STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. EDUARDO LAGO(11-04-0450, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2321-14T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
EDUARDO LAGO, a/k/a CHULEY EDDIE,
EDGARDO LAGO, EDUARDO L. LAGO,
and EDUARDO LAGOS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________
Submitted March 14, 2017 – Decided August 1, 2017
Before Judges Fisher, Leone and Vernoia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment
No. 11-04-0450.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Stephen W. Kirsch, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the
brief).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Sarah E. Ross and
Frank Muroski, Deputy Attorney Generals, of
counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals his convictions following a jury trial for
murder and weapons offenses. He argues the court erred by
permitting testimony in violation of his right to confrontation
and by providing an incorrect response to a question posed by the
jury during its deliberations. Based on our review of the record
in light of the applicable law, we affirm.
I.
The charges against defendant arise from the murder of Yessina
Feliciano at the Elizabeth home of her sister, Gloria Francisco,
and brother-in-law, Jesus Francisco.1 In the early morning hours
of November 14, 2010, the doorbell rang and Feliciano and Gloria
opened a side door to the home, where they were confronted by
three men. Gloria knew defendant and immediately recognized him
as one of the men, but was not familiar with the others. She saw
defendant lift his arms with something in his hands, and heard a
single gunshot. Feliciano suffered a gunshot wound and died at the
scene. The three men fled.
Defendant was arrested and charged in an indictment with
first-degree knowing or purposeful murder of Feliciano, N.J.S.A.
2C:11-3(a) or (b) (count one); second-degree unlawful possession
of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count two); and second-degree
1
We will refer to Gloria and Jesus Francisco by their first names
to avoid any confusion and for ease of reference.
2 A-2321-14T4
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
4(a) (count three). The evidence during his jury trial showed the
following.
On November 14, 2010, Gloria and Feliciano awoke to the sound
of the doorbell and went to side door of the home. The area outside
the door was well-lit and when Feliciano opened the door, Gloria
saw defendant and two other men. Gloria knew defendant "extremely
well" because he was a former friend of her son Steven Rios, had
been at their home hundreds of times, and had lived at the home
for a few months. When Gloria saw defendant standing at the door,
his hands were down between his legs and he was holding something.
The other two men stood with their hands at their sides.
Gloria testified that she observed "something in between
[defendant's] hands which was a gun," but later clarified that she
could not identify the object he held. However, Gloria saw
defendant raise his arms while grasping the object, and point his
arms in the direction of her and Feliciano. She heard a gunshot,
pulled Feliciano away, and closed the door. Gloria saw Feliciano
bleeding from the chest and mouth.
Jesus testified he awoke to screaming and went downstairs
where he observed Feliciano bleeding from the chest. He asked
Gloria who shot Feliciano and she said it was defendant. Jesus
3 A-2321-14T4
called the police and, after they arrived, provided them with
photographs of defendant and Rios together.
Rios testified about his prior friendship with defendant and
a dispute that had arisen between them over gang membership. Rios
and defendant had been close friends and in 2010 joined the "Crips"
gang. Defendant later moved to Newark and joined the "Bloods"
gang. Rios's gang "boss" learned that defendant joined the Bloods
and "gave [Rios] a green light" to beat up defendant. Rios
testified that if he did not follow the order, he would be beaten
by his own gang's members. Rios said he never saw defendant again,
and that his only further contact with defendant was an argument
over the phone at an unspecified time after defendant moved to
Newark.
The police searched for defendant following Gloria's
identification of him as the shooter. Detective William Lord went
to an apartment on Railroad Avenue in Newark to search for
defendant. The apartment was identified as a place defendant and
a friend had lived. The residents of the apartment were Donte
Kirce, his girlfriend Laisha Maldanado, her brother Kidanys
Maldanado,2 and other members of the Maldanado family.
2
We will refer to Laisha and Kidanys Francisco by their first
names to avoid any confusion and for ease of reference.
