DCPP VS. T.M.T. AND M.S.IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF J.E.T.(FG-09-0112-16, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4777-15T3
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD
PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
T.M.T.,
Defendant-Appellant
and
M.S.,
Defendant.
___________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP
OF J.E.T., a minor.
___________________________________
Submitted September 20, 2017 – Decided October 23, 2017
Before Judges Fuentes, Koblitz, and Suter.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
Docket No. FG-09-0112-16.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Catherine Reid, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Joyce
Calefati Booth, Deputy Attorney General, on
the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
Guardian, attorney for minor (Todd Wilson,
Designated Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant T.M.T. appeals from a Family Part order dated June
24, 2016 terminating her parental rights to her daughter, J.E.T.
(Jill).1 We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in
Judge Lourdes I. Santiago's comprehensive written opinion issued
with the order.
T.M.T. is the biological mother of four children. Jill, the
oldest child, was born in October 2003. T.M.T.'s parental rights
to her other children, Gary, Carrie and Penny, were terminated in
other proceedings. We affirmed those terminations. See N.J. Div.
of Youth & Family Servs. v. T.M.T., No. A-4189-11 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 216 N.J. 363 (2013) (T.M.T.) and N.J. Div. of
Child Prot. & Permanency v. T.M.T., No. A-4990-13 (Jan. 6, 2016).
Jill and her siblings were removed from T.M.T.'s care in 2008
by the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) due
1
We use fictitious names throughout the opinion to protect the
children's privacy. R. 1:38-3(d)(12).
2 A-4777-15T3
to concerns about T.M.T.'s mental health when she claimed another
woman's child was her baby. T.M.T. was hospitalized for suicidal
ideations, engaged in self-mutilation and "was diagnosed with
alcohol abuse, depressive disorder and bipolar disorder." T.M.T.,
supra, slip op. at 4. The children remained in resource homes.
[A] pattern of mental health issues and non-
cooperation was repeated over the next several
years. T.M.T. repeatedly refused to cooperate
with court-ordered drug testing, refused to
let the assigned Division case worker inspect
her home, and refused to allow psychologists
or psychiatrists to evaluate her except on
terms that she dictated. She also denied that
she was mentally ill, although she
periodically experienced mental health
crises.
[Id. at 3-4.]2
The first guardianship trial in 2012 involved Jill, Gary and
Carrie. The record supported the trial court's finding that
"T.M.T. has chronic severe mental illness which she has not
acknowledged or successfully addressed, and which preclude[ed] her
from safely caring for her children." Id. at 32. We said that
"[T.M.T.'s] failure to acknowledge or address her mental illness,
and her resulting inability to care for her children has led to
their extended stay in foster care." Id. at 33. We affirmed the
2
We cite to our unreported decisions because they involve the
same party, T.M.T., and her children, although the other opinions
refer to her as "T.T."
3 A-4777-15T3
trial court's decision "that the Division proved the first three
prongs of the best interest tests under [N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)]
by clear and convincing evidence as to all three children." Id.
at 35.
The Family court terminated T.M.T.'s parental rights to Gary,
who was to be adopted by his resource family. However, it denied
termination of T.M.T.'s parental rights to Jill and Carrie. We
affirmed those orders, agreeing that the Division had not proven
the fourth prong of the statutory test with respect to Jill or
Carrie. Ibid. Neither Jill nor Carrie had adoptive home
placements at that time. The children were "at risk to remain in
'foster care limbo.'" Ibid. They needed therapeutic foster home
placements to be ready to be adopted. At that time, T.M.T. was
"their only continuing source of emotional support, even though
she was incapable of parenting [the children]." Id. at 36.
We made clear that should the Division find adoptive parents
for Jill and Carrie and if T.M.T. were still not able to parent
the children, then the Division could refile for guardianship.
The inquiry would then be to "address the children's current
situation, T.M.T.'s current ability to provide them with
4 A-4777-15T3
permanency, and if she has no such ability, whether there is a
permanent adoptive home for each child."3 Id. at 36 n.7.
