NANTICOKE LENNI-LENAPE TRIBAL NATION VS. JOHN J. HOFFMAN, ETC. (L-2343-15, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

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APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2756-15T1
NANTICOKE LENNI-LENAPE
TRIBAL NATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOHN J. HOFFMAN, Acting Attorney
General of the State of New Jersey,
Defendant-Respondent.
______________________________________
Argued June 6, 2017 – Decided July 10, 2017
Before Judges Ostrer, Leone and Vernoia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Docket
No. L-2343-15.
Gregory A. Werkheiser (Cultural Heritage
Partners, PLLC) of the Washington, DC bar,
admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for
appellant (Barry, Corrado & Grassi, P.C., and
Mr. Werkheiser, attorneys; Frank L. Corrado,
and L. Eden Burgess (Cultural Heritage
Partners, PLLC) of the Washington, DC bar,
admitted pro hac vice, on the brief).
Stuart M. Feinblatt, Assistant Attorney
General, argued the cause for respondent
(Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney; Mr. Feinblatt, of counsel and on the
brief; Kimberly A. Hahn, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
Andrews Kurth LLP, attorneys for amici curiae
Indian Law Resource Center, Alliance of
Colonial Era Tribes, and Religious Society of
Friends Salem Quarter Indian Affairs Committee
(Joseph A. Patella, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Nanticoke Lenni-Lenape Tribal Nation filed a five
count complaint alleging defendant, the New Jersey Attorney
General,1 violated its rights under the New Jersey Constitution
and breached duties imposed under the common law by denying and
repudiating the State's prior recognition of plaintiff as an
American Indian Tribe. Plaintiff alleged defendant's actions have
and will deprive it of benefits under various federal statutes and
programs that are conditioned upon the State's recognition of it
as an American Indian Tribe. The trial court granted defendant's
motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e), finding
plaintiff's claims are barred because the State never enacted a
statute expressly recognizing plaintiff as an American Indian
Tribe. We reverse because we find the court applied the wrong
legal standard and incorrectly failed to accept plaintiff's
factual allegations in the complaint as true.
1
Acting Attorney General John Jay Hoffman was named as the
defendant in the complaint in his individual and official
capacities. Hoffman's tenure ended in March 2016.
2 A-2756-15T1
I.
Because we review the trial court's dismissal of the complaint
under Rule 4:6-2(e), we accept as true the factual allegations in
the complaint. Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, 140 N.J. 623, 625
(1995). Plaintiff is "a constitutionally organized, self-
governing, inherently sovereign American Indian tribe," a majority
of whose members reside in New Jersey. It is presently comprised
of about 3,000 members, and maintains tribal grounds in Burlington
County.
Plaintiff avers that in 1982, the State Legislature adopted
a concurrent resolution "officially recogniz[ing] plaintiff as an
American Indian Tribe."2 Since the enactment of the resolution,
plaintiff has received benefits under various federal statutes and
programs based on New Jersey's recognition of plaintiff as an
American Indian Tribe.
Plaintiff further alleges that following the adoption of the
resolution, the State routinely reaffirmed its recognition of
plaintiff and two other tribes as American Indian Tribes "through
2
A copy of New Jersey Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 73 (1982),
was submitted in support of defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint. The resolution resolved that "the Confederation of
Nanticoke-Lenni Lenape Tribes of southern New Jersey, an alliance
of independent surviving tribes of the area, is hereby designated
by the State of New Jersey as such," and that "the Congress of
the United States, is hereby memorialized to acknowledge the
Confederation . . . as such."
3 A-2756-15T1
a series of actions consistent with and necessarily predicated
upon that recognition." In 1992, the Legislature passed, and the
Governor signed into law, L. 1991, c. 359, which amended N.J.S.A.
26:8-49, entitled "[c]orrections to birth and fetal death
certificates." The statute states in part:
In the case of a correction to the birth record
of a member of one of the three New Jersey
tribes of American Indians, the Powhatan-
Renape Nation, the Ramapough Mountain Indians,
or the Nanticoke[]Lenni-Lenape Indians, the
substantiating documentary proof may include,
but shall not be limited to, an affidavit,
satisfactory to the State registrar or any
local registrar and signed by the chief of the
tribe that according to tribal records the
person whose certificate is to be amended is
a member of the tribe of the chief whose
signature appears on the affidavit.
[N.J.S.A. 26:8-49 (emphasis added).]