4 A-2321-14T4
During the daytime hours of November 14, 2010, Lord went to
the Railroad Avenue apartment twice in search of defendant. Lord
spoke with Laisha and was permitted to look through the apartment
for defendant, but defendant was not there.
Later that evening, Kirce arrived home at the Railroad Avenue
apartment and found the door barricaded with furniture. Kidanys
let Kirce into the apartment and Kirce saw defendant. About forty-
five minutes later, Kirce left the apartment and went to see Laisha
where she worked. Kirce testified that Laisha "explained the
situation" that a "lady died in Elizabeth." The court sustained
defense counsel's hearsay objection to the testimony and struck
the testimony. In response to the prosecutor's next questions,
Kirce said he called "Crimestoppers"3 based on information he
learned from Laisha. Kirce did not testify about what he told
Crimestoppers when he called.
Kirce returned to the Railroad Avenue apartment and "sat in
the living room with Kidanys and defendant." Kirce heard defendant
say "[s]omebody had to go," but defendant did not indicate what
he meant or who he was talking about.
3
"Crimestoppers" was described by Lord as a hotline "where people
can make anonymous tips to the police regarding criminal activity."
5 A-2321-14T4
The State introduced portions of Kirce's statement4 to the
police where he explained that while he was in the apartment,
Kidanys retrieved a gun with a missing bullet from a back room and
handed it through the apartment door to an unidentified individual.
In his statement, Kirce explained that defendant said "they" shot
his "baby['s] mother['s] salon," that he went "looking for the
dudes" and when he could not find them, he shot "one of the dude's
aunt[s]." Kirce also told the police defendant was "scared" because
defendant believed "the cops [were] coming."
In response to the information Kirce provided to
Crimestoppers, later that evening Lord and Sergeant Jorge Jiminez
went to the Railroad Avenue apartment and arrested defendant. They
also took Kidanys, Kirce, and two other men to the police station
to obtain their statements. The investigation led police to the
men that accompanied defendant to the scene of the shooting.
Noel Gonzalez was present when Feliciano was shot. He
testified that he left a party in Newark with defendant and a man
named Chutay in a car driven by Nelson Pena. Gonzalez was
intoxicated but remembered standing by a house and seeing defendant
at a different house about twenty feet away. Gonzalez saw defendant
4
The court permitted the introduction of portions of Kirce's
statement to the police following a hearing conducted in accordance
with State v. Gross, 121 N.J. 1 (1990). Defendant does not
challenge the court's ruling on appeal.
6 A-2321-14T4
"pull up [what] would appear to look like a gun" and shoot a woman
at her doorway. On cross-examination, he acknowledged he "didn't
see [defendant] actually pull the trigger," but did see defendant
raise his hand right before the gunshot went off. According to
Gonzalez, when defendant raised his hand, there was no one else
near defendant other than the woman in front of him.
Nelson Pena testified that at about 4:00 a.m., he left a
party in a car with defendant, Gonzalez, Chutay and "Slash."
Defendant gave Pena directions to a street in Elizabeth, where
Pena stopped the car in accordance with defendant's instructions.
Pena, Gonzalez and defendant exited the car. Pena watched defendant
and Gonzalez approach the side of a house, heard a shot and a
scream, and the three men ran back to the car and departed. Pena
testified that he did not see defendant with a gun and there was
no discussion in the car concerning a shooting after they departed
the scene.
Kidanys also testified. He was at the Newark party but did
not leave in the car with defendant and the others. He testified
that defendant left in a car driven by "Nelson" and there were
three other occupants. Kidanys explained that when the individuals
later returned to the party, defendant said they had gone to
Elizabeth and that "They did something . . . Somebody got killed."
Defendant told Kidanys "he shot the person in the head." Defendant
7 A-2321-14T4
said the shooting was over "family problems or something like
that," and showed Kidanys a .22 caliber revolver and a bullet
casing. Defendant also told Kidanys a guy was "bothering
[defendant's] baby mom," and that he rang the doorbell of the home
where the shooting took place and shot the woman that opened the
door.