Jill has special needs. Raymond Brown, the Division's
caseworker, testified at the guardianship trial that Jill suffers
from "boundary issues, some sexualized behaviors," "ADHD, power
struggle[s]," "academic issues, [and] issues with her peers." The
Division placed Jill with "Family B" in April 2015. This was
Jill's sixth resource home. T.M.T. had moved to Florida a year
earlier and did not maintain contact with Jill.
In August 2015, the Division filed a guardianship complaint
seeking to terminate T.M.T.'s parental rights to Jill. On June
24, 2016, following three days of trial, Judge Santiago ordered
the termination of T.M.T.'s parental rights. In her written
decision, she addressed each prong of the statutory test.
With regard to the first prong, the judge discussed T.M.T.'s
"chronic and untreated mental health issues and her unwillingness
to engage in services." She found that Jill "has suffered
instability and enduring harm by T.M.T.'s inability to provide her
3
In 2013, the Division filed a guardianship complaint seeking the
termination of T.M.T.'s parental rights to Carrie and T.M.T.'s new
baby, Penny. We affirmed the 2014 termination of T.M.T.'s parental
rights to these children in an unpublished opinion in 2016. See
N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. T.M.T., supra, No.
A-4990-13.
5 A-4777-15T3
with a stable home," thus making T.M.T. unable to offer Jill the
potential of reunification. Regarding the second prong, the judge
found that T.M.T. was unwilling to engage in required mental health
treatment, making her unable to abate the harm to Jill. With
regard to the third prong, the judge found that although the
Division had been granted a "no reasonable efforts" order, it
"continued to offer [her] services." T.M.T. was provided with
"parenting classes, therapy, individual psychotherapy and
medication monitoring." The Division assisted her in obtaining
Section 8 housing, and "numerous referrals for therapy." T.M.T.
was uncooperative, however. Her services were disrupted when she
moved to Florida and would not provide the Division with an
address. The Division ruled out other relatives for possible
placement.
With respect to the fourth prong, the judge found the Division
proved by clear and convincing proof that terminating T.M.T.'s
rights to Jill would not do more harm than good. There was no
evidence presented by T.M.T. that she had "made any improvements
in her ability to parent or that she is interested in reunification
with [Jill]." In the current home, there were resource parents
willing to adopt her who could address any harm arising from
terminating T.M.T.'s rights.
6 A-4777-15T3
On appeal, T.M.T. challenges the judge's finding that prong
four was satisfied. She contends the Division did not meet its
burden of showing that termination was in Jill's best interest,
because it did not show by clear and convincing evidence that Jill
may be adopted. T.M.T. also contends the judge was not impartial
and that "she had pre-judge[d]" the case. We find no merit to
these contentions.
"Our review of a trial judge's decision to terminate parental
rights is limited." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L.,
191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007) (citing In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172
N.J. 440, 472 (2002)). We must accord substantial deference to
the findings of the Family Part due to that court's "special
jurisdiction and expertise in family matters." Cesare v. Cesare,
154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998).
A parent has a fundamental right to enjoy a relationship with
his or her child. In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337,
346-47 (1999). These rights "are not absolute," but are "tempered
by the State's parens patriae responsibility to protect the welfare
of children." Id. at 347. The standard by which the rights of
the parents and the interests of the State in the welfare of the
child are balanced is "through the best interests of the child
standard." Ibid. Under that standard, an individual's parental
7 A-4777-15T3
rights may be terminated if the Division establishes all of the
following criteria:
(1) The child's safety, health or
development has been or will continue to be
endangered by the parental relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to
eliminate the harm facing the child or is
unable or unwilling to provide a safe and
stable home for the child and the delay of
permanent placement will add to the harm.
Such harm may include evidence that separating
the child from his resource family parents
would cause serious and enduring emotional or
psychological harm to the child;
(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable
efforts to provide services to help the parent
correct the circumstances which led to the
child's placement outside the home and the
court has considered alternatives to
termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not
do more harm than good.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1)-(4).]
