DCPP VS. D.B., SR. AND C.B. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF W.I.B. AND D.B., JR. (FG-14-0016-16, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1621-16T3
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD
PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
D.B., SR.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
C.B.,
Defendant.
________________________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF
W.I.B. and D.B., JR.,
Minors.
________________________________________________
Argued October 11, 2017 – Decided November 13, 2017
Before Judges Yannotti, Carroll and Leone.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County,
Docket No. FG-14-0016-16.
Mark E. Kleiman, Designated Counsel, argued
the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Kleiman, on the
briefs).
Chanel J. Van Dyke, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Christopher
S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Jason
W. Rockwell, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Ms. Van Dyke, on the brief).
Linda Vele Alexander, Designated Counsel,
argued the cause for minors (Joseph E.
Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
attorney; Ms. Vele Alexander, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
D.B., Sr. appeals from an order entered by the Family Part
on December 1, 2016, which terminated his parental rights to two
minor children, W.I.B. and D.B., Jr.1 On appeal, D.B. argues that
the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) failed
to establish with clear and convincing evidence all of the criteria
in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) for termination of his parental rights.
For the reasons that follow, we reject these arguments and affirm.
I.
We briefly summarize the relevant facts and procedural
history. In February 2009, while he was married to A.B., D.B. met
C.B. on-line. Several months later, he moved in with C.B. and her
1
We use initials for the parents and others in order to protect
their identities, and hereinafter refer to D.B., Sr. as D.B.,
D.B., Jr. as D.J., and W.I.B. as W.B.
2 A-1621-16T3
three children, K.C., H.R., and D.D. At that time, D.B. was married
to A.B. In May 2010, C.B. gave birth to W.B. She was D.B. and
C.B.'s first child. D.B. divorced A.B., and in December 2010,
married C.B. D.J. was their second child. He was born in September
2013. D.B. has two other children. The Division's involvement with
C.B. and her family began in August 2005, when the Division removed
K.C. and H.R. from her care. These children were later returned
to C.B.
In 2009, shortly after D.B. moved in with C.B., the Division
began to receive reports that the home was filthy, and that D.B.
and C.B. had not been parenting the children properly. The Division
opened a case file and began to provide services to the family.
In November 2011, the Division referred D.B., C.B., W.B., and D.J.
for services including Family Preservation Services (FPS) and
psychological evaluations. By the end of 2011, C.B. and the
children had participated in FPS's programs, and there was some
improvement to the cleanliness of the home and the children, but
FPS recommended more intensive services.
In January 2012, the Center for Evaluation and Counseling
(CEC) performed forensic psychological evaluations and concluded
that home-based family counseling was necessary to address D.B.
and C.B.'s inadequate parenting skills. CEC also found that
individual psychotherapy was required for the parents and two of
3 A-1621-16T3
the children, K.C. and H.R. The CEC noted that D.B. had not
accepted responsibility for the conditions that led to the
Division's involvement with the family, citing his busy work
schedule, participation in the National Guard, and general lack
of knowledge about what went on in the home. Throughout the
remainder of 2012, the Division continued to provide services to
the family, including rental assistance, referral to a food pantry,
and in-home services.
In January 2013, one of the Division's workers arrived
unannounced at D.B. and C.B.'s home. While there, the worker noted,
among other things, piles of clothes on the sofas and floor, cat
litter scattered throughout the house, a strong odor of cat feces,
inadequate heat on the second floor, three cats eating cat food
out of cans on the kitchen table, and dishes piled high in the
sink. The worker reported that the conditions in the home were
chaotic.
In June 2013, another Division worker made an unannounced
visit to the home. The worker noted that there were dirty clothes
throughout, and the sink was overflowing with dirty dishes. The
worker then witnessed W.B. climb into a crib. According to the
worker, W.B. was lying flat on her back. She had her pants down
around her ankles and a vibrating device against her vagina.
