STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ALFREDO LOPEZÂ (13-10-1370, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0070-15T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ALFREDO LOPEZ, a/k/a BUGSY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________
Submitted May 3, 2017 – Decided June 29, 2017
Before Judges Accurso and Lisa.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Bergen County, Indictment No.
13-10-01370.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Stephen W. Kirsch, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the
brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Bergen County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Catherine A. Foddai,
Senior Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
After his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of
a search conducted pursuant to, or as a consequence of, a
communications data warrant authorizing the installation and use
of a Global Positioning System (GPS) device on his automobile,
defendant pled guilty to first-degree possession with intent to
distribute heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and 5b(1). He was
sentenced in accordance with the recommendation in his plea
agreement to ten years imprisonment with a five-year parole
disqualifier, to be served consecutively to a sentence he was then
serving. On appeal, defendant argues:
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE ITEMS
SEIZED SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THERE WAS NOT
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH
WARRANT.
POINT II
THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE SENTENCE.
We reject these arguments and affirm.
The warrant authorizing the GPS device was issued on February
19, 2013. It was supported by the affidavit of that date by New
Jersey State Trooper Richard Pogorzelski, who was assigned to the
Violent and Organized Crime Control North Bureau, Drug Trafficking
North Unit (DTNU), Strategic Targeting Squad. The judge to whom
the affidavit was presented was limited to the information
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contained within the four corners of the affidavit. State v.
Wilson, 178 N.J. 7, 14 (2003). Accordingly, we will set forth a
summary of those facts, to which both the Law Division judge and
we are limited in determining the propriety of the warrant.
Pogorzelski had extensive training and experience in drug
identification and investigative procedures, including with
respect to illicit distribution of narcotics, gang investigations,
and the collection of gang-related intelligence. He possessed a
Bachelor of Arts degree in criminal justice, and had been assigned
to the DTNU for eight years at the time of making the affidavit.
He had participated in more than one hundred narcotics and criminal
investigations. He had arrested and interviewed individuals
involved with violating drug laws as well as members and associates
of street gangs. He had conducted surveillance on individuals and
groups who are members of criminal organizations. Through these
activities and contacts with other law enforcement agencies
enforcing gang and narcotics violations, he had become familiar
with methods and patterns of activities associated with street
gangs and the distribution of illegal drugs.
In January 2012, the DTNU received information from the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) that defendant was involved in the
distribution of heroin in and around northern New Jersey and New
York. The information provided defendant's date of birth and
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described the car he was using, a gray Jaguar XJ, to transport and
store heroin and the proceeds derived from sales.
A check of motor vehicle records revealed that defendant also
owned a 2007 Cadillac Escalade. It was later learned that this
vehicle received a parking ticket in the area of Charles Street
in Garfield on October 10, 2012.
A subsequent criminal history check revealed that on March
3, 2012, defendant had been arrested in Paramus for eluding the
police. During the pursuit, he allegedly threw approximately 2500
decks of heroin out of the motor vehicle before being apprehended.
He was under indictment in Bergen County for those charges at the
time of Pogorzelski's affidavit.
The criminal history check also revealed that defendant had
indictable convictions for drug distribution crimes committed in
1998, 2003 and 2005, resulting respectively in State Prison
sentences of eight, four, and five years. He also had other
criminal convictions.
An inquiry into employment records revealed that defendant
was unemployed at the time of Pogorzelski's affidavit. His last
known employment was in 2009.
Physical surveillance of defendant by the DTNU began on
January 9, 2013. The affidavit described observations made on
January 9, 21 and 25, and February 12, 2013.
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On January 9, 2013, defendant's Jaguar was observed parked
in front of 217 MacArthur Avenue in Garfield. An individual
matching defendant's description walked toward it, entered it, and
drove away from the area. The car had a temporary registration
tag, a look-up of which revealed that it had been issued to
defendant, with an address of 22 Stegman Terrace in Jersey City.
Surveillance was conducted at that location, but neither the Jaguar
nor defendant were ever seen there.
On January 21, 2013, the Jaguar was again seen at 217
MacArthur Avenue. Defendant was observed walking around the block,
repeatedly looking from side-to-side, scanning the area.
Defendant did not approach the Jaguar, but continued looking side-
to-side, as if checking for law enforcement presence.
