KEVIN HARVARD v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY, ATLANTIC-CAPE MAY VICINAGE

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5091-15T1
KEVIN HARVARD,
Plaintiff-Appellant.
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
v.
August 12, 2019
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION
JUDICIARY, ATLANTIC-
CAPE MAY VICINAGE,
Defendant-Respondent.
—————————————————————————————————
Argued November 14, 2017 – Decided January 29, 2018
Before Judges Hoffman, Gilson and Mayer.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Cumberland County, Docket No.
L-0850-13.
Frank L. Corrado argued the cause for
appellant (Barry, Corrado & Grassi, PC,
attorneys; Frank L. Corrado, on the briefs).
Kimberly A. Eaton, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Christopher
S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney;
Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General,
of counsel; Gregory J. Sullivan, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HOFFMAN, J.A.D.
In 2000, the Assignment Judge for the Atlantic-Cape May
Vicinage (the Vicinage) appointed plaintiff Kevin Harvard as a
Special Civil Part Officer (SCPO). In 2010, the Vicinage began
investigating plaintiff's financial records and eventually found
over a dozen violations of various directives of the Administrative
Office of the Courts (AOC). As a result, in July 2012, the
Assignment Judge for the Vicinage terminated plaintiff's
appointment in accordance with AOC Directive # 2-07, which states
a SCPO's "appointment may be terminated at any time in the
discretion of the Assignment Judge."
One year later, in July 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint in
the Law Division alleging violations of the Conscientious Employee
Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14, the New Jersey
Civil Rights Act (CRA), N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2, and his
constitutional substantive and procedural due process rights.
After the parties completed discovery, the Vicinage successfully
moved for summary judgment, resulting in the dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff then filed this
appeal, seeking reversal of the June 29, 2016 order granting
summary judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm.
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, applying
the same standard used by the trial court, L.A. v. N.J. Div. of
Youth & Family Servs., 217 N.J. 311, 323 (2014), which requires
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denial of summary judgment if "the competent evidential materials
presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to
resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving
party." Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 59 (2015) (quoting Davis
v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 406 (2014)); see also
R. 4:46-2(c). Similarly, our review of legal issues is de novo.
Waskevich v. Herold Law, P.A., 431 N.J. Super. 293, 297 (App. Div.
2013).
Viewed most favorably to plaintiff, the summary judgment
record established the following relevant facts. In 2000,
following his appointment as a SCPO, plaintiff established an
office in his home. Around 2004, plaintiff hired three employees
to help run his office; the Vicinage was not involved in his
decision to hire these employees.
In its written opinion, the trial court succinctly described
the relationship between SCPOs and their respective vicinages:
Judiciary Human Resources is not involved
in the recruitment or employment process for
SCPOs. Instead, the appointment of SCPOs is
by court order signed by the Assignment Judge.
The court order expressly states "that this
appointment may be discontinued at the
discretion of the court." The consent
paragraph of the appointment order expressly
states that "I understand that a [SCPO] is not
an employee of the New Jersey Judiciary."
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SCPOs are categorized as independent
contractors under AOC directives, considered
to be independent contractors by Judiciary
Human Resources, and their legal status is
that of an independent contractor for tax and
labor law purposes. SCPOs are not paid a
salary. They are compensated by commissions
and fees set by statute. They do not receive
any of the perquisites and emoluments enjoyed
by judiciary employees. By way of example,
SCPOs are not members of the Public Employee
Retirement System ("PERS"), are not eligible
for pension benefits, do not receive health
or life insurance coverage benefits, and are
not subject to minimum wage and hour
requirements. SCPOs do not receive any paid
vacation or sick leave. The judiciary does
not make any employer-based social security
contributions on behalf of SCPOs. SCPOs
receive a Form 1099, not a W-2 form . . . .
SCPOs are purely at-will appointees that
serve at the pleasure of the [V]icinage
Assignment Judge. They are not appointed for
a statutory term of office or a defined
contractual period, and have no tenure rights
or civil service rights. SCPOs are not
appointed annually or for any other time
period. They serve until their appointment
is discontinued.
SCPOs work independently, at their own
pace, and provide their own equipment,
offices, vehicles and insurance. SCPOs can
hire their own employees without vicinage
approval unless the employee would assist in
serving process. Bank accounts utilized by
SCPOs are in their name, not in the name of
the judiciary.
