STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. TIMOTHY MURPHY(95-09-1004, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4677-15T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TIMOTHY MURPHY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
Submitted October 30, 2017 – Decided November 29, 2017
Before Judges Sabatino and Rose.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 95-
09-1004.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Mark Zavotsky, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Thomas K. Isenhour, Acting Union County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Milton S.
Leibowitz, Special Deputy Attorney
General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of
counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Timothy Murphy appeals from a May 25, 2016 order
denying his petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR") following
an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
We incorporate by reference the facts and procedural history
set forth in our prior opinions. Briefly, following bifurcated
jury trials, defendant was convicted of armed robbery and the
offense of certain persons not to have weapons, among other
charges. Defendant was sentenced as a persistent offender to an
aggregate fifty-year prison term with a twenty-year period of
parole ineligibility.
Defendant's conviction and sentence were upheld on direct
appeal. State v. Murphy, No. A-2573-98 (App. Div. Jan. 20, 2000).
The Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Murphy, 164 N.J.
560 (2000).
Defendant thereafter filed the present PCR petition alleging
he had been denied effective assistance of counsel by two
successive attorneys who represented him before and then at trial.
In essence, defendant alleges his attorneys' performances were
deficient by failing to inform defendant he faced an extended-term
sentence if he did not plead guilty prior to trial.
The first PCR judge denied defendant's petition without
holding an evidentiary hearing. We affirmed that denial in an
unpublished opinion. State v. Murphy, No. A-1678-10 (App. Div.
2 A-4677-15T2
Oct. 24, 2012). The Supreme Court granted certification and
summarily reversed and remanded for a hearing. State v. Murphy,
213 N.J. 533 (2013).
The second PCR judge permitted oral argument, but decided an
evidentiary hearing was not required, and denied defendant's PCR
petition essentially for the same reasons set forth by the first
PCR judge. Defendant appealed. Determining the Court intended
the term, "hearing," to mean an "evidentiary hearing" with
testimony, we vacated and remanded the matter to the trial court
with instructions to complete a testimonial hearing. State v.
Murphy, No. A-1960-13 (App. Div. Dec. 18, 2015).
On May 25, 2016, the second PCR judge conducted an evidentiary
hearing. Defendant and both of his former attorneys testified at
the hearing.
Defendant's first attorney ("pretrial counsel") testified he
had been an assistant deputy public defender for approximately
nine years when his representation of defendant in this case began
in 1995. By that time, he had represented "[h]undreds, probably
up to a thousand" clients. Pretrial counsel did not have an
independent recollection of his representation of defendant, which
occurred more than twenty years prior to his testimony.
During the course of his representation of defendant,
pretrial counsel met with defendant four times. One of the
3 A-4677-15T2
meetings, held at the Monmouth County Jail on a holiday, lasted
approximately ninety minutes. Pretrial counsel did not have an
independent recollection of the meeting, but testified "it would
have been [his] practice" to review the State's plea bargain
approval form ("plea form") and the discovery in this matter,
which was "not that big," consisting of six pages of police
reports, the indictment, and defendant's "rap" sheet. As pretrial
counsel explained, "[i]t would have been [his] practice to go over
everything."
Specifically, as to the plea form, pretrial counsel was
"almost 100 percent positive" he reviewed with defendant the
State's offer, that is, a plea of guilty to the first-degree
robbery and fourth-degree certain persons offenses. In exchange,
the State had recommended an eighteen-year prison term with a six-
year period of parole ineligibility, dismissal of the remaining
counts, and waiver of an extended term. Pretrial counsel testified
further "it would have been [his] practice" to explain to defendant
the meaning of the State's offer to "waive [an] extended term."
Specifically, if defendant were sentenced to a discretionary
extended term as a persistent offender, "his exposure would be
between [twenty years] to life."
During the court proceeding the day after receiving the
State's plea offer, defendant rejected it. Pretrial counsel
4 A-4677-15T2
contemporaneously completed a trial memorandum indicating
defendant did not accept the State's offer, which was noted as
"[eighteen] with a six aggregate" but did not include waiver of
the extended term. Shortly thereafter, defendant's file was
transferred to another attorney who represented defendant at trial
("trial counsel").
In his file transfer memo, pretrial counsel noted, among
other things, "[d]efendant can be very abusive. He rejected all
offers. Unfortunately, he has a record and the case is fairly
strong against him." Although pretrial counsel did not
specifically note that defendant was facing an extended term,
counsel "had a concern that [defendant] was looking at some serious
time."
Trial counsel testified that he has practiced as a criminal
defense attorney since 1971. From 1979 to 1998, he was employed
as a public defender, and represented "thousands" of clients.
Trial counsel could not recount the number of times he met with
defendant, but recalled meeting him at the Monmouth County Jail.
Trial counsel was "sure [he] discussed [with the defendant] the
plea . . . and sentencing exposure." He was aware defendant was
extended term eligible, and would have reviewed the plea offer
with defendant even if defendant were adamant he wanted a trial.