Feliciano's autopsy was performed by a State medical
examiner, Dr. Wall,5 on the day of the shooting. At the time of
trial, Wall was not available to testify. The State called another
medical examiner, Dr. Junaid Shaikh, to testify concerning the
cause of Feliciano's death. Shaikh was qualified as an expert in
forensic pathology.
Shaikh testified he reviewed Wall's autopsy report and made
independent findings based on his review of photographs of the
autopsy, the toxicology report, and the record of Wall's
investigation. Shaikh determined the cause of death was a "gunshot
wound [to her] chest," and the manner of death was "homicide."
Defense counsel objected to Shaikh's testimony, arguing it
was hearsay because it was based on Wall's autopsy report. The
court overruled the objection, finding "the hearsay rules permit
5
The record does not indicate Wall's full name.
8 A-2321-14T4
an expert [] to rely upon other expert[s'] reports . . . in
reaching his or her conclusions."
Defendant exercised his right not to testify and did not
present any witnesses. He was convicted on all counts. At
sentencing, the court merged count three into count one and imposed
a forty-year sentence subject to the requirements of the No Early
Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and a concurrent seven-year
sentence with a three-year period of parole ineligibility on count
two. Defendant appealed.
On appeal, defendant makes the following arguments:
POINT I
IN VIOLATION OF THE CONFRONTATION AND HEARSAY
DOCTRINES OF STATE V. BRANCH AND STATE V.
DEHART, THE TRIAL JUDGE IMPROPERLY ALLOWED THE
STATE TO PUT BEFORE THE JURY EVIDENCE THAT
DONTE KIRCE CONTACTED POLICE IN ORDER TO HAVE
DEFENDANT ARRESTED ONLY IN RESPONSE TO BEING
TOLD A HEARSAY ACCOUNT OF DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME. (PARTIALLY RAISED
BELOW).
POINT II
THE JUDGE'S RESPONSE TO THE JURY'S QUESTION
ABOUT THE DEFENDANT'S POTENTIAL CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY IF HE WERE NOT THE SHOOTER WAS
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A
POSSIBLE VERDICT FOR A LESSER-INCLUDED
OFFENSE. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT III
THE MEDICAL EXAMINER, WHO DID NOT CONDUCT THE
AUTOPSY OF THE DECEDENT, WAS IMPROPERLY
9 A-2321-14T4
ALLOWED, OVER OBJECTION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL,
TO READ PORTIONS OF THE AUTOPSY REPORT THAT
WAS PREPARED BY THE MEDICAL EXAMINER WHO
ACTUALLY PERFORMED THE AUTOPSY, THEREBY
VIOLATING DEFENDANT'S CONFRONTATION RIGHTS
UNDER STATE V. BASS.
II.
"The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution confer on
. . . defendant[s] the right to confront the witnesses against
[them]." State v. Williams, 219 N.J. 89, 92 (2014), cert. denied,
___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1537, 191 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2015). Defendant
argues his right to confrontation was violated when Kirce testified
that he called the police based on information provided by Laisha.
Defendant contends the testimony permitted the jury to infer that
Laisha had knowledge implicating defendant in Feliciano's murder,
and that its admission requires reversal of his convictions.
Before the challenged testimony, defendant had objected to
Kirce's testimony that Laisha told him "about the situation" and
that "a lady died in Elizabeth." The State argued the testimony
was admissible to explain why Kirce subsequently called the police
about defendant. The court sustained the objection on hearsay
grounds and immediately advised the jury that the testimony was
stricken.
10 A-2321-14T4
Kirce then answered the following two questions posed by the
prosecutor.
[PROSECUTOR:] Without giving any testimony
to what conversations you [and Laisha] had,
did you learn information from Laisha?
[KIRCE:] Yes.
[PROSECUTOR:] Based upon that information,
what did you do?
[KIRCE:] I called Crimestoppers.
Defendant did not object to the questions, but now contends Kirce's
responses violated his right to confrontation as interpreted by
our Supreme Court in State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338 (2005).