Based on his training and experience, Pogorzelski stated that
the use of fictitious addresses is a typical practice utilized by
large-scale drug dealers to thwart detection of their actual
whereabouts. Likewise, his training and experience taught him
that "squaring the block and looking inside parked cars are
counter-surveillance maneuvers used by individuals to detect the
presence of law enforcement."
On January 25, 2013, the Jaguar was parked in front of 217
MacArthur Avenue. It contained a temporary registration issued
to defendant, but this was different than the one previously
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observed. Based on his training and experience, Pogorzelski was
aware that "criminals often change the license plates on their
vehicles in order to hide their true identity or to avoid detection
of law enforcement." Further, a second temporary registration is
not typically issued for a vehicle. The temporary registration
initially issued is typically replaced by a permanent license
plate.
Another observation was also made on January 25, 2013. A
black Dodge Challenger bearing a Georgia temporary registration
was parked in front of 217 MacArthur Avenue. An individual later
identified as Brandon Pinzon exited the vehicle and walked up to
the front door while talking on his cell phone, and then returned
to the Dodge Challenger and sat in the driver's seat for some
time. A criminal record check revealed that Pinzon had been
arrested for distribution of heroin, cocaine and marijuana, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.
After about an hour, Pinzon travelled slowly around the block,
a maneuver Pogorzelski described as another counter-surveillance
technique. Defendant then exited 217 MacArthur Avenue and got
into the Challenger with Pinzon. After traveling approximately a
half of a block, they parked for a short time and then returned
to where defendant had entered the vehicle. Defendant got out of
the Dodge Challenger, entered his Jaguar, and drove away.
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Pogorzelski stated that, based on his training and experience, he
believed this short meeting was indicative of a narcotics
transaction or narcotics business meeting, having taken place away
from 217 MacArthur Avenue because "many times drug dealers conduct
their illicit business inside vehicles in order to remain hidden
from view and away from their homes or stash locations."
On February 12, 2013, defendant came out of 217 MacArthur
Avenue and walked toward his Jaguar, the whole time talking on his
cell phone and scanning the area side-to-side. He got into the
Jaguar and drove off. He was followed and observed to make erratic
lane changes and turns without signaling. He traveled to the
Paterson Stamp Store in Clifton. He got out of the Jaguar and
entered the store for about five minutes. The store is known to
members of the DTNU, based on debriefing several defendants and
confidential sources, as a place used by narcotics traffickers,
specifically heroin mill managers, to purchase stamps for their
production facilities. These are used to affix their brand name
to the drugs they sell.
Defendant then drove from the stamp store to Hackensack. He
was observed squaring blocks, driving past the same locations,
repeatedly passing the same streets, looking into vehicles as they
passed him, and, in one instance, activating his left-turn signal
but making a right turn. He eventually parked the Jaguar and
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walked into a building. These maneuvers appeared to Pogorzelski
to be further counter-surveillance techniques utilized by
defendant to see if law enforcement was following him.
A utility company record check, with subpoenaed records,
revealed that defendant was not among the names and addresses of
any subscribers or customers at 217 MacArthur Avenue. The building
contained four apartments but defendant was not listed as a
subscriber or customer in any of them. Again, based upon his
training and experience, Pogorzelski knew "that members of drug
trafficking organizations utilize fictitious or third party names
when renting apartments in an attempt to isolate themselves from
prosecution or detection by law enforcement."
Pogorzelski expressed the need for the GPS device in order
to continue this investigation. Because of the observed counter-
surveillance techniques defendant was utilizing, it was his belief
that "continued physical surveillance increases the risk of
compromising the integrity and effectiveness of this
investigation" because their cover would eventually be
compromised, "thereby endangering the chances of ascertaining the
full scope of the illegal operation." Accordingly, "the requested
device is a crucial aid to physical surveillance that will permit
the investigation to remain covert and for the safety of the
officers involved in this surveillance." Further, the device will
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permit monitoring of the location of the Jaguar, "which there is
probable cause to believe will be the transport vehicle for the
narcotics." Additionally, the device would help to establish a
pattern for defendant's movements and contacts.
The affidavit also contained the following paragraphs:
17. Based upon my training and
experience, and the information developed thus
far in this investigation, I know that
transactions and meetings related to the
transportation and distribution of controlled
dangerous substances occur at diverse hours
of the day and night on a seven day-a-week
basis. I also know, based upon my training
and experience, that persons involved in
illegal drug distribution activities often
vary the patterns of operation to avoid
detection. I further believe that the
captioned gray Jaguar XJ, will be used in the
furtherance of the commission of the specified
crimes on an unpredictable basis and at all
hours of the day and night, seven days-a-week.
