EUGENE BERTA VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD(NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2306-15T1
EUGENE BERTA,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD,
Respondent.
_________________________________
Argued September 27, 2017 – Decided October 26, 2017
Before Judges Fuentes and Manahan.
On appeal from New Jersey State Parole Board.
Eric J. Marcy argued the cause for appellant
(Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, PA, attorneys;
Mr. Marcy, of counsel and on the brief).
Gregory R. Bueno, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Christopher
S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Lisa
A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Mr. Bueno, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Eugene Berta, incarcerated at East Jersey State Prison,
appeals from a final agency decision of the New Jersey State Parole
Board (Board), affirming the Board panels' decisions denying him
parole and imposing a 120-month future eligibility term (FET). We
affirm.
In August 1983, Berta was indicted for murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
3 (count one), and second-degree possession of a firearm for an
unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count two). The indictment
arose from the July 16, 1983 discovery of the victim's partially
decomposed body in the bathtub of her home in Metuchen. An autopsy
revealed that the victim died from a gunshot to the back of her
head. State v. Berta, Docket No. A-1909-12 (App. Div. June 5,
2014), cert. denied, 221 N.J. 220 (2015). An investigation
eventually led to Berta's arrest, the victim's paramour, who was
married and was also carrying on affairs with other women. Berta
entered a plea of not guilty. After a three-week jury trial,
Berta was convicted as charged. In December 1984, Berta was
sentenced to life imprisonment with a thirty-year period of parole
ineligibility.
Berta attained eligibility for parole on September 24, 2014.
Predicated upon that parole status, a hearing officer referred the
matter to a two-member panel for review.
After consideration of Berta's eligibility status, on March
26, 2015, the two-member panel denied Berta parole and referred
the matter to a three-member panel to establish a FET outside of
the presumptive schedule. The two-member panel cited
2 A-2306-15T1
institutional infractions. The panel noted that although Berta's
last infraction was in October 2002, he had a number of earlier
infractions. The panel further noted that there was insufficient
problem resolution by Berta, specifically, his lack of insight
into his criminal behavior, his denial of committing the crime,
and his minimization of his conduct. In support of the panel's
determination, it attached addenda, which included a confidential
psychological report.
In rendering its decision, the panel also considered Berta's
interview, documentation in his case file, and the confidential
material report filed. The panel found mitigating factors
including: no prior criminal record or minimal criminal record;
participation in programs specific to behavior; participation in
institutional programs; average to above average institutional
reports; institutional adjustment has been favorable, last
infraction in October 2002; and risk assessment evaluation, "10
LSI-R" (Level of Service Inventory-Revised). The panel suggested
Berta participate in behavior modification, one-to-one counseling,
and institutional programs geared toward criminal behavior.
On June 10, 2015, a three-member panel considered Berta's
case. Three months later, in an eight-page written decision based
upon the two-member panel's findings, the three-member panel
3 A-2306-15T1
imposed a 120-month FET.1 A confidential addendum was also
attached to the notice of decision.
Berta appealed the three-member panel's decision to the full
Board. Upon review, the full Board issued a notice of final
decision affirming the decision to deny parole and establish a
120-month FET. This appeal followed.2
Berta raises the following arguments on appeal:
POINT I
THE PAROLE BOARD SUMMARILY AND ARBITRARILY
DISMISSES OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE THAT
PLAINTIFF EUGENE BERTA WILL NOT COMMIT ANOTHER
CRIME IF RELEASED ON PAROLE.
POINT II
THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO ASSESS PLAINTIFF'S
SUITABILITY FOR PAROLE TO A RESIDENTIAL
COMMUNITY TRANSITIONAL PROGRAM WAS ARBITRARY.
1
A FET for an inmate serving a sentence for a crime committed on
or after to August 19, 1997, is not reduced by credits. See
N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.2(i); see also N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.56(b). For an
inmate who committed a crime prior to August 19, 1997, such as
Berta, the FET is, however, reduced by credits. As a result,
Berta's parole eligibility is October 2, 2021. However, the Board
panel noted that if Berta's present work assignment and custody
status were to continue, his projected parole eligibility date
would be in January 2020.
2
Thereafter, upon motion of the New Jersey State Parole Board, we
entered a consent protective order on May 23, 2016. The Board's
confidential appendix includes various psychological evaluations,
letters from the victim's family members, and confidential
addendums, all of which were reviewed when considering Berta for
parole.