Trial counsel "always made it [his] practice to explain the plea
5 A-4677-15T2
[offer] . . . even if [clients] indicated in no uncertain terms
they were not going to plead [guilty]."
Trial counsel testified further that even if his client did
not want to discuss a plea bargain, counsel would respond, "you're
going to hear it from me anyway." Given the strength of the
State's case against defendant, trial counsel "probably would have
urged him to consider taking a plea." Trial counsel had no
specific recollection of informing defendant he was extended-term
eligible, "but that would have been something that struck [him]
as significant to discuss with an accused."
Defendant testified in his own behalf at the PCR hearing and
denied either attorney had advised him he was extended-term
eligible. On cross-examination, defendant admitted he did not
inform the trial court he first learned he was extended-term
eligible on the day of sentencing. Defendant claimed he "didn't
want to be belligerent because [he] still needed the mercy of the
judge."
Defendant also acknowledged he had informed the trial court,
on the first day of trial, he was dissatisfied with trial counsel
for his failure to file pretrial motions. Notwithstanding the
court's admonishments, defendant interrupted the trial judge to
request a postponement of trial and new counsel, which the court
denied.
6 A-4677-15T2
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing on May 25, 2016,
the PCR court rendered an oral decision denying defendant's
petition. This appeal followed.
Defendant argues in a single point:
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN ITS
DETERMINATION THAT THE TESTIMONY
PRESENTED AT THE EVIDENTIARY
HEARING FAILED TO SUBSTANTIATE A
CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE FOR
PRETRIAL COUNSEL'S SILENCE ON THE
ISSUE OF EXTENDED TERM
EL[]IGIBILITY AND TRIAL COUNSEL'S
MISADVICE REGARDING DEFENDANT'S
PENAL EXPOSURE AT TRIAL.
Our review of a PCR claim after a court has held an
evidentiary hearing "is necessarily deferential to [the] PCR
court's factual findings based on its review of live witness
testimony." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013); see also
State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 373 (App. Div. 2014) ("If
a court has conducted an evidentiary hearing on a petition for
PCR, we necessarily defer to the trial court's factual findings.").
Where an evidentiary hearing has been held, we should not disturb
"'the PCR court's findings that are supported by sufficient
credible evidence in the record.'" State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560,
576 (2015) (quoting Nash, supra, 212 N.J. at 540). We review any
legal conclusions of the trial court de novo. Nash, supra, 212
7 A-4677-15T2
N.J. at 540-41; State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004), cert.
denied, 545 U.S. 1145, 125 S. Ct. 2973, 162 L. Ed. 2d 898 (2005).
"[A] defendant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel
on PCR bears the burden of proving his or her right to relief by
a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339,
350 (2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1192, 133 S. Ct. 1454, 185 L.
Ed. 2d 361 (2013). A defendant must prove counsel's performance
was deficient; it must be demonstrated that counsel's handling of
the matter "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness"
and that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104
S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984); State v. Fritz,
105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-part test in
New Jersey).
A defendant must also prove counsel's "deficient performance
prejudiced the defense." Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104
S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. Prejudice is established by
showing a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at
698. Thus, petitioner must establish that counsel's performance
was deficient and petitioner suffered prejudice in order to obtain
8 A-4677-15T2
a reversal of the challenged conviction. Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct.
at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693; Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 52.
The PCR court found both defense attorneys credible, while
finding defendant was not credible "at all." Referencing
defendant's three prior convictions, the court observed that
"someone who has been previously convicted of a crime is less
likely to honor the oath requiring truthfulness than a person who
had never been convicted." The court's consideration of
defendant's prior convictions in this manner was proper. See
N.J.R.E 609; State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127, 136 (1978).
Further, the PCR court cited its opportunity to observe
defendant in response to the prosecutor's questioning regarding
his capacity to express dissatisfaction with trial counsel when
it suited him. Specifically, the PCR court juxtaposed defendant's
on-the-record complaint to the court that trial counsel failed to
file pretrial motions, with defendant's silence when he allegedly
learned he was extended-term eligible. The PCR court also rejected
defendant's rationale, that he did not want to appear belligerent
by raising the extended-term issue, concluding "[a]nd it became
abundantly clear to me at that point that [defendant] will say
whatever he needs to say to put forth his position."
Moreover, the PCR court accepted both counsels' "general
practice" of advising defendant he was extended-term eligible,
9 A-4677-15T2
finding this practice was more credible than defendant's denial.
N.J.R.E. 406(a) supports the PCR court's findings that both counsel
"acted in conformity with [their] habit or routine practice." Id.Thus, the PCR court properly considered counsels' testimony about
their routine practices in dealing with clients in determining
their credibility.
We see no reason to disturb the PCR court's factual and
credibility findings. Those findings are entitled to our
deference. State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009).
Affirmed.
10 A-4677-15T2