IN THE MATTER OF TAQIYYAH DAVIDSON (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0246-15T2
IN THE MATTER OF TAQIYYAH
DAVIDSON, ESSEX COUNTY.
_________________________________
Submitted April 26, 2017 – Decided July 20, 2017
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Farrington.
On appeal from the Civil Service Commission,
Docket No. 2015-2874.
Taqiyyah Davidson, appellant pro se.
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent Civil Service
Commission (Valentina M. DiPippo, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
Courtney M. Gaccionne, Essex County Counsel,
attorney for respondent County of Essex (Kecia
M. Clarke, Assistant County Counsel, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Taqiyyah Davidson appeals from the July 30, 2015 final agency
decision of the Civil Service Commission (Commission) terminating
her employment as an Essex County Juvenile Detention Officer for
violating the policies against fraternization with a juvenile
inmate and failing to admit multiple visits with that juvenile
when confronted. We affirm.
We derive the following facts from the record. On February
18, 2014, Davidson was interviewed by Sergeant Shiranda Morton in
the Office of Internal Affairs. She was questioned regarding her
association with T.W., a former juvenile inmate. During the
interview, Davidson stated that inmate T.W. was a family friend
who she had known for a long time. Davidson did not admit to
visiting T.W. in the Union County Jail. She did admit that she
went to the jail, on one occasion, to drop off his mother. Contrary
to her assertion, the County had surveillance videos and sign-in
logs that she entered the facility and visited T.W. on that day,
and on approximately a dozen other occasions. Davidson was also
questioned about whether she was aware of the policy against
fraternizing with inmates, which she initially denied. Davidson
was served with preliminary notice of disciplinary action on
February 18, 2014, charging her with being in violation of Essex
County Juvenile Detention Standard of Conduct and Code of Ethics
Order #08-01, which prohibits fraternization, and Essex County
Juvenile Detention Center Fraternizing Policy #03-13, which
restricts contact with current and former residents. She was
further charged with violation of N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(1)
("Incompetency, inefficiency or failure to perform duties"),
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N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6) ("Conduct unbecoming a public employee"),
and N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12) ("Other sufficient cause").
A departmental hearing on the disciplinary charges was held
on March 12, 2014. Essex County sought termination. Sergeant
Morton's testimony showed Davidson had been employed as a Juvenile
Detention Officer by Essex County since June 12, 2010. She
received new-hire training on June 23, 2010. Davidson is also a
police academy graduate. She began police academy training on
June 13, 2011 and graduated on August 3, 2011. As part of her
police academy training, she received instruction on ethics,
fraternization, general conduct, different forms of fraternization
and policies and procedures regarding fraternization. The County
produced testimony regarding the instruction Davidson received,
including zero tolerance of officers fraternizing with inmates.
Sergeant Morton testified, and the other testifying witnesses
corroborated, that Davidson was required, and failed to report,
contact with the juvenile or seek permission for contact, in
writing, prior to her contact with T.W. Sergeant Morton testified
that despite Davidson's denial of receipt of non-fraternization
training, Davidson scored 90% on the portion of the police academy
training exam that covers fraternization. On April 11, 2014, the
hearing officer found for Essex County, sustaining the charges and
specifications. He determined termination was unwarranted because
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Davidson had no prior disciplinary action, had not violated the
fraternization policy since being notified of the infraction, and
the County presented no evidence that Davidson's job performance
had been otherwise unsatisfactory. The hearing officer imposed a
three-month suspension.
Davidson requested an administrative appeal on May 7, 2014.
On May 23, 2014, the Commission transferred the matter to the
Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for determination as a contested
case. On August 11, 2014 and August 13, 2014, a hearing was held
before Administrative Law Judge, Leland S. McGee. Judge Leland
S. McGee sustained the charges and recommended an eight-month
suspension.
