MARY BEDEN VS. LANCE BEDEN (FM-04-0949-09, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4835-14T2
MARY BEDEN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LANCE BEDEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________________
Argued December 13, 2016 – Decided July 20, 2017
Before Judges Suter and Guadagno.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part,
Camden County, Docket No. FM-04-0949-09.
Mark J. Molz argued the cause for appellant.
Amy C. Goldstein argued the cause for
respondent (Capehart & Scatchard, P.A.,
attorneys; Ms. Goldstein, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant, Lance Beden appeals1 from portions of a
matrimonial post-judgment enforcement order entered June 4,
2015, denying defendant's cross-motion to modify his alimony
obligation to plaintiff, Mary Beden.2 For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
The parties were married in 1980 and had three children.
They divorced pursuant to a final judgment of divorce (FJD)
entered on February 4, 2010, which incorporated a property
settlement agreement (PSA)3 of same date. The PSA provided that
defendant would pay plaintiff permanent alimony4 of $800 per week
based on defendant's salary of approximately $136,000 per year.
In 2014, plaintiff sought enforcement of defendant's
alimony obligation. On October 3, 2014, defendant was ordered
to make a lump sum payment of $4800 to plaintiff and was
1
Defendant's notice of appeal indicates incorrectly that
plaintiff is appealing.
2
The June 4, 2015 order also granted plaintiff's motion to
convert defendant's alimony arrears to a judgment; required
defendant to make a lump sum payment towards those arrears;
required defendant to execute a listing agreement for the sale
of the marital residence; and ordered defendant to pay
plaintiff's counsel fees. Defendant has not appealed from those
portions of the order.
3
The FJD refers to the PSA alternatively as a marital settlement
agreement.
4
The alimony obligation would terminate upon the death of either
party or the wife's remarriage.
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required to list the marital home for sale. The alimony
obligation remained "in full force [and] effect." Attorneys for
both parties signed the order to indicate their client's consent
as to form. That order was not appealed.
Defendant failed to comply with the October 3, 2014 order
and plaintiff again sought enforcement in April 2015. Defendant
cross-moved to recalculate alimony and his life and health
insurance obligations, retroactive to March 1, 2014, when he
claimed he was laid off.
On June 4, 2015, a different judge heard oral argument and
concluded that defendant had not made a good faith effort to
find employment and had not established a prima facie case of
changed circumstances.
On appeal, defendant presents two arguments:
POINT I
DEFENDANT HAS ESTABLISHED A CHANGE IN
CIRCUMSTANCES.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S LOSS OF EARNINGS ARE SIGNIFICANT
AND NOT TEMPORARY.
Defendant claims his layoff in March 2014 constitutes a
change in circumstances entitling him to relief. The motion
judge found that defendant's efforts to obtain employment over a
fifteen-month period, consisting of posting his résumé on line,
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attending a job fair, and applying for seven positions, did not
constitute a good faith effort to find employment.
To modify a support obligation, the movant must show
"changed circumstances." Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146
(1980). Temporary circumstances do not warrant modification.
Id. at 151. Rather, "[t]he party seeking modification has the
burden of showing such 'changed circumstances' as would warrant
relief from the support or maintenance provisions involved." Id.
at 157 (citing Martindell v. Martindell, 21 N.J. 341, 353
(1956)).
No brightline rule dictates "when a changed circumstance
has endured long enough to warrant a modification of a support
obligation." Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 23 (App. Div.
2006). "Instead, such matters turn on the discretionary
determinations of Family Part judges, based upon their
experience as applied to all the relevant circumstances
presented, which we do not disturb absent an abuse of
discretion." Ibid.
As the Family Part has special expertise in family matters,
and has had the opportunity to hear and see the witnesses
testify firsthand, we accord deference to its findings of fact.
Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412-13 (1998). Thus, a decision
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on an application to modify alimony will not be overturned on
appeal absent an abuse of discretion:
To vacate a trial court's findings in a
proceeding modifying alimony, an appellate
court must conclude that the trial court
clearly abused its discretion, failed to
consider "all of the controlling legal
principles," or it must otherwise be "well
satisfied that the finding[s] [were]
mistaken," or that the determination could not
"reasonably have been reached on sufficient
credible evidence present in the record after
consideration of the proofs as a whole."
[Rolnick v. Rolnick, 262 N.J. Super. 343, 360
(App. Div. 1993) (citations omitted).]
Applying these principles, we are satisfied that the motion
judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that there was no
change in circumstances since the last time the Family Part
considered defendant's alimony obligation on October 3, 2014.
Defendant's broad and sweeping claim that "there are no jobs for
a 59 year old individual with a [c]ollege level degree in
[e]lectrical [e]ngineering from 1978" finds no support in the
record.
Affirmed.
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