SCPOs serve various court documents, including
landlord/tenant summonses, complaints, and warrants of removal,
for which they receive statutory fees. SCPOs also conduct physical
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lock-outs of tenants under warrants of removal, for which they
receive direct payment from the landlords. They also serve wage
executions on employers, levies on banks, and related turnover
orders, for which they receive statutory commissions.
SCPOs must designate an accountant to audit their financial
records on an annual basis. AOC Directive # 4-03. The Trial
Court Administrator and Vicinage Finance Manager must review and
approve this designation. Ibid. "Annually, at the end of the
State fiscal year (July 1 - June 30), but before November 1,"
SCPOs must escheat any unclaimed checks to the State. AOC
Directive # 3-03.
Plaintiff designated Robin Shields, CPA, to audit his
financial records. From 2006 through 2009, Shields annually noted
that plaintiff "has outstanding checks on his books that should
be written off his books as uncleared (not presented for payment),
the amounts and details of which are to be available for ten years
from the date written. The matching funds should be paid to the
State for escheatment." In 2007, the Trial Court Administrator
reviewed Shields' audit report and informed plaintiff he should
have escheated the uncleared checks noted in Shields' 2006 audit.
Shields' 2010 report stated plaintiff was depositing funds
"four to six weeks after they appear[ed] on the cash receipts
journal. This is not in accordance with the regulations." AOC
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Directive # 4-03 required weekly deposits. In an addendum report,
Shields again noted that plaintiff failed to escheat many unclaimed
checks "as required."
On December 13, 2010, plaintiff sent the Vicinage a letter
in response to Shields' 2010 report. He wrote, "The date I
assign[ed] to the posted funds is a reference identifier that my
system uses to sort and reference the posted funds. That date has
little bearing on the calendar date the funds are presented at the
bank." He assured the Vicinage that "[a]ll funds are deposited
weekly as required by the rules regarding same. I have used this
procedure successfully and without incident for the past eleven
years and eleven months."
At the same time Shields sent her report to the Vicinage, she
sent another copy to the AOC's Internal Audit Unit (IAU). After
reviewing the report, the IAU began an investigation to assess
plaintiff's compliance with AOC directives. The IAU initially
found five problems with plaintiff's financial practices: 1)
plaintiff was depositing funds more than a week after they appeared
in his cash receipts journal; 2) plaintiff's records stated he
collected $125,600 in June, but he deposited $127,000; 3)
plaintiff was not annually escheating unclaimed checks; 4)
plaintiff was not disbursing his funds on a monthly basis, as
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required under AOC Directive # 4-031; and 5) plaintiff had $134,000
in outstanding checks but $130,000 in the checking account. At
some point after receiving Shields' report, the IAU met with
Shields. The meeting confirmed the IAU's concerns regarding
plaintiff's financial records.
Around January 2011, the Vicinage learned the State had a tax
judgment against plaintiff for $5,904.96. AOC Directive # 2-07,
states that a potential SCPO "must not have any outstanding
judgments against him [or] her." According to plaintiff, he paid
the judgment the same day he received it.
In February 2011, the IAU met with plaintiff. Plaintiff
claimed his accounting software prevented him from posting
multiple checks from the same person on the same day, so he
occasionally had to backdate checks to enter them into the
software. The IAU knew other SCPOs who used plaintiff's software
without similar problems, but plaintiff said he had not purchased
software updates, as they had done.
The Vicinage consequently asked plaintiff for a working copy
of his software. "[U]nder protest but in an attempt to cooperate,"
plaintiff claims he "provided his computer [software] to the
1
The IAU suspected plaintiff had numerous checks outstanding
from prior months because he was backdating them to appear to
comply with AOC directives.
7 A-5091-15T1
Vicinage for review." By this point, however, plaintiff claims
he had already hired a programmer to fix his computer program.
When asked at his deposition whether he produced "anything to the
Vicinage indicating that" past improper postings "was due to a
glitch" in his computer, plaintiff replied, "No."
On October 18, 2011, the IAU issued a report assessing
plaintiff's financial records, listing thirteen "issues of non-
compliance" with AOC directives. The report included a finding
that plaintiff had failed to maintain required records of trust
fund activity and had failed to escheat funds to the State, in
violation of other directives.
