STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. EUGENE C. TAYLOR (15-10-1164, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1076-16T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
EUGENE C. TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued May 17, 2017 – Decided July 24, 2017
Before Judges Alvarez, Accurso, and Lisa.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County,
Indictment No. 15-10-1164.
Daniella Gordon argued the cause for appellant
(The Gordon Law Firm, and Barry J. Pollack
(Miller & Chevalier, Chartered) of the
District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac
vice, attorneys; Ms. Gordon and Mr. Pollack,
on the briefs).
Alexis R. Agre, Assistant Prosecutor, argued
the cause for respondent (Scott A. Coffina,
Burlington County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms.
Agre, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
On leave granted, defendant Eugene Taylor appeals from the
March 7, 2016 denial of his motion to dismiss a superseding
indictment charging him with first-degree attempted murder,
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1); first-degree disarming a law enforcement
officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-11(a); second-degree aggravated assault,
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A.
2C:12-3(b); third-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-
2(a)(3)(a); third-degree aggravated assault on a law enforcement
officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5)(a); and fourth-degree obstructing
the administration of law, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a). Defendant's
subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied. Defendant
had argued in support of his applications that evidence of his
psychiatric state at the time of the incident in question was
clearly exculpatory and thus the State should have presented it
to the grand jury. For the reasons stated in Judge Delehey's
written opinion of March 7, 2016, we affirm both orders. We add
some brief comments.
The charges arose when during the early morning hours of May
14, 2013, police were called about a man out in the street who was
yelling about Jesus. Delanco Township Police Department Officer
Frank Ambrifi responded. When he arrived, defendant jumped in
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front of the police car, and the officer nearly struck him.
Defendant appeared angry, and even at gunpoint he refused to get
down on the ground. When Ambrifi got out of his vehicle, defendant
ran towards him. Ambrifi sprayed defendant with mace twice without
success, and began to strike defendant with a flashlight to try
to subdue him. Defendant head-butted the officer. The two men
struggled to the ground, and Ambrifi shot defendant four times.
Defendant continued to attack the officer, who also shot himself
in the leg as the men wrestled for control of Ambrifi's gun. When
backup arrived, defendant was taken to a hospital, and later to
the Ann Klein Forensic Center where he was diagnosed as
schizophrenic.
During the grand jury presentation, the officer who testified
regarding his interviews about the event also testified about his
interviews with defendant's friends and family. Defendant's
acquaintances said that in the days leading up to the incident,
defendant became obsessed with religion and death.
Prior to the grand jury presentation, defendant was examined
by a forensic psychologist, who opined that defendant had been
suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the incident,
and was unable to understand the nature of his conduct, or
distinguish right from wrong. That report, as well as the records
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from defendant's hospitalization at Ann Klein, were available when
the case was presented to the grand jury.
In his written decision, Judge Delehey first distinguishes
the insanity defense from a mental disease or defect that results
in diminished capacity. As he put it, the insanity defense "does
not exculpate, but rather excuses a person's conduct. Diminished
capacity, however, negates a finding of purposeful or knowing
conduct." The judge agreed with the well-established proposition
that pursuant to State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216 (1996), the State
had to present clearly exculpatory evidence. He did not agree,
however, that a defendant's mental state constituted such
evidence.
Judge Delehey reasoned that a grand jury may either indict
or hand down a no bill, while a petit jury can find a defendant
guilty, acquit, or find a defendant not guilty by reason of
insanity. When diminished capacity is raised as a defense, a jury
has the options of finding a defendant either guilty or not guilty
if he or she lacked the requisite mental state. The grand jury
process is nothing more than a prosecutor obtaining "the permission
of the grand jury to put the matter before a petit jury for its
determination . . . ." The affirmative defense of insanity
requires a petit jury's resolution after both sides have the
opportunity to retain experts, marshal the evidence, and cross-
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examine the experts on these issues. The defense of diminished
capacity also requires a trial, with similar opportunities to
develop the defense. Both are affirmative defenses pled after
indictment, therefore the prosecutor had no obligation to present
any evidence of defendant's mental condition. This evidence was
not clearly exculpatory, but rather pertained only to affirmative
defenses, which "can be pled only after indictment. Insanity and
diminished capacity are affirmative defenses . . . . Resolution
of affirmative defenses before the grand jury would convert it to
an adjudicating body rather than an accusatory one."