In State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 265-68 (1973), the Court
addressed an accused's right to confront witnesses in the context
of a police officer's testimony concerning why certain actions
were taken during an investigation. During trial, a detective
testified that "before defendant was arrested the officers had
been talking to an informer and that based on information received
they went to [a] tavern," with a description of defendant's
clothing, and found defendant in possession of narcotics. Id. at
266-67.
The Court explained the hearsay rule does not prevent an
officer from testifying that he took an action based "upon
information received," but that "when the officer becomes more
11 A-2321-14T4
specific by repeating what some other person told him concerning
a crime by the accused the testimony violates the hearsay rule
. . . [and] the accused's Sixth Amendment right to be confronted
by witnesses against him." Id. at 268-69. The Court reversed the
defendant's conviction because the "detective's hearsay testimony
led to the 'inescapable inference' that the detective received
information from an unknown source implicating the defendant in
the crime," Branch, supra, 182 N.J. at 349 (explaining Bankston),
and because "the record presented a debatable case for the jury,
admission of the testimony "may well have been the decisive factor
which resulted in the guilty verdict," Bankston, supra, 63 N.J.
at 272-73.
In Branch, supra, 182 N.J. at 346-47, the primary issue
concerning defendant's guilt was his identification by two victims
during their review of photo arrays. A detective testified the
arrays were assembled "based on information received." Id. at 347.
The Court found that a police officer may testify that he took an
action "based on information received" to explain an action, "but
only if necessary to rebut a suggestion that they acted arbitrarily
and only if the use of that phrase does not create an inference
that the defendant has been implicated in a crime by some unknown
person." Id. at 352. "The 'common thread' that renders testimony
about information received from non-testifying third parties
12 A-2321-14T4
inadmissible 'is that a police officer may not imply to the jury
that he possesses superior knowledge, outside the record, that
incriminates the defendant.'" State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 152
(2014) (quoting Branch, supra, 182 N.J. at 351); see also State
v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 12—13 (2012) ("an officer's reasons for
placing a particular photo in an array are irrelevant and
prejudicial," and can "improperly bolster[] the victim's account
and invade[] the role of the jury to weigh the
victim's credibility").
Defendant argues Kirce's testimony that he called
Crimestoppers based on information from Laisha violated his right
to confrontation in the same manner as the testimony of the
officers in Bankston and Branch. Even if we assume this testimony
violated defendant's right to confrontation, he cannot show
prejudice. "When evidence is admitted that contravenes not only
the hearsay rule but also a constitutional right, an appellate
court must determine whether the error impacted the verdict."
Weaver, supra, 219 N.J. at 154. Here, defendant did not object to
the testimony and we therefore consider whether Kirce's testimony
impacted the verdict under the plain error standard. We will not
reverse unless the testimony was "clearly capable of producing an
unjust result." R. 2:10-2; see Branch, supra, 182 N.J. at 353
(applying the plain error standard where there was no objection
13 A-2321-14T4
to testimony that violated defendant's right to confrontation).
We reverse only where there is a possibility of an unjust result
"sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error
led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached."
State v. G.V., 162 N.J. 252, 280 (2000) (quoting State v. G.S.,
145 N.J. 460, 473 (1996)).
Having carefully reviewed the record, we are convinced
Kirce's testimony was not clearly capable of producing an unjust
result. R. 2:10-2; see also State v. Kemp, 195 N.J. 136, 156 (2008)
(finding that even where testimony may implicate "the concerns
interdicted by Bankston," a reversal is not required where the
totality of the circumstances leads to the conclusion that
admission of the evidence was harmless). Kirce's testimony that
he called Crimestoppers based on information he received from
Laisha does not logically support a conclusion that Laisha
implicated defendant in the commission of a crime or that she had
any knowledge concerning his involvement in any crime.
The jury was not presented with any evidence Laisha had any
knowledge about defendant's involvement in Feliciano's murder. She
was not present at the scene and there is no evidence she spoke
to anyone who was present. The evidence showed only that Laisha
spoke to Lord when he went to the apartment on two occasions
looking for defendant.