On October 20, 2011, Shields issued her 2011 report, which
supported the IAU's findings. On December 7, 2011, plaintiff sent
the Vicinage a letter attacking Shields' 2011 report, describing
it as "full of material errors" and "overall unreliable." He
added, "This audit report does not reflect the activities of my
financial records during the period under review."
On July 30, 2012, the Assignment Judge notified plaintiff by
letter that his "service as a [SPCO] is discontinued." The judge
later explained that the "key basis" for his decision was findings
contained in the October 18, 2011 letter from the IAU, and the
"lack of any additional justification" or "explanation" regarding
these findings.
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In addition to asserting claims of CEPA, CRA, and due process
violations, plaintiff's complaint also alleged that the Vicinage
had acted arbitrarily and capriciously under the common law, in
depriving him of his continued appointment and his entitlement to
commissions earned. Plaintiff alleged he "was the only African-
American [SCPO] in the [V]icinage," claiming he received
differential treatment "because of that."
After hearing oral argument, the motion judge entered the
order under review, setting forth his reasons in a comprehensive
fifty-page written decision. The judge addressed each of
plaintiff's claims in detail and explained why each claim lacked
merit.
First, the judge determined that plaintiff was not an
"employee" for CEPA purposes. The judge reasoned the majority of
the factors in the Pukowsky2 test weighed in favor of classifying
plaintiff as an independent contractor and not an employee because:
he was hired as an independent contractor, he did not receive a
salary or benefits, he was taxed as an independent contractor, he
controlled his own schedule and work subject only to accounting
and financial reporting requirements imposed by AOC Directives,
2
Pukowsky v. Caruso, 312 N.J. Super. 171, 182-83 (App. Div.
1998).
9 A-5091-15T1
he selected his own accountant for his annual financial report;
the SCPO position was at will serving at the pleasure of the
Assignment Judge; SCPO services were not integral to the business
of the Vicinage; and the SCPO position involved specialized skills
not possessed by Vicinage employees.
Second, the judge concluded plaintiff did not engage in
actionable whistle-blowing under CEPA. He reasoned that
plaintiff's complaints to the Vicinage, and the practices of the
Vicinage and the AOC, did not concern the health, safety, or
welfare of the public and did not report a public harm. The judge
also concluded plaintiff's complaints to the Vicinage concerned a
private disagreement over his accounting practices, commissions,
and reputation.
Third, the judge determined that the Vicinage does not
constitute a "person" amenable to suit under the CRA. The judge
completed an analysis using the three Fitchik3 factors. Under
factor one, the judge found that any judgment in favor of plaintiff
would be paid out of State revenue. The judge reasoned the second
Fitchik factor weighed in favor of classifying the Vicinage as a
State entity because the State funds, administers, and operates
3
Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655,
659 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc).
10 A-5091-15T1
it. The judge found that the third Fitchik factor favored
classifying the Vicinage as an arm of the State because the
Vicinage has little to no autonomy outside of the authority the
State has granted it, and the AOC is a State entity managed by the
Chief Justice and the Acting Administrative Director.
Fourth, the judge concluded plaintiff failed to establish due
process claims under Article I, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey
Constitution. Regarding his substantive due process claim, the
judge reasoned plaintiff had no entitlement to continued
employment, and no precedent recognized substantive due process
protection for one's good reputation. The judge also observed
that Rule 6:12-3(b) called for another SCPO to proceed with the
execution of all writs that had been delivered to a prior SCPO who
is no longer able to act.
Finally, the judge determined that plaintiff's allegation
that the Vicinage arbitrarily deprived him of his protected liberty
interest in continued employment free of injury to his reputation
was time-barred. The judge reasoned that to the extent plaintiff
relied on the prerogative writ of certiorari, the forty-five day
limitation under Rule 4:69-6(a) barred his claim.
On appeal, plaintiff presents five arguments: 1) the trial
court erroneously found that plaintiff was not a Vicinage employee
under CEPA; 2) the trial court erroneously found that plaintiff
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did not engage in whistle-blowing activity; 3) the Vicinage is a
person subject to suit under the CRA; 4) plaintiff has stated a
claim that the Vicinage violated his State constitutional
substantive and procedural due process rights; and 5) plaintiff
has stated a timely common law claim of arbitrary treatment under
the fundamental fairness doctrine.
We have considered each of plaintiff's arguments in light of
our review of the record and applicable principles of law. We
discern no basis to disturb the order granting summary judgment.