The judge also denied the motion for reconsideration, on the
same basis. On appeal, defendant raises the following points:
I. The Lower Court Erred by Not Dismissing
the Superseding Indictment Based on the
State's Failure to Disclose to the Grand
Jury Exculpatory Evidence and to Provide
Appropriate Legal Instructions []
A. The State Violated Its Duty to
Disclose Clearly Exculpatory Evidence to
the Grand Jury []
B. The State Violated Its Duty to
Provide the Grand Jury Relevant Legal
Instructions []
C. The Trial Court's Rationales for Not
Dismissing the Superseding Indictment
Are Inconsistent with Binding Appellate
Precedent []
1. The trial court was wrong to
conclude the State had no duty to
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present evidence of, or legal
instructions pertaining to,
diminished capacity and insanity
merely because those defenses must
be pled after indictment []
a. The prosecutorial duty
imposed by Benny Hogan applies
to evidence supporting a
diminished capacity defense []
b. The prosecutorial duty
imposed by John Hogan applies
to evidence supporting
diminished capacity and
insanity defenses []
2. Allowing the grand jury to
consider evidence of diminished
capacity and insanity would not have
improperly transformed it into an
adjudicating body []
3. The trial court erred in
concluding that inviting the grand
jury to consider the issue of
insanity would run afoul of the
State's involuntary commitment laws
[]
4. The court wrongly concluded
that the State had no duty to
disclose Dr. Hugonnet's findings to
the grand jury []
D. The State's arguments in support of
the trial court's ruling are unavailing
[]
1. The State wrongly asserts it
had no duty to disclose Dr.
Hugonnet's report []
2. The State's concerns regarding
the admissibility of diminished
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capacity evidence and the
defendant's burden of proving
insanity at trial are misplaced []
II. The Superseding Indictment Should Be
Dismissed with Prejudice []
These arguments repeat those made to Judge Delehey, and are equally
unavailing.
A trial court's decision denying a motion to dismiss an
indictment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Saavedra,
222 N.J. 39, 55 (2015). Viewing the evidence and the rational
inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the State, we
determine "whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
found that the State presented evidence sufficient to establish a
prima facie case on the elements of the relevant offenses," and
when it found the State "did not withhold exculpatory evidence
from the grand jury or fail to present to the grand jury a defense
. . . that should have been presented." Id. at 57. However,
"[i]t is not the role of the reviewing court to question the
strength of the case, its possible deterrent value, or the
government's enforcement priorities." State v. L.D., 444 N.J.
Super. 45, 54 (App. Div. 2016)(citing State v. Perry, 124 N.J.
128, 168 (1991)).
We see no abuse of discretion in Judge Delehey's opinion,
which is grounded in the clear distinction between the grand jury
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process and the petit jury system. The State is required to
present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury only "in the rare
case in which . . . evidence . . . both directly negates the guilt
of the accused and is clearly exculpatory." Saavedra, supra, 222
N.J. at 63 (emphasis in original) (quoting Hogan, supra, 144 N.J.
at 237). Evidence "directly negates" a defendant's guilt where it
"squarely refute[s] an element of the crime." Ibid. Determining
whether evidence is "clearly exculpatory" requires it "to be
analyzed 'in the context of the nature and source of the evidence,
and the strength of the State's case.'" State v. Scherzer, 301
N.J. Super. 363, 427 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Hogan, supra, 144
N.J. at 237). Furthermore, this disclosure requirement does not
apply unless the prosecutor has "actual knowledge" of the
exculpatory evidence. Saavedra, supra, 222 N.J. at 63.
In Scherzer, the defendants argued the State failed to present
"clearly exculpatory evidence" to the jury, specifically,
testimony from two of defendants' experts. Scherzer, supra, 301
N.J. Super. at 427. The experts would have refuted the mental
state of the victim as portrayed by the State. Ibid. If taken
as true, the testimony would have "directly negated an element of
the crime defendants were accused of." Ibid. However, because
presenting such testimony would have required the grand jury to
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make a "credibility judgment," we held it was not "clearly
exculpatory" and the State was not obligated to present it. Ibid.
The parallel between the scenario in Scherzer and the one in
this case is quite clear. In order to reach a decision, the grand
jury would have had to weigh the expert's credibility, thus
resulting in testimony that, if the jury had concluded it was not
credible, would not have been "clearly exculpatory." See Scherzer,
supra, 301 N.J. Super. at 427. Thus the State had no obligation
to present the opinion evidence.