14 A-2321-14T4
Moreover, there is no evidence showing Kirce knew the police
were searching for defendant prior to his conversation with Laisha.
In his challenged testimony, Kirce said only that based on the
information Laisha provided, he called Crimestoppers. The evidence
permitted only an inference that Laisha told Kirce the police were
searching for defendant, and Kirce, who knew defendant was at the
apartment, called Crimestoppers to report defendant's location.6
When considered in the context of the evidence, Kirce's
testimony about the actions he took based on information Laisha
provided relates solely to the search for defendant. Unlike the
testimony at issue in Bankston and Branch, Kirce's testimony did
not "permit[] the jury to draw the inescapable inference that a
non-testifying declarant provided information that implicated"
defendant in the commission of a crime, and did not "suggest[]
that some other person provided information that linked defendant
to the crime." Branch, supra, 182 N.J. at 351. To the contrary,
6
The same result applies even if we accept defendant's contention
that the jury could not be reasonably expected to honor the judge's
ruling striking Kirce's testimony that he discussed "the
situation" with Laisha and she said "a lady died in Elizabeth."
This testimony does not implicate defendant in the commission of
any crime but even if it did, it was harmless because there is no
evidence Laisha had any knowledge about the commission of the
murder or of defendant's involvement in the murder. In any event,
we presume the jury followed the court's instructions to strike
the testimony. State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365, 409 (2012).
15 A-2321-14T4
Kirce's testimony suggested only what the jury knew from other
witnesses, that the police were searching for defendant. We
therefore do not find there is a reasonable doubt that admission
of the testimony led the jury to a result it otherwise might not
have reached. G.V., supra, 162 N.J. at 280.
Even assuming Kirce's testimony suggested defendant's
participation in a crime, there is an additional reason admission
of the testimony did not constitute plain error.7 Unlike in
Bankston, supra, 63 N.J. at 272-73, and Branch, supra, 182 N.J.
at 353, where the challenged testimony was capable of producing
an unjust result because there was little other evidence of guilt,
here there is substantial evidence of defendant's guilt beyond
Kirce's brief testimony. Gloria had known defendant for a very
long time, recognized him at the door, and immediately identified
7
Defendant argues the harmless error standard of review applies
because the challenge to Kirce's testimony was partially raised
below when defendant objected to Kirce's testimony that he and
Laisha discussed the situation and she said "a lady died in
Elizabeth." We disagree. The record shows the court sustained the
objection to the testimony and struck it. There was no objection
to the particular testimony challenged on appeal and, as such, the
plain error standard applies. R. 2:10-2; Branch, supra, 182 N.J.
at 353. In addition, we observe that because the harmless error
standard requires that we determine whether an error was clearly
capable of producing an unjust result, our decision here would be
unchanged under that standard. See State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325,
337-38 (1971) ("[T]he same ultimate standard applies whether the
error was objected to below or whether the error was first claimed
upon appeal").
16 A-2321-14T4
him as the shooter. Gonzalez and Pena established that defendant
directed their travel to Gloria's home and that defendant went to
the door, stood in front of a woman, raised his hands, and a
gunshot was fired. Kirce testified defendant admitted that he shot
"one of the dude's aunt[s] where [the dude] live at." Kidanys
testified defendant showed him the gun and admitted to his motive
for the shooting, and that he rang a doorbell and shot the woman
that opened the door.
In sum, there was substantial evidence defendant murdered
Feliciano beyond Kirce's testimony that he called Crimestoppers
after speaking to Laisha. Kirce's testimony was therefore not
clearly capable of producing an unjust result. R. 2:10-2; Kemp,
supra, 195 N.J. at 153-54.