4 A-1621-16T3
The worker reported that W.B. sometimes slept in her parents'
room. The worker indicated that C.B. had disclosed that she and
D.B. sometimes used "sex toys" and together they have had sex with
a third person. C.B. claimed, however, that the children were not
at home during those times. The Division ultimately found that the
vibrator W.B. was seen using on her private area was C.B.'s back
massager.
In April 2014, the Division received an anonymous call stating
that C.B.'s eldest child, K.C., who was then eleven years old,
told the caller she had been left at home to babysit the other
children, who were five months to seven years old. One of the
Division's workers made an unannounced visit to the home and found
D.B. with the children. D.B. told the worker that he would never
leave an eleven-year-old child alone to care for the other
children, although other witnesses disputed D.B.'s assertion.
In June 2013, while C.B. was pregnant with D.J., D.B. met
I.S. online. As we noted previously, D.J. was born in September
2013. Shortly after D.J. was born, the Division visited the home
and found that it was infested with bedbugs. The Division paid the
extermination costs and purchased new beds and sofas for the
family. By December 2013, the Division considered the conditions
in the home to be marginally improved.
5 A-1621-16T3
In March 2014, D.B. met I.S. in Boston for their first in-
person meeting. When D.B. returned from Boston, he began to end
his relationship with C.B. At some point, K.C. was sent to stay
with a relative in Pennsylvania. D.B. decided that I.S. should
move in to help C.B. care for the children. He drove with W.B. to
North Carolina to pick up I.S., but C.B. did not agree with his
plan and called the police. She insisted that D.B. return with
W.B.
In May 2014, C.B. obtained a temporary restraining order
(TRO) against D.B., claiming that he had abused her emotionally
and verbally. After C.B. agreed to allow D.B. to return to the
home, the TRO was dismissed. In June 2014, D.B. moved to North
Carolina. He told the Division he intended to surrender his
parental rights to his children, and he would not return to New
Jersey unless C.B. permitted I.S. to reside in the family home.
Later that month, the Division removed W.B., D.J., and the
other children after a worker found them dirty, hungry, and covered
with insect bites. At the time, the children were apparently
staying with their elderly grandmother at her home. The Division's
worker observed the children outside, playing on a strip of grass,
without adult supervision.
On June 16, 2014, the trial court granted the Division's
application for immediate custody, care and supervision of the
6 A-1621-16T3
children. Shortly thereafter, the Division placed D.J. in a
resource home with Mr. and Mrs. P. Several months later, W.B. was
placed with Mr. and Mrs. P. C.B.'s other children were also placed
in resource homes.
In August 2014, the CEC issued a report recommending that the
Division pursue alternate placements for the children due to "the
severity and chronicity of [D.B. and C.B.'s] neglectful parenting
. . . ." The August 2014 report stated that visitation with both
parents should be supervised, but D.B.'s visits should be
supervised therapeutically due to his reported anger-management
issues.
In December 2014, the CEC issued another report, which noted
that D.B. recognized the need for alternative housing to begin
reunification, but he had made little progress to secure such
housing. By January 2015, D.B. was living in a trailer in North
Carolina with I.S. That same month, the CEC evaluated I.S. and
recommended that she be included in D.B.'s visits with his children
because she was part of D.B.'s reunification plan. The CEC also
recommended that I.S. receive individual psychotherapy because she
had been sexually abused in the past.
In March 2015, the trial court suspended D.B.'s visitation
after W.B. made a comment to her foster parents indicating D.B.
may have sexually abused her. The Division investigated the report
7 A-1621-16T3
and determined the allegation of sexual abuse was unfounded, but
found that D.B. and C.B. had exposed W.B. to sexual behaviors and
materials. For this reason, the Division determined that D.B. had
sexually exploited W.B. After a hearing on May 19, 2015, the court
reinstated D.B.'s visits.
In June 2015, D.B. informed the Division that he and I.S. had
moved back to New Jersey and were residing with his parents. In
August 2015, the trial court approved the Division's permanency
plan for W.B. and D.J., which called for the termination of D.B.
and C.B.'s parental rights and adoption of the children by Mr. and
Mrs. P. Thereafter, the Division filed its guardianship complaint.