4 A-2306-15T1
POINT III
THE CATCH-22, THE ASSERTION OF INNOCENCE IN
PAROLE CONSIDERATION – THE CONSEQUENCES OF
FAILING TO ADMIT GUILT AT THE PAROLE HEARING.
POINT IV
IT IS A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS TO 1) PARSE
THE RECORD TO DENY PAROLE; 2) IGNORE
PLAINTIFF'S SUITABILITY FOR COMMUNITY
RESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONAL PROGRAMS; 3) EXCLUDE
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION PSYCHOLOGICAL
EVALUATIONS; AND 4) PERMIT THE SUPPRESSION OF
RECOMMENDATIONS BY VOLUNTEERS.
Berta raises the following additional arguments on appeal under
one point heading:
POINT I
THE BOARD EXCLUDED INFORMATION IT WAS REQUIRED
TO CONSIDER, FOCUSED ENTIRELY ON THE FACTS OF
THE ORIGINAL CRIME AND PLAINTIFF'S ASSERTION
OF INNOCENCE, AND DISREGARDED COMPELLING
POSITIVE INFORMATION REQUIRING A REMAND TO THE
FULL BOARD[.]
A. Lip Service to Having
Acknowledged the Existence of
Mitigating Information is Not a
Substitute for an Honest
Consideration and Evaluation of
Compelling Positive Information
that Supports Parole[.]
B. The Failure to Obtain and Review
the Department of Correction
Psychological Evaluation Violates
N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b)4, 11, 13,
and, at a Minimum, Requires a
Reversal and Remand for
Consideration of Such Evaluations
by the Full Board[.]
5 A-2306-15T1
C. The Appellate Division Should
Confirm that Recommendations of
Staff and Volunteers Should Not Be
Suppressed — the Case Should be
Remanded for Consideration of the
Two Recommendations that were
Withdrawn Under the Threat of
Dismissal[.]
D. The State Relies Heavily on the
Board's "Subjective Assessment of a
"Deeply Rooted Pathology" Which,
Under This Record, is a "Gut
Feeling" that is Insufficient to
Deny Parole[.]
E. The Board's Actions in Submitting
an Incomplete Record . . . [.]
The scope of appellate review of final decisions of
administrative agencies is limited. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J.
182, 194 (2011). We do not disturb decisions of the Board, like
those of other administrative agencies, unless they are
"arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [are] not supported by
substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Henry
v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 580 (1980) (citing Campbell
v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)); see also
Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 192 (2001)
(Trantino VI). We will set aside an agency decision only "if
there exists in the reviewing mind a definite conviction that the
determination below went so far wide of the mark that a mistake
must have been made." N.J. State Parole Bd. v. Cestari, 224 N.J.
6 A-2306-15T1
Super. 534, 547 (App. Div.) (quoting 613 Corp. v. N.J., Div. of
State Lottery, 210 N.J. Super. 485, 495 (App. Div. 1986), certif.
denied, 111 N.J. 649 (1988).
Berta argues that the Board failed to specifically discuss
and analyze the weight accorded to each factor, including Berta's
parole plan, employment and volunteer history prior to
incarceration and during incarceration, and participation in
educational and rehabilitate programs. We disagree.
The Supreme Court has held that the Board's "decisions are
highly 'individualized discretionary appraisals.'" Trantino VI,
supra, 166 N.J. at 173. "Accordingly, the Board 'has broad but
not unlimited discretionary powers,' and its determinations 'are
always judicially reviewable for arbitrariness.'" Ibid. (quoting
Monks v. N.J. State Parole Board, 62 N.J. 348, 359 (1973). The
Board's decisions "depend[] on an amalgam of elements, some of
which are factual but many of which are purely subjective
appraisals by the Board members based upon their experience with
the difficult and sensitive task of evaluating the advisability
of parole release." Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr.
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 10, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2105, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668,
677 (1979). As the Court observed, parole boards should focus on
"what a man is and what he may become rather than simply what he
has done." Ibid. (citation omitted).
7 A-2306-15T1
If the crime for which an inmate is incarcerated occurred
before August 19, 1997, "the Board panel shall determine whether
. . . by a preponderance of the evidence . . . there is a
substantial likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime under
the laws of the State of New Jersey if released on parole."
N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.10(a).3 Thus, when an inmate becomes eligible
for parole, there is a "presumption in favor of parole," In re
Trantino Parole Application, 89 N.J. 347, 356 (1982) (Trantino
II), and the burden is on "the State to prove that the prisoner
is a recidivist and should not be released." Trantino VI, supra,
166 N.J. at 172 (quoting N.J. State Parole Bd. v. Byrne, 93 N.J.
192, 205 (1983)).