The County filed exceptions to Judge Leland S. McGee's
decision. On July 30, 2015, following a hearing, the Commission
issued a final administrative decision upholding Davidson's
removal. The Commission determined that the testimony regarding
the training that Davidson was required to take was credible and
that both the new-hire training and the Academy training included
fraternization and ethics policies concerning disclosure of
relationships with incarcerated people and visits to same. The
Commission found sufficient evidence in the record to support the
charge of violation of the Essex County Juvenile Detention
Standards of Conduct and Code of Ethics Order #08-01. The
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Commission further found Davidson engaged in conduct unbecoming a
public employee and gave sufficient cause for disciplinary action
by violating the Essex County Juvenile Detention Standard of
Conduct and Code of Ethics Order #08-01. The Commission did not
find that sufficient other causes existed pursuant to N.J.A.C.
4A:2-2.3(a)(12) and dismissed the charge of other sufficient
cause.
On appeal, Davidson raises the following argument:
THE APPELLANT WAS SUSPENDED FROM HER JOB FOR
VIOLATING FRATERNIZATION POLICY 03-13 (9A)
[SIC] THAT SHE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE EXISTED AND
THE EMPLOYER STATED THAT ALL POLICIES
DISTRIBUTED ARE SIGNED FOR BUT FAILED TO
PRODUCE THE CLAIMANT'S SIGNITURE [SIC] FOR THE
POLICY AT QUESTION, THEREFORE, SHE SHOULD NOT
HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM EMPLOYMENT.
Our scope of review of an administrative agency's final
decision is limited. We accord to the agency's exercise of its
statutorily-delegated responsibilities a strong presumption of
reasonableness. See Newark v. Natural Res. Council Dep't of Envtl.
Prot., 82 N.J. 530, 539 (1980), cert. den., 449 U.S. 983, 101 S.
Ct. 400, 66 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1980). Our function is to determine
whether the administrative action was arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable. See Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 580
(1980). "We will only decide whether the findings could reasonably
have been reached on the credible evidence in the record,
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considering the proofs as a whole." Bowden v. Bayside State Prison
(Dep't. of Corr.), 268 N.J. Super. 301, 304 (App. Div. 1993). See
also Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589 (1965). We cannot
substitute our judgment for that of the agency. See In re Polk
License Revocation, 90 N.J. 550, 578 (1982). The burden of showing
the agency's action was arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious
rests upon the appellant. See Barone v. Dep't of Human Servs.,
Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 210 N.J. Super. 276, 285
(App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 107 N.J. 355 (1987).
We accord deference to a final agency action, and will not
substitute our "judgment for the expertise of an agency so long
as that action is statutorily authorized and not otherwise
defective because arbitrary or unreasonable [or not supported by
the record]." In re Authorization for Freshwater Wetlands Gen.
Permits, 372 N.J. Super. 578, 593 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting In re
Distrib. of Liquid Assets, 168 N.J. 1, 10 (2001)) (alteration in
original).
We are satisfied that Davidson's contentions as to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the findings of misconduct
are without merit. From an examination of the record, we are
satisfied that the action of the agency on this score was supported
by substantial credible evidence and was neither arbitrary,
capricious nor unreasonable.
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We turn next to Davidson's contention that the Commission
"erred as a matter of law" by failing to impose progressive
discipline. In its de novo review, the Commission agreed with
Judge Leland S. McGee's finding of facts and his substantiation
of the charge of conduct unbecoming a public employee, N.J.A.C.
4A:2-2.3(a)(6), and violations of Essex County policies. However,
the Commission determined that Davidson's unblemished prior
disciplinary history was outweighed by the seriousness of the
infraction. The Commission found Davidson's removal from
employment was appropriate despite her lack of prior disciplinary
history. The Commission based its findings on the fact that
the appellant was a public safety employee who
maintains safety and security in the
potentially dangerous environment of a
juvenile detention facility, while promoting
adherence to the law among detainees, and as
such, is held to a higher standard of public
duty. This standard includes upholding an
image of utmost confidence and trust, since
juvenile detention officers, like municipal
police officers, hold highly visible and
sensitive positions within the community.
Removal in this case is not "so disproportionate to the
offense . . . as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness." In
re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 484 (2007) (citations omitted). The
Commission's decision to uphold Essex County's removal of Davidson
is reasonable based upon the credible evidence in the record.
Affirmed.
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