The Assembly Health and Human Services Committee explained:
. . . This bill permits corrections to birth
certificates and fetal death certificates of
certain American Indians to be made on the
basis of an affidavit signed by the tribal
chief stating that the person in question is
a member of the tribe according to tribal
records. American Indians are frequently
issued birth certificates indicating an
incorrect race, and often encounter
difficulties in obtaining evidence
satisfactory to the State registrar of vital
statistics or to local registrars to support
their claims that their birth certificates
should be amended. This bill would
specifically allow a chief of one of the three
New Jersey tribes, the Powhatan-Renape Nation,
the Ramapough Mountain Indians, or the
4 A-2756-15T1
Nanticoke[]Lenni-Lenape Indians, to submit
affidavits concerning tribal records which
could be used as proof of membership in the
chief's tribe.
[Gen. Assem. Health and Human Servs. Comm.,
Statement to Gen. Assem. No. 999 (codified at
N.J.S.A. 26:8-49).]
In September 1992, the Office of Governor James Florio sent
a letter to the federal Indian Arts & Crafts Board. The Board
regulates the use of the "Indian-made" label on products, and
permits only state or federally recognized tribes to use the label.
The letter stated:
Governor Florio has asked me to respond to
your recent letter about the state of state-
recognized Indian tribes in New Jersey. The
New Jersey State Legislature, comprised of the
Senate and Assembly, is the law-making body
that is responsible for the legal recognition
of Indian tribes. Formal recognition is
accomplished by State Resolutions, which
remain in effect until rescinded. To date,
three tribes have been recognized.
In 1995, the Legislature passed and the Governor approved
legislation creating the nine-member Commission on Native American
Affairs. See L. 1995, c. 295, codified as N.J.S.A. 52:16A-53 to -
58.3 The Commission "act[s] as a liaison among American Indian
communities, the State and federal governments, and educational,
social and cultural institutions." N.J.S.A. 52:16A-56(e). The
3
The legislation was amended in 2001. L. 2001, c. 417, §§ 2-7.
5 A-2756-15T1
Commission consists of nine members: the Secretary of State and
eight public members; "[t]wo of the public members shall be members
of [plaintiff], to be appointed by the Governor on the
recommendation of [plaintiff] and with the advice and consent of
the Senate." N.J.S.A. 52:16A-53. There are also two members
appointed from the Ramapough Mountain Indians, the Powhatan Renape
Nation, and the "Intertribal People." Ibid. "Intertribal People"
are American Indians who reside in New Jersey and are not members
of the three aforementioned tribes, but are "enrolled members of
another tribe recognized by another state or the federal
government." Ibid.
In February 2000, the Office of New Jersey's Secretary of
State "confirmed, upon inquiry, that the State of New Jersey has
recognized three groups of Indians. They are referred to in the
law as the Nanticoke Lenni-Lenape Indians, the Ramapough Mountain
Indians, and the Powhatan Renape Nation."
Also in 2000, the Office of Governor Christine Todd Whitman
"confirmed to the U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, that
[plaintiff] [was] one of New Jersey's three state-recognized
American Indian tribes." The U.S. Census Bureau responded by
stating that its records showed the State granted recognition to
tribal governments including plaintiff.
6 A-2756-15T1
In a November 2000 report to the Governor and Legislature,
the Commission stated there were "only three tribes" "legally
recognized by the State" and identified plaintiff as one of them.
According to plaintiff, between 2000 and 2001, "multiple
governmental environmental assessments for improvements at McGuire
Air Force Base confirmed that [plaintiff] is state-recognized."
In 2001, an individual claiming to represent his own newly
created tribe sued the State seeking to acquire land, and plaintiff
sued the individual "to prevent him from implying any association
with it." The individual's lawsuit "failed, in part, because the
[S]tate asserted that the citizen was not affiliated with one of
its three existing tribes."
In March 2003, U.S. Senator John Corzine wrote to the U.S.
Department of the Interior stating:
The Nanticoke Lenni-Lenape have been
functioning as a designated tribe in New
Jersey since a concurrent resolution passed
the New Jersey Legislature to designate them
as such in 1982. As a result, the Nanticoke
Lenni-Lenape has received grants and services
from federal programs for [state-recognized]
Indians.
