PHILLIP A. DIXON VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONSÂ (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1941-15T3
PHILLIP A. DIXON,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
__________________________
Submitted July 6, 2017 – Decided July 19, 2017
Before Judges Yannotti and Haas.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
Corrections.
Phillip A. Dixon, appellant pro se.
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Randy
Miller, Deputy Attorney General, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Phillip Dixon, an inmate currently in the custody
of the Department of Corrections (DOC), appeals from the DOC's
final administrative decisions adjudicating him guilty of
institutional infractions .254, refusing to accept a housing unit
assignment, and *.803/*.306,1 attempting to disrupt or interfere
with the security or orderly running of the correctional facility.
N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). We affirm.
On September 13, 2015, Senior Corrections Officer Barrett
ordered Dixon to pack up his belongings and move to a different
cell. Dixon refused to comply with this order and stated, "I'm
not going to double lock,[2] send me to lock-up." Dixon was charged
with refusing to accept a housing unit assignment and placed in
prehearing detention. After a sergeant investigated the incident,
the matter was referred to a hearing officer.
At the hearing, Dixon was represented by a counsel substitute.
Dixon pled not guilty to the charge, claiming that there was
information in his file indicating that he was designated as "a
single lock only" and, therefore, was not required to share a cell
with another inmate. However, there were no orders in Dixon's
medical or institutional files directing that he be assigned to a
single-inmate cell and Dixon failed to produce any documents from
his own records to support his claim. Dixon was granted
1
Infractions "preceded by an asterisk (*) are considered the most
serious and result in the most severe sanctions." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-
4.1(a).
2
Dixon used the term "double lock" to indicate that he did not
want to share a cell with another inmate.
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confrontation of Officer Barrett, who confirmed that Dixon refused
to move to the new cell. The hearing officer denied Dixon's
request to confront several other officers because they had not
witnessed the incident. Dixon did not call any other witnesses
on his own behalf.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer found
Dixon guilty of refusing a housing unit assignment and sanctioned
him to time served in detention, ninety days' of administrative
segregation, and thirty days' loss of television privileges. Dixon
filed an administrative appeal and, on November 5, 2015, the
Administrator upheld the hearing officer's findings and sanctions.
While that matter was pending, Dixon sent a letter to a DOC
Assistant Commissioner and the Administrator. In the September
14, 2015 letter, Dixon alleged that he was entitled to "single
cell status." Toward the end of his letter, Dixon stated, "I fear
placing me in a cell will end with my death or the death of my
cellmate. Given my military training, it is more likely the
latter. Either way, I will never leave prison. This is not what
I want!"
As a result of the threat contained in the letter, Dixon was
charged with attempting to disrupt or interfere with the security
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or orderly running of the correctional institution3 and, following
an investigation, the matter was referred to a hearing officer.
Dixon was again represented by counsel substitute. Dixon pled not
guilty, and asserted that he did not threaten anyone because he
did not know who his cellmate would be and did not say that he
would definitely kill that individual. Because the charge was
based on the letter Dixon sent to the prison administrators, the
hearing officer denied Dixon's request for confrontation of
officers who were not involved in the matter. Dixon did not call
any witnesses.
Based upon the evidence presented, the hearing officer found
Dixon guilty of the charge and sanctioned him to 180 days' of
administrative segregation, 365 days' loss of commutation time,
and thirty days' loss of recreation privileges. Dixon filed an
administrative appeal and, on October 13, 2015, the Administrator
upheld the hearing officer's findings and sanctions. This appeal
followed.
On appeal, Dixon argues there was insufficient evidence in
the record to support the hearing officer's finding of guilt on
3
The DOC initially charged Dixon with institutional infraction
*.005, threatening another with bodily harm. However, the hearing
officer later modified the charge to attempting to disrupt or
interfere with the security or orderly running of the correctional
institution under *.803/*.306.
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both charges and asserts that his due process rights were violated
by the DOC during its handling of the charges. We disagree.
The scope of our review of an agency decision is limited. In
re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999). "An appellate court
ordinarily will reverse the decision of an administrative agency
only when the agency's decision is 'arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable or [] is not supported by substantial credible
evidence in the record as a whole.'" Ramirez v. Dep't of Corr.,
382 N.J. Super. 18, 23 (App. Div. 2005) (alteration in original)
(quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)).
"'Substantial evidence' means 'such evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Figueroa v.
Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting
In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 376 (1961)).
Prison disciplinary hearings are not part of a criminal
prosecution, and the full spectrum of rights due to a criminal
defendant does not apply. Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 522
(1975). However, when reviewing a determination of the DOC in a
matter involving prisoner discipline, we consider not only whether
there is substantial evidence that the inmate committed the
prohibited act, but also whether, in making its decision, the DOC
followed regulations adopted to afford inmates procedural due
process. See McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 194-96 (1995).
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Having considered the record in light of the foregoing
principles, we conclude that sufficient credible evidence in the
record supports the DOC's determination that Dixon was guilty of
refusing a housing unit assignment, and attempting to disrupt or
interfere with the security or orderly running of the correctional
institution. With regard to the first charge, Dixon does not
dispute that he refused to comply with Officer Barrett's order to
move to a new cell. Although Dixon argued that he was entitled
to single-cell status, there was nothing in his medical,
administrative, or personal records to support his claim.
Turning to the second charge, Dixon's threat to kill any
inmate assigned to his cell was clear from the face of his letter
to the prison officials. Contrary to Dixon's contention, the
hearing officer was not required to accept his later claim that
he did not actually intend to carry out his threat. The hearing
officer's credibility determination on this point is entitled to
deference on appeal. Taylor, supra, 158 N.J. at 659.
Dixon's due process claims also lack merit. As noted above,
an incarcerated inmate is not entitled to the full panoply of
rights in a disciplinary proceeding as is a defendant in a criminal
prosecution. Avant, supra, 67 N.J. at 522. An inmate is entitled
to written notice of the charges at least twenty-four hours prior
to the hearing; an impartial tribunal; a limited right to call
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witnesses and present documentary evidence; a limited right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; a right to a written
statement of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the
sanctions imposed; and, where the charges are complex, the inmate
is permitted the assistance of counsel substitute. Id. at 523-
29. Based upon our review of the record, we are satisfied that
Dixon received all the process an inmate is due.
Affirmed.
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