We also reject defendant's claim that Kirce's testimony
violated his right to confrontation. Defendant waived the claim
by failing to object to the testimony at trial. "The defendant
always has the burden of raising his Confrontation Clause
objection." Williams, supra, 219 N.J. at 99 (quoting Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 327, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2541,
174 L. Ed. 2d 314, 331 (2009)). "The right of confrontation, like
other constitutional rights, may be waived by the accused." Id.
at 98. A defendant is not required to assert a constitutional
right, and a defense attorney may choose as part of a reasonable
17 A-2321-14T4
defense strategy to refrain from objecting to testimony that may
be otherwise inadmissible because it violates a defendant's right
to confrontation. Id. at 99.
A failure to object to testimony that violates a defendant's
right to confrontation may not result in a waiver where the failure
"is so patently unreasonable and so clearly erroneous that no
rational counsel acting within the wide range of professional
norms would pursue such a course." Ibid. That is not the case
here. Kirce's challenged testimony added little to the State's
proofs at trial because it suggested only that he learned from
Laisha that the police were searching for defendant. The testimony
did not prejudice defendant because other witnesses established
that defendant had been identified as the shooter and that based
on that information, the police were searching for defendant.
"[G]enerally, a defendant must attempt to exercise his
confrontation right and object when necessary, if he wishes later
to claim that he was denied that right." Id. at 93. By failing to
do so here, defendant waived any claim Kirce's testimony violated
his right to confrontation.8 See id. at 102 (finding the defendant
8
Because we conclude that defendant waived his right to challenge
Kirce's testimony on Confrontation Clause grounds, it is
unnecessary to decide whether his challenge is also barred under
the invited error doctrine. Id. at 100; State v. A.R., 213 N.J.
542, 561-62 (2013). We note, however, that "[u]nder the invited
18 A-2321-14T4
waived his Confrontation Clause claim by failing to object to
challenged testimony at trial).
III.
We next consider defendant's argument that the court erred
by permitting Shaikh to testify concerning Wall's autopsy report.
Defendant asserts that because Shaikh did not perform the autopsy,
his reliance on Wall's report and testimony detailing the report's
findings constituted impermissible hearsay evidence and violated
his right to confrontation. Defendant interposed a hearsay
objection to the testimony at trial.9 We therefore consider his
error doctrine, 'trial errors that "were induced, encouraged or
acquiesced in or consented to by defense counsel ordinarily are
not a basis for reversal on appeal."'" State v. Munafo, 222 N.J.
480, 487 (2015) (quoting State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 561 (2013)).
A defendant cannot agree to a particular instruction, "'and upon
adoption by the court, take his chance on the outcome of the trial,
and if unfavorable, then condemn the very procedure he sought and
urged, claiming it to be error and prejudicial.'" State v. Ramseur,
106 N.J. 123, 281-82 (1987) (citation omitted).
9
We reject the State's argument defendant waived his right to
challenge Shaikh's testimony on Confrontation Clause grounds
because defendant did not raise the issue prior to trial and during
trial objected only on hearsay grounds. State v. Wilson, 227 N.J.
534, 543-44 (2017); see also State v. Bass, 224 N.J. 285, 311
(2017) (explaining that although confrontation clause objections
are "best addressed before trial," they are not waived if raised
during a witness's testimony (quoting Williams, supra, 219 N.J.
at 102)). Like the defendant in Wilson, defendant not only
objected on hearsay grounds at trial, he also "alluded to an
inability to cross-examine" Wall, Wilson, supra, 227 N.J. at 543
(quoting State v. Wilson, 442 N.J. Super. 224, 235 n.4 (App. Div.
2015)), by asking, "Don't I have the right to cross-examine the
person who performed the autopsy?"
19 A-2321-14T4
contentions under the harmless error standard, R. 2:10-2, and must
reverse if we determine the purportedly erroneous admission was
clearly capable of producing an unjust result. State v. Scott, ___
N.J. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op. at 17).
