STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ANTONIO D. HALL(14-07-2030, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5761-14T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ANTONIO D. HALL,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________
Submitted March 14, 2017 – Decided July 6, 2017
Before Judges Reisner and Rothstadt.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Camden County,
Indictment No. 14-07-2030.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Marcia Blum, Assistant Deputy
Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Jason Magid,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Antonio D. Hall appeals from a judgment of
conviction entered after he conditionally pled guilty to one count
of second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (handgun),
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). Pursuant to his plea agreement, two other
charges were dismissed, and he was sentenced to a five-year term
of imprisonment, subject to a three-and-one-half year period of
parole ineligibility, in accordance with the Graves Act, N.J.S.A.
2C:43-6(c). On appeal, he challenges the denial of his motion to
suppress the weapon – a handgun – arguing "the police had neither
probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to conduct an
investigatory stop." We disagree and affirm.
The facts adduced at defendant's suppression hearing can be
summarized as follows. On March 21, 2014, at approximately 10:30
p.m., Camden County Police Officer Jordan Plitt,1 his partner,
Officer Joe Olivo, and five other officers were patrolling the
South Camden area of Chesapeake and Hartford Streets, a
residential, high-crime neighborhood. They drove marked patrol
vehicles and wore uniforms that clearly identified them as police
officers. From approximately fifteen feet away, Plitt observed
defendant standing alone on a street corner, wearing a balaclava
– a face mask that left only defendant's eyes unobscured – and a
hooded sweatshirt with the hood pulled up. Defendant's clothes
1
Officer Plitt was the only witness testifying at the suppression
hearing.
2 A-5761-14T4
hung disproportionately to the left. When defendant spotted the
patrol vehicles approaching, he placed his left hand in his pocket
and began to "blade" the left side of his body away from officers. 2
Plitt's "training and experience" led him to suspect defendant was
trying to conceal a weapon.
Plitt testified that defendant began to walk towards a house
on the corner. The house was dark except for the porch light and
was surrounded by a fence and front gate. Plitt parked and exited
the patrol vehicle. When defendant reached the house, he began
"frantically . . . bang[ing] with a closed fist on the front door."
Plitt stood beyond the front gate and asked defendant if he lived
at the house.3 Defendant ignored his question and continued
knocking on the door. Plitt asked defendant to come down and talk
to him. With his hand still in his left pocket, defendant turned
and walked towards the gate. Mere feet from Plitt, defendant
"placed his right hand on the gate and hurdled it -- jumped right
over it and began to flee."
Plitt and Olivo gave chase. The remaining officers began to
get into their vehicles to provide back up. However, the foot
2
The term blading describes an attempt to conceal a part of the
body by turning it away from an observing officer.
3
Officers later determined defendant did not live at the
property.
3 A-5761-14T4
chase lasted only half a block. As Plitt was "closing the distance
about to tackle him," defendant removed his hand from his pocket,
revealing a silver handgun. Although the lighting was dark, Plitt
testified he was close enough to clearly see the weapon. Defendant
threw the handgun, and Plitt tackled him. Plitt testified,
defendant "wasn't able to throw [the handgun] too far," so it was
within arm's reach. As Plitt struggled to apprehend him, defendant
"began to reach [for the gun] . . . [,] so [Plitt] struck him in
the face[,] and [Olivo] secured the weapon."
In deciding defendant's suppression motion, the judge found
Plitt to be credible, noting he answered all questions
consistently. The judge concluded that, considering Plitt's
"training regarding firearm possession," the officer had a
"reasonable articulable suspicion supported by the facts on the
record that this defendant could have been carrying a weapon."
Specifically the judge cited to defendant's presence in a "high-
crime area at 10:34 p.m. at night," "the sagging of an object on
the left side of the defendant's body, the walking away, the
observations that the officer himself made, the frantically
knocking at a door[,] coupled with the taking off running when the
officers approached defendant." The judge noted the door defendant
was frantically knocking upon was part of "a gated home," and his
presence on the property "could've been a trespass." Based on
4 A-5761-14T4
these considerations, the court concluded there was justification
for the investigatory stop.
On appeal, defendant argues:
POINT I
BECAUSE THE POLICE HAD NEITHER
PROBABLE CAUSE NOR REASONABLE
SUSPICION TO CONDUCT AN
INVESTIGATORY STOP, THE GUN SEIZED
FROM DEFENDANT AS A RESULT OF THE
UNLAWFUL STOP SHOULD HAVE BEEN
SUPPRESSED.