In September 2015, D.B. acknowledged that he and C.B. had an
altercation with knives and the children had been exposed to sex
toys. In December 2015, Dr. Alice Nadelman conducted psychological
evaluations of D.B. and I.S. She also performed bonding evaluations
of D.B. and the children, and the foster parents and the children.
Among other things, Dr. Nadelman recommended that the
Division seek the termination of D.B.'s parental rights. She found
that D.B. was not able to provide the children with appropriate
parental care at that time or in the foreseeable future; and that
D.B. had not demonstrated the ability to provide the children
shelter, nurturing, consistency, or stability.
8 A-1621-16T3
In addition, Dr. Nadelman stated that W.B. displayed an
"intense but ambivalent" attachment with D.B. She also stated that
D.J. viewed D.B. "more like a friendly visitor than a parent." She
concluded that the children would not experience severe and
enduring harm if their relationships with D.B. are severed.
Dr. Nadelman further found that W.B. would likely miss D.B.
if his parental rights were terminated, but the child's foster
parents would be able to mitigate the harm from the loss. She
stated that D.J. views his foster parents as his parents and he
seemed more secure with them than with D.B. According to Dr.
Nadelman, D.J. would not suffer any harm if D.B.'s parental rights
are terminated.
Dr. Mark Singer, D.B's expert, performed psychological
evaluations of D.B. and I.S. He also performed bonding evaluations
of the children. In his report, Dr. Singer wrote that reunification
with the children would require "a significant transition period"
to introduce W.B. to a new family, and D.B. would require
additional time for the transition. Dr. Singer stated that D.B.
was not able to parent W.B. and D.J. capably at the present time,
but he could do so sometime in the future if he complied with
certain recommendations.
In April, May, and June 2016, the Family Part judge conducted
a trial on the Division's guardianship complaint. Prior to trial,
9 A-1621-16T3
C.B. surrendered her parental rights to W.B. and D.J. so that Mr.
and Mrs. P. could adopt them. At the trial, the Division presented
testimony from four caseworkers, Dr. Nadelman, and persons from
the CEC, including Melissa Ciottone. D.B. testified on his own
behalf, and called I.S. and Dr. Singer as witnesses.
Thereafter, the trial judge filed a forty-six page opinion,
in which she found that the Division had proven by clear and
convincing evidence all of the criteria in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)
for termination of D.B.'s parental rights to W.B. and D.J. The
judge memorialized her decision in an order entered on December
1, 2016. This appeal followed.
II.
On appeal, D.B. argues that the trial judge erred by finding
that the Division had proven all four prongs of the best interests
test in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) for termination of his parental
rights. We disagree.
We note initially that the scope of our review in an appeal
from an order terminating parental rights is limited. N.J. Div.
of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007) (citing
In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002)). "Appellate
courts must defer to a trial judge's findings of fact if supported
by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence in the record."
10 A-1621-16T3
Ibid. (citing In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188
(App. Div. 1993)).
The Division may petition the court for an order terminating
an individual's parental rights when such relief is warranted in
the "best interests of the child," and the court may grant the
petition if the Division establishes the criteria in N.J.S.A.
30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing evidence. In re Guardianship
of K.L.F., 129 N.J. 32, 38 (1992) (citing In re J.C., 129 N.J. 1,
10-11 (1992)). "The four criteria enumerated in the best interests
standard are not discrete and separate; they relate to and overlap
with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that
identifies a child's best interests." In re Guardianship of K.H.O.,
161 N.J. 337, 348 (1999).
A. Prong One
On appeal, D.B. argues that the trial judge erred by finding
that the Division established prong one of the best interests
standard, which requires the Division to show that "[t]he child's
safety, health or development has been or will continue to be
endangered by the parental relationship." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
15.1(a)(1). D.B. contends the evidence does not show that W.B. and
D.J. have been harmed by his relationship with them.
It is well established that the Division is not required to
demonstrate actual harm in order to satisfy prong one. N.J. Div.
11 A-1621-16T3
of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 418, 440 (App.