In Bass, supra, 224 N.J. at 291-92, the Court held that under
certain circumstances "the State may present the testimony of a
qualified expert who has conducted independent observation and
analysis regarding an autopsy performed by a medical examiner who
is unavailable to testify at trial, without violating the
defendant's" right to confrontation. The testifying doctor is
permitted to testify "as an independent reviewer of the information
generated by the autopsy" based on a review of "autopsy
photographs" and other evidence. Id. at 319. The testifying doctor,
however, may not simply "parrot" the information in the autopsy
report without violating a defendant's confrontation rights. Ibid.
"[A] testimonial report that is not admitted into evidence can
engender a violation of the Confrontation Clause if that report
is 'integral' to the testimony of a substitute witness." Id. at
317 (quoting State v. Roach, 219 N.J. 58, 76-77 (2014), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2348, 192 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2015)).
Contrary to defendant's assertions, there were portions of
Shaikh's testimony that did not violate defendant's confrontation
rights. Shaikh explained that he conducted a review of the autopsy
20 A-2321-14T4
photographs, which showed Feliciano's internal and external
injuries, the gunshot wound, the entrance of the bullet at the
left side of Feliciano's chest, and the recovery of the bullet
within Feliciano's body. Based on his review of the photographs
and the autopsy and toxicology reports, he made an independent
finding that Feliciano died as the result of a gunshot wound to
the chest. This testimony was based on Shaikh's independent review
of the evidence and did not violate defendant's right to
confrontation. See id. at 319 (explaining that a substitute medical
examiner may provide an opinion based upon an independent review
of the evidence).
There were, however, portions of Shaikh's testimony where he
simply parroted Wall's autopsy report.10 Shaikh referred to the
autopsy report and testified concerning physical findings made by
Wall during the autopsy. Those portions of his testimony violated
defendant's confrontation rights. Id. at 316-20. We therefore must
consider whether the admission of those portions of his testimony
require reversal of defendant's convictions.
10
We reject the State's argument that Shaikh's testimony
concerning the autopsy report did not violate defendant's
confrontation rights because the report was not testimonial. See
id. at 316-17 (finding autopsy report was testimonial under the
"primary purpose test" where the autopsy was conducted during an
active police investigation of a homicide).
21 A-2321-14T4
In determining whether admission of Shaikh's testimony
parroting Wall's report constituted harmless error, we consider
the importance of the testimony in the context of all of the
evidence presented at the trial. Id. at 308. The record shows
there was other substantial evidence demonstrating Feliciano died
from a gunshot wound to her chest. Separate from his parroting of
Wall's report, Shaikh testified that his own independent
evaluation of the evidence supported his conclusion Feliciano died
from a single gunshot wound. Other evidence established that
Feliciano was shot in the chest and died immediately thereafter.
Moreover, the cause of Feliciano's death was not an issue genuinely
disputed issue at trial. Instead, defendant argued only that the
State failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he fired
the gun. Therefore, we are not convinced Shaikh's testimony, to
the extent it parroted Wall's report, was clearly capable of
producing an unjust result.
IV.
We last address defendant's claim that the court erred in its
response to a question posed by the jury during its deliberations.
The jury asked: "[c]an the defendant cause the victim's death by
instructing and leading everyone to the scene regardless of who
pulled the trigger[?]" The court conferred with counsel and the
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parties agreed without objection to the following response to the
jury's inquiry.
The answer to your question is no. Since the
defendant is charged with causing the death
of [] Feliciano himself, he cannot be found
guilty of causing [] Feliciano's death by
. . . instructing and leading everyone to the
scene regardless of who pulled the trigger.
If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that it was [defendant] who caused the
death of [] Feliciano knowingly or purposely,
then you must find him not guilty.
However, if you are convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that he did cause her death
and all the elements of either murder or
aggravated manslaughter have been proven by
the State beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must convict the defendant.
Defendant argues for the first time on appeal that the court
erred in not instructing the jury on principal and accomplice
liability, thereby depriving defendant of an opportunity for a
verdict on the lesser-included offense of aggravated manslaughter
or a potential acquittal.
