SALI GUIRGUIS VS. RAMEZ MORRIS(FM-12-1719-12, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2908-15T3
SALI GUIRGUIS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RAMEZ MORRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________
Submitted September 13, 2017 – Decided September 28, 2017
Before Judges Manahan and Suter.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex
County, Docket No. FM-12-1719-12.
Ramez Morris, appellant pro se.
Lane & Lane, LLC, attorneys for respondent
(Daniel J. Lane, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
This matter is before us on appeal by defendant Ramez Morris
from a post-judgment Family Part order dated February 1, 2016,
which denied his motion for reconsideration of a prior order and
granted, in part, plaintiff Sali Guirguis' motion in aid of
litigant's rights.1 Having considered defendant's brief and
appendix in terms of compliance with the rules of procedure set
forth in Part II, "Rules Governing Appellate Practice in the
Supreme Court and the Appellate Division of the Superior Court,"
we are constrained to dismiss the appeal with prejudice but without
costs.
The parties were married in July 2006. One child, a daughter,
was born of the marriage. The parties were divorced by dual
judgment of divorce in December 2012. The judgment incorporated
a matrimonial settlement agreement. Thereafter, the parties
engaged in ongoing motion practice, which resulted in the entry
of orders including the present order under appeal.
Defendant, who is self-represented, filed a notice of appeal
from the February 1 order on March 17, 2016, along with an
accompanying case information statement (CIS). R. 2:5-1. For
many months thereafter, defendant failed to file a conforming
brief and appendix per Rule 2:6-1 and Rule 2:6-2. Although we
ultimately accepted defendant's brief and appendix, that
acceptance did not constitute our "imprimatur" of conformance.
1
The order contains nineteen discrete paragraphs. Eleven of the
paragraphs either denied the relief sought by both parties without
prejudice, including defendant's motion for reconsideration, or
denied the relief sought as moot. The order provided for payment
schedules relating to defendant's previously ordered reimbursement
of medical expenses to plaintiff and for plaintiff's counsel fees.
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Rather, our acceptance was to afford defendant an opportunity to
prosecute his appeal subject to our plenary review both on the
appeal's procedural compliance and on the appeal's merits.
We commence by noting that parties to appeals must fully
comply with the appellate rules. In Still v. Ohio Casualty
Insurance Company, 189 N.J. Super. 231 (App. Div. 1983), this
court addressed rule compliance:
The rules which deal with appellate
briefs are few in number, easy to understand
and simple to follow. Each rule was adopted
for a specific reason. Together, they
contribute to make the administration of
justice smoother and more expeditious. Any
violation of the rules makes it more difficult
for the courts to operate, slows down the
administration of justice and increases its
costs. Violations cannot and will not be
tolerated.
[Id. at 236.]
In Abel v. Elizabeth Board of Works, 63 N.J. Super. 500 (App.
Div. 1960), we held that our rules "are more than guides and
admonitions. They were made to be complied with and should not
be lightly disregarded." Id. at 509.
Failure to abide by the appellate rules implicates sanctions,
including the sanction of dismissal. R. 2:9-9 states:
Failure properly to prosecute or defend
an appeal or proceedings for certification
shall be ground for such action as the
appellate court deems appropriate, including,
but not limited to, dismissal of the appeal
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or petition, imposition of costs or attorney's
fees or such other penalty as may be assessed
personally against the attorney.
In terms of relaxation of the rule's requirements in a case
of a self-represented litigant, as here, there is no assurance of
lenity. As we held in Venner v. Allstate, 306 N.J. Super. 106
(App. Div. 1997), status as a pro se litigant does not relieve the
obligation of compliance with the rules. Id. at 110.
To be sure, we recognize that dismissal of the appeal is the
ultimate sanction and one which must be cautiously invoked. See
Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 96 N.J. 336, 345 (1984); Gnapinsky
v. Goldyn, 23 N.J. 243, 247-48 (1957). As such, we have considered
alternative sanctions but conclude those alternatives lack
contextual suitability.
In our view, the deficiencies in defendant's appeal would not
be remediated by reprimand, censure, suppression of the brief and
appendix, monetary sanctions or assessments of costs and
attorney's fees. The deficiencies of the brief include but are
not limited to: failure to provide a concise statement of facts
with references to the appendix and the transcript; failure to
include legal argument that contains point headings so as to afford
a reviewing court to arrive at a proper determination based on
legal authority; and failure to address only those issues relating
to the appeal of the order. R. 2:6-2(a)(5); R. 2:6-2(a)(6).
4 A-2908-15T3
A proper statement of facts is vital to the appellate process.
Patel v. Erhardt, 177 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 1981). In Patel,
we noted that the required statement of facts is critical to our
"independent examination of the record." Id. at 558. As well,
we have frequently emphasized the need for point headings in the
brief's legal argument, as proper presentation of applicable law
is essential to appellate review. See Hayling v. Hayling, 197
N.J. Super. 484, 488-89 (App. Div. 1984). The failure to provide
point headings in the presentation of legal argument has resulted
in our declining to consider the issue raised. See Solar Energy
Indus. v. Christie, 418 N.J. Super. 499, 508 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 207 N.J. 190 (2011).
Further, defendant's failure to provide a conforming brief
is in derogation of his responsibility to refer us to specific
parts of the record that support his argument. It is not our
obligation to "scour the record" in search of such support. See
Spinks v. Twp. of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 454, 463 (App. Div.
2008).
Nor is the defendant's failure to conform to our appellate
rules to be indulged as "form over substance." The product of
defendant's non-conformance is a legal argument that is rambling,
disjointed, raises issues outside the notice of appeal, and lacks
requisite reference to controlling decisions of law. This does
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not just unduly burden us; it prevents us from exercising our
appellate role.
Finally, we have considered the sanction of a dismissal
without prejudice. However, when considering the numerous
opportunities provided to defendant over many months to cure his
non-conformance, as well as plaintiff's interest to have the appeal
timely resolved, we exercise our discretion per Rule 2:9-9 and
dismiss the appeal with prejudice.
Dismissed.
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