18. I believe that the execution of the
Communications Data Warrant and Search Warrant
described in Paragraph 2, supra, will reveal
the location of the captioned gray Jaguar XJ
as it travels in and around New Jersey, as
well as to neighboring jurisdictions. By
tracking the captioned vehicle, I will be able
to determine the time and route of the
captioned vehicle and the locations to which
it is driven. I will be able to make
arrangements to place the said vehicle under
physical surveillance when feasible and safe
to do so. The combined use of the monitoring
device and physical surveillance will assist
in identifying other individuals involved in,
and significant locations used by this
organization for the processing, transfer, and
storage of illicit narcotics, and the proceeds
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generated therefrom. Determining the
identities of all the individuals involved in
this operation, as well as key locations used,
will assist in defining the overall scope of
the operation and in gathering sufficient
evidence to successfully prosecute its
members.
The affidavit was presented to Judge Edward A. Jerejian, who
issued the warrant. By its terms, the warrant expressed the
judge's findings that
the facts presented in said application show
probable cause for believing that issuance of
an Order to install and monitor a tracking
device . . . upon the subject automobile will
lead to the discovery of evidence of [drug]
crimes . . . and that said installation and
monitoring will tend to identify individuals
engaged in violations of the aforementioned
offenses.
Defendant pled guilty on January 13, 2015, to possession with
intent to distribute heroin. In the plea colloquy he acknowledged
that on March 21, 2013, he possessed, along with others, five
ounces or more of heroin with the purpose to give or sell it to
others. The pre-sentence report reveals that the incident in
which the drugs were seized and the arrests were made involved
defendant who arrived at the location in the gray Jaguar. The
matters contained in this paragraph, of course, are not contained
within the four corners of the search warrant affidavit. We merely
state them for purposes of completeness.
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Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized as a result
of the search warrant authorizing installation of the GPS device
on his Jaguar. The motion came before Judge Liliana S. DeAvila-
Silebi. No testimony was presented. The sole issue was whether
the search warrant affidavit provided the requisite probable cause
to authorize issuance of the warrant.
After hearing oral argument, Judge DeAvila-Silebi issued a
comprehensive oral opinion. She recognized the deference that
should be accorded to the issuing judge's probable cause
assessment, and she set forth the proper standards required to
establish probable cause. She recognized that the information in
the affidavit must be considered under a totality of the
circumstances test. Recognizing Pogorzelski's extensive training
and experience, she observed that it is necessary "to take into
account what is the trooper observing or what is the police officer
reporting based on his training and experience because to a
layperson certain information may be just innocent behavior but
to a trooper with specific training and experience may see it
differently."
The judge then went through the particulars set forth in
Pogorzelski's affidavit. She noted that each incident could be
viewed as innocent behavior, especially by a layperson, but even
by a law enforcement officer. However, in the aggregate, she was
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persuaded that based on all of the information provided, including
defendant's criminal history and the counter-surveillance
maneuvers recognized by members of the DTNU, a pattern of conduct
emerged. When viewed through the perspective of a law enforcement
officer well trained and experienced in investigating the
behaviors of individuals involved in high-level drug distribution
enterprises, that pattern of conduct established probable cause
that defendant was engaged in drug distribution activity and was
utilizing his Jaguar in those activities. She therefore denied
defendant's suppression motion. She said:
So for that reason based on everything that
I've said and the totality of the
circumstances and all the specific facts that
I've brought out out of the affidavit, and
you'll notice I didn't bring out all the facts
because the other facts are not important in
my evaluation of the standard. Those facts
alone that I brought out are sufficient enough
to establish a suspicion of criminal activity
to warrant the GPS installation.
It's a well founded suspicion or belief
of guilt. And also traditional surveillance
methods would not have been effective in this
case based on the totality of everything that
happened in the affidavit, how it was
difficult for them to follow them for long
periods of time because of the fact that in
fact they were doing a lot of squaring of the
blocks.
So for that reason the GPS was valid.
The search warrant was valid. It's not going
to be suppressed, any of the evidence.
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Under the Constitutions of the United States and New Jersey,
individuals are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures,
and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause. U.S. Const.
amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. Unless a search falls within
one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the
police must first obtain a warrant from a neutral judicial officer
as a prerequisite to a search. State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204,
210 (2001). Before issuing a warrant, the judge must be satisfied
that probable cause exists to support the belief that a crime has
been or is being committed at a specific location, or that evidence
of a crime will be found at the place to be searched. Ibid. The
installation of a GPS device on a vehicle is a search within this
context. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-12, 132 S. Ct.
