STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ANTHONY L. SLEDGE (11-04-0765, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1887-16T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ANTHONY L. SLEDGE, a/k/a
SLEDGE, LEWIS SLEDGE, and
ANTHONY LEWIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
Submitted October 17, 2018 – Decided August 13, 2019
Before Judges Fuentes and Vernoia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 11-04-0765.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Andrew Robert Burroughs, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Matthew E.
Hanley, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Anthony Sledge appeals from an order entered by the Law
Division, Criminal Part denying his post-conviction relief (PCR) petition. We
affirm.
On April 19, 2011, an Essex County grand jury indicted defendant and
charged him with first degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, second degree
aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1), second degree attempted sexual
assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1), third degree aggravated
criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a)(3), third degree criminal restraint,
N.J.S.A. 2C:13-2, fourth degree stalking, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b), and fourth
degree impersonating a police officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-8. On November 29,
2011, defendant pled guilty to first degree robbery and third degree aggravated
criminal sexual contact. In return, the prosecutor agreed to recommend the court
sentence defendant to a term of imprisonment of six years, subject to an eighty-
five percent period of parole ineligibility and five years of parole supervision as
required by the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
On March 23, 2012, before the sentencing hearing, defendant retained new
counsel and moved to withdraw his guilty plea. On June 25, 2012, the court
reviewed the motion under the standards in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 157-58
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(2009), and found no grounds to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.
On November 30, 2012, the court sentenced defendant in accordance with the
plea agreement. On January 31, 2013, defendant appealed the sentence imposed
by the court and the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea under the
summary procedural process codified in Rule 2:9-11. We affirmed the trial
court's decision in an order entered on May 13, 2013.
Defendant filed this pro se PCR petition on May 6, 2015. Defendant
alleged his first trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to file a motion t o
suppress. The vicinage's Assignment Judge entered an order that same day
assigning counsel to represent defendant in the prosecution of his PCR petition.
The matter came for oral argument before the PCR judge on February 16, 2016.
PCR counsel argued that defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing based
on the following statement that is part of the order entered by this court
upholding the trial court's denial of defendant's Slater motion:
Finally, we note that defendant's arguments from the
[t]rial [c]ourt suggests the attorney who represented
him at the time of his plea provided ineffective
assistance.
Because these claims, [mis-advise] about the length of
the sentence that was accurately described on the record
at the time of the plea, and the [attorney's] failure to
review discovery with defendant rest on matters outside
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the record, if defendant wishes to assert them he should
do so by way of a petition for post[-]conviction relief.
The judge asked PCR counsel if this "reference to the Appellate Division"
should be construed as "mandating that there be a hearing . . . [.]" PCR counsel
responded that it was his position that "there should be an evidentiary hearing
based clearly . . . inferentially . . . if not stated, that since the matters were
outside of the record that . . . a hearing should be held." The PCR judge rejected
this interpretation and stated: "the Appellate Court is not mandating that
I . . . conduct a hearing, only that these PCR matters be considered by virtue of
PCR as opposed to by way of appeal[.]" The State relied on its brief.
On July 17, 2017, the PCR judge considered additional oral argument
from defendant's new counsel. Defendant's new PCR counsel argued the request
for relief was based on defendant's observation of his trial counsel "to be in an
intoxicated or bizarre state." According to defendant, his attorney's intoxicated
or dysfunctional state of mind prevented him from properly investigating the
case and filing motions on his behalf. Defendant also alleged his trial attorney
promised him he would not serve more than three years imprisonment subject to
NERA. PCR counsel argued that during the time of plea negotiations,
defendant's trial attorney was "admitted in[to] Hackensack Hospital for his . . .
problems with alcohol and drugs or whatever it was that he was seeking
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assistance for at the time." PCR counsel also claimed that trial counsel
eventually "surrender[ed] his law license." Finally, PCR counsel alleged that
trial counsel should have requested an evidentiary hearing to challenge the
search warrant pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
The State refuted all of PCR counsel's claims. The prosecutor emphasized
that defendant did not present any competent evidence to support his claim that
his trial attorney was mentally unstable and intoxicated at the time he
represented him during plea negotiations and at the plea hearing. The
prosecutor characterized as "baseless" defendant's claim that his trial counsel
received treatment for drug addiction. Because defendant did not establish a
prima facie case of ineffective assistance under prong one of Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the State argued he was not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing.
In an order-opinion dated August 31, 2017, the PCR Judge found
defendant did not make out a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. The judge distilled defendant's argument in support of PCR to five
allegations against trial counsel: (1) bizarre conduct; (2) failure to investigate
the case; (3) failure to file a motion attacking the validity of the search warrant;
(4) the guilty plea was not made in a knowing and voluntary manner; and (5)
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these cumulative errors deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. The
PCR Judge addressed each allegation and found no legal basis or factual support
to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
With respect to the allegations of inebriation or mental instability against
the trial counsel, the PCR Judge specifically noted that "the Appellate Division
also found no merit to this argument in light of [defendant's] acknowledgement
of the anticipated sentence on the record at the time of the plea." The judge
found defendant's allegations of trial counsel's failure to investigate the case and
his attacks on his guilty plea were equally unsupported by the record. The PCR
Judge ultimately rejected the remaining arguments as baseless and legally
without merit.
Defendant now raises the following arguments in this appeal.
POINT I
AS DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
(1) Trial counsel's bizarre conduct denied
Petitioner a fair and reliable proceeding.
(2) Defendant's attorney failed to
investigate the case.
(3) Trial counsel failed to file any motions
on behalf of his client.
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(4) The guilty plea was not knowingly and
intelligently made because pela [sic]
counsel failed to provide discovery and
review the case with him.
[(5)] Trial counsel's cumulative errors
denied Defendant effective . . . assistance
of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment.
POINT II
AS THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL
FACTS IN DISPUTE, AN EVIDENTIARY [SIC]
WAS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-
prong standard in Strickland, defendant must first demonstrate that his trial
counsel's performance was deficient. 466 U.S. at 687. Second, he must show
there exists "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. Our
Supreme Court has also held that a PCR court should exercise its discretionary
authority to conduct an evidentiary hearing under Rule 3:22-10 when the
material facts underpinning defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel lie outside the trial record and require the attorney's testimony. State v.
Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992).
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Here, we are satisfied the PCR court correctly found defendant did not
establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The judge
did not abuse his discretion in concluding defendant was not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing. We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the
PCR Judge in his memorandum of opinion and order dated August 31, 2017.
Affirmed.
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