We therefore affirm, substantially for the reasons set forth by
the motion judge in his thorough and well-reasoned written
decision. We add the following comments.
Even if we were to accept plaintiff's argument that the motion
record precluded a finding that, as a matter of law, plaintiff was
not a Vicinage employee for CEPA purposes, the record clearly
demonstrates that plaintiff failed to establish a whistle-blower
claim under CEPA. See Turner v. Associated Humane Soc'ys, Inc.,
396 N.J. Super. 582, 594 (App. Div. 2007) (holding that a complaint
that "deals with the employee's personal harm, not harm to the
public" is not viable under CEPA). The record lacks any credible
evidence of harm to the public.
Regarding plaintiff's due process claim, the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
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paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution protects individuals
from deprivations of life, liberty, and property, without due
process of law. See Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 99 (1995). The
essence of procedural due process is notice and an opportunity to
be heard. See State v. Garthe, 145 N.J. 1, 8 (1996). There are
no bright-line rules to judge the constitutionality of a particular
procedure employed in a proceeding; "[i]t is a flexible concept
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
M.Y.J.P., 360 N.J. Super. 426, 464 (App. Div. 2003).
Substantive due process "protects individuals from the
'arbitrary exercise of the powers of government' and 'governmental
power [. . .] being used for [the] purposes of oppression.'"
Filgueiras v. Newark Pub. Schs., 426 N.J. Super. 449, 469 (App.
Div. 2012) (quoting Felicioni v. Admin. Office of the Courts, 404
N.J. Super. 382, 392 (App. Div. 2008) (alteration in original)).
Substantive due process, however, "is reserved for the most
egregious governmental abuses against liberty or property rights,
abuses that 'shock the conscience or otherwise offend . . .
judicial notions of fairness . . . [and that are] offensive to
human dignity.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting
Felicioni, 404 N.J. Super. at 469). When determining the extent
of this protection, New Jersey courts must weigh the "nature of
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the affected right, the extent to which the governmental
restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the
restriction." Visiting Homemaker Serv. of Hudson Cty. v. Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders, 380 N.J. Super. 596, 610 (App. Div. 2005)
(quoting Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552, 567 (1985)).
"[A]n employee hired at will has no protected interest in his
employment and may not prevail on a claim that his or her discharge
constituted a violation of property rights." Morgan v. Union Cty.
Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 268 N.J. Super. 337, 355 (App. Div.
1993). An at-will employee's termination may, however, implicate
a liberty interest when the termination may result in
disqualification from future public appointment. Ibid.
Depending on the context, New Jersey's doctrine of
fundamental fairness augments "existing constitutional
protections" or exists "as an independent source of protection
against state action." Doe, 142 N.J. at 108 (quoting State v.
Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 377 (1987) (Handler, J., dissenting)). It
"serves to protect citizens generally against unjust and arbitrary
governmental action, and specifically against governmental
procedures that tend to operate arbitrarily." Ibid. "Fundamental
fairness is a doctrine to be sparingly applied. It is
appropriately applied in those rare cases where not to do so will
subject the defendant to oppression, harassment, or egregious
14 A-5091-15T1
deprivation." Ibid. (quoting State v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679,
712 (1989) (Garibaldi, J., concurring and dissenting)).
In support of his claim that the Vicinage violated his
procedural due process rights by terminating his appointment,
plaintiff argues he "demonstrated a state-protected 'entitlement'
to unpaid future commissions on writs he served before he was
terminated, and he has further established that [the] Vicinage has
deprived him of that entitlement without offering him any process
whatsoever." We disagree.
Plaintiff overlooks Rule 6:12-3(b), which requires the court
to reassign cases to another SCPO in place of a SCPO who, "for
any . . . reason is unable to act." R. 6:12-3(b). The replacement
SCPOs shall "proceed with and complete the execution of all writs"
previously delivered to the replaced officer. Ibid. The
replacement SCPOs are entitled to the commissions from their work,
not the replaced officer. See N.J.S.A. 22A:2-37.2.
Given the Vicinage's extensive investigation of plaintiff's
conduct, and the numerous chances it offered him to explain it,
the Vicinage provided plaintiff due process, and that process only
served to confirm his significant non-compliance with AOC
directives. Plaintiff's contention that he never received "an
opportunity to explain himself or rebut the charges against him"
is a bald assertion, unsupported by the record.
15 A-5091-15T1
Affirmed.
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