Furthermore, there was no obligation for the jury to be
instructed regarding possible defenses. The State has a
responsibility to instruct the jury on relevant defenses as a
"corollary to [the] responsibility to present exculpatory
evidence." State v. Hogan, (John Hogan), 336 N.J. Super. 319, 341
(2001). However, it is not the State's obligation to sift through
the record to make the determination as to when those instructions
are appropriate. Id. at 343. It is only when there are facts
that clearly establish the appropriateness of such an instruction,
not expert opinion, that an instruction has to be given. See id.
at 343-44.
It is black letter law that the diminished capacity defense
is one considered a "failure of proof defense." State v. Nataluk,
316 N.J. Super. 336, 343 (App. Div. 1998). Evidence of defendant's
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mental health illness or mental defect negates the mens rea element
of the crime. Ibid. It must be established by a preponderance
of the evidence. State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 442-43 (1988).
Clearly, the crimes with which defendant was charged required
a purposeful or knowing state of mind. Evidence of mental illness
or defects can in some instances, obviously, negate the mens rea
necessary for the crime. But, for example, a condition which
results in uncontrollable rage or lack of control would not, by
itself, negate a requisite mental condition such as knowledge or
purpose." Nataluk, supra, 316 N.J. Super. at 344.
Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that if a
mental condition "resulting in a rage and loss of control does not
affect cognitive capacity sufficient to preclude the necessary
mental state, it will not constitute diminished capacity." State
v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 646-47 (1993)(emphasis in original).
The process by which a petit jury considers diminished capacity,
requires a trial, direct and cross-examination as well as expert
testimony at times. A grand jury only determines whether a crime
has been committed and if a defendant probably committed it; it
is an accusatory not adjudicatory body. Sherzer, supra, 301 N.J.
Super. at 427. If defendant's argument is accepted, the function
of the grand jury would be completely distorted. A grand jury's
only role is to decide whether a criminal proceeding should be
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commenced. Ibid. Therefore, no instruction was necessary, nor
should proof have been presented, regarding diminished capacity.
It would have distorted the jury's functioning, and would not have
clearly negated guilt. See John Hogan, supra, 336 N.J. Super. at
343-44.
The "insanity" defense is codified in N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1, which
provides that "[a] person is not criminally responsible for conduct
if at the time of such conduct he was laboring under such a defect
of reason, from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did
not know what he was doing was wrong." It is an "affirmative
defense which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence."
Ibid.
Unlike diminished capacity, the insanity defense does not
negate the mental elements of a crime, it affords a petit jury the
ability to return a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity,"
rather than "guilty" or "not guilty." State v. Breakiron, 108
N.J. 591, 600 (1987). A defendant who is found not guilty by
reason of insanity must be evaluated by the court in accordance
with N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8. After the examination, if the court finds
that the "defendant cannot be released without supervision or
conditions without posing a danger to the community or to himself,
it shall commit the defendant to a mental health facility . . .
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." N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b). Otherwise defendant is to be released.
Ibid.
The legislative history of the insanity defense runs counter
to defendant's position. The predecessor to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8 was
N.J.S.A. 2A:163-3 (repealed 1979), which provided that "[i]f, upon
the trial of any indictment, the defense of insanity is pleaded .
. . the jury shall be required to find specially by their verdict
whether or not such person was insane at the time of the commission
of such offense . . . and . . . whether or not such insanity
continues . . . ." (Emphasis added). If the jury found the
defendant was and continued to be insane, the court was required
to order his commitment. Ibid. This statute was repealed after
the Court in State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 255 (1975) held it
unconstitutional because it authorized "involuntary commitment
without proof of dangerousness." However, the Court left the
preamble to the statute intact, which states that the insanity
defense is to be pleaded "upon the trial of any indictment," not
before the indictment. Ibid.
The Court in Krol detailed the procedure for temporary
commitment and evaluation of a defendant acquitted for insanity
that would later be codified in N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8. Id. at 255-265.
While N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8 begins "[a]fter acquittal by reason of
insanity" rather than "upon the trial of any indictment," the
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legislature was likely mirroring the language in Krol, which begins
describing the commitment process with "[f]ollowing acquittal by
reason of insanity . . . ." Id. at 255. The Court noted that
"courts in determining [an insane defendant's] dangerousness
should take full advantage of expert testimony presented by the
State and by defendant." Id. at 261. Since, as discussed above,
the State need not present defendant's or its own expert testimony
on insanity to a grand jury, the Court was obviously still only
contemplating the assertion of an insanity defense at trial after
indictment. There is therefore no reason to believe that the
legislature meant for N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8 to broaden the defense so
it could be presented to a grand jury.
Affirmed.
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