CANDICE LINZMAYER VS. KEYPORT BOARD OF EDUCATION(NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3315-15T2
CANDICE LINZMAYER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
KEYPORT BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Respondent-Respondent.
___________________________
Submitted September 12, 2017 – Decided September 29, 2017
Before Judges Hoffman and Gilson.
On appeal from the Department of Labor and
Workforce Development, Division of Workers'
Compensation, Claim Petition Nos. 2012-7471
and 2012-7476.
Shebell & Shebell, LLC, attorneys for
appellant (Danielle S. Chandonnet, of counsel
and on the brief).
Brown & Connery, LLP, attorneys for respondent
(Deborah C. Brennan, of counsel and on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Candice Linzmayer appeals from a March 4, 2016
order of the Division of Workers' Compensation (Division) denying
her claims for medical and temporary disability benefits. We
affirm because the Division's decision was supported by sufficient
credible evidence and credibility findings made after a trial.
I.
Petitioner was a math teacher at Keyport High School from
2006 until December 2011. Her claims for Workers' Compensation
benefits are based on an incident that occurred on January 14,
2011 (the January 2011 incident). Petitioner claims that she was
assaulted by a student and sustained physical and psychological
injuries. She filed claims for medical and temporary disability
benefits that her employer, the Keyport Board of Education
(employer), denied.
A Workers' Compensation judge conducted a trial on the claims.
Petitioner testified and presented the testimony of two lay
witnesses, and two expert witnesses. Her employer presented
testimony from the high school principal and vice principal, and
two expert witnesses.
Petitioner testified that on January 14, 2011, she was
assigned to monitor the girls' locker room and had been instructed
that only students who were in gym class were allowed to use the
bathroom in the locker room. A female student, who was not in gym
class, came into the locker room and petitioner informed her that
she could not use the bathroom. According to petitioner, the
student became upset and assaulted petitioner by pushing her and
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causing her to fall into the wall. The student then repeatedly
hit petitioner in her head and neck. Petitioner went on to testify
that she reported the assault to the principal and vice principal,
as well as the police. The student was suspended for ten days.
Following the January 2011 incident, petitioner claimed that
she experienced significant and worsening back and neck pain, as
well as anxiety and stress. Petitioner received treatment from
her primary care physician, as well as several specialists. She
acknowledged that she never sought treatment through the Workers'
Compensation system until she filed her first claim in April 2012.
The teacher union president and vice president were called
to testify on petitioner's behalf. Both union officials testified
that petitioner informed them of the incident after it occurred.
Neither witness stated that petitioner complained about
significant injuries, nor did petitioner request medical treatment
through Workers' Compensation. The president of the union also
explained that petitioner had been under investigation for poor
performance and tardiness. Ultimately, petitioner worked out an
agreement under which she resigned her position rather than contest
potential tenure charges that could have led to a suspension of
her teaching license.
The employer acknowledged that there was an incident on
January 14, 2011, but disputed that petitioner had suffered any
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injuries. In that regard, the principal testified that petitioner
reported the incident to him and the vice principal, but described
the incident as simply a student pushing by her. Both the
principal and vice principal testified that they did not observe
any injuries to petitioner on the day of the incident and that
petitioner never complained of any physical or psychological
problems related to the January 2011 incident.
The experts who testified on behalf of petitioner were medical
experts, with expertise in orthopedic medicine and psychiatry.
Petitioner's medical expert diagnosed her with facial, cervical,
thoracic and lumbar contusions, a severe strain of the cervical,
dorsal and lumbosacral musculature, and opined that those injuries
were related to the January 2011 incident. That expert recommended
that she undergo MRIs, EMGs, pain management, physical therapy,
and neurological consultations.
Petitioner's psychiatric expert opined that she was
experiencing significant psychiatric impairments, chronic pain,
anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder. He opined that
petitioner should receive psychotropic medication and at least six
months of counseling.
The experts called on behalf of the employer presented
markedly different opinions. The employer called a medical expert
specializing in pain management. That expert opined that
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petitioner's physical symptoms were not supported by tests and
that she did not require additional treatment. The employer's
second medical expert was board certified in psychiatry and
neurology. He diagnosed petitioner with chronic pain syndrome and
adjustment disorder with mixed emotions, but opined that those
problems were not attributable to the January 2011 incident. He
also opined that petitioner had no need for psychiatric treatment
as a result of her work.
