RUIRU JI VS. HANSON SHUEN LO (FM-18-0631-10, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)Â (CONSOLIDATED)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5206-14T31
A-0747-15T3
RUIRU JI,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
HANSON LO,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________
RUIRU JI,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
HANSON SHUEN LO,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________
Submitted May 2, 2017 – Decided December 1, 2017
Before Judges Suter and Grall.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset
County, Docket No. FM-18-0631-10.
Hanson Shuen Lo, appellant pro se.
1
These are back-to-back appeals consolidated for the purpose of
this opinion.
Ruiru Ji, respondent pro se.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SUTER, J.A.D.
In these consolidated appeals, defendant Hanson Lo appeals
portions of post-judgment matrimonial orders entered by the Family
Part on May 29, 2015; June 5, 2015; July 24, 2015; and September
1, 2015. His appeal of the July 24, 2015 order was out of time
and we decline to consider it.2 We reverse and remand the June 5,
2015 order that required pre-screening of the parties' motions and
is the subject of A-5206-14. We direct the court to apply the
holding in Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 51 (App. Div.
2010), should there be the need for any future order to control
the applications for relief made by one or both of the parties.
We affirm the portions of the other orders that defendant appeals
in A-0747-15.
I.
Plaintiff Rui-Ru Ji and defendant Hanson Shuen Lo were married
in 1998. Following a lengthy trial, the Family Part entered a
dual judgment of divorce (DJOD) on May 31, 2013.
2
We also decline to consider any argument regarding paragraph 24
of the June 5, 2015 order because it was not listed on defendant's
notice of appeal.
2 A-5206-14T3
They have two daughters, Annie and May,3 who were twelve and
eight at the time of the divorce. Among other issues, the DJOD
addressed custody and parenting time. The DJOD provided for the
appointment of a parenting time coordinator to "resolve parenting
time disputes between the parties." Among the reasons given for
appointing the parenting coordinator was the need to "streamline
the resolution of parenting disputes." The parties were ordered
to submit all disputes to the parenting coordinator before
"involving the court by motion." The parties were to include the
recommendation of the parenting coordinator in their post-judgment
motions.
There have been more than thirty post-judgment motions, with
multiple requests for relief, and orders to show cause filed since
entry of the DJOD. Because we write for parties who are familiar
with the procedural and factual history of their litigation, we
discuss only such portions of the orders as relate to these
appeals.
Defendant appeals portions of four orders: May 29, 2015,
paragraph 2; June 5, 2015 (the June 5 order) paragraphs 4, 5, 7,
21, 22 and 28; June 5, 2015 that required prior approval before a
filing can be treated as a motion (the June 5 prior approval
3
We have used fictitious names to preserve the children's privacy.
3 A-5206-14T3
order); and September 1, 2015, paragraphs 1, 9, 13, 14, 20, 21 and
22.4 The June 5 prior approval order is appealed under A-5206-14
and addressed in section IV, infra.
II.
A.
Under the DJOD, defendant exercised parenting time with May
during the week and overnight every other weekend. Defendant was
not to "sleep in the same bedroom . . . during his visitation
sessions." Defendant's parenting time with Annie was suspended
until he and Annie "attend[ed] therapy together concerning their
relationship issues."
In April 2014, defendant's overnights with May were suspended
until he could provide proof to the parenting coordinator of his
living arrangements. His weekly parenting time continued. That
order is not part of this appeal. In July 2014, defendant's
request for reinstatement of his overnight parenting time with May
4
We address the May 29 and June 5 orders in this appeal because
the record does not permit our determination that they were
untimely appealed. Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration
as to both of the orders on June 22, 2015, which motion was decided
on September 1, 2015. This tolled the time for appeal. R. 2:4-
3(e). Defendant's notice of appeal was filed October 5, 2015, and
amended October 9, 2015, within forty-five days of September 1.
We can not determine from the record when the underlying orders
were served.
4 A-5206-14T3
was denied because he still had not obtained a "simple home
inspection." That order also is not part of this appeal.
In 2015, plaintiff sought to amend the parties' parenting
schedule to reflect recommendations by the parenting coordinator,
which included visitation on Thursday, some Saturdays and Sundays,
but no overnights. Defendant requested additional time with May
on Sunday during the day. He did not ask for overnight visitation.
He also asked that the court conduct an in camera interview with
May to "gauge her opinions on how she likes to be treated and the
parenting time schedule." Defendant did not ask for parenting
time with Annie.
On May 29, 2015, the Family Part judge ordered parenting time
for defendant consistent with the recommendation of the parenting
coordinator. Defendant's overnight parenting time remained
suspended because he had not submitted to an inspection of his
residence as previously ordered.
Defendant subsequently renewed his request that the court
conduct an in camera interview, now with both children, about a
number of issues including parenting time. He did not ask for
overnight parenting time with May or Annie. In the June 5, 2015
order, the court denied that request because there was "no custody
determination being made . . . – there is only an on-going dispute
between the parties regarding parenting time."