Each prong must be proven by the Division with clear and convincing
evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J.
420, 447 (2012).
Our 2013 decision affirmed the finding that the Division had
proven all three prongs of the statutory test regarding T.M.T.
That case involved Jill. In her 2016 opinion, Judge Santiago
included findings that addressed each of those three prongs, even
8 A-4777-15T3
though the first three prongs already were proven. T.M.T. has not
appealed those findings.
T.M.T. challenges the judge's finding under the fourth prong
of the statute. We are satisfied that there was sufficient
credible evidence in the record to make this finding.
The fourth statutory prong requires the trial court to balance
the harms suffered from terminating parental rights against the
good that will result from terminating these rights. See K.H.O.,
supra, 161 N.J. at 363; see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs.
v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 610-11 (1986). "The question to be
addressed under [the fourth] prong is whether, after considering
and balancing the two relationships, the child will suffer a
greater harm from the termination of ties with her natural parents
than from the permanent disruption of her relationship with her
foster parents." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 355.
The trial judge's conclusion on the fourth prong was
supported. Dr. Frank Dyer testified for the Division that Jill's
current resource family was "viewed as being particularly good at
caring for the more challenging children in the system." They
were "absolutely committed" to adopting Jill.
9 A-4777-15T3
Dr. Dyer conducted a psychological re-evaluation of Jill and
a bonding evaluation between Jill and her resource mother. 4 Jill
reported a "sense of safety and security in her resource home" and
expressed a desire to live with the resource family. She was
"beginning to form a genuine attachment to her current resource
parents." Dr. Dyer testified that Jill would not suffer enduring
harm if T.M.T.'s parental rights were terminated because the
resource parents could ameliorate any harm. Jill would be placed
at risk of harm if reunified with her mother.
T.M.T. is critical of the Division's proof because there was
no first hand testimony from the resource family. However, we are
satisfied the record supported the availability of an adoption
opportunity for Jill. Jill remained with the family for more than
a year despite behavioral issues that might have disrupted the
placement. Other placements in the past failed because of Jill's
behaviors. As Dr. Dyer testified,
My overall impression is that [Jill] is
exactly where she needs to be with caretakers
who love and value her, who don't have ideas
that she's possessed by a demon, no concerns
that she's going to grow up to be
schizophrenic. They're comfortable with her.
They enjoy her. They're meeting her needs.
The child is happy there. And this is really
the ideal placement for her, in my view, which
4
T.M.T. failed to attend the examination and bonding evaluation
that were set up for her.
10 A-4777-15T3
is something that this girl deserves after
five previous resource placements and a failed
reunification.
T.M.T. never presented any evidence to the contrary about the
supportive environment offered by the resource family.
T.M.T. is critical of Jill's placement because one of the
children living with the resource family ran away. It is sheer
speculation to intimate that conduct had anything to do with the
resource family or Jill. We are satisfied there was substantial
credible evidence in the record to support the court's finding
that the fourth prong was satisfied.
T.M.T. contends the judge was not impartial, challenging the
fairness of the decision. Our review of the record shows there
is no basis whatsoever to this claim. There was no proof the
termination decision was based on anything other than the evidence
in the case, which amply supported the termination order. T.M.T.
had notice and an opportunity to appear at the hearing; she was
excused because of illness. Any conversation the judge had with
T.M.T.'s sister was made in open court. Understandably, the judge
questioned aloud T.M.T.'s mental health and behavior after T.M.T.
first asked the judge at a pre-trial conference whether she spoke
with "dead people" and then, when asked if she would accept service
11 A-4777-15T3
of the complaint, told the judge to "take it and shove it," to "go
to Hell" and then to "put that shit on the record."
After carefully reviewing the record and the applicable legal
principles, we conclude that T.M.T.'s further arguments are
without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
12 A-4777-15T3