adjustment.
PER CURIAM
This appeal arises out of a prerogative writs action in which plaintiff Greg
Voci challenged a resolution by the Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of
Atlantic City (Zoning Board), which granted use and bulk variances to defendant
Hard Cheese AC, LLC (Hard Cheese or the Applicant), so that it could build a
car wash. Plaintiff appeals from an August 3, 2018 order denying
reconsideration of a June 15, 2018 order, which rejected the challenges to the
variances. Plaintiff argues the resolution should be invalidated because the then-
Mayor Donald Guardian testified in favor of Hard Cheese's application, thereby
undermining the impartiality of the Zoning Board's hearing and contravening
the conflict-of-interest rules. The trial court found, however, that there was no
showing that the Mayor had any conflict of interest. We affirm because the
record supports that finding.
I.
In 2017, defendant Hard Cheese filed an application with the Zoning
Board requesting use and bulk variances to construct an automated car wash
facility on a vacant lot in Atlantic City. The property for the proposed car wash
is located in neighborhood-commercial and single-family-attached zoning
districts. Hard Cheese's proposed car wash is not a permitted use in either
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district, thus, a use variance is required. Hard Cheese also sought bulk variances
from two parking lot requirements.
On March 23, 2017, the Zoning Board held a public hearing on Hard
Cheese's application. At that hearing, four people testified: then-Mayor
Guardian; Licensed Professional Engineer and Planner Jon Barnhart;
Montgomery Dahm, the principal of Hard Cheese; and the owner of a business
located near the proposed car wash. All of those people testified in favor of the
application and no one opposed the application.
At the beginning of the hearing, counsel for the Applicant explained that
the Mayor wanted to comment on the application as a member of the public.
Counsel requested the Zoning Board to allow the Mayor to testify first because
the Mayor had another meeting he was going to attend. In making that request,
counsel acknowledged that members of the public usually speak at the end of
Zoning Board hearings. The Zoning Board granted counsel's request and the
Mayor testified in favor of Hard Cheese's application. Specifically, the Mayor
testified in relevant substance:
I just wanted to speak favorably about this project. You
know, I know it sounds like just a car wash, but if we
only do the big projects that the big boys from outside
spend $100-million, than we'll end up recanting. I'm
not attacking - - We can't do (indiscernible). And big
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projects aren't enough. We need little people, ma and
pa organizations to be doing something here.
The Mayor also testified:
We need the small projects that are ow - - owned by
local people, local residents, and in the big projects as
well. So I just wanted to speak favorably. I understand
that there may be some need for some zoning
adjustments on the spot, but it's a vacant spot with
nothing going on. This is not heavily used, this side of
- - of the - - the street. . . . And I was concerned about
this spot with other commercial uses that it would be
quite crowded, and that probably would be a problem
because it is still a residential neighbor - - poor
residential neighborhood. Probably don't know that
they could come in and object at this meeting. So I
think it's definitely a good use for this project. It - - It's
a good a project and I hope you look favorably on it
being a business (indiscernible) project. I'll be happy
to answer any questions you have for me.
No one asked any questions of the Mayor. Instead, the Zoning Board
Chairman thanked the Mayor for attending the hearing and sharing his
comments. At that time, the following exchange occurred between the Mayor
and the Chairman:
CHAIRMAN LONGCRIER: And [the Zoning Board]
believe[s] in the diversity of business and mixed use
and things like that. So it will be said - - I don't want
to be premature. - - after the vote. And - - But we will
have our questions and our concerns, but, of course, we
always believe we give everyone a fair shake.
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MAYOR GUARDIAN: Yeah. Don't give him an easy
--
CHAIRMAN LONGCRIER: Yes. Yes.
MAYOR GUARDIAN: You could - -
CHAIRMAN LONGCRIER: Yes.
MAYOR GUARDIAN: - - (indiscernible) do what
you're supposed to do - -
CHAIRMAN LONGCRIER: Yes.
MAYOR GUARDIAN: - - all the other restraints and
things, but make certain - - but make sure - -
CHAIRMAN LONGCRIER: Yes.
MAYOR GUARDIAN: - - that he makes a buck so he
pays his taxes.
CHAIRMAN LONGCRIER: Yes. All right. All right.
After the Mayor's testimony, the Applicant presented its case in support
of the use and bulk variances. To support its variance requests, the Applicant
first presented testimony from Jon Barnhart. Barnhart testified in detail as to
why the variances were appropriate. Regarding the use variance, Barnhart
testified that the property was particularly well-suited for the proposed car wash
based on the limited hours of the facility, the surrounding businesses, and the
character of the street abutting the property. Barnhart further testified that the
proposed car wash would promote the general welfare by providing a service to
the community in an aesthetically pleasing facility. Concerning the bulk
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variance, Barnhart testified there was a hardship necessitating the variance as
the required parking space setback would prevent the development of the
property for any use based on the layout of the site. Moreover, Barnhart testified
that the benefit of the deviations in the length of the parking spaces and the
required setback for the parking area would outweigh any harm they caused.