In 2006, Governor Corzine created the Committee of Native
American Community Affairs "to research and report on the social
and economic conditions of New Jersey's state-recognized American
Indian tribes and other American Indian communities." The
7 A-2756-15T1
Committee issued a 2007 report observing "that while the [S]tate's
prior recognition of the Tribes was legally sufficient, it was
proving politically insufficient, because over time members of the
state bureaucracy had begun to undermine the tribes' status out
of confusion and prejudice," and recommending "that further steps
be taken to reaffirm the recognition of 25 years prior, with
options including refreshed concurrent resolutions, an executive
order, or legislation." The report found:
Concurrent New Jersey legislative resolutions
passed in 1980 and 1982 recognized three New
Jersey Native American tribes — the Nanticoke
Lenni-Lenape, the Powhatan Renape, and the
Ramapough Lenape [sic] . . . . [The Committee]
determined that the 1980 and 1982 concurrent
legislative resolutions did recognize the
three New Jersey American Indian
tribes . . . . New state action might be
taken to further "affirm state recognition for
[the] three tribes previously
recognized . . . ," even if such
legislation was not required.
In 2010, "the [S]tate once again affirmed to the U.S. Census Bureau
that [plaintiff] was state-recognized."
Plaintiff's complaint also detailed alleged actions taken by
State officials to undermine the State's recognition of plaintiff
as an American Indian Tribe. Plaintiff alleges that in 2001, in
response to a request from the federal Indian Arts & Crafts Board
to the Commission for any additions to the State's list of
recognized tribes, the Division of Gaming Enforcement wrote a
8 A-2756-15T1
letter advising that the State had no state-recognized tribes. The
letter, written by the Director of the Division of Gaming
Enforcement, stated that the 1982 concurrent resolution did not
formally recognize plaintiff, and added that only the federal
government could determine whether the tribes were state-
recognized.
In 2012, the federal General Accountability Office (GAO)
issued a report "on the status of American Indians in the U.S."
Plaintiff then "discovered from the federal government that a
state employee assigned to staff the state Commission on American
Indian Affairs had, without the knowledge or consent of the
Commissioners who are charged with executing its mission, informed
the GAO that New Jersey had no state-recognized tribes." Plaintiff
subsequently "sought answers from [d]efendant." According to
plaintiff, defendant's Chief of Staff proposed a "formal written
retraction of the state's previous state correspondence denying
the state-recognition of the tribes," but it never came to
fruition.
Plaintiff alleges that as a consequence of the State's
repudiation of its recognition of plaintiff as an American Indian
Tribe, plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer the loss
of: the ability to market and sell products as "Indian-made" under
the Indian Arts and Crafts Act, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 305 to 310; grants
9 A-2756-15T1
from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Administration (HHS) for Native Americans; the ability to do
business as a certified tribal company; educational opportunities
and funding; loss of funding from HHS's block grant program;
membership and standing in professional organizations, including
the National Congress of American Indians; approval for lines of
credit; and eligibility for government contracts.
Based on the foregoing allegations, plaintiff asserted causes
of action for violation of plaintiff's right to procedural due
process, substantive due process, and equal protection under the
New Jersey Constitution. Plaintiff also asserted claims that
defendant is estopped from repudiating its recognition of
plaintiff as an American Indian Tribe, and the repudiation
constitutes arbitrary and capricious action under state law.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming
plaintiff's causes of action were fatally flawed because the State
never officially recognized plaintiff as an American Indian Tribe
in the first instance. Defendant argued plaintiff's causes of
action were deficient as a matter of law because they were based
on the false premise that plaintiff had been recognized by the
State. Defendant asserted state recognition could only be extended
by statute, and that the 1982 concurrent resolution and the other
statutes and declarations referenced in the complaint were
10 A-2756-15T1
insufficient to confer the state recognition claimed by plaintiff.
Defendant argued it could not unlawfully repudiate a recognition
that was never officially granted and, as a result, plaintiff's
causes of action should be dismissed.
In an oral opinion, the court stated that it was plaintiff's
position that "New Jersey law recognizes"4 plaintiff as an American
Indian Tribe. The court limited its consideration of defendant's
motion to a determination of whether there was a New Jersey statute
extending recognition. The court reasoned that the 1982 resolution
was insufficient to establish recognition because it did not
constitute a law under Article 5, Section 1, Paragraph 14 of the
New Jersey Constitution.5 The court further found that although
N.J.S.A. 26:8-49, which was enacted in 1992, expressly states that
plaintiff is one of New Jersey's "Tribes of American Indians," it
is not a law that extended recognition because it was intended
4
This is an incorrect statement of plaintiff's position.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the 1982 resolution, subsequent
statutes, and the pronouncements of State officials conferred or
confirmed recognition sufficient for its receipt of various
federal government benefits.