1. BECAUSE THE POLICE DID
NOT ORDER HALL TO STOP, AND ONLY
ASKED HIM TO TALK TO THEM, THEY
INITIATED A FIELD INQUIRY, NOT AN
INVESTIGATORY STOP.
2. THE POLICE DID NOT HAVE
REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR AN
INVESTIGATORY STOP.
3. THE "PLAIN-VIEW"
EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY.
We review a motion judge's factual findings in a suppression
hearing with great deference. State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101
(2016). In our review of a "grant or denial of a motion to
suppress [we] must uphold the factual findings underlying the
trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by
sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Gamble, 218
N.J. 412, 424 (2014); see also State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424,
440 (2013). We defer "to those findings of the trial judge which
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are substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see
the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing
court cannot enjoy." State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 223, 244 (2007)
(quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). We owe no
deference, however, to the trial court's legal conclusions or
interpretation of the legal consequences that flow from
established facts. Our review in that regard is de novo. State
v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015); State v. Vargas, 213 N.J. 301,
327 (2013).
Applying these standards, we find defendant's arguments to
be without sufficient merit to warrant extensive discussion in a
written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2), and affirm substantially for the
reasons articulated by the motion judge in her oral decision,
adding only the following comments.
We conclude that the evidence adduced at the suppression
hearing established that the police officer had a particularized
and articulable suspicion of criminal activity, justifying an
investigatory stop of defendant. An investigatory stop, also
called a Terry4 stop or an investigatory detention, "occurs during
a police encounter when 'an objectively reasonable person' would
feel 'that his or her right to move has been restricted.'" State
4
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889
(1968).
6 A-5761-14T4
v. Rosario, ____ N.J. ____,____ (2017) (slip op. at 18) (quoting
State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002)). An investigatory
stop "must be based on an officer's 'reasonable and particularized
suspicion . . . that an individual has just engaged in, or was
about to engage in, criminal activity.'" Id. at 18-19 (quoting
State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002)).
When reviewing whether the State has established a valid
basis for an investigatory stop, we "give weight to 'the officer's
knowledge and experience' as well as 'rational inferences that
could be drawn from the facts objectively and reasonably viewed
in light of the officer's expertise.'" State v. Citarella, 154
N.J. 272, 279-80 (1998) (quoting State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 10-
11 (1997)). Facts that might seem innocent when viewed in
isolation can sustain a finding of reasonable suspicion when
considered in the aggregate. Stovall, supra, 170 N.J. at 368
(citing Citarella, supra, 154 N.J. at 279-80). "[A] group of
innocent circumstances in the aggregate[, accordingly,] can
support a finding of reasonable suspicion." Ibid.
Applying these principles, we find Plitt formed a reasonable
and particularized suspicion defendant had engaged in, or was
about to engage in, criminal activity based upon the aggregate of
his observations. Plitt saw defendant standing on a corner in a
high-crime area, see State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 26 (2004)
7 A-5761-14T4
(considering an area's reputation for crime a relevant factor when
assessing reasonable suspicion), wearing a balaclava and clothing
that hung disproportionately to the left and, when defendant
noticed Plitt, he attempted to conceal the left side of his body,
blading. Pursuant to Plitt's training and expertise, his
observations indicated defendant might have a concealed weapon.
See Citarella, supra, 154 N.J. at 279 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted) (holding "courts are to give weight to
the officer's knowledge and experience"). Upon observing Plitt,
defendant began frantically banging on the front door of a nearby
house. State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 29 (2010) (considering
defendant's nervous actions as a factor supporting reasonable
suspicion); Elders, supra, 192 N.J. at 250 ("nervousness and
conflicting statements, along with indicia of wrongdoing, can be
cumulative factors in a totality of the circumstances analysis
that leads to a finding of reasonable and articulable suspicion
of ongoing criminality").
Based on the totality of these circumstances, Plitt was
justified in conducting an investigatory stop, even before
defendant ran away. Defendant's flight provided "an additional
factor that heighten[s] the level of reasonable articulable
suspicion already engendered by [defendant's] antecedent actions."
Citarella, supra, 154 N.J. at 281; see also State v. Tucker, 136
8 A-5761-14T4
N.J. 358, 409 (1994) (concluding flight, when combined with other
evidence of criminal activity, can justify a suspect's detention
or arrest).
The denial of defendant's suppression motion was supported
by sufficient credible evidence, and it was legally correct. We
have no cause to disturb defendant's conviction.
Affirmed.
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