Div. 2001), certif. denied, 171 N.J. 44 (2002). Rather, the
Division must show that the child's safety, health or development
has been or will be endangered in the future, and whether the
parent is or will be able to eliminate the harm. Ibid.A parent's failure to provide a "permanent, safe, and stable
home" engenders significant harm to the child. In re Guardianship
of DMH, 161 N.J. 365, 383 (1999). Likewise, a parent's failure to
provide "solicitude, nurture, and care for an extended period of
time is in itself a harm that endangers the health and development
of the child." Id. at 379.
In this case, the trial judge found that the Division had
"unquestionably demonstrated" that D.B. placed W.B. and D.J. at
substantial risk of harm. The judge noted that D.B. was aware that
the Division had been involved with C.B. and her children since
2005, when the Division removed C.B.'s two oldest children from
her care. The judge noted that D.B. had withheld information from
the Division regarding the conditions in the home, which he knew
placed the children at risk.
The judge found that D.B. had acknowledged that C.B. posed a
continuing risk to his children, and he only participated minimally
in family counseling from 2011 until 2014, when the Division
removed the children. The judge noted that after the Division
12 A-1621-16T3
removed the children, D.B. did nothing to secure appropriate
housing and did not present an appropriate parenting plan to the
Division.
The judge also pointed out that D.B. had sexually exploited
W.B. and allowed C.B. to exploit her sexually. The child's
therapist had testified that W.B. exhibited age-inappropriate
sexual behaviors. Further, D.B. had admitted he was aware that
C.B. had sex toys in the home, and that the children may have
walked in on him and C.B. while they were having sex. D.B. told
the CEC that he caught D.D. watching pornography on his cell phone
and iPad. Moreover, C.B. had reported to the Division that D.B.
often watched pornography in the family room.
The judge found that D.B. had harmed W.B. by exposing her to
sexualized material and behavior, and allowing C.B. to expose the
child to such inappropriate material and behavior. The judge
concluded that D.B. had neglected both children while they were
in his care. He had essentially abandoned the children to C.B.'s
care so that he could pursue a romantic relationship with I.S. He
also delayed in making provisions for the children's care when
they were first placed in a resource home.
We are convinced that there is sufficient credible evidence
to support the judge's findings. The record supports the judge's
conclusion that the Division established prong one with clear and
13 A-1621-16T3
convincing evidence. D.B.'s arguments to the contrary are entirely
without merit.
B. Prong Two
D.B. next argues that the evidence does not support the
judge's finding that the Division established prong two of the
best interests test. This prong requires the Division to establish
that "[t]he parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm
facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and
stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement
will add to the harm." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2).
Here, the trial judge noted that D.B. was willing and eager
to parent the children, and he had complied with the court's orders
and the Division's services. The judge found that, even so, D.B.
is unable to cease causing harm to the children in the foreseeable
future. The judge found Dr. Nadelman's report and testimony on
these issues to be credible and persuasive.
The judge referenced Dr. Nadelman's determination that D.B.
had shown little understanding that participating in services was
just the first step in a process that involves learning, accepting
responsibility, changing, and developing a more adaptive life and
parenting skills. Dr. Nadelman opined that D.B. had not recognized
his responsibility for the children's conditions of neglect, lack
of adequate supervision, unclean and unhealthy environment, and
14 A-1621-16T3
exposure to inappropriate persons and adult sexuality. The doctor
noted that D.B. abdicated his parental responsibilities by moving
to North Carolina while his family's conditions deteriorated.
In addition, Dr. Nadelman opined that D.B. had "repeatedly
demonstrated poor judgment, faulty reasoning, denial of
responsibility, inadequate cause and effect thinking, distortion
of reality[,] and purposeful deception, none of which [D.B.] was
willing to acknowledge." The doctor stated that D.B. did not
demonstrate the capacity to provide safe and appropriate parental
care for the children at that time or in the foreseeable future.
The doctor concluded that D.B. "has not demonstrated the ability
to protect his children from danger or even to recognize potential
dangers to their safety and well-being."