5
The court found that under the State Constitution a law must
first be approved by both houses of the Legislature and then only
becomes a law if signed by the Governor within the time period
allowed, or is not returned to the Legislature by the Governor
with objections before the time expires for his consideration, or
if the Legislature overrides the Governor's objections.
11 A-2756-15T1
only to identify plaintiff as "an ethnic group for vital statistic
purposes."
The court did not address the 1995 enactment of N.J.S.A.
52:16A-53, which established the Commission, but instead relied
on an amendment to N.J.S.A. 52:16A-56(g)6 providing that
recognition of the "authenticity of any organization, tribe,
nation or other group as an American Indian Tribe . . . shall
require specific statutory authorization." The court determined
there was no statute extending recognition to plaintiff as an
American Indian Tribe, and that plaintiff's complaint did not
state claims upon which relief could be granted because they were
premised on the incorrect legal contention that plaintiff was a
state recognized American Indian tribe. The court entered an order
granting defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. This appeal
followed.
II.
Rule 4:6-2(e) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint for
"failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." When
considering an application for relief under this rule, a court is
required to "search[] the complaint in depth and with liberality
to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be
6
The amendment became effective on January 8, 2002. L. 2001, c.
417, § 4.
12 A-2756-15T1
gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being
given to amend if necessary." Major v. Maguire, 224 N.J. 1, 26
(2016) (quoting Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.,
116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)).
We review an order of dismissal under Rule 4:6-2(e) de novo
and "apply the same test as the Law Division." Smerling v. Harrah's
Entm't, Inc., 389 N.J. Super. 181, 186 (App. Div. 2006). In other
words, "our inquiry is limited to examining the legal sufficiency
of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint," and determining
if "a cause of action is 'suggested' by the facts." Green v. Morgan
Props., 215 N.J. 431, 451 (2013) (quoting Printing Mart, supra,
116 N.J. at 746). "The examination of a complaint's allegations
of fact required by the aforestated principles should be one that
is at once painstaking and undertaken with a generous and
hospitable approach." Printing Mart, supra, 116 N.J. at 746.
The complaint alleges plaintiff received various federal
benefits since 1982 because it satisfied a required condition for
the receipt of the benefits: state recognition as an American
Indian tribe. The complaint further alleges the State has
wrongfully repudiated its recognition and that plaintiff has
therefore lost and will lose federal benefits it has enjoyed since
1982.
13 A-2756-15T1
Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint was founded
solely upon the argument that the State never granted recognition
qualifying plaintiff for the receipt of federal benefits.
Defendant argued recognition could be extended only by statute,
there was no statute extending recognition, and thus plaintiff's
claims rested on a false legal premise and should be dismissed.
The court accepted defendant's argument, found that a statute was
required for an extension of state recognition, and concluded
defendant could not wrongfully repudiate recognition that had
never been granted.
Based on our review of the complaint, we are convinced the
court erred in dismissing plaintiff's claims for two reasons.
First, the court failed to accept plaintiff's factual allegations
that the State has recognized plaintiff as an American Indian
tribe in a manner sufficient for plaintiff's receipt of federal
benefits. Second, the court erred by failing to apply the
applicable federal standards in determining that state recognition
was never granted. We address the issues in turn.
In considering defendant's dismissal motion, the court was
required to accept the complaint's factual allegations as true and
interpret them with great liberality. See Major, supra, 224 N.J.
at 26. The court's conclusion that a statute extending recognition
was required for plaintiff's receipt of federal benefits, however,
14 A-2756-15T1
is contradicted by the facts alleged in the complaint. According
to the complaint, plaintiff has continuously received federal
benefits since 1982 based on the State's recognition of it as an
American Indian Tribe.
The complaint alleges the federal government accepted the
actions of the State, whether by concurrent resolution,
declarations of government officials, statutes such as N.J.S.A.
26:8-49 and N.J.S.A. 52:16A-53,7 or otherwise, as recognition
sufficient to qualify plaintiff for federal benefits. Therefore,
the court's determination that a statute was required to extend
the recognition is incorrect as a matter of fact based on the
allegations in the complaint. If, as the court found, a statute
was the only means of obtaining state recognition satisfying the
federal standard for benefits, plaintiff would not have received
federal benefits based on state recognition since 1982 as alleged
in the complaint.8
7
Because we conclude defendant's claim plaintiff did not receive
state recognition sufficient to qualify it for federal benefits
must be determined under the federal standards, we do not offer
an opinion on the court's determination that N.J.S.A. 26:8-49
did not constitute sufficient state recognition other than to note
the court made its determination without reference to the federal
standards.