945, 949-53, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911, 917-23 (2012).
The concept of probable cause "eludes precise definition."
Sullivan, supra, 169 N.J. at 210 (quoting Wildoner v. Borough of
Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 389 (2000)). Courts generally accept it to
mean "less than legal evidence necessary to convict though more
than mere naked suspicion." Id. at 210-11 (quoting State v. Mark,
46 N.J. 262, 271 (1966)). Probable cause is "consistently
characterized . . . as a common-sense, practical standard" for
testing a warrant's validity, State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95,
120 (1987), which is met when police have a well grounded suspicion
13 A-0070-15T3
that a crime is being committed. Sullivan, supra, 169 N.J. at
211.
In identifying the competing policy concerns behind the
probable cause requirement, our Supreme Court has said:
Probable cause is a flexible,
nontechnical concept. It includes a conscious
balancing of the governmental need for
enforcement of the criminal law against the
citizens' constitutionality protected right
of privacy. It must be regarded as
representing an effort to accommodate those
often competing interests so as to serve them
both in a practical fashion without unduly
hampering the one or unreasonably impairing
the significant content of the other.
[State v. Kasabucki, 52 N.J. 110, 116 (1968).]
The United States Supreme Court similarly described probable cause
as a "practical, non-technical conception." Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 544
(1983). Probable cause requires more than mere suspicion; it
requires a showing of a "fair probability" that criminal activity
is taking place. State v. Demeter, 124 N.J. 374, 380-81 (1991).
A probable cause determination must be based on the totality
of the circumstances and requires consideration of probabilities.
State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 389. The totality of the
circumstances is, by definition, very fact sensitive. A
qualitative analysis is required to be applied to the unique facts
and circumstances in any given case. State v. Keyes, 184 N.J.
14 A-0070-15T3
541, 556 (2005). The analysis comes down to a "practical, common-
sense decision." Jones, supra, 179 N.J. at 390. Whether probable
cause exists "involves no more than a value judgment upon a factual
complex rather than an evident application of a precise rule of
law, and indeed a value judgment which inevitably reflects the
seasoning and experience of the one who judges." Schneider v.
Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 362 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1146,
121 S. Ct. 1083, 148 L. Ed. 2d 959 (2001) (quoting State v.
Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 72-73 (Weintraub, C.J., concurring), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 942, 92 S. Ct. 2849, 33 L. Ed. 2d 766 (1972)).
For these reasons, a reviewing judge should pay "substantial
deference" to the discretionary determination of the judge who
issued the warrant. Sullivan, supra, 169 N.J. at 211; Kasabucki,
supra, 52 N.J. at 117. Review of a warrant's efficacy "is guided
by the flexible nature of probable cause and by the deference
shown to issuing courts that apply that doctrine." Sullivan,
supra, 169 N.J. at 217. Warrant applications "should be read
sensibly rather than hypercritically and should be deemed legally
sufficient so long as they contain[] factual assertions which
would lead a prudent [person] to believe that a crime [has] been
committed and that evidence . . . of the crime [is] at the place
sought to be searched." Ibid. (quoting State v. Laws, 50 N.J.
15 A-0070-15T3
159, 173 (1967) (alteration in original), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
971, 89 S. Ct. 408, 21 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1968)).
If the information in the affidavit could have reasonably led
the issuing judge to find probable cause, that judge's
determination should not be second guessed upon review. When the
adequacy of the facts supporting probable cause in a search warrant
affidavit is challenged, "and their adequacy appears to be
marginal, the doubt should ordinarily be resolved by sustaining
the search." Jones, supra, 179 N.J. at 388-89 (quoting Kasabucki,
supra, 52 N.J. at 116). It is therefore well settled that a search
executed pursuant to a warrant is presumed valid, and the defendant
bears the burden of proving lack of probable cause in the warrant
application. Sullivan, supra, 169 N.J. at 211.
For the purposes of this court's appellate review, a Law
Division judge's review of whether a search warrant was supported
by adequate probable cause is a question of law. The trial court's
interpretation of the law is not entitled to any special deference,
and our review is de novo. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm.
of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
Applying these principles, upon our de novo review, we concur
with Judge DeAvila-Silebi's conclusion that the issuing judge did
not err in finding that Pogorzelski's affidavit provided
sufficient facts to establish probable cause that defendant was
16 A-0070-15T3
engaged in ongoing drug distribution activity. We reject
defendant's argument that Pogorzelski set forth nothing more than
a series of hunches which, even if considered in the aggregate,
did not establish a reasonable probability of criminal activity.
