STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. NYGERA ARRINGTON (15-06-1511, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1008-15T1
GISELA R. PRIETO,
Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW and
SHILOH COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondents.
————————————————————————————————————
Submitted March 16, 2017 – Decided May 3, 2017
Before Judges Hoffman and O'Connor.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Department
of Labor, Docket No. 00047284.
Gisela R. Prieto, appellant pro se.
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent Board of Review
(Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General,
of counsel; Adam Verone, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
Clifford G. Stewart, attorney for respondent
Shiloh CDC.
PER CURIAM
Gisela Prieto appeals from the final agency decision of the
Board of Review. The Board of Review affirmed the Appeal
Tribunal's determination disqualifying Prieto from unemployment
compensation benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), for leaving work
without good cause attributable to the work. Defendant claims
good cause existed due to allegedly discriminatory and retaliatory
actions by the employer. We affirm.
Prieto began working as a part-time data manager for Shiloh
Community Development Corporation (Shiloh) in February 2014. In
October of that year, data Prieto entered into the computer began
to go missing. Prieto testified her supervisor, Linda Johnson,
screamed at her during a meeting that month, and she declined to
allow Prieto to attend certain training. At various times, Johnson
allegedly made comments to Prieto along the lines of "what do you
think you're a soul sister you don't know stuff like that." Prieto
describes herself as white and Hispanic.
On November 19, 2014, Prieto submitted an Employee
Complaint/Concern Form, in which she detailed allegations against
Johnson. Shortly thereafter, on November 23, Johnson sent Prieto
an email with an attached Employee Warning Notice, and asked her
to keep daily logs of her work, as she had failed to timely input
significant amounts of data. Following the investigation of
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Prieto's complaint, Shiloh changed Prieto's supervisor to Avril
Noyan.
On December 4, Prieto spoke with Marie Thelusma-Chase,
Shiloh's CEO, and others. Prieto expressed her belief that Noyan
had incorrectly charged patients and had improperly coded medical
records. The group asked Prieto to take some time off while they
investigated. Before she left, Prieto locked her door and turned
in her keys because she "didn't want to be falsely accused" of
"[t]aking or doing something with my work."
On December 11, Prieto had a meeting with Johnson and Noyan.
At the meeting, Noyan stated, "[S]he didn't know what kind of
Christian that [Prieto] was." On December 16, Prieto claimed
Noyan entered her office, and in a "hostile" tone, demanded to
know the status of a data discrepancy. Prieto accused Noyan of
changing records. Noyan has authority to change the records.
Around that same time, Prieto claimed she began to see
"strange people" when leaving the building, who would ask, "[H]i
how you doing?" Prieto never asked management about the "strange
people," but also claimed, "We had . . . mysterious things happen
of someone entering the office and that's it just I couldn't handle
it. I couldn't handle having to worry that I could be falsely
accused of . . . fabricating data and going to jail." Prieto said
these factors made her employment "unbearable."
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On January 4, 2015, Prieto submitted her resignation and
filed for unemployment benefits with the Division of Unemployment
Insurance. A Deputy to the Director of the Division determined
Prieto was disqualified from benefits, finding she had voluntarily
left work without good cause.
Prieto appealed to the Appeal Tribunal, which affirmed the
decision. Specifically, the Tribunal determined Prieto had not
demonstrated her working conditions were "abnormal," nor had she
demonstrated that her supervisor's actions were sufficient cause
to leave her position. The Tribunal cited Prieto's admissions
that she left work due to the "strange people," and because she
did not want to be blamed for falsifying documents. The Board of
Review later affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's decision. This appeal
followed.
We exercise limited review of administrative agency
decisions. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). We
simply determine whether the administrative decision is arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable. Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81
N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980). The burden rests with the person
challenging the action. In re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443-
44 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 219 (2006).
In matters involving unemployment benefits, we accord
deference to the expertise of the Board of Review. See Brady,
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supra, 152 N.J. at 210; Doering v. Bd. of Review, 203 N.J. Super.
241, 245 (App. Div. 1985). We must accept the Board's findings
where supported by sufficient credible evidence. Brady, supra,
152 N.J. at 210.
Unemployment compensation exists "to provide some income for
the worker earning nothing because he is out of work through no
fault or act of his own." Futterman v. Bd. of Review, 421 N.J.
Super. 281, 288 (App. Div. 2011) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Brady,
supra, 152 N.J. at 212). A person becomes disqualified for
benefits when he or she voluntarily leaves work "without good
cause attributable to such work." N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).
An employee who leaves work voluntarily has the burden of
proving he or she "did so with good cause attributable to work."
Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 218; see N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(c). We have
construed "good cause" to mean "cause sufficient to justify an
employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and
joining the ranks of the unemployed." Condo v. Bd. of Review, 158
N.J. Super. 172, 174 (App. Div. 1978) (quoting Associated Util.
Servs., Inc. v. Bd. of Review, 131 N.J. Super. 584, 586 (App. Div.
1974); Goebelbecker v. State, 53 N.J. Super. 53, 57 (App. Div.
1958)). The good cause must directly relate to the individual's
employment and give the individual no choice but to resign.
N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b). The test relies on "ordinary common sense
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and prudence." Zielenski v. Bd. of Review, 85 N.J. Super. 46, 52
(App. Div. 1964). The employee must base the resignation upon
"real, substantial and reasonable circumstances not imaginary,
trifling and whimsical ones." Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J.
Super. 284, 288 (App. Div. 1983).
Prieto claimed good cause, alleging her employer retaliated
against her by requiring her to keep a performance log and by
issuing performance reprimands. However, these actions came
because Prieto received a warning for substandard performance.
Mere over-sensitivity to criticism does not constitute good cause.
Associated Util. Servs., supra, 131 N.J. Super. at 589. On-the-
job reprimands from a supervisor, even when public and arguably
improper and humiliating, do not justify a claimant's resignation.
Gerber v. Bd. of Review, 313 N.J. Super. 37, 40 (App. Div. 1998).
Prieto also claimed good cause in that the "soul sister"
comment and another statement about her Christianity created a
discriminatory and hostile work environment. One-time comments
will form the basis for a hostile work environment claim only in
a "rare and extreme case." Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J.
587, 606-07 (1993). Where multiple incidents exist, we must
examine their cumulative impact. Id. at 607.
Here, Prieto failed to demonstrate how these comments
constituted discrimination, let alone how they justified her in
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leaving the job. She merely recited the statements without
context. As such, we find no basis to disturb the administrative
finding that Prieto's work conditions were not "abnormal."
Alternatively, Prieto suggested her sightings of "strange
people" justified her leaving her job. While Prieto claimed the
"strange people" caused her concern, she never spoke with
management about her concerns nor did she attempt to determine the
identity of these people. She provided no evidence these people
deserved her suspicions; she had limited interactions with them
and they simply asked her, "[H]ow you doing." Imaginary or
trifling circumstances do not justify an employee's resignation.
Domenico, supra, 192 N.J. Super. at 288. This alternative claim
clearly lacks merit.
Accordingly, we find nothing arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable about the Board's determination that Prieto left work
voluntarily and without good cause. Further, the Board's decision
finds support in substantial credible evidence in the record. We
find no basis to disturb the Board's finding.
To the extent we have not addressed any of Prieto's remaining
arguments, it is because they are without sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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