Next, Montgomery Dahm, the principal of Hard Cheese, testified briefly.
Thereafter, the Zoning Board questioned counsel for the Applicant on a number
of details concerning the requested variances. After answering those questions,
the Applicant finished its presentation, and the hearing was opened to the public
for comment.
At that time, a local business owner testified. He stated that he was the
owner of a laundromat located across the street from the proposed car wash. He
spoke favorably of the proposed car wash, describing it as "a great opportunity"
and "a nice eye opener thing for people" entering Atlantic City.
The public portion of the hearing then closed, and the Zoning Board voted
on the application. All six members present voted to approve the Applicant's
request for the use and bulk variances needed to build and operate the car was h
facility.
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In a resolution adopted on April 27, 2017, the Zoning Board memorialized
its decision. Concerning the use variance, the Zoning Board concluded that the
proposed use of the property as an automated car wash facility was "an
appropriate use which is particularly well suited for the subject property." The
Zoning Board explained that the property was located on a "main artery" of
Atlantic City and that the property had been vacant for a substantial period. The
Zoning Board also found that "[t]he proposed car wash is aesthetically appealing
and does not have the noise or other impacts associated with car washes." As
such, the Zoning Board concluded that the proposed car wash was "compatible
with the zoned uses and the actual pattern of development."
As to the bulk variances, the Zoning Board determined that the requested
setback for the parking area and the decreased parking space length dimensions
would "not have a substantial detriment to the zone plan[.]" The Zoning Board
found the car wash would provide a valuable service to the neighborhood and
surrounding areas and its design "was not contemplated by the governing body
and thus constitutes a change in circumstances" that was sufficient "to reconcile
the grant of the use variance with the omission of such use from the zone." The
Zoning Board's approval of the use and bulk variances was conditioned upon
Hard Cheese complying with multiple conditions detailed in the resolution.
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On June 12, 2017, plaintiff filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs
against Hard Cheese and the Zoning Board. Plaintiff is the owner of a car wash
located less than one mile from Hard Cheese's proposed car wash. Plaintiff had
not opposed the variances before the Zoning Board. In his complaint, plaintiff
alleged that the Zoning Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably
by approving defendant Hard Cheese's application for use and bulk variances.
Specifically, plaintiff contended that Hard Cheese had not established the
positive and negative criteria needed for use and bulk variances as required by
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d).
Defendants filed their answers. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order
setting forth a briefing schedule and a date for a final hearing. In its brief in
support of its challenge to the resolution, plaintiff argued that the Mayor's
appearance before the Zoning Board and his statement in support of the
application created a conflict of interest that "tainted" the entire hearing.
On December 11, 2017, the trial court held a hearing and the parties
presented oral argument.1 Thereafter, on June 15, 2018, the trial court issued an
order and eighteen-page written opinion denying plaintiff's challenges to the
resolution. The trial court found that the Zoning Board's decision granting use
1
We were not given a copy of the transcript of the December 11, 2017 hearing.
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and bulk variances was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The trial court
further held that the Mayor's appearance before the Zoning Board did not taint
the hearing. In that regard, the court found that plaintiff had presented no
evidence that the Mayor had a direct or indirect pecuniary interest in the car
wash project. The court also found that there was no evidence that the Mayor
had any personal interest in the project. Moreover, the court found that there
was no showing that the Mayor's appearance before the Zoning Board
improperly influenced the Zoning Board or any of its members because the
Mayor did not appoint the Zoning Board members. Instead, the court found that
the Mayor had "merely express[ed] comments in favor of a local project[.]"
Accordingly, the trial court entered final judgment upholding the Zoning Board's
resolution.
On July 5, 2018, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration. After hearing
oral argument on August 3, 2018, the court denied plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration, and read its decision into the record. Later that day, the court
entered a written order memorializing its denial of reconsideration. Plaintiff
then filed a notice of appeal, but appealed only the August 3, 2018 order denying
reconsideration.
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II.
Plaintiff raises one issue on appeal. He argues that the trial court abused
its discretion by not finding that the Mayor's testimony before the Zoning Board
tainted the proceedings. We reject this argument because there was no showing
of a conflict of interest or other improper conduct by the Mayor or the Zoning
Board.
We review a denial of a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of
discretion. Brunt v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 455 N.J. Super.