This is a "highly predictive" determination, Thompson v. N.J.
State Parole Bd., 210 N.J. Super. 107, 115 (App. Div. 1986)
(quoting Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 368, 359
(1973)), which must take into account "the aggregate of all of the
factors which may have any pertinence." Beckworth, supra, 62 N.J.
at 360.
3
Parole decisions for inmates who are serving sentences for crimes
committed before August 18, 1997, are governed by the parole
standards set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a) prior to the
amendment, whereas parole decisions made for those serving
sentences for crimes committed after that date are governed by the
revisions to that statute. Williams v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 336
N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 523 (2000).
8 A-2306-15T1
N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b) (1) to (23) contains a non-exhaustive
list of factors that the Board may consider in determining whether
an inmate should be released on parole. Among the pertinent
factors are "[s]tatements by the inmate reflecting on the
likelihood that he or she will commit another crime; the failure
to cooperate in his or her own rehabilitation; or the reasonable
expectation that he or she will violate conditions of parole[]"
as well as "any other factors deemed relevant[.]" Ibid. "[T]he
Board [must] focus its attention squarely on the likelihood of
recidivism." McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super.
544, 565 (App. Div. 2002).
Upon review of the record, we find the applicable factors
were taken into account in reaching the decisions, as evidenced
by the two-member panel's notice of decision, addendum, and
confidential addendum, as well as the three-member panel's notice
of decision, addendum, and confidential addendum. The addendum
to the two-member panel's decision offers noteworthy insight and
is provided in full:
The crime in this case was the product
of a toxically manipulative criminal
personality. Inmate Berta's manipulation of
his wife, the victim and at least one other
woman resulted in the cold[-]hearted execution
of a girlfriend[.] After shooting her with
her own handgun, he simply left her body in
her own bathtub and he left on a vacation with
another lover — using the tickets purchased
9 A-2306-15T1
by the deceased. His wife and children stayed
in New Jersey. Trial testimony showed that
[the victim] was murdered on July 8, 1983.
Her body was discovered on July 16[,] after
her parents became concerned when she didn’t
appear to have returned from the planned
vacation. The body was in an advanced state
of decomposition.
Evidently, [i]nmate Berta's relationship
with [the victim] had become strained after
he had not sought a divorce from his wife. On
the same day of the murder, [i]nmate Berta
left for the vacation with [another
girlfriend, P.B.]. The Pre-Sentence
Investigation Report (PSI) summarized some of
the testimony from trial as follows:
[P.B.] . . . testified that
when she and [Berta] were at the
Northwoods Motel in Barnum,
Minnesota on the night of [July 9,
1983, Berta] produced a handgun.
She stated she did not see where the
gun came from and when she asked
[Berta what he] was doing with the
gun, he told her that he always
carried it with him. She stated
that she did not see the gun the
remainder of the trip. [P.B] also
testified that on the way to the
airport [Berta] asked her, "Do you
love me?" She replied in the
affirmative. He then asked her, "Do
you believe that I love you?" She
replied in the negative. [Berta]
then stated, "You better, I just
killed [three] people, I'll blow
your God damn brains out." [Berta]
also told [P.B.] that she did not
have to worry about the victim as
she was completely out of the
picture. It was also learned that
the victim had given [Berta] $5000
10 A-2306-15T1
on [June 24, 1983,] and another
$5000 on [July 7, 1983].
While all of this lethal drama was taking
place, [i]nmate Berta had a responsible job,
a wife and children. He had never been
convicted of any other crimes and he may have
appeared to all of the world to be a normal,
successful husband and father and a low risk
for criminal activity. The profound nature
of his many manipulations and the cold-blooded
nature of his execution of [the victim] tell
quite a different story.
Inmate Berta's superficial success on the
street is mirrored in his seeming success
during his incarceration. In prison, he has
taken many programs and has a low Level of
Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) score of
[ten]. For many inmates, such a record would
be a very good sign of growth. However, a
closer examination of [i]nmate Berta's prison
programs reveals a mixed picture. He did take
Anger Management, AA, Houses of Healing and
has sought to enter Palliative Care Program
and, more recently, Focus on the Victim. The
bulk of his completed programs, however, have
been directed at academic or vocational
interests — Building Trades, Culinary Acts,
Masonry, U.S. History, Employment Readiness,
Civil Rights, Urban American History, and
Introduction to Sociology. Inmate Berta's
challenge is not so much in finding a job.
His challenge is in overcoming the truly
malignant aspects of his manipulative
personality.