After hearing the testimony at trial, the compensation judge
found petitioner to be incredible. He also found that petitioner's
lay and expert witnesses did not support her claims. In contrast,
the compensation judge found the expert testimony presented on
behalf of the employer to be credible and persuasive. Relying on
the testimony of the employer's experts, the compensation judge
found that petitioner's alleged medical and psychiatric symptoms
were not related to her employment. Accordingly, on March 4,
2016, the compensation judge entered an order denying petitioner's
motions for medical and temporary benefits.
II.
On appeal, petitioner makes two arguments. First, she
contends that the denial of her request for medical treatment is
against the weight of the evidence presented at trial. Second,
she argues that the compensation judge erred in relying on the
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testimony of the principal because the principal was not present
when the incident occurred. We are not persuaded by either of
petitioner's arguments.
Our role in reviewing a Workers' Compensation decision is
limited to examining "whether the findings made could reasonably
have been reached on sufficient credible evidence presented in the
record, considering the proofs as a whole, with due regard to the
opportunity of the one who heard the witness to judge of their
credibility." Lindquist v. City of Jersey City Fire Dept., 175
N.J. 244, 262 (2003) (quoting Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J.
589, 599 (1965)). We give such factual findings "substantial
deference." Bellino v. Verizon Wireless, 435 N.J. Super. 85, 94
(App. Div. 2014) (citing Ramos v. M&F Fashions, Inc., 154 N.J.
583, 594 (1998)). We will only disturb the compensation judge's
decision if it is "manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with
competent[,] relevant and reasonable credible evidence as to
offend the interests of justice." Lindquist, supra, 175 N.J. at
262 (quoting Perez v. Monmouth Cablevision, 278 N.J. Super. 275,
282 (App. Div. 1994), certif. denied, 140 N.J. 277 (1995)).
Here, there was sufficient evidence for the compensation
judge to deny petitioner's claims. Petitioner first argues that
the compensation judge's rejection of her medical claims was
against the weight of the evidence at trial. In essence,
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petitioner is asking us to independently evaluate the conflicting
expert testimony and reach a conclusion different from the
compensation judge. Our standard of review does not permit such
a result. Moreover, the record does not support such an argument.
A compensation judge has expertise in weighing the testimony
of competing experts and assessing the validity of the claim.
Ramos, supra, 154 N.J. at 598. The judge is "not bound by the
conclusional opinions of any one or more, or all of the medical
experts." Bellino, supra, 435 N.J. Super. at 95 (quoting Kaneh
v. Sunshine Biscuits, 321 N.J. Super. 507, 511 (App. Div. 1999)).
We will not reverse a judgment simply because the judge gave more
weight to the opinion of one physician over the other. Smith v.
John L. Montgomery Nursing Home, 327 N.J. Super. 575, 579 (App.
Div. 2000).
As previously discussed, four medical experts testified at
trial: two for petitioner and two for the employer. The
compensation judge rejected the testimony of petitioner's two
expert witnesses explaining that their opinions were based on
petitioner's version of the assault and that the experts failed
to conduct appropriate tests and reviews of medical records. In
contrast, the compensation judge accepted the testimony of the two
medical experts who testified on behalf of the employer. Relying
on the opinion of those experts, the compensation judge found that
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petitioner's medical conditions were not caused or related to her
employment at Keyport High School. That finding was not against
the weight of the evidence. Instead, the finding was supported
by the testimony of two experts who the compensation judge found
to be credible based on their examination of petitioner, the tests
they conducted, and their review of petitioner's medical records.
Petitioner also argues that the compensation judge erred by
relying on the testimony of the principal. Specifically,
petitioner argues that because the principal was not present when
petitioner was assaulted by the student, the compensation judge
erred by relying on the principal's testimony concerning what
happened during the incident. The principal's testimony, however,
was based on what the petitioner told him. As such, the testimony
was admissible hearsay of a party opponent. N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1).
Thus, the compensation judge appropriately relied on the
principal's testimony.
Affirmed.
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