5 A-5206-14T3
Defendant asked to resume overnight visitation with May once
he rented a two-bedroom apartment. In the July 24, 2015 order,
the court found defendant showed changed circumstances warranting
a modification. Because safety issues were now satisfied, which
had led to suspension of defendant's parenting time, the court
ordered that defendant could resume overnight parenting time with
May. However, the court found it was not in May's best interest
to revert "immediately" to the DJOD parenting time schedule, and
modified the parenting time schedule to include only one overnight
every other weekend rather than two. Future requests for
modification could be made, consistent with the DJOD, after first
presenting the request to the parenting coordinator. Defendant
did not request parenting time with Annie.
Defendant sought reconsideration of his overnight parenting
time with May because he contended he had not been ordered to
submit to a home inspection and was penalized by having not
complied. On September 1, 2015, the court denied defendant's
request for reconsideration.
Defendant contends on appeal that the court permanently
modified his parenting time without conducting a best interest
analysis, without making findings of fact or considering relevant,
credible evidence and by simply accepting the recommendation of
the parenting coordinator.
6 A-5206-14T3
B.
Defendant requested that the court hold plaintiff in contempt
because he claimed she made false statements in some of her motion
papers submitted to the court. He alleged that she "falsely
accused me of stealing monies from our joint bank account" had
"stolen my identity" and then tried to "frame me." Defendant
alleged Bank of America commenced an investigation and that the
police were investigating the issue. On June 5, 2015, the court
denied defendant's request for entry of a contempt order noting
that defendant had involved the local police and county prosecutor
and "law enforcement . . . already subpoenaed the relevant account
statements."
Defendant's request for reconsideration of this issue was
denied on September 1, 2015, because defendant did not provide any
new information or demonstrate that the decision was palpably
incorrect or irrational.
Defendant appeals the June 5 and September 1 orders,
contending the court failed to make appropriate findings of fact
or consider relevant, credible evidence about the merits of his
underlying contentions and plaintiff's alleged misrepresentations.
C.
Annie "threatened to harm herself" in November 2012 and
"resisted visiting with defendant since that time." Defendant's
7 A-5206-14T3
parenting time with Annie was suspended under the DJOD until they
could "attend therapy together concerning their relationship
issues." Annie was hospitalized 2014 following a suicide attempt.
The DJOD provided that "with regard to medical choices,"
plaintiff had "full custody" of the children. In entering the
DJOD, the court found that giving plaintiff full medical authority
regarding the children was in the "best interests" of the children
and that plaintiff was "better equipped to make these decisions
on her own."
Defendant contended that plaintiff's "abusive" parenting
style related to Annie's suicide attempt and that her neglect was
putting the children at risk by ignoring her need for therapy. He
wanted Annie to continue with a particular therapist who was
identified in the DJOD. He requested an order to stop plaintiff
from interfering with Annie's therapy, to cooperate with her
therapy and for the court to appoint an expert to assess any acts
or symptoms of parental alienation by plaintiff.
The court denied these requests in the June 5, 2015 order.
Noting that the DJOD required Annie to attend therapy with a
specific therapist "on an as needed basis as she reasonably
determines," the court found defendant had not shown that therapy
with this doctor was needed. In addition, defendant had not shown
the suicide attempt was related to plaintiff's parenting, or that
8 A-5206-14T3
she interfered with or was not cooperating with Annie's therapy.
The court denied defendant's request to appoint an expert to assess
whether there was parental alienation because he had not shown
evidence of alienation. The court denied defendant's request to
conduct an in camera interview with the children because there was
no pending request to change custody. Defendant's request for
reconsideration of these issues was denied on September 1, 2015.
On appeal, defendant contends plaintiff is not in compliance
with the DJOD by not continuing therapy with the doctor identified
therein. Although acknowledging that Annie had therapy with three
other doctors, he contends that plaintiff did not show the court
that they were superior physicians for Annie. He alleged he was
not apprised of the children's welfare and broadly alleged evidence
of "alienation tactics." He contends the court should determine
the cause of the suicide attempt under its "parens patriae
interest" and blamed plaintiff's parenting.
III.
We review the Family Part judge's findings in accordance with
a deferential standard of review, recognizing the court's "special
jurisdiction and expertise in family matters." Cesare v. Cesare,
154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). Thus, "findings by the trial court are
binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial,
credible evidence." Id. at 411-12 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc.
9 A-5206-14T3
v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). However, "[a]lthough
a family court's factual findings are entitled to considerable
deference, we do not pay special deference to its interpretation
of the law. [T]he trial court is in no better position than [an
appellate court] when interpreting a statute or divining the
meaning of the law." D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245 (2012)
(citations omitted).