On appeal, D.B. argues that the judge erred by relying upon
Dr. Nadelman's report and testimony. He contends Dr. Nadelman was
confused as to the psychological tests she administered to him,
as well as the components of those tests. He asserts that Dr.
Nadelman's findings lack sufficient scientific basis and therefore
constitute a net opinion. He further argues that the bases for Dr.
Nadelman's conclusions are spurious and inaccurate.
We are convinced, however, that there is sufficient credible
evidence in the record for the judge's findings. We reject D.B.'s
contention that the judge erred by accepting Dr. Nadelman's report
15 A-1621-16T3
and testimony. An appellate court must defer to the trial court's
assessment of an expert's testimony because the trial court is in
a better position "to evaluate the witness' credibility,
qualifications, and the weight to be accorded to [the expert's]
testimony." DMH, supra, 161 N.J. at 382. We see no reason to
second-guess the judge's assessment and evaluation of Dr.
Nadelman's report and testimony.
We therefore conclude that the record supports the judge's
determination that D.B. is unable or unwilling to eliminate the
harm to the children, and a delay in permanent placement will
cause further harm. The record supports the judge's determination
that the Division had established prong two by clear and convincing
evidence.
C. Prong Three
D.B. argues that the Division failed to establish prong three
of the best interests test, which requires that it show it "made
reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent[s]
correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement
outside the home and the court considered alternatives to
termination of parental rights . . . [.]" N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
15.1(a)(3).
On appeal, D.B. argues that although the Division provided
him with an array of services, it failed to provide him with a
16 A-1621-16T3
formal case plan, as required by N.J.A.C. 10:133D-1.4 (recodified
at N.J.A.C. 3A:12-1.4), until after the trial had already begun.2
He contends the trial judge erred by overlooking the Division's
"misfeasance" and by finding that there is no question that D.B.
knew what he had to do to achieve reunification with his children.
D.B. therefore argues the judge erred by finding that the Division
made the reasonable efforts required by N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3).
We are convinced D.B.'s arguments are without sufficient
merit to warrant comment. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We note, however,
that the Division provided D.B. with numerous services, including
Family Team Meetings, in-home therapy, rental assistance,
Christmas gifts for the children, funds for new furniture and
insect extermination services, therapy, visitation, travel
expenses, parenting classes, and forensic psychological
evaluations and therapy.
The trial judge found that although the Division did not
provide D.B. with a formal written case plan until May 2016, the
caseworkers all had testified credibly that they had maintained
daily communications with D.B., and he was well advised as to what
2
A "case plan" is defined as "a written statement of the Division's
intervention on behalf of the child, which includes identification
of the problems [that] necessitate Division involvement with the
family, the services or actions needed, who will accomplish or
provide them, and the planned time frame for providing each
service." N.J.A.C. 10:133-1.3 (recodified at N.J.A.C. 3A:11-1.3).
17 A-1621-16T3
was required to achieve reunification with the children. The record
supports the judge's findings and her conclusion that the Division
made reasonable efforts to help D.B. address the circumstances
that led to the children's removal.
Accordingly, we conclude that there is sufficient credible
evidence in the record to support the judge's findings on prong
three. The record supports the judge's finding that the Division
had established prong three with clear and convincing evidence.
D. Prong Four
D.B. contends the Division did not present clear and
convincing evidence establishing prong four, which requires the
Division to show that the "[t]ermination of parental rights will
not do more harm than good." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). D.B. argues
that the judge erred by relying upon Dr. Nadelman's report and
testimony for her findings on prong four because of the
aforementioned alleged deficiencies in Dr. Nadelman's report and
testimony. D.B. therefore argues that the judge's determination
that the Division established prong four is not based on sufficient
credible evidence.
In her opinion, the judge noted that Dr. Nadelman had
performed bonding evaluations, which showed that W.B. had an
"intense but ambivalent" attachment to D.B., and that D.J. was
securely attached to his foster parents. Dr. Nadelman stated that
18 A-1621-16T3
D.J. would suffer no harm if D.B.'s parental rights are terminated,
and while W.B. would be sad and confused, the foster parents could
mitigate any harm. Dr. Nadelman opined that the termination of
D.B.'s parental rights would allow the children to retain the
stability and security they now have with their resource parents.