Moreover, his Low LSI-R score is more a
reflection of his work history on the streets,
his age and certain other relatively static
factors. In fact, it is likely that he would
have similarly low score if he had taken the
test on the day before his brutal crime. The
panel finds and assigns less weight to the
11 A-2306-15T1
LSI-R score and to some of his programs as it
does to the current nature of his personality.
During his hearing, [i]nmate Berta flatly
denied committing the murder. Instead, in a
carefully worded statement, he stated[,]
"[Programs] have given me insight into my
prior behavior which resulted in [the
victim's] murder." I accept responsibility
for that behavior and for the death of [the
victim]." When pressed to explain what
actions led to the victim's murder, he said:
"Well, I was married as you know. I was having
an affair with her and seeing another woman
besides and I was aware of the fact that my
wife did not appreciate me living the
lifestyle that I was leading and I continued
to do it anyway, not really caring at that
time about how anybody felt."
When asked if he was implying that his
then wife arranged for [the victim's] murder,
[i]nmate Berta said: "I'm suggesting based on
the evidence that was brought up during my
trial, during the investigation, and since
then, that she might have had some involvement
in it. Yes."
The [p]anel carefully reviewed various
statements that were made by [i]nmate Berta
over time about the murder and his
involvement. Clearly, his wife was the victim
of an unfaithful, abusive and extremely
manipulative husband. His recent denials and
the attempt to shift blame to his wife are as
chilling as they are disgusting. These
statements are inconsistent with the weight
of the evidence at trial and they are even
inconsistent with each other.
It is often difficult for a panel to
assess an offender's personality today
compared with whom he or she was at the time
of a long-ago crime. With [i]nmate Berta,
there is no such difficulty. The panel finds
12 A-2306-15T1
that [i]nmate Berta is as deeply possessed of
criminal thinking and the compulsion to
manipulate as he was when he ended the life
of a young woman who loved him. The Panel
finds that his is a deeply rooted pathology
that is not mitigated by the programs he has
taken, or the fact that he has a low LSI-R
score. The [p]anel finds that he is a
dangerous individual and that there is a
substantial likelihood that he would commit
another crime if released on parole.
Within the confidential addendum, the Board also referenced and
considered the psychologist report.
Contrary to Berta's assertions, the Board considered all
applicable mitigating factors, including his achievement and
maintenance of minimum custody status, and his favorable
institutional adjustment, his last infraction having been
committed in 2002. Yet, the Board found these mitigating factors,
on balance, were outweighed by other factors. Berta's low LSI-R
was specifically found to be less consequential than Berta's
psychopathic and manipulative disposition. As such, the Board was
well within its discretion to conclude there existed a substantial
likelihood that Berta would commit a crime if released.
In the Board's assessment of Berta's likely future behavior,
it relied on a "subjective appraisal" predicated upon its
experience in parole-release decisions. The Board's decision to
grant or deny parole requires a careful review of data gathered
from various sources to create a rational basis from which it can
13 A-2306-15T1
make an informed prediction of an inmate’s future behavior. This
decision-making process is inherently fraught with subjectivity.
We thus accord the Board broad discretion. Puchalski v. N.J.
State Parole Bd., 104 N.J. Super. 294, 300 (App. Div.), aff'd, 55
N.J. 113 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938, 90 S. Ct. 1841, 26
L. Ed. 2d 270 (1970).
In sum, after our independent review of the record, we are
satisfied that the Board's decision was supported by sufficient,
credible facts in the record, including the Board's confidential
appendices. See Greenholtz, supra, 442 U.S. at 9-10, 99 S. Ct.
at 2105, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 677. The Board assessed the relevant
factors, fully documented, and supported its decision pursuant to
N.J.A.C. 10A:71-318(f). In light of the Board's assessment of
Berta, and mindful that we "must give 'due regard' to the ability
of the factfinder" with expertise in this field to judge
credibility, T.H. v. Div. of Developmental Disabilities, 381 N.J.
Super. 366, 381-82 (App. Div. 2005), rev'd on other grounds, 189
N.J. 478 (2007), we conclude that the decision was not arbitrary
or capricious.
Berta also contends that the Board's imposition of a FET
outside of the presumptive guideline was arbitrary, capricious,
and unreasonable. We disagree.
14 A-2306-15T1
An inmate serving a sentence for murder is ordinarily assigned
a twenty-seven month FET after a denial of parole. N.J.A.C.