We have no necessity to consider whether the court abdicated
its authority to the parenting coordinator, as alleged by
defendant, when it adopted her recommendation about parenting time
in the May 29, 2015 order. Although defendant contends this was
done without "conduct[ing] any sort of factual finding as to
whether [modification of the parties' custody and parenting time
agreement] would be in the best interests of the children," that
issue is moot. The May 29 order was modified by the July 24, 2015
order. See City of Camden v. Whitman, 325 N.J. Super. 236, 243
(App. Div. 1999) (providing that "courts of this state do not
resolve issues that have become moot due to the passage of time
or intervening events."). The July 24 order allowed overnight
parenting time with May. Although defendant contends the court
abused its discretion by entering that order, defendant's
overnight parenting time with May is not squarely before us because
defendant did not timely appeal that order. Even if he had, we
10 A-5206-14T3
find no abuse of discretion by the court in ordering overnight
parenting time with May that was not "immediately" what it had
been in the DJOD, given the suspension of overnight parenting with
her for nearly fifteen months and the high conflict nature of the
family.
We similarly find no abuse of discretion by the court's entry
of the other orders that are appealed in A-0747-15. We agree with
the court that defendant did not show plaintiff "has failed to
comply with her obligations under the terms of the [DJOD] with
respect to her duties as the sole legal custodian in the domain
of medical and other related choices." There was no evidence that
therapy was not being provided for Annie by competent physicians
or that plaintiff was not cooperating in obtaining or providing
those services. We agree with the court that defendant's proofs
did not demonstrate the necessity for the court to appoint an
expert on parental alienation. See R. 5:3-3(a) (providing that
appointment of experts by the court is within the court's
discretion to assist in disposition of an issue). We agree there
was no necessity to interview the children in camera when the
issues involved parenting time and not custody. The court did not
abuse its discretion by not holding plaintiff in contempt.
Defendant asked for reconsideration of the court's orders.
We agree with the court that defendant presented no new evidence
11 A-5206-14T3
for the court's consideration nor did he show that the court's
decision was based on incorrect reasoning. See Fusco v. Bd. of
Educ. of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 (App. Div.) (citing
D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)
(providing that reconsideration is "granted only under very narrow
circumstances . . . in which either (1) the [c]ourt has expressed
its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis,
or (2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or
failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent
evidence.")), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 544 (2002).
After carefully reviewing the record and the applicable legal
principles, we conclude that defendant's further arguments in A-
0747-15 are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
IV.
The court's June 5, 2015 prior approval order precluded both
plaintiff and defendant "from filing any further applications for
relief without obtaining prior authorization from this [c]ourt."
That order allowed the parties to submit requests for relief but
they were to be "pre-approved" before "converting" them to become
motions in the Family Part. The court explained in its written
statement of reasons that the parties repeatedly filed motions for
relief since the divorce. The multiple applications often were
12 A-5206-14T3
"procedurally deficient" and included claims that the court
already had decided. Considering this a misuse of motion practice,
the court described their actions as the "repetitive filing of
deficient and frivolous motions."
In A-5206-14, defendant appeals the June 5, 2015 prior
approval order. He contends the court erred because there had
never been a finding that the parties' motions were frivolous or
filed for an abusive purpose, nor had the courts, who heard the
motions, imposed sanctions.
Our review of the June 5, 2015 prior approval order and
accompanying statement of reasons reveals that it was entered
without application of our holding in Parish, supra, 412 N.J.
Super. at 54, where we described the findings required before a
court could enjoin litigants from presenting their claims.
Specifically,
In those limited instances where appropriate,
an injunction should be issued only after the
judge (1) makes a finding that past pleadings
were frivolous or designed for an abusive
purpose; (2) fully scrutinizes the newly filed
pleadings and determines them to be repetitive
and within the scope of the proscribed
vexatious matters; and (3) has unsuccessfully
attempted to abate the abuse by employing
sanctions such as those provided by Rule 1:10-
3 or Rule 5:3-7. Additionally, any restraint
entered must be circumscribed, not global, and
narrowly focus on the issues shown to warrant
restraint.
13 A-5206-14T3
[Parish, supra, 412 N.J. Super. at 54.]
As we said there, "[t]he business of the courts is to finalize
disputes. Any discretionary exercise of the extreme remedy of
enjoining or conditioning a litigant's ability to present his or
her claim to the court must be used sparingly; it is not a remedy
of first or even second resort." Ibid.
Here, the June 5 prior approval order applied broadly to any
application made by either plaintiff or defendant; it was not
narrowly focused on specific issues. The order required pre-
screening before an application could be considered a motion, but
it did not identify who would screen the applications or what
criteria would be applied. The court did not identify other
motions that previously were deemed to be frivolous. The court
did not make reference to any prior sanctions. As such, we reverse
the June 5, 2015 prior approval order that required pre-screening
and remand the issue for consideration in light of Parish.
A-0747-15 is affirmed; A-5206-14 is reversed and remanded.
14 A-5206-14T3