The judge also pointed out that Dr. Nadelman had opined that
the resource home was the only "safe and stable" home W.B. has
had, and D.J. has been in the resource home since he was nine
months old. Dr. Nadelman opined that if the children are removed,
they would both experience "loss, separation reaction, and anger"
towards D.B., which he would not be able to mitigate.
Dr. Nadelman noted that introducing I.S. as a "new mommy"
would be an additional risk of harm and it would cause confusion.
Dr. Nadelman added that D.B.'s plan to co-parent the children with
I.S. would present another risk since there would be four children
in the family. I.S.'s children are older, and her son had exhibited
aggression and inappropriate sexual behavior.
The judge added that Dr. Nadelman found that there is a
significant risk in placing W.B. in a home with an older boy,
given that both of them has exhibited inappropriate sexual
behavior. There also is a risk that D.B.'s relationship with I.S.
would experience stress, which Dr. Nadelman said she had "every
19 A-1621-16T3
reason to believe will happen due to their independent risk
factors."
The judge noted that Dr. Singer had suggested that the
children would not suffer undue harm if D.B. were afforded
additional time to address the issues required for reunification.
The judge observed, however, that although neither expert
recommended immediate reunification, Dr. Singer could not opine
as to the timeline for permanency for the children. The judge
concluded that "[i]n balancing the equities, the children's need
for permanency outweighs [D.B.'s] right to additional time to
address the issues that led to the children's removal."
We are convinced that the judge did not err by giving
significant weight to the children's need for permanency. We note
that Dr. Nadelman found that D.B. would not be capable of parenting
the children adequately in the foreseeable future, and Dr. Singer
could not opine as to the time required for D.B. to become capable
of parenting the children.
We conclude there is sufficient credible evidence in the
record for the judge's findings on prong four. The judge properly
found that the Division had presented clear and convincing evidence
showing that the termination of D.B.'s parental rights will not
do more harm than good.
20 A-1621-16T3
III.
D.B. further argues that the trial judge abused her discretion
by qualifying Melissa Ciottone, D.B.'s therapist at the CEC, as
an expert witness. We note that at trial, the Division asked the
court to qualify Ciottone as an expert in child abuse and neglect,
evaluations, and therapy based on her education and professional
experience. D.B.'s attorney objected to qualifying Ciottone as an
expert witness in every area except for therapy. The judge
overruled the objection.
On appeal, D.B. argues that he was denied his right to due
process by the admission of Ciottone's testimony about the nature
and substance of his therapeutic sessions with her. He claims the
Division set a trap for him. He asserts he reasonably believed
that by engaging in therapy with Ciottone, he was doing what was
required to regain custody of his children. He contends the
Division then used his words against him at trial, without prior
notice to him or his attorney.
At oral argument before us, counsel for the Division noted
that D.B.'s attorney never raised this issue in the trial court.
Counsel asserted that D.B. had signed an informed consent form in
which he agreed to participate in therapeutic services conducted
at the CEC, and the form stated that any "material obtained during
these services is not privileged and may be used in a court of law
21 A-1621-16T3
or in the proceeding in which [he was] currently involved." Because
this form was not part of the record, we required the Division to
file a motion to supplement the record, which D.B. opposed. We
granted the Division's motion.
We reject D.B.'s contention that the trial judge erred by
admitting Ciottone's testimony, and that his right to due process
was denied by the admission of her testimony. As noted, D.B. signed
a form consenting to therapy at the CEC. In that form, D.B.
indicated he understood the "material obtained" in the therapy
sessions was not privileged and any such material could be used
in a court of law. Thus, there is no merit to D.B.'s contention
that his communications with Ciottone during the therapy sessions
were privileged, or that he did not have notice that his statements
could be used as evidence in the guardianship proceedings.
Affirmed.
22 A-1621-16T3