STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. HAMEED S. BROOKS(14-12-3721, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1535-15T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
HAMEED S. BROOKS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________
Submitted March 28, 2017 – Decided July 6, 2017
Before Judges Messano and Grall.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Camden County,
Indictment No. 14-12-3721.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Stefan Van Jura, Deputy Public
Defender, II, of counsel and on the brief).
Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Jason Magid,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Following a jury trial, defendant Hameed S. Brooks was found
guilty of third-degree escape, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5(a), and sentenced
to a five-year term of imprisonment with a two-and-one-half-year
period of parole ineligibility. The evidence adduced by the State
revealed that on January 31, 2014, defendant was a resident of
Hope Hall, a "transitional" halfway house in Camden. Hope Hall
is operated by a non-profit agency and accepts prisoners from the
Department of Corrections (the DOC), providing them with
counseling and employment services in a residential setting.
Defendant entered Hope Hall on January 7, having previously
been incarcerated at Bayside State Prison. Upon entering the
facility, defendant was advised of its rules and regulations, one
of which prohibited any "[e]scape or unauthorized absence from
work assignment or the facility." Defendant signed a copy of
these rules and regulations.1
Hope Hall's program manager explained that the facility's
alarm sounded at 12:45 a.m. on January 31, 2014, signaling an
emergency exit side door had been opened. A count of the residents
revealed defendant was missing. A search of defendant's room
indicated his personal belongings were gone.
Although a one-and-one-half-story-high fence surrounded the
facility, one gate was always kept open. Hope Hall maintained a
midnight curfew, and, while residents were sometimes granted
furloughs to work, and there were frequent comings and goings from
1
The document was admitted into evidence at trial but is not part
of the appellate record.
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the facility, defendant was not eligible for furlough because he
had been at Hope Hall for such a short time. He was not permitted
to leave the facility at all. Hope Hall contacted DOC, which
issued a warrant for defendant’s arrest. Defendant never returned,
and the Camden County Police Department apprehended him on April
1.
Defendant elected not to testify. During the charge
conference, defense counsel requested the judge charge the jury
on obstructing the administration of law or other governmental
function by flight. See N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) ("A person commits
an offense if he purposely obstructs, impairs or perverts the
administration of law or other governmental function or prevents
or attempts to prevent a public servant from lawfully performing
an official function by means of flight . . . ."). Defense counsel
acknowledged that obstruction was not a "lesser-included" offense
of escape. Rather, he argued the jury could reject the State's
contention that defendant was in custody, while at the same time
concluding defendant's absence "shut down the facility for a while
and so he obstructed [its] ability to function as a government
agency."
The judge determined there was "no rational basis" for the
charge "based on the facts" of the case. She denied the request.
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In summation, defense counsel argued, among other things,
that defendant may not have "kn[own] he was in custody," or simply
missed curfew. He argued the written rules of the facility were
ambiguous, and DOC imposed administrative discipline on defendant
for his unauthorized absence, suggesting defendant was unaware he
could be subject to criminal charges.
The judge's jury instructions essentially followed verbatim
Model Jury Charge (Criminal), "Escape, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5a" (2006).
The jury found defendant guilty of the sole count in the indictment
charging him with escape.
Before us, defendant argues in a single point:
THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS DECISION TO DENY
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR A JURY CHARGE ON THE
LESSER OFFENSE OF OBSTRUCTION REQUIRES
REVERSAL OF THE ESCAPE CONVICTION.
Having considered this contention in light of the record and
applicable law, we affirm.
"Whether an offense is an included offense of another charge
requires a comparison of the statutory elements of each charge."
State v. Thomas, 187 N.J. 119, 129 (2006). Defendant acknowledges
obstruction is not a lesser-included offense of the crime of
escape.
"In contrast, related offenses are those that 'share a common
factual ground, but not a commonality in statutory elements, with
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the crime[] charged in the indictment.'" State v. Maloney, 216
N.J. 91, 107 (2013) (quoting Thomas, supra, 187 N.J. at 132). "A
court may instruct on a related offense when 'the defendant
requests or consents to the related offense charge, and there is
a rational basis in the evidence to sustain the related offense.'"
Id. at 108 (quoting Thomas, supra, 187 N.J. at 133). "The evidence
must present adequate reason for the jury to acquit the defendant
on the greater charge and to convict on the lesser." State v.
Brent, 137 N.J. 107, 118-19 (1994).
In pertinent part, an actor commits the disorderly persons
offense of obstruction if he "purposely obstructs, impairs or
perverts the administration of law or other governmental function
. . . by means of flight." N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) (emphasis added).
In this case, to justify charging the jury on obstruction, the
evidence must have supported the jury's finding beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant fled Hope Hall, for the purpose of obstructing
a governmental function and, his flight, actually obstructed a
governmental function. Model Jury Charge (Criminal), "Obstructing
Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function, N.J.S.A.
2C:29-1" (2000).
Under our Criminal Code, "[a] person acts purposely with
respect to the nature of his conduct or a result thereof if it is
his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to
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cause such a result." N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1). "Where an offense
requires purpose, the result must be the kind of result designed
by the actor[.]" Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated,
comment 4 on N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3 (2016-17).
Here, there was no evidence to rationally support the
conclusion that defendant's "conscious object" in fleeing Hope
Hall was to obstruct the operation of the facility. Instead,
after being in the facility only a few short weeks, defendant left
during the early morning hours through a side entrance, took all
his belongings with him and never returned. All the evidence
pointed to defendant's singular purpose being his escape, without
concern for what, if any, effect it would have on Hope Hall or its
staff. Moreover, there was scant evidence that the operation of
the facility was impaired in any significant way, or that
defendant's escape impacted other residents of Hope Hall.
In short, we agree there was no "rational basis in the
evidence to sustain the related offense" of obstruction by flight.
Maloney, supra, 216 N.J. at 108 (quoting Thomas, supra, 187 N.J.
at 133). The judge, therefore, did not err by refusing to give
jury instructions on that offense.
Affirmed.
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