357, 362 (App. Div. 2018). An abuse of discretion occurs "when a decision is
'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably depart[s] from established
policies, or rest[s] on an impermissible basis.'" Ibid. (quoting Pitney Bowes
Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div.
2015)). Nevertheless, we review de novo the law governing conflicts of interest,
including the statutory and common law. Piscitelli v. City of Garfield Zoning
Bd. of Adjustment, 237 N.J. 333, 350 (2019) (citing Dunbar Homes, Inc. v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 233 N.J. 546, 559 (2018)); see also 388 Route 22
Readington Realty Holdings, LLC v. Twp. of Readington, 221 N.J. 318, 338
(2015) ("In construing the meaning of a statute, an ordinance, or our case law,
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our review is de novo." (citing Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salem v. N.J. Prop.-
Liab. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 215 N.J. 522, 535 (2013))).
Our Supreme Court has recently reiterated that "[t]he overall objective 'of
conflict of interest laws is to ensure that public officials provide disinterested
service to their communities' and to 'promote confidence in the integrity of
governmental operations.'" Piscitelli, 237 N.J. at 349 (quoting Thompson v.
City of Atlantic City, 190 N.J. 359, 364 (2007)). Resolving whether a conflict
of interest prevented the Mayor from testifying in favor of Hard Cheese's
application is governed by the Local Government Ethics Law (LGEL), N.J.S.A.
40A:9-22.1 to -22.25; the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-
1 to -163; and the common law. Piscitelli, 237 N.J. at 349-50.
The LGEL applies to all municipal office holders, including mayors and
members of zoning boards. Id. at 350. See also N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.3(g). In
enacting this code of ethics for municipal officers and employees, the
Legislature recognized:
a. Public office and employment are a public trust;
b. The vitality and stability of representative
democracy depend upon the public's confidence in
the integrity of its elected and appointed
representatives;
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c. Whenever the public perceives a conflict between
the private interests and the public duties of a
government officer or employee, that confidence is
imperiled;
d. Governments have the duty both to provide their
citizens with standards by which they may
determine whether public duties are being faithfully
performed, and to appraise their officers and
employees of the behavior which is expected of
them while conducting their public duties[.]
[N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.2(a) to (d).]
Thus, the LGEL aims to "make ethical standards in state and local government
'clear, consistent, uniform in their application, and enforceable on a statewide
basis.'" Grabowsky v. Twp. of Montclair, 221 N.J. 536, 552 (2015) (quoting
Wyzykowski v. Rizas, 132 N.J. 509, 531 (1993)).
To that end, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(d) provides that
[n]o local government officer or employee shall act in
his [or her] official capacity in any matter where he [or
she], a member of his [or her] immediate family, or a
business organization in which he [or she] has an
interest, has a direct or indirect financial or personal
involvement that might reasonably be expected to
impair his [or her] objectivity or independence of
judgment[.]
Next, the MLUL applies specifically to members of municipal zoning
boards, and it provides that no member of a zoning board "shall be permitted to
act on any matter in which he [or she] has, either directly or indirectly, any
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personal or financial interest." N.J.S.A. 40:55D-69; accord Piscitelli, 237 N.J.
at 352; Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 552.
Similar to the statutory requirements of the LGEL and the MLUL, in
Wyzykowski, our Supreme Court enunciated the four situations under the
common law where a public official is disqualified on conflict-of-interest
grounds. Specifically, an official is disqualified when he or she has:
(1) "Direct pecuniary interests," when an official votes
on a matter benefitting the official's own property or
affording a direct financial gain; (2) "Indirect pecuniary
interests," where an official votes on a matter that
financially benefits one closely tied to the official, such
as an employer, or family member; (3) "Direct personal
interest," when an official votes on a matter that
benefits a blood relative or close friend in a non-
financial way, but in a matter of great
importance, . . . and (4) "Indirect [p]ersonal [i]nterest,"
when an official votes on a matter in which an
individual's judgment may be affected because of
membership in some organization and a desire to help
that organization further its policies.
[Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 553 (second and third
alterations in original) (quoting Wyzykowski, 132 N.J.
at 525).]
The overarching principle of the conflict-of-interest provisions under the
LGEL, the MLUL, and the common law is that "[a] citizen's right to 'a fair and
impartial tribunal' requires a public official to disqualify himself or herself
whenever 'the official has a conflicting interest that may interfere with the
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impartial performance of his [or her] duties as a member of the public body. '"
Piscitelli, 237 N.J. at 352-53 (quoting Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 551). In resolving
whether an official has a disqualifying interest, "[t]he question is not 'whether a
public official has acted dishonestly or has sought to further a personal or
financial interest; the decisive factor is "whether there is a potential for
conflict."'" Id. at 353 (quoting Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 554). To answer that
question, a court must determine "whether the circumstances could reasonably
be interpreted to show that [conflicting interests] had the likely capacity to tempt
the official to depart from his [or her] sworn public duty." Ibid. (first alteration
in original) (quoting Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 523).
