STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. PATRIC D. REED-PRICE (16-06-1349, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4249-16T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
PATRIC D. REED-PRICE, a/k/a
PATRICK PRICE, PATRICK REED,
PAT REED, PAT REID, PATRICK
D REEDPRICE, PATRICK D. PRICE,
and PATRICK REEDPRICE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________
Submitted September 17, 2018 – Decided September 20, 2018
Before Judges Haas and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Atlantic County, Indictment No.16-06-1349.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Michael T. Denny, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Damon G. Tyner, Atlantic County Prosecutor, attorney
for respondent (Nicole L. Campellone, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
An Atlantic County grand jury charged defendant in a seven-count
indictment with first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(4)
(count one); third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) (count two);
fourth-degree criminal trespass, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(a) (count three); fourth-
degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (count four);
third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
4(d) (count five); third-degree witness tampering, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a)(5) (count
six); and fourth-degree contempt for violation of a domestic violence restraining
order, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(1) (count seven).
Following a trial, at which defendant represented himself, the jury
convicted defendant of counts one through six. The trial judge then granted the
State's motion to dismiss count seven.
The judge merged counts four and five into count one, and sentenced
defendant on that count to eighteen years in prison, subject to the 85% parole
ineligibility provisions of the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. By
virtue of this conviction, defendant was also subject to Megan's Law registration
and reporting requirements, and parole supervision for life. The judge sentenced
defendant to a concurrent five-year term on count two, a concurrent eighteen-
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month term on count three, and a concurrent five-year term on count six. This
appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant raises the following contentions:
POINT I
THE PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER TACTICS
UNFAIRLY BOLSTERED THE CREDIBILITY OF
THE COMPLAINING WITNESS. (Not Raised
Below).
A. In Summation, The Prosecution Improperly
Referred To The Defendant's Status [A]s Pro Se
Counsel For Himself And Argued That The
Complaining Witness Was More Credible
Because She Was Willing To Be Questioned By
The Accused.
B. The Prosecution Improperly Bolstered The
Victim's Credibility When He Argued That She
Had Not Told Any Lies During Her Testimony.
POINT II
THE SENTENCE IS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE
AND UNDULY PUNITIVE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT
OFFENSE-ORIENTED. (Not Raised Below).
We find insufficient merit in these contentions to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add the following comments.
J.M. was the State's primary witness at trial. J.M. had been in a four-
month dating relationship with defendant. On July 9, 2015, J.M. told defendant
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that she was breaking up with him. The next day, defendant telephoned J.M.
and asked her to leave work and speak to him at her apartment. She refused.
Later that afternoon, J.M. went to her apartment to pick up some items for her
young son, dropped the child at his grandmother's house, and went to a family
barbeque.
In the evening, defendant asked the husband of J.M.'s landlord to let him
into her apartment, and he agreed to do so. When the landlord learned that
defendant was in the apartment, she immediately called J.M. to alert her. After
speaking to the landlord, J.M. left the barbeque and drove home. On the way,
J.M. called defendant and told him to get out of her apartment. J.M. then called
her mother and asked her to stay on the phone with her as she entered the
apartment.
When she went inside, J.M. saw defendant come out of the bathroom
wearing a shirt wrapped around his head, and carrying a kitchen knife. J.M.
screamed for her mother to call the police, and defendant took the telephone
headset away from her. Defendant then put his hand over J.M.'s mouth, forced
her head into the kitchen sink, and threatened to kill her.
Defendant told J.M. to go into the bedroom, and pushed and hit her when
she did not immediately comply. Defendant then ordered J.M. to take off her
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pants. When she refused, he pulled them off of her and inserted two o f his
fingers into her vagina. J.M. begged defendant to think of her son, and defendant
replied that if her son was there, he would have killed the child first and made
J.M. watch.
J.M.'s mother called J.M. and defendant allowed her to answer, while
putting the knife to her throat. J.M. gave one-word responses to her mother's
questions, and defendant hung up the phone. When J.M.'s mother called back,
defendant answered and said "everything is okay."
At that point, J.M. saw the light from a flashlight at her window, broke
away from defendant, ran out of the apartment, and met two police officers in
the parking lot. The police arrested defendant.
Sometime in April 2016, defendant sent J.M. a letter. He told J.M. that
he was going to represent himself at the trial, and intended to force J.M. to attend
every day of the proceedings, which he anticipated would last two years, so that
she would miss work and get fired. However, he indicated that if she refused to
come to court, she would not be subjected to the protracted litigation and
subsequent negative consequences. Defendant did not call any witnesses or
testify on his own behalf.
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During his closing argument to the jury, defendant asserted that J.M.'s
testimony was not credible. In his summation, the prosecutor pointed to several
facts in the record to refute this claim. The prosecutor noted that J.M. testified
about "an extremely embarrassing topic" in front of a "whole group of
strangers," and had answered questions posed to her directly by defendant, the
man who assaulted her. The prosecutor also reminded the jury that J.M. testified
she had a prior conviction and did not "lie about it, she admitted everything
about it." Finally, the prosecutor remarked that J.M.
didn't lie when . . . defendant asked if the defendant was
good to her son. She could have easily lied to make it
look like . . . defendant was a jerk before this. She
didn't. She took an oath to tell the truth, and I submit
that based on her testimony and appearance, she did tell
the truth, the good, the bad and the ugly.
In Point I, defendant argues that by making these comments, the
prosecutor improperly vouched for J.M.'s credibility. We disagree.
Prosecutorial misconduct is not a basis for reversal unless the conduct was
so egregious that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. State v. DiFrisco, 137
N.J. 434, 474 (1994). Considerable leeway is afforded to prosecutors in
presenting their arguments at trial "as long as their comments are reasonably
related to the scope of the evidence presented." State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 82
(1999). When, as here, the defendant fails to object to the prosecutor's
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comments at trial, the allegedly "improper remarks will not be deemed
prejudicial." State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 576 (1999).
No misconduct occurred in this case. It is well settled that "a prosecutor
may not express a personal belief or opinion as to the truthfulness of his or her
witness's testimony." State v. Staples, 263 N.J. Super. 602, 605 (App. Div.
1993). However, a prosecutor may argue that a witness is credible based on the
evidence adduced at trial. State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. 363, 445 (App.
Div. 1997).
Here, defendant argued in his closing that J.M. was not telling the truth.
The prosecutor's brief comments were in direct response to that allegation. The
prosecutor referred solely to evidence in the record and drew reasonable
inferences from that testimony. While defendant argues that the prosecutor's
remark about defendant questioning J.M. directly at trial was an improper
reference to his "status as pro se counsel for himself[,]" the jury was fully aware
that defendant was proceeding without an attorney and, as a result, was
personally interrogating his alleged victim. Therefore, we reject defendant's
arguments on this point.
In Point II, defendant argues that his sentence was excessive. This
argument also lacks merit.
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Trial judges have broad sentencing discretion as long as the sentence is
based on competent credible evidence and fits within the statutory framework.
State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 500 (2005). Judges must identify and consider
"any relevant aggravating and mitigating factors" that "are called to the court's
attention[,]" and "explain how they arrived at a particular sentence." State v.
Case, 220 N.J. 49, 64-65 (2014) (quoting State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 297
(2010)). "Appellate review of sentencing is deferential," and we therefore avoid
substituting our judgment for the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 65; State v.
O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215 (1989); State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 365 (1984).
We are satisfied the judge made findings of fact concerning aggravating
and mitigating factors that were based on competent and reasonably credible
evidence in the record, and applied the correct sentencing guidelines enunciated
in the Code. Accordingly, we discern no basis to second-guess the sentence.
Affirmed.
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