When a defendant fails to object to a jury charge at trial
or a response to a jury question during deliberations, we review
for plain error, and "disregard any alleged error 'unless it is
of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an
unjust result.'" State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016)
(quoting R. 2:10-2). Plain error, in the context of a jury charge,
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is "[l]egal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the
substantial rights of the defendant and sufficiently grievous to
justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court
that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about
an unjust result." State v. Camacho, 218 N.J. 533, 554
(2014) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Adams, 194 N.J.
186, 207 (2008)).
Appropriate and proper jury charges, including instructions
on lesser-included offenses, are essential to a fair trial. State
v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374, 387 (2002); see also State v. Gonzalez,
444 N.J. Super. 62, 70 (App. Div.) (explaining that jury
instructions play a critical role in criminal prosecutions),
certif. denied, 226 N.J. 209 (2016). However, a defendant's
counsel's failure to object to jury instructions not only "gives
rise to a presumption that he did not view its absence as
prejudicial to his client's case," State v. McGraw, 129 N.J. 68,
80 (1992), but is also "considered a waiver to object to the
instruction[s] on appeal." State v. Maloney, 216 N.J. 91, 104
(2013).
"When a defendant may be found guilty either as a principal
actor or as an accomplice, the jury should be instructed about
both possibilities." State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 223 (1997). The
judge may charge the jury on accomplice liability even if the
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indictment did not expressly allege accomplice liability as long
as there is a rational basis in the evidence for accomplice
liability. State v. Hakim, 205 N.J. Super. 385, 388 (App. Div.
1985). The rational basis standard is a low threshold, requiring
"more than a mere 'scintilla of evidence.'" State v. Harvey, 151
N.J. 117, 149 (1997) (quoting State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 489
(1995)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1085, 120 S. Ct. 811, 145 L. Ed.
2d 683 (2000).
"[T]he obligation to provide the jury with instructions
regarding accomplice liability arises only in situations where the
evidence will support a conviction based on the theory that a
defendant acted as an accomplice." State v. Crumb, 307 N.J. Super.
204, 221-22 (App. Div. 1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215 (1998).
"When the State's theory of the case only accuses the defendant
of being a principal, and a defendant argues that he was not
involved in the crime at all, then the judge is not obligated to
instruct on accomplice liability." Maloney, supra, 216 N.J. at
106.
Applying these principals, we find no error, let alone plain
error, in the court's response to the jury question. Defense
counsel never requested a jury charge on accomplice liability and
agreed to the judge's response to the question. Moreover, there
was not a scintilla of evidence supporting a charge of accomplice
25 A-2321-14T4
liability. Harvey, supra, 151 N.J. at 149. The State's theory of
the case was that defendant shot Feliciano based on gang-related
retaliation against Rios and Rios's family. There was no evidence
that anyone other than defendant was the shooter.
Defendant did not testify or present any witness testimony.
In summation, defense counsel argued that the State put on an
incomplete case where no witness saw the gun allegedly used in the
shooting and the gun was not recovered. Counsel also argued each
witness had a different story and that defendant had no motive to
kill Feliciano based on gang-related issues with Rios. In other
words, defendant's theory was that he did not commit the crime at
all. The court therefore was not obligated to sua sponte instruct
the jury on accomplice liability in response to the jury question.
Maloney, supra, 216 N.J. at 106.
Defendant is also incorrect that the court's response to the
jury question deprived him of the possibility of being convicted
of the lesser-included offense of aggravated manslaughter. The
court charged the jury on the lesser-included offense of aggravated
manslaughter, and reminded the jury it could convict defendant of
either murder or aggravated manslaughter, or acquit defendant, in
its response to the jury's question. The judge ensured there was
no risk that the jury convicted defendant simply because it was
called upon to reach an "all-or-nothing" determination on the
26 A-2321-14T4
murder charge. See State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47, 54 (1993)
(explaining where jurors are not instructed on a lesser-included
offense, they "may be tempted to find defendant guilty of a crime
he or she did not commit simply because it prefers to convict on
some crime rather than no crime at all").
We have considered defendant's remaining arguments and find
they are without merit sufficient to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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