Courts should, however, apply the conflict-of-interest rules cautiously, as
"[l]ocal governments would be seriously handicapped if every possible interest,
no matter how remote and speculative, would serve as a disqualification of an
official." Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 554 (alteration in original) (quoting
Wyzykowski, 132 N.J. at 523). Indeed, public officials "cannot and should not
be expected to be without any personal interest in the decisions and policies of
government[.]" N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.4; see also Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 554 ("It
is essential that municipal offices be filled by individuals who are thoroughly
familiar with local communities and concerns."). Accordingly, "the nature of
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an official's interest must be carefully evaluated based on the circumstances of
the specific case." Grabowsky, 221 N.J. at 554 (citing Van Itallie v. Borough
of Franklin Lakes, 28 N.J. 258, 268 (1958)); accord Piscitelli, 237 N.J. at 353-
54.
Applying these principles to the facts in this case, plaintiff did not
establish that the Mayor had any conflict of interest or that the Mayor's
appearance before the Zoning Board tainted the proceedings. Initially, it is
important to clarify what plaintiff is contending and what evidence plaintiff
presented. Plaintiff is not alleging that any Zoning Board member had a conflict
of interest. Thus, there was no showing that anyone who voted for the resolution
had a conflict of interest. Moreover, plaintiff did not present any evidence that
the Mayor had a direct or indirect pecuniary interest in the car wash project.
Instead, plaintiff's objection is based on a vague generalized contention
that the Mayor was acquainted with the principal of Hard Cheese and had held
some fundraising events at the principal's restaurant. Critically, however, there
was no evidence supporting those vague assertions.
The evidence in the record establishes that the Mayor appeared and
testified in favor of the application as a member of the public. The Mayor
himself did not participate in the Zoning Board's vote on the variances.
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Accordingly, the Mayor is not prohibited from testifying by the LGEL, the
MLUL, or the common law since he took no official action, such as voting, on
behalf of the application. See N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(d); N.J.S.A. 40:55D-69;
Piscitelli, 237 N.J. at 351-53; Grabowski, 221 N.J. at 553; Wyzykowski, 132
N.J. at 525-26.
Plaintiff argues that the Mayor should be per se prohibited from testifying
before the Zoning Board as a member of the public because he is "the highest
ranking government official in the City of Atlantic City," and, thus, he has the
potential to exert a "psychological influence" over the Zoning Board. Our
Supreme Court has already rejected the position that a mayor's appearance
before a zoning board automatically compromises the impartiality of the
proceeding by creating a disqualifying conflict of interest. See Wyzykowski,
132 N.J. at 528, 530-31. Instead, the Court held that the conflict-of-interest
provisions of the common law and LGEL continue to guide the inquiry even in
situations involving the testimony of a mayor or other high-ranking official. See
id. at 529-32.
Plaintiff also argues that the hearing was tainted by the Mayor's testimony
because the Zoning Board accorded special treatment to the Mayor in allowing
him to testify out of order and not subjecting him to cross-examination. This
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argument is not supported by the record. The Mayor explicitly stated: "I'll be
happy to answer any questions you have for me." Thereafter, no questions were
asked and there were no objections placed on the record concerning the manner
or substance of the Mayor's testimony. As to the order of the Mayor's testimony,
counsel for the Applicant requested that the Zoning Board permit the Mayor to
testify first due to a schedule conflict. Counsel acknowledged that the public
usually testifies at the end of a public hearing. It was within the Zoning Board's
discretion to allow the Mayor to testify first. Based on the underlying
circumstances, granting that request did not undermine the impartiality of the
proceedings.
Finally, it should be noted that there is no evidence that any of the Zoning
Board members were disqualified from voting on the application due to the
Mayor's testimony. The Mayor had not and will not be appointing the Zoning
Board members because those appointments are made by the City Council of
Atlantic City. See City of Atlantic City, N.J., City Code § 163-27(A) (2019).
In sum, the Mayor's testimony did not taint the Zoning Board's grant of
the use and bulk variances. Under the LGEL, MLUL, and the common law, the
Mayor was permitted to provide public comment on the application as it
concerned a decision affecting the entire community, rather than a personal or
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private interest. Moreover, the Mayor did not participate in the actual decision-
making process. Finally, there is no evidence that any of the Zoning Board
members should have been disqualified from voting based on the Mayor's
testimony.
Affirmed.
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