8
We recognize that N.J.S.A. 52:16A-56(g) was amended in 2002 to
provide that recognition of an American Indian Tribe "shall require
specific statutory authorization. Defendant states it is not
15 A-2756-15T1
Moreover, the court erred by failing to consider or apply the
federal standard for determining whether plaintiff was a state
recognized American Indian tribe entitled to receive the benefits
cited in the complaint. Plaintiff claimed a loss of benefits which
are awarded only upon the federal government's acceptance of state
recognition of an American Indian tribe. As such, federal standards
determine whether a state's action constitutes recognition
sufficient for the award of benefits.9
We offer no opinion on the applicable standards for the
federal government's acceptance of the State's recognition of
plaintiff during the period alleged in the complaint. The standards
were not considered by the motion court. It appears the current
standards are flexible and differ among the federal agencies from
claiming N.J.S.A. 52:16A-56(g) is retroactive. We offer no opinion
on that subject or the effect of the enactment on plaintiff's
entitlement to federal benefits. We observe that the court offered
no support for its conclusion that a statute was required for
state recognition prior to the 2002 amendment, and did not address
the federal government's continuing grant of benefits to plaintiff
based on state recognition following the amendment.
9
The federal government may directly recognize a tribe as an
American Indian Tribe. See generally 25 C.F.R. §§ 83.1 to 83.12.
Plaintiff does not allege direct federal recognition here.
Plaintiff alleges that New Jersey's recognition has qualified it
for the receipt of federal benefits since 1982 and defendant's
actions constitute a wrongful and constitutionally impermissible
repudiation of the State's recognition.
16 A-2756-15T1
which plaintiff has received benefits. But they do not expressly
require the enactment of a state statute extending recognition.10
See e.g., 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(13) (defining "Indian tribe" under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act as "any Federal
or State Indian tribe, band, rancheria, pueblo, colony, or
community"); 25 U.S.C.A. § 4103(13)(A) (defining a "State
recognized tribe" under the Native American Housing Assistance and
Self-Determination Act as "any tribe, band, nation, pueblo,
village, or community . . . that has been recognized as an Indian
tribe by any State" and entered into a contract under the United
States Housing Act of 1937); 25 C.F.R. § 309.2(e)(2) (providing
the Indian Acts and Crafts Act applies to tribes that are "formally
recognized . . . by a State legislature or by a State commission,
or similar organization vested with State tribal recognition
authority"); 34 C.F.R. § 263.3(3)(1) (providing that under the
10
"State recognition can take a variety of forms, and federal laws
extending to state-recognized tribes defer to the states'
characterizations." Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 3.02
(2015). "Some states administer lands set aside for tribal groups
that are not recognized by the federal government. Other states
provide political recognition through representation on state
Indian commissions or councils, or administer benefit programs for
non-federally recognized tribes located within their boundaries."
Ibid. "At least one state has authorized a state-recognized tribe
to create a police force, vested with most of the same powers as
state or municipal officers." Ibid. "Another form of state
recognition may consist of merely acknowledging that a particular
tribal group constitutes the indigenous people of a particular
area in the state." Ibid.
17 A-2756-15T1
Department of Education's Professional Development Program,
"Indian" means "[a] member of an Indian tribe or band, as
membership is defined by the Indian tribe or band, including . .
. any tribe or band recognized by the State in which the tribe or
band resides"); 45 C.F.R. § 96.44(b) (finding "[a]n organized
group of Indians" eligible for a block grant "based on [s]tate
recognition if the State has expressly determined that the group
is an Indian tribe," including by a "statement of the State's
chief executive officer verifying" state recognition); 45 C.F.R.
§ 1336.33(a)(3)(ii),(4)(ii) (providing the eligible groups for
certain Native American programs under the HHS include
"[i]ncorporated non-Federally and State recognized" tribes).
We do not offer an opinion as to whether the resolution,
statutory enactments, or pronouncements by the State officials
cited in the complaint were sufficient under the past or present
federal standards to correctly bestow upon plaintiff the federal
benefits it claims it lost and will lose as a result of the State's
actions. On a motion to dismiss the complaint, it is sufficient
that the complaint alleges they were. We decide only that the
court erred by not accepting as true the facts alleged in the
complaint and by determining, without regard to the complaint's
factual allegations or the federal standards for state
18 A-2756-15T1
recognition, that the State did not grant recognition in the first
instance.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
19 A-2756-15T1