10A:71-3.21(a)(1). The Board in its discretion may add or deduct
nine months to this FET. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(c). However, in
cases where an ordinary FET is "clearly inappropriate due to the
inmate's lack of satisfactory progress in reducing the likelihood
of future criminal behavior[,]" a three-member panel may impose a
FET in excess of administrative guidelines. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-
3.21(d). Further, "[i]n making the determination that the
establishment of a future parole eligibility date pursuant to (a)
or (b) and (c) above is clearly inappropriate, the three-member
panel shall consider the factors enumerated in N.J.A.C. 10A:71-
3.11." N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(d).4
Appellate courts do not substitute their judgment for that
of the Board with respect to denial of parole or the setting of a
FET. See Cestari, supra, 224 N.J. Super. at 547; see also In re
Polk License Revocation, 90 N.J. 550, 578 (1982).
In this matter, the Board established a 120-month FET:
In establishing this [FET], the Board
panel recognized that at the time of the
4
Parenthetically, for an inmate who committed a crime prior to
August 19, 1997, such as Berta, the FET is reduced by credits. A
FET for an inmate serving a sentence for a crime committed on or
after to August 19, 1997 is not reduced by credits. See N.J.A.C.
10A:71-3.2(i); see also N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.56(b).
15 A-2306-15T1
murder in this case, you had a clean criminal
record and a very good work record, you were
relatively well educated with a wife and
children, and overall, you seemingly
maintained an "outward appearance" of a
normal, successful husband and father.
However, the jury's verdict finding you guilty
of the murder of [the victim] reveals your
manipulation of your wife, the victim and at
least one other woman resulting in the
execution of your girlfriend[.] In assessing
your present state of thinking at your
hearing, the Board panel determined that,
depending on your audience, your current
version of the facts of the murder varies from
outright denial, to mitigation of your actions
leading up to the murder, to the suggestion
of mere coincidence and supposition that your
wife committed the murder, yet you accept
responsibility for your "actions." Having the
opportunity to assess your credibility, the
Board panel finds that you have little to no
credibility when it comes to questions that
involve the murder or your personality and
that you are as deeply possessed of criminal
thinking and the likelihood to manipulate as
you were when you ended the life of a young
woman with whom you had a relationship. Your
disposition of manipulation continued even
after many years of incarceration, thus
revealing a lack of satisfactory progress in
reducing the likelihood of future criminal
behavior.
The Board enunciated specific reasons for the imposition of
a 120-month FET. Particularly, the Board noted several reasons
for establishing a FET outside of the administrative guidelines.
This included Berta's overall institutional adjustment and his
insufficient problem resolution. Although the Board noted that
Berta's last infraction occurred in 2002, and his seven infractions
16 A-2306-15T1
were minor in nature, the Board found there was "evidence of an
inability or unwillingness to restrict [his] behavior to meet the
rules and requirements of incarceration." Moreover, the Board
detailed its findings regarding Berta's lack of insight into his
violent behavior, denial of his crime, and minimization of his
conduct.
Although the 120-month FET is lengthy, the Board's decision
was reached on sufficient credible evidence amply supported by the
record and well within the Board's broad discretion; the imposition
of a lengthier FET here is neither arbitrary nor capricious. See
Trantino IV, supra, 154 N.J. at 24 (citing Brady v. Dep't of Pers.,
149 N.J. 244, 256 (1997). See, e.g., McGowan, supra, 347 N.J.
Super. at 565 (upholding the establishment of a thirty-year FET).
See also Johnson v. Paparozzi, 219 F. Supp. 2d 635, 642-43 (D.N.J.
2002) (rejecting an inmate's argument that the setting of a 120-
month FET was unconstitutional where the panel complies with the
direction of N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21 and considers the twenty-three
factors enumerated in N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11).
Additionally, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(d)(4), the
Board provided a written statement of reasons for the establishment
of a FET differing from the presumptive guideline established in
N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(a). While regard was also given to mitigating
factors, which the Board enumerated in its decision, based on
17 A-2306-15T1
"sufficient credible evidence in the whole record," the balance
weighed in favor of denying parole and in fixing Berta's FET at
120 months. See Cestari, supra, 154 N.J. Super at 547.
Having reviewed the record in light of these well-settled
standards, including the psychological evaluation and other
materials in the confidential appendix, we conclude that
appellant's arguments are without merit. We are satisfied that
the Board considered the "aggregate of all pertinent factors,"
N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(a). The totality of the aggravating factors,
supported by the record, provided the Board with sufficient bases
to deny parole and impose the FET. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(d). In
sum, the Board's decision is entitled to our deference.
Affirmed.
18 A-2306-15T1