We agree, as did Judge DeAvila-Silebi, that viewed in isolation,
each of the observed incidents would not support a probable cause
finding. Likewise, the information received from the DEA, although
reliable and sufficiently detailed to lend credibility to it, was
a year old when physical surveillance of defendant began. However,
it did provide background information which, along with
defendant's prior criminal history, including three separate
indictable convictions for drug distribution offenses, was
properly considered. It was also appropriate for members of the
DTNU to take into account defendant's arrest on March 3, 2012, for
a drug related offense, in which he allegedly possessed a very
large quantity of heroin which was packaged for distribution.
The counter-surveillance techniques described by Pogorzelski
might not be obvious to laypersons, and might not be significant
in a single isolated incident. However, through the lens of
training and experience, the continuous utilization of these
techniques demonstrated to law enforcement officers possessing
expertise in investigating high-level drug distribution
organizations a substantial probability that drug distribution
17 A-0070-15T3
activity was being conducted. Defendant's suppression motion was
properly denied.
Defendant's excessive sentencing argument requires little
discussion. Pursuant to the plea agreement, defendant was
sentenced for this first-degree crime to a base term at the bottom
of the first-degree range, namely ten years, with a parole
disqualifier of five years. Also, as provided in the plea
agreement, the sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to
the sentence defendant was then serving for a drug conviction
arising out of the March 3, 2012 arrest.
Judge James J. Guida imposed the sentence. He found the
applicability of aggravating factors (3) the risk that defendant
will commit another offense, (6) the extent and seriousness of
defendant's prior criminal record, and (9) the need for deterrence.
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(3), (6) and (9). Because of defendant's advanced
kidney disease for which he was receiving dialysis treatment, the
judge found the applicability of mitigating factor (11) the
imprisonment of defendant would entail excessive hardship.
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(11). The judge found a substantial
preponderance of aggravating factors. Defendant does not dispute
those findings by Judge Guida.
This, of course, would have justified at least a mid-range
base term of fifteen years up to the twenty-year maximum for a
18 A-0070-15T3
first-degree crime. However, because of the plea agreement,
defendant was given the benefit of the bottom-of-the-range ten-
year base term. In these circumstances, we find no abuse of
discretion in the imposition of a period of parole ineligibility
of five years, rather than the three-and-one-third years defendant
seeks.
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5h, when a defendant is sentenced
for an offense committed while released pending disposition of a
previous offense,
the term of imprisonment shall run
consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment
imposed for the previous offense, unless the
court, in consideration of the character and
conditions of the defendant, finds that
imposition of consecutive sentences would be
a serious injustice which overrides the need
to deter such conduct by others.
Defendant argues that Judge Guida did not give adequate
consideration to whether or not defendant satisfied the serious
injustice test. Defendant seeks a remand for further consideration
of the issue. We do not agree.
Judge Guida expressed his reasons for finding that the serious
injustice test was not satisfied. In doing so, he gave due
consideration to defendant's serious medical condition. His
stated reasons included the following:
I also find that he is suffering from late-
stage or end-stage kidney disease which
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apparently is being treated at the prison
facility. To the extent that he's performing
now -- he appears to be healthy and I -- I say
that exteriorly; I don't know what's going on
inside him. He's able to communicate with
me, answer questions and gave me a statement
as to his position which was actually
eloquent, and also indicating from the records
that were given to me or the letters that were
given to me, certificates that he's able to
be a mentor in the prison. So while it is a
hardship, I don't find that it is an extreme
hardship in that regard.
The judge did not err in finding that defendant had not
satisfied the very high standard required to trigger the exception
to the presumptive consecutive sentencing requirement of N.J.S.A.
2C:44-5h. We are satisfied that the judge's findings regarding
aggravating and mitigating factors were based on competent and
credible evidence in the record, he correctly applied the
sentencing guidelines set forth in the Code of Criminal Justice,
and the sentence imposed was not excessive or unduly punitive and
did not constitute an abuse of discretion. State v. O'Donnell,
117 N.J. 210 (1989); State v. Gertler, 114 N.J. 383 (1989); State
v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984).
Affirmed.
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